

2. 3. Typology

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2. 3. 1 Analytical and synthetic judgment

Bibl. st.: Ph. Thiry, *Notions de logique*, Paris / Bruxelles, 1998, 87s . Under the title

"Scientific contextualization" mentions proposer a classification of judgments advocated especially by I. Kant (1724/1804) - in the service of his criticism. We rewrite.

1. Analytic. A subject A, if it exposes in its conceptual content upon "analysis" (dissection) B as a saying, is an "analytic" judgment. Thus according to Kant: "All bodies are extended." Reason: all (physical) bodies are expanded as situated in space.

Note: In the form of reasoning, it is shown that from the subject A the saying B is deducible. Thiry models "The triangle has three sides" and "Man is a thinking being." Analytic judgments depend on no experience called "sense" by Thiry. The saying provides no new information about the subject ... leading to them being called "tautologies," i.e., the saying merely provides other words for the subject. Whether the contradiction axiom 'the' is sufficient reason for such statements may be correct in Kant's thinking but is subject to criticism: in natural logic, the identity (especially the partial) between subject and proverb is the basis. Which is already evident from the name 'tautology' itself.

2. Synthetic. Kant distinguishes between "synthetic a posteriori (empirical)" and "synthetic a priori (metaphysical)."

2.1. Empirical. 'Synthesis' here means "addition of saying to subject" and does so in virtue of and especially "after" (a posteriori, retrospectively) experience. Thus according to Kant, "All bodies are heavy." Which is correct only if the definition of 'body' does not include the characteristic 'heavy' of course. 'Empirical' means "in virtue of empiricism (experience)." Thiry gives as models, "The table is green" and "The dog sleeps." That the saying B belongs to the subject A is evident only from experiential data outside the decomposition of the given concept content.

2.2. Metaphysical. That from subject A the said B can be asserted, becomes possible but not o.g. sense experience. What Kant calls "a priori," i.e. o.g., o.g., the already given and thus "before" experience. Kant gives as models, "All rights are the shortest lines between two points" or " $5 + 7 = 12$ " (mathematical) and "All that occurs has a cause" (physical). In other words: the two basic sciences of the then exact natural science rely for a very important part on "metaphysical" judgments.

Thiry's judgment. Such "famous" classification is clearly debatable. Thus, "The earth is round" is an analytical judgment since Copernicus (1473/1543) and heliocentrism, in that the kenrek "round" has since been part of the physical definition of "earth. As is well known, heliocentrism states that the sun is at the center of the solar system and that the planets revolve around the sun. However, in the time preceding that of Copernicus, the geocentric viewpoint prevailed: it was believed that the earth was at the center and that the planets revolved around it. The judgment: "The earth is round" could until then be considered a metaphysical judgment (synthetic a priori).

The following may be added: Nor could one take it ill of Ferdinand Magellan (1480/1521) and his fellow travelers if, after their journey around the world (1519/1521), which they were the first to complete, they stated, "The earth is round," and this on the basis of their own and particularly difficult experience - Magellan did not survive the journey. Then, however, for his traveling companions it is an empirical judgment (synthetic a posteriori). Even for a child, who still has to discover, laboriously calculating, that $5+7$ is indeed - and always - 12, this seems to be an empirical judgment rather than a metaphysical one.

Thiry: In any case, the classification is a kind of philosophical landmark since numerous philosophers go into it to accept or criticize it.

Note: Kant's seminal book, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781-1, 1787-2), has as a main task the answer to the question, "How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?" Their content as general judgments does not come from samples provided by sensory experiences. Thus, that content has only one origin, our human mind which thoughtfully "imposes" such judgments on the sensory data.

But since our data are purely sensory and are thus limited to what he calls the phenomena (the phenomenal world), what he calls "the things in themselves" escape what he supposes to be in, behind, above the sensory data (the phenomena). The knowledge of things in themselves would be what he calls "an absolute knowledge." It is therefore not within the reach of our knowledge.- Consequence.- The propositions of traditional metaphysics which are synthetic judgments a priori, are not justifiable by reason.- Thus : "The soul is a substance" (understand: a being or fact existing in itself). Similarly : "God exists".- Note: Such proposition betrays that Kant knew no sacred experience. Traditional religions - and in their wake traditional metaphysics - stated on the basis of experience (out of body experiences, contact with ancestral souls, for example) that the soul was a "substance," however beyond and beyond Kant's sensory experience. Traditional religions - e.g., the biblical ones - also stated on the basis of experiences (Yahweh appears to Abraham or to Moses, for example) that God was a "substance" and exists, even though such experiences of God exceed what Kant calls "the phenomena" of sensory knowledge.

Note: In his *Prolegomena* (1783), Kant employs the terms 'analytic' and 'synthetic' in a methodological sense. There a deduction - which deduces from a general truth a particular truth - is called "synthetic. A reasoning that presupposes a demanded as if it were already given and examines this 'lemma' (provisional solution) for its conditions of possibility is called 'analytic'. One clearly recognizes in this Plato's distinction between 'sunthesis' (deduction) and 'analysis' (reduction). The plural of meanings given to both terms leads to confusions because a subject from which, thanks to 'analysis' of the conceptual content, one can 'deduce' the saying, Kant calls 'analytic' and a saying that is sayable from the subject thanks to experience, leads to a 'synthetic' judgment!

2. 3. 2 Axiom

Bibl. st.: Ch. Lahr, *Cours*, 562/566 (*Les axiomes et les postulats*); A. Virieux-Reymond, *L'épistémologie*, Paris, 1966, 48/52 (*La méthode axiomatique*); I.M. Bochenski, *Philosophical methods in modern science*, Utr./Antw., 1961, 91/124 (*The axiomatic method*).

An "axiom" is one kind of judgment. We now specify.

Definition. If given a finite number of propositions (judgments) such that the meaning of all other propositions deducible from them is deducible within a set of connected propositions, then that finite number of basic propositions is an axiom. An "axiom" is one proposition of this. Within such an axiomatic is a finite number of concepts - basic concepts whose meaning is only apparent from the propositions deducible from them.

Origins. A. Herreman, *Axiomatisation et formalisation (Mathématiques)*, in: D. Lecourt, dir, *Dict. d 'histoire et philosophie des sciences*, PUF, 1999, 90/95, says that the axiomatization of sciences in ancient Hellas is controversial: some argue that the eleate Parmenides (-540/...) and Zeno (-500/ ...) are at the cradle of the method that finds its elaboration in Euclid's Elements (IVth/IIIth century) (think of the proof from the absurd); the others claim that Plato and his academy or Aristotle's Analytics are the origin.

The big change. The obsolete terminology called "axiom" a general prepositional phrase and "postulate" a private prepositional phrase. The axiom applied to the whole system of derivations; the postulate, richer in content but poorer in scope, applied to part of it. A. Virieux-Reymond, o.c., 49, says that the recent terminology is Euclid's distinction between axiom, postulate and even hypothesis (supposition) extends.

Formalization. The renewed (common since the XIXth century) view bans any intuitive (experience-derived) content - called "semantic interpretation" - in an axiom (the sentence becomes, as it were, an "empty shell") in such a way that its content becomes apparent only later from the inferences within the system. This is called "the hypothetical-deductive method." The sentences are phrased according to a mathematical model. Hence the term "calculus" (logical arithmetic).

Deduction. Lahr emphasizes: deduction is not o.g., but by axiom. GG: $x = a + b$. GV: prove that $a < x$ and $b < x$. If an axiom holds that every partial sum is smaller than its total sum and a and b are partial sums of the total sum x , then $a < x$ and $b < x$. In other words: an axiom, thanks to its prior summarizing meaning, stores within its derived system a multiplicity of deductions.

Note: Platonically, an axiom is a "lemma" whose richness in deductions is worked out thanks to the corresponding "analysis. We call that with O. Willmann "the lemmatic - analytic method." Lemma' is 'prolepsis', premise, hypothesis that reveals its meaning thanks to analysis.

One usually says but less ready "analytical method" because an analysis does not hang in the air but works out a given - lemma.

2. 3. 3 *The value judgment*

Bibl. st.: R. Nadeau, *Voc. techno et analyt. d'épistémologie*, PUF, 1999, 350s ... A. Brunner, *Die Grundfragen der Philosophie*, Freiburg, 1949-3, 77.

Two rules regarding the ontological foundation impose themselves.

- "Omne ens est bonum" ("All that is, is good (valuable)) **1.** The correct meaning is this: before making a value judgment, define what that value judgment is about. This corresponds to the "characterizing" value judgment that E. Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, New York, 1961, presupposes as a necessary condition for an "estimating" value judgment. What is present concerning 'being' (reality) decides the possible 'being' of value.

- **2.** "All that is is material object amenable to a multiplicity of formal objects" (10.4).

'Being' (reality) is substantially interpretable and this from a multitude of perspectives ('formal objects'). This also applies to the value content in what is.

"Value applies." The inference from both previous points is that value - in ancient scholastic parlance "good" - "applies," i.e. makes itself felt, valued and estimated. The one who "feels, appreciates, estimates" value, however, is not an automaton but an I with a latitude concerning reality and value. Yet that I cannot get over it: "What holds, holds".

Axiological subjectivism and relativism. "Axiology" is the raising of "axia," value. Value subjectivism defines value as "What a person holds to be valuable." In other words : the valuing subject decides whether something is valuable or not - Value relativism holds that value depends on circumstances and is "in itself" fundamentally nothing. - Brunner's critique. - How then does one understand that the I as the valuing subject can err if value exists wholly thanks to that I? The valued is found in the error in the matter different - found different - than the "I" so stated. Value is thus 'relative' in the sense that the I, the group, the circumstances (situational aspect) feel value, value it, estimate it and so let it come into its own, but this ultimately on the basis of the objective essence of value.

Material object and formal objects.- One and the same fact - e.g., a venom - is "certainly not so bad" for the snake specialist o.g., immunization, but for those bitten by a cobra in the

African steppe, possibly "lethal" and thus "very bad. The venom itself is the material object. The various value judgments do not deny the objective, material object but show the multiplicity of formal objects to which it is susceptible.-This is not "relativism" that denies "being in itself. This is "perspectivism that knows what is "in itself" is subject to perspectives.

2. 3. 4 Value judgments.

Bibl. st. :A. O. Bettermann, *Psychologie und Psychopathologie des Wertens*, Meisenheim am Glan, 1949. - We are particularly interested in the first part which typifies some basic attitudes of man toward values. The second part tries to define pathological attitudes.

1. The naive appreciation.-- Particularly children and "childlike" adults appreciate without "issues" and do so with a conviction that comes across as "self-confident. Surrender to one or more values is conspicuous.-- "One is absorbed in them." Most often it involves inherited values.

2. Emphatic appreciation.- 'Emphasis' is a kind of speaking, viz. with feeling emphasis. Surrender is also striking here in that - says the author - the intimate of the person, without regard to the environment, makes the value the center of "the world." Thus : true infatuation as well as true self-sacrifice for something and especially for someone. Similarly : true religion (showing this in worship, among other things). In the strong degree "the appreciator sees nothing else"!

3. Appraising valuation.- 'To appraise' is to value something, something else.

Social prestige, profit-making, money-making e.g. are first-rate, the rest "is at the service of", is valued "in function of". Such appreciation is not spontaneous but testifies to the calculating mind. - The civilized society that does not focus on man as a person per se but "the position" in that society, "values" frequently.

4. The alienation of values.- The person stands aloof from any value. Already appraisal carries such a thing in its germ. What becomes especially impossible within this attitude is surrender to a value. At most it comes to some psychic experience "in response to" value, - in the form of "aestheticism" (aesthetic values are "subjectivized"), of "criticism" (truth values are reduced to subjective afflictions), ironic - sarcastic attitude to life (the world, fellow human beings, culture are 'viewed' as if by an outsider with a preference for what Bettermann calls 'humor' "but which in fact amounts to what is colloquially called 'irony' and 'sarcasm'").- Man

immersed in the "modern mass" is easy to do so because he belongs to that mass but "does not count." Intellectuals who succumb to cultural nihilism exhibit value alienation in their elitist way. - According to Bettermann, however, utter value alienation occurs only in psychotics.

Astonishing - critics say - is the fact that Steller puts the very essence of value - what value actually is and by which it contrasts with the rest of reality - as completely as possible in parentheses "for methodological reasons." For that essence is constantly put first! His value judgments alone on basic attitudes toward values require it. If "value" was not something that is captured with the mind (rational insight, feeling and spirit) as laying claim to us, as demanding commitment because it counts as "something higher," how could Bettermann describe value alienation as substandard?

Bettermann sees his typology as a table of temperaments. He constantly reacts against the typology of Ed. Spranger (1882/1863) who designed a "verstehende" structural psychology in the wake of W. Dilthey (1833/1911). Spranger left us a typology of life forms. This is based on values themselves as contents. "Tell me what value thou hast, and I will tell thee what soul thou hast." Thus, lapidary Spranger's basic insight can be summarized: the theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, power-willing and the religious soul are the main "forms of life" that Spranger discerns as responses to the various cultural spheres. So that he establishes a cultural psychology. Note that a life form tolerates other valuations but as secondary. Thus the economic soul asks : "What does it yield?". And so concerning religion, economic success is the pre-eminent sign of "divine favoritism." And fellow human beings are first of all "useful.

2. 3. 5 Ethical judgment falls back on axioms

Bibl. st.: R. Barthes, *L' aventure sémiologique*, Paris, 1985, 115 and 148. Steller speaks of a systechy (pair of concepts) in ancient and medieval rhetoric that is still current and that John of Salisbury (1115/1180), the humanist, conceived as central.

In his *Metalogicus* (On Logic), he rails against an excessive separation of theoretical philosophy (then called "dialectics") and literatology (then called "rhetoric"). After all, dialectics limits itself to the universal, while rhetoric is interested in the singular. In a story e.g. or a drama, people act in singular - concrete situations that include a multitude of details (time, place and other circumstances).

"Thesis / hypothesis." This systechy can be understood within the rhetoric of the time.

- **1. Thesis.** Latin: *positio, propositum*. This is the domain of dialectics because a "thesis" is a generally valid proposition or judgment. E.g., "The tyrant, if he transgresses limits, may be killed in conscience" or "Man, if he does not wish to become extinct, is obliged to marry." Note: One sees it: 'ethical' or 'moral' judgments have as a saying "obligatory / not obligatory (allowed) / obligatory not (forbidden)." That is dialectic, theoretical morality.

- **2. Hypothesis.** Latin: *causa, negotium*. Rhetoric expresses itself in situated (singular - concrete) propositions. Thus: "This dictator here and now, since cross-border harmful, may in conscience be killed" or "This girl here and now, if in her marriageable age, must marry". Especially in the latter case but also in the case of a tyrant, one feels that a practical problem of conscience arises. Very singular-concretely, "If for man marriage is a duty and Anneke is a man, for Anneke marriage is a duty" poses the problem of the transition from a universal judgment to a singular judgment. Common sense will immediately protest: "That marriage is a duty for humanity as a whole, yes! But this does not imply that marriage for a singular - concrete human being like Anneke is a duty!".

Situational morality. R. Le Senne (1882/1954), from his spiritualist philosophy of mind, posed the problem in the form of an objection to what has been called "rationalist morality": "The complete program of a rational ethics (op.: moral theory) was promised rather than worked out by rationalist morality because, like deductive science, so too it has stumbled upon the always to some extent unforeseeable variety of experience." (*Traité de morale générale* (1942)).

What Le Senne is saying here in moderate form - deducing a practically feasible code of conduct only from merely general moral axioms - is to overlook the unpredictabilities of practical life. But an extreme - influenced by existentialism, among other things - situational morality drives it so far as to deny any general axiom regarding conscientious behavior. Which culminates in an individualistic - subjectivistic form of behavior.

Contextual judgment. Contextualism on the subject puts it differently:

- (1) a problem of conscience can only arise and be solved
- (2) within the context of already accepted axioms

(3) which in turn cannot be questioned except by appeal to other axioms.

To kill a dictator in a responsible manner presupposes as an axiom that in some cases such a thing can or even must be done in conscience, but a circumstance within the actual situation - e.g. the all too impracticable in our judgment - causes us to fall back on another axiom, namely, "An all too impracticable act one would rather not do".

In other words, contextualism does not disavow axioms but foresees situations that invoke other axioms. We derive the definition of (ethical) contextualism from R. Nadeau, *Voc. technique et analytique de l'épistémologie*, PUF, 1999, 111.

2. 3. 6. This particle summarized:

Kant advocated a classification of judgments. In the saying, an analytic judgment provides no new information about the subject; a synthetic judgment does. Synthetic judgments, according to him, can be empirical or metaphysical. Empirical judgments are based on sensory experience. Metaphysical judgments precede experience. Not everyone agrees with this classification.

An axiom is one proposition within a set of related propositions or axiomatics.

Recent formalization bans any semantic interpretation in such an axiomatics in such a way that its content is only later revealed by the inferences within the system. This is called "the hypothetical-deductive method"

Making a correct value judgment requires correct definitions in advance. Even then, a material

object lead to a multiplicity of formal objects. Notwithstanding that things exist "in themselves," they are still subject to perspectivity, to different value judgments.

A lot of value judgments also involve the basic attitude of the individual. This attitude can be naive, emphatic or appraising. The basic attitude can also take a diseased form: man then shows himself - almost psychotically - as alienated from values.

Spranger left us a typology of life forms.

Ethical judgment falls back on axioms. The thesis or generally valid proposition may be overshadowed by the hypothesis in singularly concrete cases. Life exhibits a variety of experiences that is not always foreseeable so that, after careful consideration, one may find situations

provides where one falls back on axioms other than the original ones. One speaks of contextual judgment.