

2. Doctrine of Judgment

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Judgment 2. 1.

Sofie went to the doctor with mother.

- "So, Sofie, what did the doctor do?" Father asks in the evening.
- "First he took my wrist, and then he checked what time it was."

A judgment is the assignment of models already present in the mind (memory) to an original (the subject) as shown in Sofie's judgment.

2. 1. 1 The judgment (quantity/quality)

"To judge is from something, to assert something," says Aristotle, in *De interpretatione*. His title says it: to interpret the subject (subject as original, S) in terms of the saying (predicate as model, P) is to judge. In this Aristotelian sense, judgment theory is a part of "hermeneutics" (theory of interpretation).

- **The sense in itself.** Bernhardt Bolzano (1781/1848), known for his four-volume *Wissenschaftslehre* (1837), conceives of judgment as a knowable content or forma independent of the knowing and thinking mind as a psychological being: for him, immediately logic differs from judgment, from psychology from judgment. He therefore speaks of "judgment, expressed in a sense, in itself."

- **Quality and quantity.** Bibl. St.: Ch. Lahr, *Cours (Logique)*, 502/506 (La proposition).

The concept expresses itself in a term. The judgment term is the sentence (proposition, statement). The judgment term, like the understanding term, is a total term divisible into partial terms.

- **Sentence and full sentence.** The sentence takes two grammatical forms, the singular sentence and the full sentence. For example: "The girl came running onto the beach" and "Because she wanted to know how warm the sea water was, the girl came running onto the beach." The full sentence represents greater intelligible content, of course.

- "S is P." One does not misunderstand this symbol-shortened formula because it symbolizes both an inheritance judgment and a relation-expressing judgment. J. Lachelier (1832/1918) distinguishes between inheritance judgments and relation-expressing judgments. Thus: "Pete is a man" means "To Pete is man's own or 'inherent'". One can also say, "Pete includes (implies) being human". "Pete is Jef's son" means "Pete's relation to Jef is that of son (to father)." Logically, however, one also states "That Pete is the son of Jef is peculiar to (inherent in) Pete". A "relation" is a partial identity (analogy) and this is a property (in the broad Platonic sense) that something has insofar as it is thought including something else. Conclusion: so one does not confuse grammatical signs (words here) with logical terms. If then, per se, relations play a role, - logically speaking - they are, as emphasized several times above, similarity and coherence. In the sentence "Pete is the son of Jef," that is coherence, because they do not resemble each other under the conscious point of view but are interrelated.

Quality. One pays attention to the identitive nature of the saying that is affirmative (is), negative (is not) or restrictive (with reservations: is in some sense and is not in some sense) with respect to a subject. These are three "qualities. Stylistic judgment. "This wall is white". "This wall is not white". Suppose two house painters look at the wall with a connoisseur's eye and one says, "This wall is white and is not white." Logical: "This wall, if pure white is 'white', is not 'white', but, if impure white is still 'white', then it is 'white'". In other words: logically perfectly in order with some semblance of being contradictory. A restrictive judgment: "white with reservations". Living life includes many restrictive - cautious - judgments. One thinks, for example, of "in my opinion," "insofar as it appears," and the like.

Quantity. Quantity is betrayed by the counting words to the subject.

- **Distributive.** Singular, private, universal. "The Platonist Speusippus was Plato's nephew".

"Some Platonicians were skeptics.

"All Platonicians put Plato first.

"God alone is the creator of the evolving universe" is a way of saying "God alone is the only one who (...)." Which is a singular judgment.

- **Collective.** One-part, multi-part, all-part.

"This plume of this bird is brown."

"Head and neck of this bird are hurt."

"The whole bird makes a poor impression.


As already cited (1.1.5), scholastics derived the letters A (all) and I (some (well)) to 'affirmare' ('confirm') and 'O' (some not) and 'E' (none) to 'nego' ('I deny').

Geometric models. O. Willmann, *Abriss*, 73f, mentions that the quantitative of a judgment is "picturable" in circles or Venn diagrams, after John Venn (1834/1923), English mathematician and philosopher.

We get respectively:



S a P S e P

All S is P No S is P



S i P S o P

Some S is P Some S is not P



2. 1. 2 The judgment in itself and in context

A judgment includes a term that as original defines the rest, and a salient term that is the core of the model. But in addition there are the "provisions" that specify both original and model. A word about that.

The attributive clause stands by (specifies) a non-verb phrase. Thus: "Beautifully she appeared on the beach". 'Beautiful' specifies 'she' and not as would seem, given local proximity, 'appeared!' "She, the boss lady of the café, did not let herself". The clause "the bazin of the café" has a noun and specifies 'she' (and is called 'adjustment' or 'apposition') and does so as a reasoning specifier.

The adverbial (adverbial) clause accompanies a verb form. Thus: "Suddenly she showed up" (where 'suddenly' is an adverb).

Grammatical 'modalities'. This aspect of judgment seems important to us given the shades ('nuances') that concern the reality character in the verb.

1. Interrogativus. Asking a question. "Does a girl appear on the beach?".

2. Dubitativus. Expressing a doubt. "Would a girl appear on the beach?".

Understood : "It seems unlikely" or "Doubtful is it that ... ".

3. Potentialis. Possibility-indicating. "Maybe / perhaps a girl will appear on the beach". Or "It is possible that . ".

4. Realis. Fact-indicating. "A girl (actually) appears on the beach."

5. Concessivus. Concession-indicative. "Nevertheless (notwithstanding) a girl appears on the beach". Or "Against every expectation ...".

6. Irrealis. Unreality-indicating. "No girl appears on the beach".

7. Conditionalis. Conditional. "In that case (under that condition) a girl appears on the beach".

Contextual. A judgment, in life, is not usually a cloistered statement. Of that we now give a paradigm.

1. "Hilde runs." If that sentence is an answer to the question "What profession does Hilde practice?", then that sentence means "Hilde is a runner." She is then one instance of the collection of "runners."

2. "Hilde is walking." If that sentence is an answer to the question "What is Hilde doing right now?", then that sentence means "Hilde is walking right now." She is then represented in a current activity.

The "unsaid". A number of linguists have been talking about "the unsaid" in recent years.

That which is not said within a conversation, a.k.a. within a judgment, can be decisive for the correct understanding of the "saying"! Seemingly absent is what is not said, yet present! It pictures itself - without words but contextually - in the sense of a judgment. This is very evident from the phrase "Hilde walks" when one asks the question to which the phrase is an answer.

Conclusion. Both "in itself" and "in context" (contextually) a judgment is subject to meanings of all kinds!

2. 1. 3 The reason for a judgment

"The semiotic turn. The tendency to center all that is sign dates from Ch. Peirce (1839/1914), F. de Saussure (1857/1913) and Ch. Morris (1901/1971), among others.

- Ch. Peirce *Collected Papers* (1931/1935)), defined the sign as "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect" (something that in somebody's eyes stands for something under some point of view).

- Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, a posthumous work published by three of his students in 1916), it called the theory of signs "semiology" and emphasized the system of signs.

- Ch. Morris; *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*, Chicago Univ. Press, (1938) advocated the tripartite "semiotics" that had become prevalent since him, following in Peirce's footsteps incidentally.

- Finally, Lady Welby (1837/1912), who with her 'significa', emphasized the 'act of language' as a means of human understanding and found supporters in the Netherlands, among others, might also be mentioned here

Semiotic reason. Morris distinguished three main aspects.

- **1. Syntactic.** "It's sunny today". 'Syntax' pays attention to the well-formed formulation of a language sign, here the phrase "It's sunny today." The redundant parts fit together linguistically well: the rules of speech come into their own. That is the syntactic reason for the validity of the utterance.

- **2. Semantic.** "It's sunny today." 'Semantics' pays attention to the truth of the statement.

If it is indeed - ascertainably - sunny today, the sentence is a semantically 'meaningful' (meaningful) statement, a judgment in the true sense. Syntax situates the sentence within the language system with its rules but semantics situates it within the whole of the surrounding reality with its 'facts,' here the fact that the sun is shining. "What is so is so": the sun shines and so the speaker says truthfully and factually that "it is so"! That is the semantic reason for the validity of the statement.

- **3. Pragmatic.** "It's sunny today." 'Pragmatic' notes the intended result of the utterance. The man speaking says to his wife in the morning at sunrise, "It's sunny today" with the intention of proposing to her that she take advantage of that sunny day to go out. The phrase is an invitation. That is the pragmatic reason for the statement.

Consider Einstein's formula " $E = mc^2$." By itself, that formula is a mathematical equation. That's all it is. That's syntax. But the day Einstein fills in the blank shells (Platonic lemmata) of that formula, i.e. interprets, interprets, they become descriptive terms: "E" stands for energy, "m" for mass and "c" for the speed of light. Thus Einstein then describes the structure of the set of elements comprising E, m, c^2 .

Model theory expressed: the syntactic but empty formulas or "shells" acquire semantic content and become pragmatic, usable. They are physical models that provide information about physical or physical realities.

The actual act of language. The main issue in signifi- is some form of rapport between people with as its instrument a use of language that places itself as purposefully as possible in the service of that rapport. Significa, if consistent with itself, reverses the order of semiotics explained above in a paradigm. First there is the pragmatics which aims at understanding - here: getting the woman to go out with him, - which has long been the intention of both of them, who were only waiting for the auspicious occasion, i.e. a sunny day. Then there is the semantics: at

last the main condition of the day out is a fact and so the "It is - understood: at last - sunny today" resounds. Comes last a well-formed sentence, expression of syntax.

The reason. All that is, has its reason. Even a statement. Morris taught us to grasp them semiotically. Lady Welby taught us to interpret them significantly. Two "perspectives," i.e. approaches, on one and the same utterance or "language sign" that shows its plurality in the process.

2. 1. 4 Testability of statements

Bibl. st.: J.M. Bochenski, *Philosophical methods in modern science*, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1961, 74vv. (Semantic sense and verifiability).

Two propositions steller defends.

1. A judgment, if a method is identifiable by which it is "verifiable" (testable for its truth), is "semantically meaningful" (meaning something).

2. An expression (e.g., a word) that is not a judgment, if it proves useful as part of a semantically meaningful judgment, is "semantically meaningful."

Sense (meaning) and testability are not totally identical. Thinkers who identify both are refutable.

Testability is unspecified and in a twofold sense: there is a multiplicity of testing methods (e.g., sensory testing is only one method) and as soon as there is, if not truth, then at least probability, there is sufficient reason to value a judgment as meaningful, i.e., informative, telling rather than "not telling."

Some types. H. Reichenbach (1891/1953) considers confirmation or refutation of a scientific judgment possible in four ways: logical, technical, physical and transempirical. However, there are other classifications.

- **1. Logical.** A judgment, if it contains no contradiction, is logically (understand: logistically) verifiable. Thus: "A physical body, if moving at a speed of 350,000 km per second, becomes extremely light". Physically such judgment is unverifiable but purely logistically it contains no contradiction.

- **2.1. Technical.** A judgment, if technical means exist to test it, is technically verifiable. "The temperature of this sunlit stone is

25° C." is testable by means of a thermometer because the thermometer is a technical means of verifying the truth of the judgment.

- **2.2. Physical.** A judgment, if it does not violate the laws of physics, is physically verifiable. "A physical body, if moving at a speed of 350,000,000 km/second, becomes extremely light" is contrary to the laws of physics and thus "falsifiable," refutable.

- **3. Transempirical.** 'Transempirical' means "that which goes beyond empirical methods." Reichenbach chooses as a model the judgment of a certain religious sect: "The cat is a divine being." What test method to find for that? In other words: how to make such a thing evident? For the empiricist (or positivist) such a statement belongs to the nonsense of metaphysics because he accepts only technical, physical and logical criteria (means of discernment).

- However, there are other classifications. A husserlian phenomenologist will accept the pure blotting out of a given (phenomenon) as verification. Psychologists who scientifically apply the introspective (self-observation-based) method will accept as verified a judgment formed along those lines. Religious judgments thus have their own means of verification that Bochenski calls "transnatural. Such methods exceed those of the logical positivist (= logical empiricist) that Reichenbach was.

Tolerability axiom. R. Carnap (1891/1970) who, with H. Reichenbach, founded the journal *Erkenntnis*, claims, "Everyone is free to determine what kind of verifiability he considers permissible." Of course so that at least probable judgments arise!

Note: The intersubjective testability consists in the fact that apart from a single person forming a judgment according to some method, others can also test that judgment. At least in principle. This applies to all methods but particularly to the introspective method which makes judgments about one's own mental life. But this also applies to judgments that concern only a single, single witnessed (physical or non-physical) fact. Anyone who is the sole witness to a murder can be helped - certainly not in a direct way - intersubjectively on the court! But that does not imply that that witness is not credible, i.e. does not speak truth or probability.

2. 1. 5 Semantic stages

Bibl. st.: I.M. Bochenski, *Philosophical methods in modern science*,

Utr./Antw., 1961, 72v . R. Nadeau, *Voc. techno. et anal. de l'épistémologie*, PUF, 1999, 403s.

(Métalangue). 'Semantic' means "what relates to the meaning of a sign (words e.g.)."

One can distinguish a semantic zero stage, a first stage or "object language" and a second stage or "meta language".

- **1. Semantic zero stage.** This stage is still pre-semantic. GG. To land. A hare jumps out of the grass there. This is the phenomenon that has not yet penetrated consciousness and immediately has not yet been expressed in signs (language). GV. The semantic steps.

- **2.1. First stage or 'object language'.** It penetrates my consciousness and in myself (with the inner word) I say, "A hare jumps out of the grass there." I meet a friend and say, "A hare jumps out of the grass there." The phenomenon enters the inner and spoken language. As a result, both phrases become "semantic," that is, indicating something, meaning something. The object, the hare jumping out of the grass, is depicted in language, which is object language.

- **2.2. Second stage or 'meta-language'.** A little further I say to a good acquaintance: "I said to my friend just now: 'A hare is jumping out of the grass there'". (Direct speech (language)).

Or again, "I said there just now to my friend that a hare jumped out of the grass there." (Lateral speech (language use)). Direct and lateral speech are "quoting speech or language use." The main sentence is meta-language (if one will: language about language). The subordinate sentence is object language, language that is mentioned or quoted.

Semantic rule. The meaning rule reads, "All language that speaks of itself-without citations-has no meaning." She is "semantic nonsense." The paradox of the liar. Since Plato, the following sentence has been under discussion: "What I am saying now is false."

- **Circumstantial.** The pronunciation contains a subject - "what I am saying now" - and a predicate, "is untrue." The subterm 'now' can indicate what is said immediately before or after. Meaning is given to the phrase only by context because the subterm 'what' is a lemma to be filled in (an empty shell). Filled in by what is said before or after, the sentence can contain truth

or falsehood (i.e., meaning). Without the context, the sentence is undecidable for lack of information.

- **Strictly semantic.** The sentence is object language ("what I am saying now") and at the same time meta-language ("is false"). It violates the rule of meaning. For the partial term "now" does not refer to what is said before or after but to the sentence itself at the very moment it is uttered. The non-fulfillment (by a quoted sentence) of the subterm 'what' ("what I say") clearly avenges itself.

Fr. Bochenski, o.c., 72, sees it this way : "Any expression in which there is talk of this expression itself is meaningless". Reason : such a language would belong, simultaneously, to the two semantic stages of language, viz. it would be simultaneously language and language about it. Or, in speech terms : it would be and direct and lateral speech, "which is incompatible with the doctrine about the semantic stages." The paradox of the liar gives us no judgments : "In this pseudo - utterance, after all, something is said about the utterance itself." (Ibid.). Only in a meta-language can something serious be said about it. But there is none.

Note : The logician Alfr. Tarski introduced semantic steps to formulate the concept of judgmental truth: "The snow is white" (object language) is true if and only if the snow is white (meta language). The quotation marks mean "The sentence "The snow is white" is (...)". In lateral speech, "That 'the snow is white' is true if and only if the snow is white". Susan Haack, It is True What they Say about Tarski, in: *Philosophy* 51:323/336, paraphrasing, "The sentence 'The snow is white' is affirmed by the pope ex cathedra if and only if the snow is white." Remark. "Ex cathedra" means "by authority."

Conclusion. If one talks about linguistic phenomena (object language) (meta-language) in order to express the judgmental truth of object language, it leads to such sentences which, if heard by non-semantics, i.e. the common man, give the impression that one is selling some kind of learned humor!

2.1.6. This part summarized,

"To judge is to assert of something, something," according to Aristotle. Bolzano, among others, argues that judgment is independent of the knowing and thinking mind.

Lachelier distinguishes inheritance judgments and relation-expressing judgments.

Judgments can be qualitative or quantitative. Additional clauses specify the judgment. A judgment has grammatical modalities. The unsaid also plays a role in the language context.

Semiotics tries to put all that is sign at the center. One can distinguish in this a syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspect. The signification, as human understanding, reverses this order.

Statements can be tested for truth through a multitude of methods. Reichenbach distinguished logical, technical, physical and transempirical testing.

Other classifications testify to phenomenological, psychological and religious scrutiny.

One can distinguish a number of semantic stages in language. A sentence that simultaneously expresses object language and meta-language, as articulated in the paradox of the liar, leads to semantic nonsense.