

## 2. 2. *The intentionality of a judgment*

### **Content**

2. 2. 1 Intentionality.....	210
2. 2. 2 Each judgment relies on comparison .....	211
2. 2. 3 Judgmental truth .....	213
2. 2. 4 Deelevidence .....	215
2.2.5. This particle summarizes.....	216

### **2. 2. 1 Intentionality**

F. Brentano (1838/1917; *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874)) in his study of the psychic phenomena discovered that they are invariably "consciousness of something" and thus revived the scholastic term "intentio" (understand: directedness of consciousness toward something). (H. Arvon, *La philosophie allemande*, Paris, 1970, 139). Ch. Lahr, *Cours*, 494, defines "the objective scope" of a concept by means of the medieval term "intentio. Note: our word "intentio" (intention) is not to be confused with that "intentio" which, since Brentano 'intentionality' is called. E. Husserl, in his *Méditations cartésiennes* says: "The word 'intentionality' means nothing but that profound and general property which consciousness exhibits, namely, consciousness of being something." In 1913 (*Idées*), he calls consciousness on the subject 'noësis' and the something 'noëma' as the subjective and the objective poles.

***Intentio prima / intentio secunda.*** We define the two degrees of consciousness (noësis) of something (noëma).

- First intentionality. Something, if it attracts attention in one's consciousness, shows itself immediately, then it is the object of first intentionality ("intentio prima"). Anything that is not-nothing can be "noema," object of consciousness (a triangle, a boy walking there, a utopia e.g.).

- Second intentionality. Something, if it shows itself in one's consciousness while the latter becomes aware of that presence, is object of second intentionality ("intentio secunda"). All that the medievalists call "entia rationis" (entities merely within our mental life) belongs to that domain. Thus concepts, judgments, reasonings, categorem, categories, contradictory statements, absence expressing insights ("not seeing") etc. ...

**Understanding.** Something, if in one's consciousness as far as this accurately captures that something, present is an "understanding" of that something. In other words, there is a degree of consciousness that accurately grasps something in its being and expresses it at least with the inner word.

**Judgment.** Something, if in one's consciousness insofar as it is capable of judging that something, is the object of judgment. This is a step beyond the conceptualization which grasps and formulates what is present but does not pass judgment on it. The judgment takes a position on the existence and beingness of what it has understood.

**Conclusion.** Intentionally, a judgment is always: about something (A) is made by someone (subject, person) (B) said something (C). In other words, in logical language, "If A (subject) and B (judging person) are known, (C) then said saying understandable." A judgment is intelligible only if one sees it as the expression of someone with spirit who, however unthinking, knows what judging is, more so if one sees it as at least partly determined by the judging person's own input (prejudices, axioms). That input is depicted in the saying. What is said is the judgment. Who says it is also the judgment. In this sense, Aristotle was right when he titled his theory of judgment "*Peri hermèneias*" (*De interpretatione, On the interpretation*). One can put "judgments" in an ordinator, but these are mind products of the programming person, not a mere mechanical process. A machine does not judge unless in a highly metaphorical sense, as a figure of speech.

### **2. 2. 2 Each judgment relies on comparison**

Bibl. st.: Ch. Lahr, *Cours*, 226s. (*Le jugement et la comparaison*).- We assume that a judgment is "to pronounce from an original (subject) a model (saying)." This means that one thinks of the subject including the saying and immediately makes a judgment about the subject in terms of that saying. Yet to think something including something else is to compare both. Now we follow what Lahr says.

1. All logicians hold that some of our judgments have a comparative basis, i.e., insofar as the judge consciously and thoughtfully compares subject and saying.

2.1. Some of the logicians deny that judgments which unconsciously connect subject and predicate rely on comparison. Th. Reid (1710/1796),- V. Cousin (1792/1867) and others maintain that such sentences as "I exist," "I suffer," "It is cold," "The snow is white," and the

like do not immediately rely on comparison, for it is only afterwards that the judgment maker is able to really compare both components of such judgments.

**2.2.** Aristotle and with him a whole series of logicians in antiquity, the Middle Ages, modern times claim that even the unthinking and unconscious judgments are in fact based on a kind of equation. Thus J. Locke (1632/1704; founder of the English Enlightenment) says:

"A judgment is the sensation of a relation of either fitting together (note : affirmative judgment) or not fitting together (Op.: negative judgment) of two 'ideas' (Op.: contents of consciousness) that have already been observed and compared."

"It's cold." "It" is either the weather per se around us or our bodily reaction to the weather or the encounter of both. That tropologically abbreviated subject (it says either a part (weather/reaction) or the whole (the encounter of both) in each case as original asks for information and thus elicits a model (that information). Our mind with its language memory then retrieves the term that is the requested, the saying. If our shivering impression is one of "cold," then from our language memory spontaneously rises the corresponding word. Note: The same analysis fits all the better with a phrase that we spontaneously blurt out: "The snow is white" (understood as exclamations) because in such statements the subject is not replaced by a shortening.

**Note:** The whole question is: "Is our thinking - including in the comparative form - only conscious (thoughtful) or is there also an unconscious (unthinking) thinking?" (cfr. 5.5. transcendence and light metaphysics). A W. Dilthey (1833/1911) or a W. Wundt (1833/1920) argue that "das unmittelbare Erleben" ("the direct experience") is the premise of our thinking. That direct experience, according to them, would already be real thinking experience. An E. May (1905/1956) asserts that e.g. the identity axiom - "What is, is" or "What is so, is so" - is neither deliberately presupposed nor in one way or another constructively (opm.: created from one's own mental contents) thought out but is "urtümlich geschaut" (opm.: directly perceived)." For such thinkers, it is not so difficult to interpret any judgment - even the abbreviated ones - as "directly comparatively apprehended."

We experience that our natural logical disposition is essentially comparative. What is natural logic without "thinking of the data including each other" and "expressing them immediately in terms of each other"? That is what the common mind does without ever having explicitly studied logic. And that, of course, is little or no thought!

### 2. 2. 3 Judgmental truth

Bibl. st. : Ch. Lahr, *Cours*, 677/682 (Divers états de l'esprit en présence du vrai). The issue here is judgmental truth (also called 'logical' truth), i.e. the fact that what is asserted in a judgment corresponds to the reality intended by it. This truth is governed by the identity axiom that states that "all that is (so) is, (so) is." A given, if directly encountered, lays claim to our honesty on the matter that compels us to assert what shows itself (phenomenological truth).

**Zero-trap.** What is true may be unknown so that from our side ignorance prevails.

**Stages of truth.** Lahr first distinguishes "probability" ("It seems to be as it shows itself now"). Lahr: "That grounds opinion," an uncertain judgment.

**Evidence.** What is true may be given, i.e., present, as 'evident' or 'evident'. This leads to "certainty. "One says, 'It is evident. I am certain precisely because it is evident'" (o.c., 680). An ancient definition reads, "Fulgor quidam veritatis mentis assensum rapiens" (literally, "A certain obviousness peculiar to truth that compels the mind to beaming"). This is the foundation of every phenomenology: the fact that shows itself directly provokes certainty of evidence in the one confronted with it.

**Note: Certainty.** An ancient definition states that certainty is "quies mentis in vero" (translated: "the peace of mind concerning truth"). Those who affirm objective evidentness do so without the risk of being mistaken. More than that, such certainty knows no degrees: what is evident is THERE with the whole force of its presence. In this sense, such certainty is always absolute certainty. If not, it lapses into "opinion" ("It may be true").

**Note: Objectivity.** 'Object' is "all that presents itself to our minds." Objectively, i.e. in itself, only 'true' data or actions exist because what is true is the same as what is!

'True' is thereby used in an antique sense in the sense of "being as manifesting itself (or as provable)". Consequence - says Lahr - : either something is true or it is not true (which is the contradiction axiom) and beyond true or not true there is no third (which is the axiom of excluded third). Truth and being obey the same axioms.

**Misunderstanding.** What is true is subject to our - possibly passionate - reactions. Truth can be distorted (partially misunderstood) or even denied (totally misunderstood).

This can be done consciously or even more or less unconsciously. An exasperating degree of this is called "negationism," i.e. attempting to disprove a truth known in principle by dialectical (using contradiction) or rhetorical (persuasion) means. A saying is attributed to F.M. Voltaire: "Mentez! Mentez! Il en restera toujours quelque chose!" ("Lie! Lie! There will always be something left of it!"). In other words: spreading lies through thick and thin means that always some remainder of it will remain for truth.

Paradox of G.E. Moore (1873/1958) and L. Wittgenstein (1889/1951). A propositional attitude is an attitude toward a given expressed in a proposition (judgment): 'X believes that A'. Where "believes" can also be "wishes," "desires," and the rest of the attitudes. "Anneke believes that the earth trembles, when in fact the earth does not tremble" still seems plausible as a statement. "I believe the earth trembles, while it does not tremble" seems contradictory. Both phrases, insofar as uttered by the same person, make Anneke's assertion "plausible" while the statement in I form is contradictory in that I am supposed to speak truth and thus not to commit contradiction.

B. Sylvand, *Les paradoxes pragmatiques*, in: *Sciences et Avenir (Les grands paradoxes de la science)* 135 , Paris, 2003 (juin / juillet) 31, talks about G.E. Moore's paradox as follows: "There is a koko in the kitchen but I don't believe it." According to Sylvand, this implies: 1. that I claim something and 2. that I claim that I don't believe it. Because the sentence "There is a koko in the kitchen but I don't believe it" is a judgment claiming truth, there is contradiction. Object language and meta-language are used interchangeably (cfr. 2.1.5). Whether such paradoxes teach us much is highly questionable!

***The existence of judgmental truth.*** One hears claims, "There is no truth" or "No one possesses the truth" or "everyone has his/her truth." A recent example provides us with Joseph Ratzinger et Paolo Flores d' Arcais, *Est-ce que Dieu existe? (Dialogue sur la vérité, la foi et l'athéisme)*, Paris, 2005. d' Arcais as a skeptic states that truth is an illusion and immediately that whoever pretends to possess and proclaim it will not survive exposure by skepticism. - The firmness with which the d'Arcais type skeptic expresses his judgment at least unspokenly asserts that it is true that truth is an illusion. The skeptic states unspokenly what he denies. By the way: radical skeptics suspend any judgment and stick to the undecidable regarding whether or not truth exists. - More than that, d'Arcais employs the term "illusion. How can he be so sure that illusion exists if he does not put the non - illusion first? One who judges an assertion to be false can only do so if he already knows the truth on the matter.

*As an aside*, the identity axiom (what is (so) is (so)) is the foundation of all truth inherent in judging. What is reverence for what is and so is presupposes along with the honesty with which one addresses what is and so is.

#### **2. 2. 4 Deeevidence**

Bibl st: J Hacking; *L'émergence de la probabilité*, Paris, 2002 (or.: *The Emergence of Probability*, Cambridge, 1975). The theme is "factual evidence" in the context of *La logique du Port Royal* (1662). The distinction between direct evidences and what witnesses assert on the matter is clarified: "To satisfy oneself about an event ... one paid attention to all the circumstances that make up the event, both internal and external.

"Internal circumstances" I call those circumstances that belong to the fact itself.

"External circumstances" I call those associated with the persons whose testimony leads us to give credence to the event. We turn briefly to that issue.

#### **Scenario.**

(1) A person walks unsuspectingly into a dense forest. After a while, his nose catches passing wisps resembling the smell of a wood fire. The initial quasi imperceptible smells seem to grow stronger. "It is as if in that direction someone lit a wood fire or something." Note: One apparently perceives part of a wood fire. Which represents a partial or partialvidence. The wood fire is partly directly given.

(2) Suddenly, the forest becomes brighter. The smell of burning wood becomes very evident. Until a clearing in the forest shows itself with the woodsman sitting by a burning fire. Note: The whole of the burning wood fire is now immediately given.

It is clear: the "internal conditions" of the wood fire are directly observed in two degrees of factual obviousness (phenomenal givenness).

By comparison. Hacking cites a text by J.L. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia* (1962) in which he depicts as elements of evidentiality that ground a judgment as correct: (1) the earth showing tracks resembling those of pigs, buckets with pig food in them, grunts and smells of pigs. This first factual evidence provokes as judgment: "There are pigs here somewhere" (2) Until around the corner the animals themselves can be seen directly. This second factual obviousness elicits as judgment: "Here they are, the pigs!".

Not so new. Hacking argues - following in the footsteps of M. Foucault (1926/1984) who divides cultural history into periods separated by cognitive "gaps" - that such factual evidences

are radically new in the theory of knowledge. Yet he reads Plato: in the allegory of the cave (10.2), the cave dwellers see only shadows of those who pass by who remain invisible to them. The shadows resemble those of humans and are associated with the passersby. This is a partial identity. The difference is that the cave dwellers must forego the total evidence but which they realize indirectly.

***Partial Evidence.*** It is referred to by Hacking as a 'sign' of the whole evidentiality. Not apparently o.g. 'atomic' facts, i.e. facts without relations (resembling nothing and related to nothing). What is experienceable in a first stage of perception is a part of a whole (system or collective understanding as the scholastics said) that is directly observable only in a second stage. A part that is essentially - not accidentally - similar to and especially related to its whole.

***Probability.*** Hacking's book puts probability at the center. Applied here: the part directly experienced is sign of the whole and makes the whole (or rather the rest) "probable.

***Previous experiences.*** What should not be underestimated in the conjecture o.g. of an experienced part, are the memories: those who have never smelled wood fire, - those who have never known pigs will find the probabilities on which Hacking emphasizes to be considerably weakened. The resemblance to what has already been perceived involves a "recognizing" that plays a very decisive role in deeming probable the part or the whole not directly experienced.

***Conclusion.*** Not atomic facts but facts that resemble or are related to something else are the reason or ground of the sign value of partial evidences.

### ***2.2.5. This particle summarizes.***

*Consciousness is always awareness of something. What shows itself immediately is object of first intentionality. When one becomes aware of it, such is the object of second intentionality. Judgment means that someone says something about something or someone; a model of an original is said by someone. Thus judging is always a form of conscious or unconscious comparison.*

*Judgmental truth is governed by the identity axiom "all that (so) is, (so) is. Truth and being obey the same axioms.*

*Partial evidences refer, as signs, to the whole evidence in which similarities and coherences are revealed....*