

Chapter 2, Special logic

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The scheme of traditional logic: the organon.

We follow the format of Aristotle's *Organon*, Greek for "tool" or "method. His Organon, is still considered an introduction to logic. This work includes, among other things.

a. introductory texts on what he calls "categories" (a set of basic collective concepts), and on what he calls "interpretation" (his term for "judgment");

b. the first and second analytics (discussing the proof, definition and classification of concepts as well as fundamentals).

Many points of a logical nature Aristotle addresses in his metaphysical writings, in his account of the soul and in his ethical works.

c. Dialectics. This is the third section of the Organon containing a main section, the topics (on platitudes), and a discussion of fallacies. 'Dialectics' with Aristotle means 'debating science' (as in Socrates' case). It teaches thought development and testing. The data are "ta endoxa," common opinions. The required thing is to discuss the for and against. One learns to address problems with a view to achieving true "science."

Rhetoric. O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, 1959-5, 16ff, rightly and in Aristotle's spirit adds: "A side-branch of dialectics, something not far removed from it, is rhetoric, which deals with the way in which reasoning acts on the feeling and on the will". Note: Rhetoric, once abolished in the XIX century, has been experiencing an unprecedented update for several decades. Indeed, much of what presents itself as given or proven, if taken at face value, amounts merely to "propaganda" or "publicity," and is no more than that.

Willmann, loco citato, says: "Entering analytically into the process of thinking makes it possible to account for the individual steps in it (...). In the exposition of his logical teaching points, Aristotle approaches the "exactness" of mathematics in such a way that Leibniz, in 1696, was able to say, "He has been the first to write mathematically outside mathematics. It is therefore not surprising that some thinkers today revalue Aristotle's logic or rather his entire Organon, dialectics included and not without "what is not far from it," rhetoric. After all, logic, dialectics and rhetoric cover a lot of all that is "thinking" and "reasoning."

1 Conceptualization

1. 1 The concept

1. 1. 1 The concept (content/scope).

Bibl. st.: Ch. Lahr, *Cours de philosophie*, I (*Psychologie, Logique*), Paris, 1933-27, 491/496 (L' idée et le terme). Definition. A notion (notion, concept) is reality insofar as given in our minds.

Note: We limit the term "idea" in this course to the Platonic concept.

Concept / term. "A young girl" consists of three grammatical 'terms' but is only a single logical term (which can consist of a plural of words or characters of any kind). However, "a," "young," and "girl" are logically three partial terms.

Concept content and concept scope. (3.1) The concept content (Lat.: comprehensio, complexus) is the set of characteristics (properties) - knowledge contents or formae - that collectively make up one knowledge content or 'concept'. The concept scope (Lat.: extensio, ambitus) is that to which the content 'strikes', i.e., that which the content exhibits.

Distributive and collective scope. Plato, when speaking of "stoicheiosis (order) doctrine); Lat.: elementatio) has, distinction between "all" (distributive) and "whole (collective). Medieval scholasticism (800/1450) speaks of "omne" and "totum" (singular) or

of "omnes, omnia" and "cuncti, cuncta" (plural) or of "distributive understanding" and "collective understanding. We speak of "collection" on the one hand and "system" on the other (or of "set" and "system"). Thus: "young girl" means the whole of a young girl's being (collective); "all young girls" means the set to which the content refers (distributive); "the whole (the world) of young girls" means the cohesion of young girls among themselves (collective). In other words: twice collectively (individually and as a group) and once distributively

The "content/size" ratio. Take "young girl.

(1). If "young" is dropped, then "a girl" refers to many more girls (actually, all girls).

(2). If we add "rich" - "a rich young girl" - then the expression means far fewer girls (i.e., all rich young girls). Conclusion: content is inversely proportional to size. The more specified the content becomes, the smaller the size. And conversely, the smaller the content, the larger the size.

Classical and romantic concept. The singular concept is so rich in content that it refers to precisely one instance, which constitutes the whole scope. In classical logic, traditionally, a concept is always a general concept ("universale").

Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Cours de philosophie*, I (*Psychologie.Logique*), Paris, 1933-27, 537, expresses this scholastic view: "Non datur scientia de individuo", concerning the singular (individual) no science is available. For "omne individuum ineffabile," all that is singular is not amenable to general formulas. The limitless variety (synchronical) and the equally limitless change (diachronic) of data in the real world around us prevent one from constructing a universally valid "science" concerning the varied - changeable.

Consequence: Sciences such as history and geography, which essentially aim at the individual (and the developing), limit themselves to a kind of network of generally valid statements. They are - to use a recent term - "nomothetic" ("nomos" = general law; "thesis" = drafting), i.e., they formulate "laws" that apply to a plurality of e.g., landscapes (geography) or events (historiography) are applicable. For example, there is only just one Belgium e.g. and only just one

Napoleon. At most, in the pinnacle, it is a kind of "art" (representing the individual (and evolving)) but not "science" (representing the universal).

Romanticism (1790+), however, also defined the concept as that which represents the unique and developing, - in addition to the classical concept. Thus, history and geography can be understood as an 'idiographic science.' 'Being' (i.e., that by which something - in this case, something individual - differs from the rest of being or reality) is, for Romanticism, first and foremost the singular being, to be represented in a singular concept, which in turn is amenable to a singular definition. 'Idios', in ancient Greek, means 'singular'; 'grafia' means 'representation'; corollary: idiography is representation of the individual.

As an aside, what is called a "monograph," i.e., a study about something singular, is essentially idiographic.

The definition of the fused. Bibl. st.: H. Pinard de la Boullaye, S.J., *L'étude comparée des religions, II (Ses méthodes)*, Paris, 1929-3, 509/554 (*La démonstration par convergence d'indices probables*). This text is one of the very rare texts on our subject.

Again, the rule of defining is: a. the whole given; b. just the whole given (delineated versus the rest). In the absence of axioms (general definitions), one falls back on separate cognates, but in such a way that one accumulates them (cumulative method) until one is sure that the essence of the individual given and only its essence are represented.

In that enumeration of knowables that arises inductively, the (proper) name is indeed very particular, for this is the only "singularity" that may not be universal. One sees it: one defines by enumerating until the one-off becomes distinguishable. For example, there is only just one Antwerp; there was only just one Napoleon! One can make many generalizations about these two singularities, but is nomothetic science talking about the real Antwerp and the real Napoleon?

We refer in science to the DNA method that can define on a biological - genetic basis precisely one human being.

An application. -

(a). forma (creature form. Species name)) : female.

(b). 1. Figure (view) : very beautiful; 2. Proper name : Roxana; 3. Origin : daughter of Oxuartes, satrap (kind of governor) of the 'basileus', the prince of Persia (that's how the ancient Greeks called Persia's king); 4. Region of birth : Baktrianè (an area of the then Persia (+/- Turkestan / Iran / Afghanistan); 5. Place : central - Asia; 6. Time(dot) : - 327 Roxana marries Alexander III (the great : -456/-323; founder of a Macedonian - eastern empire, source of 'Hellenistic' (= late Greek) culture); In - 319 she leaves for Epeiros (lat.: Epirus) with Alexander's mother. In -316 she is imprisoned by Kas(e)andros (lat. : Cassander), prince of Macedonia (Macedonia, in northern - Greece), and murdered in -310.

Behold the 'interpretation' of the schema that allows one to construct a definition of a character in human history. Here a definition must represent the whole defined ('overall') and only the defined ('exclusively').

Differential of circumferences. One paid attention to two series:

- distributive or sets concerning "singular / private / universal" ("just one / some (some) / all (possible)");
- collective or systems concerning: "one-piece / multiple-piece / whole" ("one part / some parts / the whole").

Note: There is in ontology (theory of reality) its own kind of concepts, viz.

'transcendental' concepts. This term "transcendental" should not be confused with "transcendental," which, as already mentioned (10.1), is Kantian and means "critical"; i.e., questioning traditional metaphysics.

The transcendental notions refer to all possible realities and all of reality. Thus: "being(s)," "reality" (at least in the strictly ontological sense), "unity," "truth," "value (goodness). More on that later, of course.

The tree diagram of Porphyrius of Tyre (233/305; a neo-Platonic theosopher) looks like this: being is either incorporeal or material; material is either inorganic or organic, organic is either vegetable or animal; animal is either reasonless or reason-gifted. Indeed, classical antiquity defined man as "an animal gifted with reason." Immediately one sees again that as the conceptual content becomes richer, starting from the concept of "being" which tolerates

all possible additions, the conceptual scope becomes poorer and represents only a diminishing portion of the overall reality.

1. 1. 2 Antonomasia (exchange name)

Bibl. st.: G. und I. Schweikle, Hrsg., *Metzier Literaturlexicon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 19 (Antonomasie). With this term we are in the area of periphrases (descriptions) that replace a term in a text with a meaning-related term and this on the basis of similarity or coherence. These include the tropes: metaphors and metonymies as well as metaphoric and metonymic synecdochs (2.4).

Synecdoche and antonomasia. Based on similarity or consistency, one "says" a term but "means" a meaning-related term.

Paradigm. In the same text, both "the evening star" and "the morning star" are employed as the name of the planet Venus. This is called "antonomasia" or (the employment of an) alternate name. Reason: the fact that Venus is sometimes perceived as an evening star and sometimes as a morning star indicates that her course encompasses both phases. It is the consistency within Venus' course that allows her to be referred to sometimes as "the evening star" and sometimes as "the morning star". One "says" "the evening star" e.g. but "means" Venus. Antonomasia is a kind of synecdoche or co-signification (2.4). By virtue of resemblance to stars one calls the luminous planet Venus, metaphorically, also morning or evening star, and not e.g. morning or evening planet.

Typology. There are two main types.

(a). **Appellative change names.** Striking specimens of a collection give rise to alternate names. Because Eve, the Biblical female figure, is a conspicuous figure, one calls a woman "an eva." Because Judas, the apostle who betrayed Jesus, is notorious, one calls a traitor "a judas." Because Casanova is notorious as a womanizer, one calls a womanizer "a casanova." Similarity is the reason.

(b). **Character change names.** Jesus' characteristic is that he is the savior. Corollary:

In the same text, one replaces his name with "the Redeemer." For to his course belongs his redemption. Agamemnon is the son of Atreus. He is an Atride. His personal name, derived from the father, his patronymic exchange name, is "the Atride" in Homer's poetry. One of the

roles of the Roman supreme god Jupiter was that, as a mythical origin, he was "the Father of gods and men." This compound term is his change name. Cohesion is the reason.

Note: Since G. Frege (1848/1925) wrote his *Sinn und Bedeutung* (1892), logicians have distinguished between 'Sinn', i.e.. knowledge content, and 'Bedeutung,' i.e. the singular fact that exhibits that knowledge content. Frege addressed antonomastic or synecdochic language. He attempts to establish the truth conditions of a proposition in the form "S = M." Filled in, "The evening star (S) is (=) the morning star (M)." To account for the truth of that sentence, one must first know that Venus is both evening star and morning star. That knowing - 'information' - is expressed (in an understated way) in the sentence "The evening star is the morning star." By the way: such statements are logically called 'identity statements' where 'identity' refers to the fact that a plural of names refers to a single (identical) fact ('refers to it'). Here the term 'identity' does not have the meaning it has in the identity axiom.

Note: One should not confuse this language with that of natural logic, because the conceptual content 'evening star' or 'morning star' refers only to a limited scope of understanding, namely Venus as evening star or morning star. These two 'different' contents refer to two 'different' dimensions. These are not identical, although they belong to the course of the same Venus.

1. 1. 3 Universalia

We adhere to that Latin term because it has been prevalent for centuries but at the same time poses the pre-eminent problem, namely, "What is the reason we rely on to speak in general-universal terms?" There is no logic without universals.

The reasoning of Sextus Empiricus. This ancient Greek physician and philosopher, is one of the main representatives of what is called "skepticism." One understands the term correctly: "skepticism" does not mean that one "doubts everything," but rather that one doubts what is not directly given. One adheres strictly to "the phenomenon." That is why skepticism is always also a kind of "phenomenism" (or "phenomenalism"). When exactly Sextus lived is unknown but one calculates, given what one knows of his contemporaries and so on, that he lived late IIth / early IIIth century.

To be sure, Sextus emphasizes the singular and the private - to the detriment of the universal - and at the same time stresses the difference and the gap between the facts of our experience and universal understanding. Behold how he reasons in his Pyrrhonian sketches.

Sextus on induction. Induction is relying on singular and private phenomena to infer the universal from them. Which is generalization. For Sextus, this is "dogmatism," which he refers to as a "belief.

Dilemma: either one tests all cases or one does not test all cases.

(1) Testing all cases summarized in a universals (singular of universals) is impractical since - except for very limited summative inductions - the singular and private cases are "infinite" in number.

(2) Not testing all cases is doable but leave the rest in limbo. Conclusion. In both cases the induction is without sufficient reason and is not a completely conclusive - Aristotle would say "apodictic" - proof.

Note: One sees that Sextus focuses on the summative nature of induction (and in this sense he is Aristotelian because "induction" (without more) is summation for Aristotle). In this, insofar as he argues, one cannot prove him wrong. Which leads us to two types of universals:

(1) There are universals that rely on the testing of strictly all cases, i.e., on a summative induction that is doable only insofar as it deals with a finite number of phenomena (cases) that are in the range of our testing ability;

(2) There are universals that lack summative induction and are thus universal at best in a hypothetical way. Whoever speaks "universals" on the latter basis - in natural laws, e.g., or in social laws - speaks axiomatically in the sense that he speaks in a way that is not totally tested and thus presupposes hypotheses. For one never knows with absolute certainty - and this is what Sextus means - whether in the untested cases no 'falsifications' (cfr. K. Popper, see further 4.1.4), i.e. refutations, are present which render the 'universal' non-universal.

Note: Such exceptions will be discussed later.

1. 1. 4 Limitation of physics

Physics, especially since it is mathematical - experimental, is a basic science. Today it is defined as the science of "nature" (understood as matter) based on "operational" method (P.W. Bridgman, *The Logic of modern Physics*). For centuries she has tested a portion of overall nature in that way. That is her summative induction. The rest that has not yet been tested still lies fallow.

Naturalism (physicism, physicalism). One tries - in order to be as strictly scientific (mean: operational) as possible - to work out the rest of the sciences in physical terms. This implies that a phenomenon - to count as scientific fact - must show physical (material) evidence. This is called "physicalism" or "naturalism. This is applied to biological and human phenomena. In this sense, physics becomes the basic science.

Paranormal phenomena. There are phenomena that still encounter resistance in the established sciences because the established methods do not integrate them unless mutilated. They are therefore called "paranormal" (situated outside the "normal" paradigm of the sciences). Paranormology is the science of such data which are physical, biological, psychological, sociological, economic, artistic etc. (so that parapsychology only studies a part and if carried through involves one-sidedness regarding method).

Scientific evidence. Established scientists respond to decidedly paranormal facts divided:

a. many positivists (who recognize only "the positive fact," - preferably the most materially provable fact possible), deny even the most obvious facts in the name of that axiom;

b. many scientists consider even these latter facts "of no importance from the physical, biological, human science point of view.

c. some, such as W. James (1842/1910), investigate them. This multiplicity of interpretations indicates that the main problem of paranormology is, "How to reach the stage of scientific obviousness?" It does get to some obviousness but it 'does not' get to a "universally accepted obviousness." Consequence: the substandard degree regarding evidence divides opinions into "against," "undecided," and "for.

Physical paranormal phenomena. Particularly since H. Thurston (1856/1939), *The Physical Phenomena of Mysticism*, London/Monaco, 1952-1, 1985-2, as well as *Surprising Mystics*, London, 1955, physically ascertainable paranormal phenomena have been a task, even and especially for physicists who are interested in 'all' physical facts on principle. Levitation (the reverse of gravitation), stigmata (bleeding spots on the body reminiscent of Jesus' crucifixion: we refer to the seriously investigated stigmata of Padre Pio), light phenomena, salamandrism (either unburnability or resistance to burning of the skin), immortality (the corporeal remains do not spoil), complete fasting (complete and long-continued abstinence from food), multiplication of foodstuffs, odors, are materially ascertainable facts and thus fall fundamentally within the domain of physics. And this with "physical evidence," which does not prevent the established research community from "ignoring" them. Note: Who wants to know more about this, reads e.g. P. Sbalchiero, dir., *Dictionnaire des miracles et de l'extraordinaire chrétiens*, Fayard, 2002 (a 230 contributors, non-believers included, with 830 articles).

Summative induction.

a. What is called "Physics" thus omits a part of the physical facts, which means that its induction concerning physical phenomena is not summative. It can therefore make responsible statements only about the part investigated and not about the part not investigated.

b. Of the paranormally called physically ascertainable phenomena, only some physicists - labeled "mavericks" - have investigated only some phenomena more closely, which necessitates suspension of judgment regarding the rest; the unexamined portion.

Conclusion. Physics does have limits.

1. 1. 5 'Private' or 'some' (Not all / even all).

The fact. - Jevons, *Logic*, 58, says: "As signs of a private proposition there are the indefinite counting words 'some,' 'some,' 'some,' 'certain,' 'few,' 'many,' 'most,' or others which mean 'partly at least.' O.c., 66, he says: "The reader should be wary of an ambiguity by which even eminent logicians have been misled. In 'private' propositions (note: i.e., in connection with contrary judgments), one should carefully read the counting word 'some' or 'any' as 'some and it may be fewer or more or even all.' This implies that 'private' ('some') can sometimes mean "not all" then again "even all."

The requested. How does this rhyme? Because "not all" conflicts with "even all."

Solution. Bibl. st.: A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, PUF, 1978-10, 743s. (private); P. Foulquié / R. Saint-Jean, *Dict. de la langue philosophique*, PUF, 1969-2, 500 (Opposition), 515s. (Private).

- **Circumstantial.** 'Some' means "at least two" (and certainly not 'all'). 'Private' means "what is not public," as in "Private interests sometimes conflict with the public good." In "A private individual can buy this land," 'private' means 'some'.

- **Collections theorem.** Within a collection (and in its way within a system), "private" means "not all copies (resp. portions). Thus: "Some triangles are rectangular triangles". This is : "not all" triangles . Circumstantial language speaks like this. Also I. Kant (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781-1)). Between "all" (universal) and "all not (none)" situates "non-all" (particular), where precisely "one" (singular), is one instance of "non-all.

- **Logic.** One assumes the following scheme concerning judgments that are "opposites" ("opposite"), i.e. have the same subject and the same saying but differ in quantity or extent (here distributively: all, some, some not, none) and in quality (here: affirmation (model) or negation (counter-model) (see also 2.1.1.).

Note: The scholastics derived A (all) and I (some (well)) from 'affirmare' ('confirm') and O (some not) and E (none) from 'nego' ('I deny'). An overview:

All students are present	(A)	All universally affirmative.
Some students are present	(I)	some do privately affirm.
Some students are not present	(O)	some not privately negative
No students. are present	(E)	no universal negative

Thus, A (all) and I (some present), and O (some not present) and E (none present) differ in quantity. Thus, A (present) and O (not present), and I (present) and E (not present or none present) differ in quality.

Within the framework below, 'private' means 'at least one'. Which does not exclude 'several' or even 'all'. 'Some' within this framework means "not by number specified specimens or portions." We get:

Alle leerlingen zijn aanwezig. (universeel bevestigend) (alle: model)	(A)	contrair	(E)	Geen leerlingen zijn aanwezig. (Universeel ontkennend). (Alle niet (geen: tegenmodel))
	s	Contra-	dicatorisch	s
	u			u
	b	Contra-	dicatorisch	b
	a			a
	l	Contra-	dicatorisch	l
	t			t
	e	Contra-	dicatorisch	e
	r			r
	n	subcontrair	(O)	n
Sommige leerlingen zijn aanwezig. (Particulier bevestigend). (Sommige wel)	(I)			subcontrair

all students are present, universally affirming (all are)

no students are present, universal negative (all are not)

no students are present, private affirmative (some are)

no students are not present, private individual negative (some are not)

Note: As indicated above, A with E is called a "contraire judgment"; I with O a "subcontraire judgment." A with I, and E with O are called "subaltern judgments." A with O, and I with E finally, are called "contradictory judgments."

Synecdoche. (2.4.) The synecdoche says 'particular' (as in the language of relations and the theory of sets, within which 'particular' is distinguished from 'singular' on the one hand and from 'universal' on the other, but is related to it ordetheoretically), but means 'at least 'one' (singular), yes, 'several' (particular) or even 'all' (universal), precisely because of its coherence. One who, by virtue of similarity or coherence, 'says' one member of the connection but 'means' another, commits a trope called 'synecdoche'. Thus, linguistically, the

same term 'private' ('some') can mean collections doctrinally 'not all' and judgments-logically 'at least one / several / all'.

1.1.6 Symbol-shortened terms

This term consists of a metaphor, i.e. "shortening," as "symbol shortening" is one type of shortening, and a metonymy, i.e. "symbol" which does not resemble "shortening" but is related to it as follows: "to symbol shortening.

A concrete example. W. St. Jevons, *Logic, Utr / Antw.*, 1966, 5 and especially 50/52, gives the following concrete model. Circumstantial: if one multiplies the sum of two quantities by its difference, this involves the difference between its second powers. Algebraic symbols shorten this to: $(a + b)(a - b) = a^2 - b^2$. Jevons: "With that product we work in obscurity or 'symbolism'. We do use the letters a and b according to certain fixed rules but without knowing anything about, or caring about, what they mean." We will now elaborate on this.

The "intuitive/symbolic" pair. Jevons illuminates our problem of symbol shortening using this pair of opposites. 'Intuitive' means something like "easily understood with the thinking of the common mind." In doing so, he argues that every symbolism starts from a minimal - essential intuition. Thus, concepts such as "square" or "hexagon" are intuitive, but concepts such as "thousand-corner" or "the difference between a figure with a thousand sides and one with a thousand and one sides" are intuitively so vague that only their intellectually defined meaning remains "sensible. Further purely intelligible concepts are e.g., 'zero,' 'contradictory' (e.g., a rectilinear arc or an unfelt pain), 'nothingness' (especially in the ontological sense of 'absolute nothingness' being absolutely nothing). In Jevons' language, these are "symbolic" terms.

The "filling in" (semantic interpretation) of symbols. Take "All numbers less than 2".

Symbolically, "For all numbers x such that $x < 2$ ". The latter expression can be filled semantically i.e. concretely signifying, by e.g. " $-4 < 2$ ". All abstract, i.e. concrete data summarizing, terms can be "filled in" in this way. What we now want to clarify briefly.

Jevons says we work in the dark and do not care what symbols, once semantically interpreted, mean. He may mean well but we consider a clarification necessary. The letter - actually 'letter digit' - 'x' does not just fill in. Only digits smaller than 2 fit as fill-ins. This means that the concrete meaning is indeed 'not left in the dark'.

But there is more. Even non-symbol-shortened terms obey precisely the same rule. In the sentence "All the flowers of this plant are yellow. Well, these flowers are from this plant. So these flowers are yellow" terms such as 'flowers' or 'yellow' or even 'of this plant' stand as abstract terms, insofar as in an account of logic the above reasoning is recited as demonstrative. They are recited as 'replaceable' and thus immediately 'fillable' by other logically equivalent terms. Thus: "All the stones of this mountain are of granite. Well, these stones come from this mountain. So these stones are of granite". In terms of logical thinking, it is not simply desperately necessary to reduce all terms to symbol-shortened terms in order to learn to think logically 'accurately' - 'akriboos' in ancient Greek. By what? Because our mind, when properly guided, accurately grasps abstract terms in and through concrete terms. The common mind does this throughout. Granted: abstract "symbols" are computationally stronger but, as Jevons insinuates, they presuppose something intuitive.

In that simplified symbol-shortened form, natural logic will e.g. symbolize a judgment as "S (subject, subject) is P (predicate)" or structurally outline a reasoning as follows: "If VZ 1 and VZ 2, then NZ (logically valid)". But only if they is 'filled in', that 'formula' (the diminutive for 'forma') begins to 'live'. If only because even logicians have learned to think concretely before getting down to abstract 'formulas' already alive. By the way: didn't Hegel say that an abstract term is "infinite richness" regarding interpretations?

1.1.7. This subsection summarizes:

Traditional logic follows the classification of Aristotle's Organon. Special logic starts with the theory of concepts. A concept is reality insofar as given in our minds. Concepts have a content and a scope. The poorer the content, the greater the extent. For example, the concept "girl" refers to all girls. The bulkier the content, the smaller the scope. 'Girl with blue eyes,' refers to only a part of "all girls. The scope can be distributive. It then refers to a collection. The scope can also be collective, it then refers to a system. The concept in classical logic is thought to be general. The romantic conception of "understanding" emphasizes the singularized or individual.

Antonomasia pays attention to descriptions. These may refer to similarity or coherence.

Logic is conceivable only because we can speak in general terms, universals.

Physics demands physical evidence from data. This means, among other things, that paranormal phenomena are integrated into physics only in a mutilated way. Natural science

can only make responsible statements about the investigated part and not about the unexamined. Physics is therefore bounded.

Indeterminate count words exhibit a differential, ranging from all yes, over some yes, some no, to none. Judgments can vary in quantity and in quality. In their negation, judgments can be contravariant, subcontrary, subaltern and contradictory.

Jevons argues that we use Symbol-shortened terms without caring their meaning. In doing so, he argues that every symbolism starts from a minimal - essential intuition

Symbols, according to him, can be so vague that only their intellectually defined can still "make sense. One may note here that our mind, through concrete terms, grasps abstract terms. Thus, they need not always be reduced to symbol-shortened terms to allow us to think of accurately.