

Text 20. A sketch of the philosophy of Jaques Derrid (46 p.).

Contents

1. Situation.	2
2. Learn	5
2.1. The ontology of "la differance".	5
Meaning.....	10
The Gulf War (02.08.1990 / 01.03.1991).....	13
Differential thinking and zeitgeist.....	15
Derida's Jewish origins.....	16
Derridism and feminism.....	17
Allan Bloom on deconstruction hermeneutics.....	19
2.2. -- The differential philosophy of language	23
Dual logocentrism.....	23
Derrida's interpretation of tradition.....	23
Language is a system.....	25
Linguistic relations.....	26
A romantic-idealist paragon.....	28
Reality and language according to de Saussure.....	29
The differentialization by Derrida.....	30
Ontology/Tropology.....	34
Henology (unit theory).....	35
The concept of association;.....	36
The Synecdoche.....	37
The traditional-logical pronouncing of a relationship.....	42
2.3. - The differential critique of traditional ontology.	43
The attack on some "superior position".	45

Jacques Derrida (1930/2004) was French philosopher known for a form of deconstructionism. We limit ourselves strictly to the essentials of the thinking of J. Derrida, who passes as one of the most distinctive thinkers of our present era.

1. Situation.

Bibl. st.: Theo de Boer et al, *Modern French philosophers*, Kempen/ Kapellen, 1993. -- The volume includes eight contributions by eight contributors to the Free University of Amsterdam.

Given. Traditional ontology, insofar as it claims a fixed foundation (foundation), which acts as a unifying viewpoint for the totality of all that is. In other words: the "foundationism" (a.k.a., "fundamentalism" or "integrist") peculiar to our traditional Western philosophy.

Requested. -- An unmasking of the very claim or "pretension" to possess a "reason" which contains such a comprehensive foundation and summary of everything. -- Or if one wants: the blotting out of the eventual limits of such a claim.

Featured are: M. Foucault (1928/1984), who, following in the footsteps of G. Bataille and M. Blanchot, seeks to disprove the all-encompassing thought of power;

J. Derrida, who, especially in the wake of Heidegger and de Saussure, unmasks logocentrism, "deconstruction" (déconstruction) that claims to be the expression of a reason that involves an all-encompassing (transcendental) understanding of everything (being);

J.-Fr, Lyotard (1924/1998), who criticizes as not valid the claim of comprehensive narratives (conceptions of human history such as the sacred history of the Bible or such as the modern progress beliefs of enlightened minds) (deconstruction of meta-stories);

J. Kristeva (1941) and L. Irigaray (1939) who debunk the phallocracy, the claim of a masculine mind as an all-encompassing understanding of everything; J. Baudrillard (1929/2007) who debunks the claim of our current communication as a communication of "empty" signs (the simulation culture);

E. Levinas (1905/1995), who demolishes the all-encompassing "egology" (I-centered philosophy) i.e. a conception of an all-encompassing (transcendental) self-consciousness with the claim to valid insight into everything, peculiar to E. Husserl, in the name of the other in the Other (God); P. Ricoeur (1913) who approaches the whole tradition "with profound suspicion

Guido Vanheeswyck. in Streven, says that the terms, "postmodernism" and "deconstructionism" (the latter term does fit Derrida) do not clearly capture the true content of the little work. He sticks with Woldring, who employs the term "hermeneutic philosophers" in his introduction. The reason: pretty much all those discussed take as given text (from predecessors) in which they prioritize as requested a. an interpretation (interpretation, meaning) b. that unmasks.

Note -- Which gives us yet another variant of the Ancient Greek term "paraphrasis" explanation (commentary). But in one well-defined sense, namely, the criticism of the claims of traditional thought.

Note -- Now one does not think that the scheme of the profs at the Free University of Amsterdam is the only one. There are other books on current philosophy. -- Thus an issue of the French alternative revue *Autrement* entitled "A quoi pensent los philosophes?" -- Some thirty contributions attempt to present the main points of contemporary themes (the topics discussed) and issues (the questions or problems associated with those topics). The salient thematics are viz.

(1) Modernity (Derrida, Habermas define "the modern" (especially in art) as all that constitutes a radical break with Western tradition(s));

(2)a. the foundations (foundations) of the subject sciences (physical and chemical sciences, biology, humanities) (the logical-mathematical sciences but also the business sciences, named above, set forth principles, axiomata (postulates), which make up the foundations or foundations of them that are tested in a foundations inquiry);

(2)b1. Ethics (morality) (our societies wrestle with issues of conscience - so e.g., on manipulating genes, so also e.g., on chemical weapons) - : in the name of what values (predetermined goods) shall we allow our conscience to be formed?)¹

(2)b2. Law (in our societies there is both law and injustice - think of the migrants : in the name of which legal system shall we create law?).

Or a V. Descombes, *Philosophie analytique versus philosophie continentale*, in: *Critique (Revue gén, des publ. franc. et étrangères)* 1987, Mar. 240/254 (t. xlii, n. 478).

--

In the Anglo-Saxon countries one thinks 'analytically': the (traditional) logic (which thematizes concepts (classes), judgements (propositions) and reasoning) serves as a 'foundation' to test the statements of sages and others, On the European continent one thinks 'hermeneutically' (i. e. one puts a given thing first, e.g. a text or a fact, in order to interpret it (interpret), because the thinker sees himself as a signifier who either tries to grasp the meaning or the fact, or as a signifier who tries to interpret the meaning.i.e. one puts a given, e.g. a text or a fact, first in order to interpret it (interpret), because the thinker sees himself as a signifier who either tries to grasp the meaning or tries to establish a new meaning. In that current, "poststructuralism" is the word one often sticks on the French continental thinkers when they interpret (see above), -- as unmasking signifiers. -- analytic philosophy puts forward a scientific ideal; hermeneutic puts forward something like a literary ideal.

*Opm. -- J. Nida-Rümelin, Hrsg, Philosophie der Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen von Adorno bis Wright, Stuttgart, Kröner, 1991, brings up more than a hundred philosophers (life sketch, works, reception, epigones), Husserl, the intentional phenomenologist, is the godfather of the phenomenological main thrust, and Frege (Gottlob Frege (1848/1925; mathematics logically structured) is the pioneer of the analytical style of philosophizing. The focus is on Martin Heidegger (1889/1976) *foundational research of traditional ontology*) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889/ 1951; logic in philosophy) who each represent one of the main streams (Heidegger: phenomenology; Wittgenstein: analytic thinking).*

*Guy Sorman, who in the meantime published *Sortis du socialisme*, Paris, 1990 (the collapse of socialist systems as an omen of nationalisms, strong charismatic figures (populists) and dictatorships endangering democracy), gives us *Les vrais penseurs de notre temps*, Paris, Fayard, 1989:*

1. Carl Sagan, James Lovelock (cosmology),
2. Ilya Prigogino, René Thom (chaology, complexity theory),
3. Stephen Gould, Edward O. Wilson, Motoo Kimura (evolutionary theory),
4. Claude Levi-Strauss, Noam Chomsky, Zhao Fusan (cultural criticism);
5. Bruno Bettelheim, Thomas Szasz, Marvin Minsky (free thinking),
6. Ernst Nolte, Edward Teller (polemology),
7. Milovan Djilas, Youri Afanassiev, Kenji Nakagami (communism, fascism.),
8. Friedrich von Hayek, Murray Rothbard (liberalism, libertarianism (anarchism)).
9. Octavio Paz, Ashis Mandy, M.S. Swaminates (underdevelopment).
10. René Girard, C. Claude Tresmontant (The Crisis of Unbelief).
11. Karl Popper. Ernst Gombrich. Isaiah Berlin (foundational crisis).

Sorman met the thinkers personally and provides a brief biography. A gold mine. The work strongly relativizes a Derrida.

2. Learn

We now turn to the main features of Derrida's teaching (1930/2004).

Bibl. st.: *B. Delfgouw/ Fr. van Peperstraten. Concise history of philosophy (From Thales to Lyotard).* Kempen/ Kapellen, 1993, 261/265 (Jacques Derrida).

2.1. The ontology of "la différance."

Derrida himself found this neologism on it. -

a. 'Différer' - in French dictionaries (Derrida is fond of dictionaries) means

1. differences ("Mon opinion diffère de la vôtre");

2. Suspensive deferring ("La discussion est différée à la semaine prochaine").

Derrida accumulates the two meanings by introducing the term "différance" (not : difference)!

b. If I want to understand - define myself - then, among other things, I need to know my ancestors (for they partly caused my being), I need to know my wife and children (for they helped shape my being and will continue it). I need to know e.g. my studies (for they helped bring about my being - that which I am), I need to know my goals (for they determine my being - that which I am and will be with). So on and so forth.

Indeed (says Derrida): being, i.e. all that was/is/will be present concerning reality (being), is only exhaustively or fully knowable insofar as I know all that differs from me! For all that differs from my being helps that - bring my being into being, make it real. into "being.

This implies strictly logically that the full ontological knowledge of my being must be postponed until ... later (when I also know and have processed all these different data). -- Since everything that differs from me counts to know me, I must of necessity postpone the full -- exhaustive -- knowledge of what I was/am/will be.

In Derrida 's parlance: what a signifier (Sa), i.e. a sound (= term) within a language system, means.

1. can only be defined by differences between that term - e.g., tree

2. - and everything that term is not - e.g., the soil in which the tree is rooted - (in the sap in the trunk of the tree, in its branches, in its blossom e.g., there are elements that come from the soil), 2. can be fully (exhaustively) defined only after all that differs but counts for the exhaustive definition is known; since we can never actually know this exhaustively, the definition, so understood, is postponed, indeed, perhaps permanently postponed.

Note -- In Derrida's language: from the tree run traces (des traces) to all that differs from the tree. Or if one wishes: all that is the tree refers to all that is not the tree (but brings it into being with it).

Or again in Derrida's parlance: the tree, in its full being (all that it was, is, will be), is present ('présence') before our reason only when and insofar as the absent (that which differs from the tree) is thought along with it: in the language of paradoxes as Derrida likes to speak them, this sounds like this: the traces (references) in the tree to what the tree is not but makes it co-exist, are the absent 'presences' in it!

Conclusion: -- Of the tree -- or of myself (here before) -- knowing everything includes knowing the rest (the complement) of the totality of all that is, being. Such an absolute ('metaphysical') knowledge is impracticable and thus "for later" (postponed).

Which does not prevent us from living, day by day, with such deferred knowledge'. Only 'eristic' (contention loving) people - thinkers - like a Derrida continue to falter at the fact that they do not know of everything, everything! They find that to be the great lacuna of traditional philosophy as ontology or metaphysics. For the latter pretends, in their eristic eyes, to know of everything, everything. Which actually has never really been true, of course,

In everyday life, we encounter deferred knowing when we are faced with a problem that we cannot (or cannot fully) solve ourselves: when the water pipe in the house stops working, we call in "an expert" (who specializes in our deferred knowing),-- e.g., a plumber. Similarly, when we are sick: the doctor represents our deferred knowledge regarding

health into illness. Platon, in his ideal state (*Politeia*), speaks of the "genesis," the genesis, of the state. The inadequacy of the individual to meet his necessary needs necessitates recourse to fellow men. Many things are needed with the result that "while the one calls the one to the aid of the one for this and the one for that, the need brings many together in one dwelling place to help each other in common." To this kind of cohabitation one gives the name "polis" city-state.

Cfr. *Politeia* 2: 369C. -- If classes, exist at all, this shows that the individual -- even if he were the 'dialectician' (understand: thinking man) in person -- cannot think and live complacently. 'Traces' refer to fellow human beings. -- well, Derrida attributes to the great ontological tradition an ideal or claim of complacency that is certainly not readily detectable with Platon.

Note -- One model of comprehensive knowledge is found in Hugo Symons, *Klare taal, Zingem, Vita*, 1993-3.

The cover literally reads the following. -- "Did you know that practically all diseases can be cured? That in a few days you can be permanently rid of migraines, palpitations, bursts of sweat in headaches? That your arm or leg should never be taken off except in a serious accident, -- exceptionally? That your stomach, intestine, uterus, breast, prostate or appendix, your child's tonsils or any part of your body can quietly remain in place and not have to be cut away if you are going to use this book -- which is written with much love -- properly?"

Several pastors and nuns labeled this book "a true gift from heaven" and rightly so, for thousands of incurably ill people healed in no time by using the more than twenty editions -- preliminary editions -- already published of this masterpiece. -- If the doctor tells you that you have only a few days or weeks to live, don't believe him! Doctors in the 20th century don't know an iota about healing. The medical industries, the pharmaceutical industries abuse their power and mislead and manipulate doctors, specialists and pharmacists. They induce medics to prescribe treatments and drugs to the sick that rarely cure them but usually make them sicker. -- "Plain Language" will give you

not only teach you what to stay away from and stay away from but, above all, show you the way to a breakneck fast and lasting cure. In this book, you will learn more about curing diseases and staying healthy than you did during eight years of classical medicine in college. "'Plain Language' will eventually replace just about any doctor's prescription you may need during your lifetime." - So much for the introduction to himself from someone who bills himself as a "master magician."

Well, Derrida presupposes something like an omniscient sage in the long tradition he deconstructs. He knows, fundamentally, well that he is deconstructing a caricature (if not, he cannot deconstruct), but he keeps this up, -- one book after another (God knows how many he has already written), -- one article after another. The claim -- prétention (in French) -- of a Symons concerning healing and health Derrida attributes to the traditional ontologist but concerning "being," all that is (all that was, is, will be). The textbooks of metaphysics (ontology) are then "a gift from heaven" in which, appropriately, all issues -- as good as all -- are made solvable. -- One does not forget this in the following pages,

A model of completion. -- *Bibl. St.* : M. Lisse, *Le motif de la déconstruction et ses portées politiques*, in: *Journal of Philosophy* 52 (1990) 12 (June), 230/250. -- Lisse, a.c., 247, cites: Micha Brumlik asks Derrida the question of responsibility regarding Nazism and concentration camps.

Now watch carefully as Derrida responds "I am suspicious of the metaphysical concept of 'responsibility': although incorporated into the language of human rights (into the premises of every democracy, -- into Western ethics and politics), this metaphysical concept of 'responsibility' has unfortunately not been able to prevent Nazism and Auschwitz."

We now quote in French: "Très souvent, au contraire, le discours nazi a utilisé l'axiomatique qu' on lui opposait. Non seulement les gouvernements ont laissé faire Hitler, mais les discours des intellectuels, les concepts théoriques issus de cette notion de responsabilité n' ont pas suffi à opposer un barrage suffisant au nazisme, mais, à l'opposé: un réseau de complicité de toutes sortes fut créé. Ce qui nous donne

Aujourd'hui une si mauvaise conscience". -- Summarize.

1. The term "metaphysical" is employed not in a neutral sense but in a "suspect" (to be discounted) sense. This is Derrida's right but whether this already correctly characterizes metaphysics as such is unproven: after all, there is a good and a bad metaphysics (just as all human products can be good and bad).

2. The reproach that Derrida directs at the 'metaphysical' concept of 'responsibility' reads: it has not been able to prevent the emergence of Nazism (because "the intellectuals" with their 'uses of language' have not proved efficient enough). -- To this the traditional thinker will reply that the impotence of a "metaphysical" concept does not in itself devalue this concept. On the contrary: by meditating on it and turning it into praxis, much good can be achieved,

3. The language of the Nazis also employed the concept - the metaphysical - of "responsibility" (think: "We as responsible for the Germanic race ...") in the opposite sense of its opponents (the democrats). This is correct. -- but to this the traditional metaphysician will reply, "Abusus non tollit usum" (Abusing something does not imply that that something cannot be used properly). In other words, Derrida, a priori against metaphysics, does not turn the ineffectiveness and abusability of a metaphysical concept against the ineffective actions of those who use that concept, -- nor against the abusing itself, but against the concept itself. As if that poor concept were "responsible" for the ineffective use, and for the misuse of itself.

Now where is "la différence"?-- By association--when the metaphysical concept of "responsibility" comes to mind, Derrida thinks of its ineffective and wrong use--Derrida finds "a trace" from the concept to its wrong and ineffective use and in such a way that the concept must pay for it. That, in a metaphysical tract when talking about "responsibility," one also talks about its "reception" (reception, influence) and use, that makes sense. But the impotence and wild - ambiguous - uses of concepts are not yet those concepts themselves.

In other words, the term 'responsibility' "goes together with" irresponsibility, in the sense of absence of 'responsibility' in the forms of ineffective and wrong 'responsibility' such that what differs from 'responsibility' actually belongs to it as its absence. With that we do not have a complete understanding of 'responsibility' because God knows what various forms of it will still show up in the course of human history. We do, however, have a deferred understanding. - That is, we have at our disposal virtually nothing of real (complete) understanding, In which there is a form of 'nihilism' ('nihil' = nothing).

By attaching to the concept the uses - the interpretations or interpretations (it is a form of hermeneutics) (associative method) and this with the emphasis on the negative uses (such as ineffective use or reverse use or interpretations), the deconstructive or deconstructive method comes about.

Meaning.

For hermeneutics or the theory of interpretation, human beings are signifiers/signifiers.--This can be done fundamentally in two ways.

1. Sentence summary.

When we try to grasp the 'meaning' of something - e.g., a metaphysical concept - we focus the intentionality of our mind on that something (e.g., that concept) itself, per se. Thus, "responsibility" can be seen as a. a given b. involving a requested or problem, treat it in such a way that, in solving the problem, one's responsibilities (engagement with conscience) are taken up. My child is ill : in conscience I cannot leave it to its fate (given: child; requested: cure illness; solution : feel obliged in conscience to do something about it).

2. Zen Foundation.

Given: the same child; requested : the sick child help: solution: "I have neither time nor desire for it". The confrontation "sick child/ own conscientious helping" does not come into its own here.

Derridianly speaking, omission also belongs to the (complete, pragmatic) understanding. What differs from it - in the form of omission (peccatum omissionis, in scholastic language) - belongs to it. The negate (the negation) belongs to the understanding itself. - Yet the omission is something that does not belong to responsible behavior on the matter, for it is there the

contradiction of! The absentee - dereliction of duty introduces something different (difference) after the metaphysical concept of responsible behavior. yes, something contradictory (radical difference). But, in Derridian theory of understanding (which associates the concept with what people do with it), the omission is, as it were, (an aspect of) the metaphysical concept itself. For - he says - for this very reason - "he is suspicious of that understanding."

Schematic.

1. The sense concept. -- With A (e.g., a metaphysical concept) I think A.

2. The foundation of sense. -- By A I do not think of A so much as B, especially as -A (not - A) in the forms of ineffective or inverted or omitted use of A. Something new, something different, is introduced by the foundation of sense.

3. The differential conceptualization.

The sentence structure of A immediately includes the sentence foundation of A such that $A = A + B$ (happening, derridian: preferably as - A). Which includes the deconstruction of A. -

Note -- Phenomenology adheres to the sense view: A is grasped and expressed purely as A, - according to the formula : given A; asked: the creature representation (sense view) of A. The phenomenologist, in its purity, aims at the neutral understanding that allows both meliorative and pejorative use.

The decrease (difference) of the decrease (difference).

Bibl. st.: Ger Groot, *Jacques Derrida*, Limited Inc., Evanston (Ill.), Northwestern University Press, 1989, in: Streven 1989: Dec., 271.-. In a brief book review, Groot, who is not disliked by Derrida, says what follows.

1. -- J.L. Austin (1911/1960) was neither metaphysicist nor analytic-positivist. Thereby he considers the analysis of ordinary language use as the starting point of philosophy. Central concept with him is "act of language," language use as communication and interaction. J. Derrida, in the concluding article of his collection *Margins* (1972) discusses Austin's philosophy of language acts.

J.R. Searle (1932/...), philosopher of language deeds in Austin's wake, attacked, in a nippy article (1977), Derrida not only as a critic of Austin but as a differentialist. In the same journal *Glyph*, Derrida responds with a very thorough deconstruction of Searle's language-deeds thinking. -- The book discussed reflects in part -- those discussions.

2. -- Groot, following that book, highlights something that interests us here and now. -- In a new afterword that Derrida adds to that discussion, Derrida takes a stand "more sharply than elsewhere" against "an overly anarchic and lax interpretation of deconstruction." Thus G. Groot.

Indeed: some epigones (one kind of interpreters) of Derrida who mimic his method, "quite often blame the deconstruction method for **a.** arbitrariness and **b.** total negation of any concept or criterion (*note*: *kritèrion* = means of cognition) of truth." Groot calls this interpretation "vulgarization"; it was fostered, among other things, by the American reception (= interpretation) - which is literary-theoretical rather than philosophical.

Result: confusion. -- Derrida 's reaction emphasizes or the strictly philosophical nature of his deconstruction (Groot calls this "the quasi-transcendental depth dimension of Derrida's philosophical position"). -- If one forgets this, then fatal misunderstandings cannot fail, Main misunderstanding according to Derrida : deconstruction would then erase all distinction -- difference -- between true and false understanding and misunderstanding, understanding and metaphor (*note*: meant is trope, metaphor and metonymy). The unambiguous rectification sets the stage for the "serious guidance of Derrida's texts."

Zedenles. -- "Against such vulgarization of his position, Derrida may not have resisted in time."

Our conclusion: -- "We are suspicious of the *différance* philosophies incorporated in the language of Derrida and his followers."

For that language, - and thus Derrida himself, "has not been able to prevent misunderstanding being introduced," indeed, "that people have abused his axiomatics (voice presuppositions) to arrive at the opposite of his opinion."

Which means that his diminishing notions show traces to things that he must mordantly reject as fallacies (inefficiencies, misuses). Which in turn implies that our understanding of his *différance* must be deferred, for it leads to inefficiencies and reversals that may not yet have all seen the light of day, indeed may continue into the future.

Thus, the fates of the differential concepts are precisely the same as those of the metaphysical concepts. *Medice, cura teipsum* (physician, heal thyself).

Derrida: "in the name of". -- In the course of an interview with a journalist of *le Monde* - *J. Derrida, Entretien avec le Monde*, Paris, Ed. Le Découverte/ Le Monde) -- in 1984, Derrida is confronted with such problems as the Solidarnost (Christian-Solidarnist Syndicate) uprising in Poland against the then Communist regime, the Red Army's war in Afghanistan to defend a "brotherland," the political situations in Salvador, Chile, -- in the Middle East, human rights in Turkey, "racist" tensions in the then EEC (now the European Union),

The Gulf War (02.08.1990 / 01.03.1991).

Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, invades Kuwait, a neighboring country, which he refers to as "Iraq's nineteenth province." In doing so, he invokes the situation of Kuwait before Western powers intervened in that region.

- "So in the name of territorial integrity - Kuwait is, in his view, integral part of Iraq" Saddam Hussein invades. -- .

"Territorial integrity" can be seen as a metaphysical concept, if only because some specialists on the region dismiss his opinion as incorrect. "In the name of injustice done to the Kuwaitis" -- remember their national sovereignty (in 1899 Kuwait, under English protection, became independent of Turkey) the Allies intervened and expelled the Iraqis. -- "National sovereignty" is also a metaphysical concept.

Derrida's dual response.

Derrida's main concern is not so much the precise dissection of the data in question as an immediate reaction: "In an immediate reaction, he would say - urgent problems do not allow anything else - : "In the name of justice regarding political relations, I agree with the disenfranchised - the Kuwaitis - against the disenfranchised - the Iraqis." What he calls "une opposition simple et radicale".

His intermediate reaction - later - is to confirm that immediate reaction: he wants "not to lose the advantage (le bénéfice) inherent in the immediate reaction" (in French: afin de ne pas perdre le bénéfice de cette prise de position").

Therefore, before anything else: "Searching for a place (*opm.*: position) where encapsulating the stance

is no longer possible" (in French: "Rechercher des lieux ou la récupération d'une prise de position quelconque n'est plus possible"). What interests us here is that Derrida, like the Iraqis and the Kuwaitis, respectively, and the Allies, justifies "in the name of." Knowing how J.-Fr. Lyotard criticized that "justifying in the name of" from the crisis of "the names" ("There are no more names in the name of which one justifies oneself"), Derrida's reaction comes across as "metaphysical." After all, In the name of something that is open to many criticisms - deconstructible - he responds "simply and radically." Like many a person who knows nothing of deconstructionist philosophy. Like the traditional metaphysician.

After all, to decide who is now rightly acting "in the name of," there is - certainly in Derrida's view - no higher authority beyond those involved: both sides will thus continue to defend, even in retrospect (in the history books e.g.), that they were "right" on their side. They will continue to claim that the opponent was wrong.

On both sides with the necessary arguments. Thus taking into account the differences - we will just postpone the proper concept of "right" until later. Notwithstanding all that, Derrida responds "in the name of" abstract concepts. In this sense, he is and remains metaphysical.

Note -- Now a Platon (-427/-347) may not be Derrida's great friend. Yet there is a text with which Derrida will agree.

P. Foulquié, La dialectique, Paris, PUF, 1949, 21, speaks of Platon's philosophizing ("dialectics"). -- After Platon presents dialectics as "the skill of raising oneself to the idea of 'the good' (*note*: value without more)," he seems to conceive of it as "the skill in discussing."

Now to explain why the future high magistrates in his ideal state, are only practiced in dialectics at an advanced age, he says "It is really to be avoided that, while they are young, they get a taste for dialectics.

Indeed, thou hast found - I think - that Young men, when they have become acquainted with the dialectic, abuse it, make a game of it. They use it to contradict each other incessantly. Those who refute them mimic

they after and refute them in turn. They engage - like young dogs - those they meet in that squabbling and tear them apart by reasoning." (*Politeia* 7: 539b).

In other words: even Platon's dialectic (going up together in dialogues toward the higher, the idea of the good) is no panache or panacea. Platon realizes this very well.

The idea "dialectic," once one thinks of it together with the ways in which people deal with it (the concept includes not only its proper use but also its abuse, as Platon says very explicitly), is linked to its differences. Thus she is to be deferred. --

Derrida: as we saw above - complains that he is misunderstood : it will be his consolation that the great founder of Western philosophy - whom he certainly does not carry in his heart - has already become very well acquainted with the same thing : whether it concerns platonic metaphysical notions or differential ones, it comes down to the same thing in terms of reception and interpretations. Especially the negative ones then.

Differential thinking and zeitgeist.

In reference to *Ph. Buyck/ K, Humbeeck, ed., De constructie (A little zoo for children of today)*, Antwerp, Restant, 1987, P. Pelckmans, in Streven, says, "Jacques Derrida's apparatus of concepts fits perfectly into a literary enterprise in which it is a question of unmasking language, of exposing its pseudo-evidence and ditto naturalness." Pelckmans specifies how this unmasking proceeds: "Any attempt to arrive at unambiguous, definitive statements does violence to the language in which they are formulated: words, sentences, texts are always naturally multivalent. It never really succeeds in bringing them unassailable into one exclusive denominator. Apparent successes in this direction fatally rely on mutilating artifice".

Remark -- When one hears such speaking, then - what we have higher called 'sense conception' - the unambiguous meaning of something - a given, e.g., a text - is always 'sense foundation'. The ambiguity of everything is so massive and massive that the pure grasp of what is given is to be postponed. -- Pelckmans adds : "The need to question everything emphatically has, in my view, less to do with any intrinsic uncontrollability of language than with a historically explicable temporal climate." The book briefly discussed by him

situates, among others, Derrida opposite Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900), the man of "Gott ist tot" (the death of the metaphysical concept of "god"), S. Freud (1856/1939), the founder of psychoanalysis (the conscious and rational life controlled by the unconscious and subconscious part of the soul), E. Husserl (1859/1938), the father of intentional phenomenology (consciousness directed, in a direct way, to all that shows itself), M. Heidegger (1889/1978), the founder of fundamental ontology. These four minds have already begun the phase-out to some extent, but Derrida thoroughly radicalizes the incitements he finds among them.

Remark -- When one learns that, surely it is not surprising that, as especially in America, epigones of Derrida rename his differential theory of understanding anarchic (libertarian), -- to his great discomfort. Unmistakably, there is an ingredient in Derrida that is anarchic.

Derrida's Jewish origins.

Oliver Tapli, *Les enfants d'Homère (L' héritage grec et l' Occident)*, Paris, Laffont, 1990 (// *Greek Fire* (1989)) 201, writes what follows.

Whether one likes Derridaism or not, deconstruction theory has charmed students/students. -- especially in the USA (where Derrida is currently (1987) working). In turn, he is surrounded by supporters(s)-.

In a conference in Los Angeles, in 1987, he looked at his own thinking from an autobiographical point of view. He asserted what follows. As an Algerian Jew but raised in France, he felt "an exile in his own country." He was driven to create a space liberated from the three great traditions alien to his own intellectual life: Greece, Christianity, German idealism.

Note -- The term "German idealism" refers essentially to the ways of thinking of Joh. G. Fichte (1762/1814), Friedr. W. Schelling (1775/1854) and especially Georg Fr. Hegel (1770/1831). Of the three, Schelling was simultaneously a Romantic thinker.

It is not surprising that, when one opposes the three European ways of thinking mentioned a moment ago, one is forced to "wind down": indeed, it is as if Derrida cannot digest those three non-Jewish currents, as if they are sour to him, as if he can never get enough of expelling them, That explains a lot.

Derridism and feminism.

The cited book by Buyck/ Humbeeck et al, *De constructie*, Antwerp, 1887, dwells, among other things, on the domains in which abolition theory asserts itself : literatology (literary studies), medicine, feminist literary studies.

Kristien Hemmerechts, Feminism and the Study of Literature (Women Read Tradition), in: *Streven* 54 (1986): dec., 237/246, writes what follows: "The French feminists are obviously not the first and only ones to erode the position of authority of the autonomous and sovereign subject. One of the great pacesetters of this movement is Jacques Derrida.

For him, language is the field of research par excellence to show how the authority of the subject/father/author is threatened and undermined. His focus is also on the mechanisms that structure the text and make it the bearer of unambiguous meaning, but on "the cracks" in the text, the mechanisms that disrupt and subvert the transmission of meaning and make the text a hotbed of multiplicity and ambiguity. Language escapes the control of "the subject" and disrupts the mechanisms that should guarantee coherence and unity.

Language utterances are not the expression of a meaning that precedes and/or transcends the language utterance, but a play of signifiers (*note*: 'signifiant' (Sa), i.e. a sound with a meaning ('signifié' (Sé)) in which the moment of meaning is repeatedly postponed. The subject has no control over this process".

Note -- This difficult text will continue to become clearer. Meanwhile, this: Hemmerechts as a feminist talks about the predominance of "the man" in our traditional culture, who is "the subject" par excellence, i.e. he with his consciousness of things imposes his views on the whole culture and even on the nature that surrounds us. The man was traditionally regarded as "autonomous," i.e. he has his own domain where he is lord and master, and at the same time as "sovereign" i.e. he is regarded as vanguard and paragon also outside his domain, e.g. for the woman.

Feminism rebels against that form of "authority" - therefore not yet against all authority without more - by interpreting things in a feminine way (hermeneutics): one and the same fact leads to both a masculine interpretation and, thanks to feminism, a feminine interpretation. It is ambiguous.

Kristien Hemmereichs formulates the main grievance as follows (a.c., 237) "Wie konnte die Frau wirklich leben in einer Welt an deren Gestaltung sie nicht teilhat?" (*Susanne Meyer, Jeder ist eine Frau*, in: *Die Zeit* 1986: Sept. 12), This is one of many questions Susanne Mayer formulates following a recent women's festival week in Hamburg.

Actually it is not a question but the confirmation of the feminist position: women live in a culture that is not their own,-- in a society that they did not help design. The political structures, the institutions, the consecrated art and literature are products of male thinking, Cultural and societal forms are made on men's terms. For women, our civilization is not a home. Even the concept of woman, as *Simone de Beauvoir* (1908/1986; *Le deuxième sexe*, Paris, 1977) argued, is a product of male thinking."

Note -- This harsh language -- it sounds like the woman was driven out of the culture whole and all is the point of view, understand: the interpretation, of the feminists at the vanguard,-- without therefore representing the point of view of millions of other women who feel happy in her roles. But that point of view does fit into derridian "subversion.

Kr. Hemmereichs concludes as follows: "Feminism raises questions that go far beyond the equal rights of men and women."--Provided by publisher.

1. It is about much more than equal pay for equal work, equal study opportunities, equal employment opportunities, -- as important as these demands may be,

2. Feminism formulates questions that touch the foundation of Western thought and society. It sows doubt where self-righteous certainties prevail, unmask.

Note: The word is out again! - values considered 'sacred,' undermines truths that are considered universal. - Hence feminism concerns everyone, men as well as women".

Note -- The very same thing could be said of Derrida's differential position : it touches the foundations of our Western culture, sows doubt where certainties prevail,-- unmask values, -- reduces general truths to private or individual ones.-- That is why Derrida provokes such vehement reactions, both pro and con.

Allan Bloom on deconstruction hermeneutics.

Bloom is the radical defender, in the USA, of the classical tradition (from the Ancient Greeks onward). -- He was confronted with Derridism on his American -- against which Derrida himself, for reason of its being too anarchic, also reacts in the name of a "straightforward" (orthodox) interpretation -- and reacted vehemently. -- *DI. Taplin. Les enfants d' Homère*, Paris, 1989, 198s., quotes him.

Allan Bloom -- so Taplin introduces -- devotes a scathing paragraph to "the school of deconstruction" -- "It is the final stage -- with no surprises at least -- on the road to the elimination of reason and to the misunderstanding of truth in the name of philosophy itself. -- The sense-making activity, of the one who reads, is more important than the text read itself. Yes, there is actually no more "text"! There is only the interpretation.

As a result, what is most important, i.e. to grasp the meaning of what the texts have to teach, is sacrificed to the soul-searching, subjective persona of that kind of interpreters/interpreters who maintain that there is neither a text nor a reality to which that text refers. -- Such a cheaper way of reading à la Fr. Nietzsche frees us from the objective demands of works that could have liberated us from an atmosphere that is becoming more suffocating from along."

Note -- The anarchic ("misarchic" to use Nietzsche's term) circumscription of Derrida's position is an exaggerated form of deconstruction. And the type of (reality in the) text interpretation is a caricature: yet there is an element of truth in it. In the sense that even Derrida shifts the emphasis away from objective reality and from the text concerning that objective reality to the one who - subjectively or not - interprets that reality and that text concerning that reality. That then is the "new hermeneutics."

Explanation.

Bibl. st.: *H. Arvon. La philosophie allemande*, Paris, 1970, 116/120 (*L'hermeneutique*). -- 'Hermeneutics' is the skill concerning interpreting, resp. interpreting (translating).

1. Traditionally, hermeneutics was an auxiliary science (in Bible study and theology, in law) that helped with the question, "How to actualize (old) texts in a (new) situation in such a way that they are (still) applicable?"

Indeed: what can an ancient text of the prophet Isaias mean for me, for us, for a Negro-African e.g.? Or what application is justifiable by a judge of a text from the Code Napoléon? One can see that 'hermèneuein', interpretation, is daily business for theologians and jurists. But in such a way that one first tries to grasp the correct, objective sense of the given text (sentence summary; D. 10), -- to then grasp the present situation correctly and objectively (sentence summary). Such that thanks to comparison (which does not mean "equivalence" but rather "confrontation") the two sense views are thought together in order to arrive at a sensible sense foundation (D. 10) in which both sense views come into their own, -- not subject to idiosyncratic, (imposed by others) straightforward (do not confuse "straightforward" with "sincere") or preferential (a-priori) sense foundations,

2. A revolution in the meaning of traditional hermeneutics is exposed in the posthumous work *Dialektik* (1839) by *Friedr. D. Schleiermacher* (1768/1834) : he turns "hermeneutics" thanks to sense-making - into something new, i.e. the pedestal of philosophizing.

First in Bible interpretation at home now sounds like this: Schleiermacher thinks that the thought content (information) in a text-e.g., a Bible text-becomes fully understandable only as one interprets it as part of the personal life of its author. Understanding the "Sits im Leben" the belonging in the life of the one who writes the text is thus fundamental.

Note -- As a method of inquiry, such hermeneutics is adopted by the historical school. F.K. von Savigny (1779/1861) is the founder of it, -- with in his wake: J.G. Eichhorn, W. Grimm, especially L. von Ranke. Thanks to the tracing of as many details as possible, trying to penetrate into what happened in the past is the objective.

3. A new revolution concerning hermeneutics represents W. Dilthey (1833/1911) with his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1883). Life (cultural-historical life) is not "explained" ("Erklären") like inorganic nature (thanks to physics and chemistry) without empathy, but "understood" ("Verstehen") through empathy and sympathy. That life - e.g., of people in the past whose

expressions is not directly knowable. What Joh. G. Droysen (1808/1884) known for his *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (1877/1878) calls "the Überreste" (i.e. the historian's sources of knowledge e.g. as testimonial remnants of the past), that Dilthey calls "Ausdrücke" (expressions). Of what? Of life. And primarily of soul life, of the life of the spirit (hence the term 'spirit science'). A cultural landscape, a monument, a legal text, an old national anthem,--a tape recording, a film reportage--all these are residues that bear witness to the inner life of fellow human beings. -- Throughout those "manifestations," "expressions," of the "spirit" ("soul life") we know that spirit, that soul life that reveals or expresses itself in it.

"The expression (of life) is the bridge, in a sense, between (be)living ('Erleben') and understanding ('Verstehen')." Or still: "Understanding ('Verstehen') is a process in which we know inner (be)life from signs given to us from outside -- think a the witnessing texts -- namely, the expressions ('Ausdrücke')." Or still: "Erleben, Ausdruck, Verstehen: these three parts together make up a single inseparable unity." Thus H. Diwald, *Wilhelm Dilthey (Erkenntnistheorie und Philosophie der Geschichte)*, Göttingen/ Berlin/ Frankfurt, 1963, 153ff. (*Der Ausdruck als Mittelglied zwischen Erlebnis und Verständnis*),

4. Following in the footsteps of M. Heidegger (existential phenomenology) and R. Bultmann (1884/1976) (existential Bible criticism), H.-G. Gadamer (1900/2002) develops a hermeneutics of his own in his *Wahrheit und Methode (Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik)*, Tübingen, 1960, in which the emphasis is less on the individual soul than with Schleiermacher, Dilthey and e.g. Emilio Betti.

With this, we hope - the concept of hermeneutics (which itself represents a whole series of (re)-designations (differences/deferred understanding)) has become somewhat clearer. Above all, Derrida 's hermeneutics now stands out more clearly against this background. His hermeneutics is clearly more rebellious, 'subversive' since he knows himself as "an exile within one's own country," i.e. Western cultural history.

In this, similar to the feminists who feel radically alien within a human country.

A comparison.

Hans Blumenberg, Das Lachen des Thrakerin (Eine Urgeschichte der Theorie), Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1987, ties in with the anecdote told in *Platon's Theaitos Dialogue*; Thales of Miletos (-624/-545; the first typical sage) is absorbed in examining the firmament and in doing so falls negligently into a well. His thracian maid burst into laughter in the process.

Blumenberg sees in - interpretation - Thales the "theoria," the inquisitive absorption into, and in - interpretation - the maid **and her? the** diurnal "Lebenswelt. Two interpretations among other possible ones impose themselves on Blumenberg:

a. the life and earthliness of philosophizing is exposed in its futility as something to laugh at;

b. the claims -- pretensions -- of philosophy arouses the laughter of "the mean mind." -- Here a word from Heidegger is appropriate: "Philosophy is that kind of thinking which compels maidens to burst into laughter. -- Blumenberg's book is spent on the interpretations -- from Platon to Heidegger -- of anecdote.

Note -- We mention this work briefly because among postmoderns there is one streak that makes merry: *Fröhliche Wissenschaft (Nietzsche)* - about the . indeed sometimes deadly seriousness and self-importance of philosophy as traditionally perpetrated.

Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, Frankf.a.M., Suhrkamp, 1981-1, 1986-2, is the work in which Blumenberg's "Theorie der Unbegrifflichksit" (theory of ungraspability) is exposed.

a. Blumenberg replaces the traditional theory of knowledge that centers on the contact between the knowing subject and the known object (theory of meaning) with the hermeneutic theory of knowledge that centers on the signifying contact between the reading and the read text,

b. But there is a pejorative ulterior motive: the text (either the world we live in or the texts concerning that world) - 'text' stands for "all that is interpretable" - turns out to be unreadable in the long run. Or at least the readability - mean: interpretability - of the world and its interpretations in texts is very limited (one senses a variant of difference/delay). One can interpret both the world and texts about the world differently each time. - This endless - yes, dead-end - process of interpretation is explained by a whole series of citations from the Bible and from ancient, medieval and modern texts.

2.2. -- *The differential philosophy of language*

We dwelt at length on Derrida's very characteristic hermeneutics, which defines a (metaphysical) term by reference to all possible interpretations of that term.-- We noted again and again that the reality of traditional ontology is replaced by "the text" where "text" designates both the reality intended in a language about reality (the referent) and that language about reality. Immediately, "the language" and "language use," respectively, took center stage. -- Let us now elaborate on both these concepts.

Dual logocentrism.

In ancient Greek, the term "logos" means, among other things, "reason/ reasoning capacity/ reasoning" but also "language" in which reason expresses itself. Derrida accuses "Western philosophy" of logocentrism: it always places the spoken word as a purer form of language above writing.

He refers to Platon for this. -- indeed: it is as *DI. Taplin, Les enfants d' Homère*, Paris, 1989, 199, writes: "*Jacques Derrida*, the best-known among the deconstructionists (deconstructionists), has published an essay, *La pharmacologie de Platon* (1968). It is a study of the *Faidros dialogue*. In it Socrates defends the thesis that the spoken language is "more real" than the written.-- Derrida also refers to J.J. Rousseau (1712/1778; conclusion and transgression of the French enlightenment or philosophie des lumières).

Derrida's interpretation of tradition.

a. *The spoken word* gives "the impression" that sound (signifier, Se) and indicated or signified (meaning, Sé) by that sound coincide (are volidental). -- Thus e.g., "I see you standing there." Whoever hears, resp. listens carefully, seems to catch the sense and believes that he/she understands what the speaker wants to say. In response to the signifier -- the term expressed in a judgment -- he/she -- so he/she believes -- understands the signified.

This while the written word gives only 'grammars', ingratiations (think of the term 'inscription'), which are difficult for the reader to decipher : he/she has to look for a signifier! Moreover, the characters of l' écriture are spaced, i.e. written in space apart, one after the other, printed, -- to be read.

Think of the phrase "I see you standing there" in the text of a letter e.g.. -- It may be that the meaning of a moment ago is meant. But it may also be that "I see you standing there (signified/ triumphant)" is meant with the emphasis on a psychic condition.

Remark -- How ambiguous that expression can be is apparent when one considers whether the person saying it is saying it neutrally (he / she sees you standing through the curtain e.g.) or triumphantly ("(You think I don't see you but) I see you standing there") or yet with some other modality. Fundamentally, modalities are central to Derrida's interpretive praxis. -- Meaning-making is thus indeed very difficult and similar to a deciphering (of signs or utterances, as Dilthey already considered (D.20)).

b. Derrida on de Saussure.

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857/1913), the author of Ch. Bally / A. Sècheyne / A. Riedlinger, *Cours de linguistique générale*, Paris, Payot, 1931-3, is the founder of structural linguistics, which focuses on semiology (the study of signs in the life of society).

For de Saussure, the written word is merely an image, a secondary tool, of the spoken language.-- Of course, as an eristician who likes to argue, Derrida notes : when he explains the differential (not the differential) of the spoken word, he appeals, among other things, to writing! Thus : the letter 'b' can also be written as 'B' or bêta as long as 'b' or 'B' or bêta are different from all the other (the complement) letters (signifiers, Se's) of the one alphabet.

In passing: in this way all other letters are "present," - though "absent" (i.e. not expressed, written or co-expressed, co-written) - in the present letter "b" ("B," beta).

Opm.-- Whether this is such a thunderous argument against de Saussure is highly questionable. But to that end.

De Saussure's conception of language extended by Derrida in a differential sense.-- The basic terms of de Saussure's semiology are 'langage' (the linguistic phenomenon), subdivided into 'langue (language)/ parole' (language use)."

In which he distinguishes two points of view - interpretations - regarding "langue" (language): one can study language diachronically (in its historical evolution) (which was done diligently before him) and synchronically.

De Saussure does not rule out the possibility of a linguistics that studies "le parole" (the use of language) and proceeds "diachronically. Yet he very definitely opts for "la langue" (the language) and does so synchronically.

Note: there is use of language when we speak, write, but also when we silently think, ponder (because, as Platon already knew, when we ponder, we mumble inner words). There is no language without language use. -- but it is also true that whoever speaks, writes, speaks inwardly while thinking, finds a language and does not invent it on the spot. Even he who says something new that has never been said by anyone before does so in a pre-existing language. If not, he would not be understood by fellow human beings.

What strikes de Saussure is that language, in principle, is identical in every individual who speaks it, while language use is such that each individual is distinguishable from all other language users.

Language is a system.

This is the systems theory aspect. Every valid sound in a language, applies only insofar as it is

- a. is part of the whole and
- b. differs - is discriminable, distinguishable - from all other valid signs. it is seen that complementation (or dichotomy (one sign/all other signs) is essential. in all difference they refer to each other. In one sign that is present, all other signs that are absent are still present somewhere.

The language as signifiant (sa)/ signifie (sé).

Each "signe," sign, contains a sound that means something (signifiant, signifier) but also a meaning (signifié, signified).

Note -- The word "donkey" is

- a. the valid sound "donkey" but
- b. also that which is meant by that sound. This need not necessarily be an actual ass existing outside the speaking: it can also be an imagined reality.

Note -- A readable account of de Saussure's conception of language gives R.C. Kwant, *Structuralists and structuralism*, Alphen aan den Rijn, Samson, 1978, 11/36 (The structuralist thinking of de Saussure).

In passing, "structure" here means the fact that accidental signs (sounds, phonological) are made orderly by the structures or ordering rules that characterize a language as language. Throughout the boundless variations of speech, the rules remain unchanged.

Linguistic relations.

Cours de linguistique générale, 170/175 (Rapports syntagmatiques et associatifs).

1. Syntagmatic links.

If we take terms such as : re-reading, against all, the life of man, God is good, - if the weather is good, then we go out -- 're' and 'reading' e.g. or 'if ... then ...' are singular or compound terms (signifiers) which, in the temporal sequence of words which make up speech (writing, thinking), both differ and belong together. This belonging together in all difference is what de Saussure calls "syntagma" (literally: something placed together, arrangement together).

2. Associative links.

O.g. similarity (difference) and coherence (break, gap) either in sound or in meaning, sets and systems arise as follows :

2.a. teach / point; education / ice; -- education / shelter; -- let us go / let us protest;

2.b. teaching/forming/educating; education/culture/civilization.

The terms, singular or compound, differ but belong together o.g. association (with one term one thinks of another that differs from it but belongs to it in memory - language memory).

The analogy (partly similar/ related/ partly different/ separate) evidently plays a leading role here. It is the basis of discovering syntagma and association (one also says "paradigm" for the latter).

As an aside, the syntagmatic relation is "in praesentia," because it makes currently present terms one, while the associative relation proceeds "in absentia," because it makes terms that are absent partially (the complement) one,

A brief comparison.

What de Saussure does is what ancient Greeks called 'stoicheiosis' o.g. 'anamnesis' 'Anamnesis' (lat.: reminiscentia, well-ordered memory) differs from 'mnèmè' (lat.: memoria, vague and incoherent memory). 'Anamnesis' is the basis of ordering by comparison (stoicheiosis; lat.: elementatio).

Platon has left us a phonological sample of this.

Bibl. st.: *E.W. Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics*, Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1944, 36v.-- In his *Theaitetos dialogue*, *Platon* distances himself from the

method of comparative ordering or stoicheiosis but in his *Filebos* 18 B/D he makes them, after redesignation, his own.

"When someone - either a god or a divine man (according to an Egyptian story, his name was Theuth (*note*: also: Thoth, the inventor of hieroglyphic writing)) noticed that all that is sound is infinitely different among themselves, he was the first to realize:

1) that the vowels in that infinity of differences were not one but many, and again

2) that there were other sounds which although not vowels still possessed a certain sound value and that there was a certain number of these too and

3) he distinguished a third kind of letters this we now call consonants.-- Then he divided the consonants until he distinguished each one separately, -- in the same way the vowels and the semivowels until he knew the number of these too.-- he called each of them and all of them collectively 'letters'. -- but he recognized that none of us could learn one of them separately without all the others;-- he considered that this was a connection that made them all one, also he assigned to them a science which he called 'grammar'."

One sees from this Platonic text that a multiplicity is brought to unity (connection) o.g. analogy (metaphorical which relies on resemblance; metonymical which relies on coherence). Immediately it is clear that de Saussure applies the same method to a newly discovered domain, namely phonological (do not confuse with traditional "phonetic") linguistics.

Note -- Romanticism -- whatever one may say of it -- was well aware of the comparative order (harmology, theory of relations), as E.W. Beth, o.c. clearly observes, "The idea of a 'mathesis universalis,' a 'scientia generalis' -

Note -- Galenos, Ramon Lull, Descartes, Leibniz had already tried to arrive at such a comprehensive comparative ordering called "mathesis universalis" - was vehemently opposed by I. Kant (1724/1804; top figure of the German Enlightenment) but taken up again by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel (D. 15: German idealism). However, the rejection of mathematics as a paradigm has led the latter to apply a mode of argument which can never be satisfactory to a reader familiar with exact methods of proof". (o.c., 141).

A romantic-idealist paragon.

Bibl. st.: H.A. Ett, ed., G.A. van den Bergh van Eysenga. *Hegel*, The Hague. Kruseman. s.d., 67vv. -- A certain Krug had reproached Hegel for deducing all things from a-priori principles -- aximas -- , i.e. from pure. thought, and thus wishing to demonstrate the necessity of all things.

Krug challenged him to an application: how can Hegel deduce the existence of every dog in every cat, indeed the existence of its penholder, from "the understanding." -- Hegel, in 1802, set right that misinterpretation of his deductive thinking. The title was : "How the ordinary human mind conceives philosophy (made clear from the works of Herr Krug)."

1. -- Actual existence.

Hegel: this needs no a-priori proof, because it is given.-- Thus dogs are an established fact.

2. -- The Hegelian deduction.

"To deduce something" means: to show that it is outside a broader - called by Hegel "dialectical" coherence

a. cannot exist and **b.** cannot be thought of. In other words: that it is indispensable as a "moment, (*note*: movable element) within a greater whole.

3. -- The Hegelian 'understanding'.

'Deducing' in the Hegelian sense is: to point out and understand the meaning and place of something e.g. dogs and cats, penholder - (*note* : what happens e.g. in the theory of evolution or in the classification of animals) with the premise of understanding, i.e. the understanding of the living whole.

So the term "understanding" is not at all the abstract thing of ordinary rationalists. It is the totality within which something can be situated that comes to full awareness.

In the broadest - comprehensive (transcendental) - sense, "the concept" is being brought to full consciousness within which each being is situated.

Hegel thinks "concretely," i.e., things in a coherence that is understood. -- The ordinary rationalist yanks things out of that coherence which does not even come to consciousness except vaguely. Thus he tried, naively admittedly, to deduce the solar system from the understanding of the living whole that is the universe; i.e. to make it comprehensible, -- to show there the meaning and place wan.

One sees that this is stoiceiosis but in a German-idealist sense.

When, after the two citations (Platon, Hegel), we now read *Cours de linguistique générale*, 157, we see how de Saussure engages in a tradition -- "To want to define the unity within the separate sign of signifier (sound) and signified (content of knowledge and thought) is a mistake. To do so would betray the belief that one can start with the separate terms and thus assemble the system as its 'sum' where one must start from the coherent whole to obtain, by analysis, its elements."

Reality and language according to de Saussure.

Bibl. st.: R.C. Kwant. *Structuralists and structuralism*. Alphen a.d. Rijn, 1978, 18,- . What de Saussure calls "nomenclature" (terminology, list of names) is the following conception:

1. given are the "things.
2. those "things" are represented in terms;
3. the concepts are expressed in words. --

He radically rejects that view.

He tries to prove this.

- a. Only the nouns (and then only in appearance) can be so indicated.
- b. the great mass of other words/word types does not fit in there.-- "The weather" can pass as the depiction in understanding and word of the weather. But "It is cold weather" or "There is no water" are no such representation.

To this must be replied that-at least in real traditional ontology and logic-it is not about 'words' but 'terms': the term is the representation in words of a concept. The 'term' in the logical sense should not be confused with the 'word' in the speech sense. Multiple words are often necessary to express a single concept. They then make up only one term. E.g., "some people," "a marble palace."

Conversely : a single word can represent several concepts. E.g. "I am singing" as a representation of "I am singing" or "I have decided to sing." -- *Cfr. Ch. Lahr, S.J., Logique*, in: *Cours de philosophie*, I (*Psychologie/ Logique*). Paris, 1933-27, 492. -- M.a.: "There is" means "It is a fact that".

But there is more: 'thing' in de Saussure's language means 'something' that is encounterable in our human world of experience." Whereas 'thing' in strict ontological language means only 'something' without more (the 'something' may or may not be encounterable in the human world of experience).

The "signs" (Sa/ Sé) of language are reality (in the strictly ontological sense of "all that is not-nothing") insofar as it appears in our thinking-thinking mind : they are the articulated phenomenon, that is, the phenomenon insofar as it shows itself.

In other words: like so many, de Saussure adheres to ordinary language (which many confuse with strict ontological-logical language).

Differentialization by Derrida.

Behold how Derrida circumscribes Saussure.

1. -- The sign (Sa / Sé = signifier/ signified) is a "positive" term.-- The term "teacher" e.g. is a signifier that refers to all that is teacher (in our mind or in our world of experience) as "domain. One can define. "One who teaches students".

Or even better, "A man who teaches students." In de Saussure's view, there is a fixed connection of signifier and signified within the sign. That this union of Sa and Sé is fixed makes the word in question a positive term (a, man, who, teaches, to, pupils are parts of the language system in which one expresses oneself). The definition consists of signs present.

2.a.-- The language we employ in language use is a finite and closed system, encompassing all valid signs. Each element can therefore be described 'positively' within that system, as just seen. The rest, of the unused terms are not prefixed. That is "the other of" the words used,

2.b.-- More according to de Saussure, the signifiers (Sa's) can only be defined by means of the differences with "the rest" of the language elements (in the form of pairs of opposites: man/woman, because the man is non-woman, -- lesson/holiday, because the lesson is labor in non-holiday; students/graduates, because to be a student is to have not yet graduated; -- etc.).

In other words, the terms present such as man, class, pupils, etc. are, within the language system, through the differences between them, the non-existent terms (the opposites). The identification of the terms used is by reference and is thus purely relational, relative. - So much for de Saussure.

In summary, de Saussure already uses the couple "present/ absent to define the present. Which is non-positively defining.

In other words, anyone who wants to understand the term "teacher" must necessarily know the entire language, even if it is not currently explicitly (= positively defined) in it. One understands the term "teacher" and the definition "a man who teaches student" with the inclusion of the rest that is not explicitly mentioned (which is a non-positive, lateral definition).

The requested at this saussurian fact.-- Now how does Derrida interpret what has just been said? He commits amplification or extension

"Derrida takes the view that de Saussure's theorem must be extended: after all, while the number of signifiers in a language is finite, the number of signifieds is infinite. Thus, there can be no fixed relation between signifier and signified. Immediately, therefore, signs cannot be understood as 'positive' terms. The sign exists only through differenties". (*B. Delfgaauw/ Fr. van Peperstraten, Concise History of Philosophy, Kampen/ Kapellen, 1993, 262v.*)

Remark -- Derrida's remark on de Saussure is not surprising, since he conceives of the meanings of a sign as results of endlessly continuous interpretations in all sorts of directions. That "dissémination" or metastasis of meanings by signifiers) founded by sense conception and especially sense foundation (D. 10) is infinitely great.

"What do I think of when I hear the sign 'teacher'?". When I have been sexually abused by a teacher as a girl e.g., that negative experience of precisely one teacher resonates in my definition (the including), especially with the term 'man' (underlined : "What I lived through with men"). Such a girl will define including her bad experience, even if it is not explicitly stated (negative definition).

What do I associate (D. 25: associative connections, but differentially) with the sign 'teacher' when I have had ('survived') two who could not stand me?" Such a person will define, without words, including those (negative) experiences.

In other words: the meanings of a signifier in a dictionary make up only part of the differential definitions. The "Lebenswelt" or "Sitz im Leben" peculiar to the signs, according to their meanings, endlessly enriches the number of meanings that one signifier has to "accommodate," -- with which the empty shell of a signifier turns out to be fillable "in real life"

Now resume for a moment D. 27 (Hegelian deduction).-- It is so clear that Derrida situates signifiers in the living totality of all possible significations. But his "understanding," which he puts first, is that of the radical reservation concerning definition(s) that lies in the totality of all difficult interpretations of a sign (signifier / signified). That caveat forces postponement and getting stuck in the provisional.

"La trace" (the trace the references). -

A moment ago we saw that each signifier refers to:

- a. an infinite number of signifiers (as its own domain)
- b. the complement of the whole system of signifiers. -- I.e. : one language term refers 'somewhere' - associatively (D. 25): one can never keep Saussure's chapter on comparisons o.g.v. associations before one's eyes enough - to its possibly own meanings and to the other terms, basically : all the other terms of the whole language system.

a. -- **Track.**

That dual reference is called Derrida with a neologism "the trace." -- thus the signifier "rape.

(a) The term includes as interpretations: "brutal/ cunning, undertaken rape" et al;

(b) he refers to "strength"/"powerlessness" ("impotence"), to "submission," to "lack of self-control" and "unscrupulousness," to "power struggle" etc.

In other words, one understands the term "rape" "fully" (including all associations) only if one grasps it as the meeting point of all associations.

The trace or reference is thus a form of presence (explicit givenness) but continually states the "full" presence, for the trace also includes absence (not explicit givenness).-- Thus, in the term "rape" inserts the term "force" and resonates with (resonates with) e.g., "forcefulness" or "powerlessness.

b. -- **the trace field or 'text'.**

Derrida thinks out of "the understanding." What understanding? Not that of Hegel. Well: the trace is the presuppositional par excellence. Not only does it lie for every meaning given to a signifier within the totality of being or reality. In fact, the field or totality of traces lies for every first

principle (i.e. all that explains the totality of all that is reality). So e.g. for the idea as Hegel conceives it, i.e. as that which explains everything (as axiom par excellence). So even for the traditional concept of being (as e.g. Aristotle presupposes it in his metaphysics as 'archè' (lat.: principium, principle)).

Why? Because the term "idea" (in the Hegelian sense) or even the term "being" (in the Aristotelian sense) enter the field of traces. They are the meeting point of references. To speak of a first principle is to enter that field.

The "textuality"

Again, a neologism. 'Texere,' in Latin, means 'to weave,' 'to interweave.' -- The network of traces or references in which each term or sign is situated, interweaves that term

- a. with all the possible interpretations or meanings that are the domain of it, and
- b. with the rest of the whole system of terms or language. To think, even to think from "first propositions," is to find oneself already in "textuality."

Now is textuality itself a "first principle"? No! "First principle" in Derrida's language implies that it is an all-embracing (transcendental) foundation on which the rest of the account can be constructed. Such a thing is too much "outside" the network or textuality as Derrida conceives it. The text is the very interweaving of all the signs of language: the traces are in the signs and the very references of the signs to domain and systemic residue.

Note -- We were talking D.25 about ancient Greek stoicheiosis. Well, 'stoicheion', lat.: elementum, actually means "all that acts as part of a sequence (a file, a line, a rank)." So e.g. *Platon*, in *Theaitètos* 202E, says "grammaton stoicheia," the letters that make up written things. Or existed the expression: "kata stoicheion" (also: stoichaiakos'), in alphabetical order.

The text was thus sensed at the time as an interlocking of elements and stoicheiosis is then to assign each element its place and meaning in the living whole. This by virtue of "anamnèsis" or memory, the faculty that gathers the references or traces o.g. associations. - Derrida's differentialism is perhaps more traditional than appears at first glance.

Ontology/Tropology.

We now interrupt the account of Derrida's thinking to test his "textuality" ontologically.

A. -- *The traditional concept of being(the).*

This term means "not-nothing" i.e. all that is anything so that even a fiction or imagination, a nightdream/daydream, becoming, a utopia or a pure thought are "being," i.e. non-nothing. A science fiction story is non-nothing, i.e., something (even a fascinating and over-involved something!) and therefore being.

In this sense, 'being(the)' is opposed to all that is absolutely nothing (what is called in substantivizing language "the absolute or utter nothing"). In this sense, the sign 'being(the)' is all-encompassing or, transcendental. For nothing that is anything at all is outside it. - All possible meanings are the domain, of that sign.

B. -- *Identitive thinking.*

All connoisseurs of traditional ontology and logic agree: identity and its variations are the pedestal of ontology and logic. This is called "the identitarian way of thinking."

The identitive range (differential).

Organizing, which traditional harmology (relational science, unitary theory) practices, relies on one schema: two or more "things" (understand: beingnesses), ietsen, are either volidentical (totallyidentical: in that case they coincide, because something is totallyidentical with itself and only something is identical with itself) or partidentical (analogous) or totally non-identical (totally different).

A classic application (exemplification).

The traditional "logical square" is such a range or differential: all - some yes/some no - none (all no), That regarding the basis of the concept of set.

Other form: whole - some parts yes/ some parts no (in part) - no part at all. That regarding the basis of the concept of system ("system").

This dual differential or range is "the (pre-present) understanding" of the living whole that is being (reality, all that is, -- diachronically: all that was, is, will be) from which traditional ontology and logic "deduces. That is, assigns (D 27), situates, interweaves each "given" (something, being) its place and meaning.

Henology (unit theory).

Another saying already used in ancient times - saying for the same thing is: one - partially one - not - one. This is said of a multiplicity. It is brought to unity on the basis of similarity/difference and/or cohesion/gap.

This is what Platon already called all and whole and the middle scholastics "totum logicum" (collection) and "totum physicum" (system). All instances ("elements") of a collection form the same (identical) unit or "totum logicum. All the parts of a system form the same unit or "totum physicum."

In the first case the common property is identical: in the second case the whole is identical, because its parts of a whole - however diverse - have one and the same common property, namely, to belong to one and the same system or whole.

Linguistically, this has the consequence that, in seeing one or more specimens, we think of the collection (we see them including the rest of the collection), see them as members of the same collection. Linguistically this also has the effect that, on seeing one or more parts of a whole, we associate them with the whole system (we see one or more parts including the rest of the whole).-- In both cases we totalize. unconsciously or consciously.

Note -- When e.g. Hegel finds identity, as it is "die einfache Grundbestimmung der traditionellen Logik" (the basic characteristic of traditional logic), ridiculous, it is because he misunderstands it.

Indeed, one often confuses 'identitive' with 'substantialist' or 'atomistic': to think in identitive terms would, in that erroneous view at least, make any relation inconceivable, No: to proceed identitively is to act comparatively (comparatively) -- which is not the same as 'equating' --, i.e. to see more than one datum in its relation to something else. To think identitatively is to see something associatively, to see something in a context of comparison, -- to see its place and meaning in the light of a living and encompassing whole (which is collection and/or system).

This is already evident from Aristotle's list of categories, in which the category of "selfhood" ("substance") goes together with "relation.

The concept of association;

See first D. 25 (also : 30; 31). We associate o.g.v. similarity/difference and coherence/gap, the two great dimensions of identity and its variations.-- The association or thought connection has as its formula: "If by a one thinks of b, then b is an association of a. a and b are thus thought-connected o.g. similarity and/or coherence, the two identitive main types.

Tropology.

That the verb 'to be' is identitive is abundantly clear from the tropes. One distinguishes two' types, metaphor and metonymy. -- associated with two types of synecdoche. the metaphoric and the metonymic.

1. -- *The metaphor.*

She is an abbreviated comparison that sees likeness -- "That woman is a reed." When seeing that woman, one thinks of the pliability of a reed in the wind. Both exhibit one and the same -- identical -- characteristic of "pliability. This is apparent in unconscious or conscious comparison. There is a trace or reference from the term "that woman" to 'reed' via pliability Thus we think of them together and at once. Note: the term "being" is appropriate to the expression, present stellens of that common property. So one says, "That woman is a reed" (where: is similar under one point of view to a reed). The woman and the reed are similar to each other.

2 --*The metonymy.*

She is the abbreviated equation that sees coherence. -- "The beard is there". When one sees the man, one thinks of one (otherwise striking and characteristic) thing, namely, his beard which distinguishes him from the rest. Both, the man and the beard, are not alike but belong to the same totality or system, namely, the one man - with - the - beard. So we think of them together and all at once. Unifying. So that instead of the subject "man" we say "beard," For there is a trace or reference from the beard to the man. We speak as if the beard is the man. Indeed to as part that stands out, of the whole that is the man. -- The man and the beard do not resemble each other: they exhibit coherence.

This appears even better in the Aristotelian model.

Eating apples is partly cause of health. The relationship is one of cause; (omen) to effect (sequel). We say metonymically, "Eating apples is healthy."

Even shorter : "Apples are healthy". -- The verb 'to be' represents - puts it there - a partial identity or unity: the connection - not the similarity - between (eating) apples and health, linked to each other by a single cognitive trait: the cause-effect relationship. The auxiliary verb 'to be' expresses that perfectly: even the simplest folk man understands that abbreviated comparison.

The Synecdoche.

While in metaphor and metonymy the similarity and coherence are central, in metaphorical and metonymic synecdoche the focus is on the collection/copy relationship and the whole/part relationship.

1. *The metaphorical synecdoche.*

"A soldier does not leave his post" says the captain. He does not mean "just one" (copy) but all (the collection).

2. *The metonymic synecdoche.*

"The parish counts two thousand souls." Meant is people (the whole) to expressed is the souls (the part).-- By the way: already the previous sentence (metonymy), i.e. "The beard is there" is synecdochic (the part is expressed to mention the whole, the man).

Two types of induction.

To 'induce' is to work with samples and to think of a totality (association) with these samples: to give them meaning and place within (the understanding of) the living whole in which they belong and become comprehensible. -- Well, on close inspection one sees two types of induction.

1. -- *The metaphorical induction.*

It relies on similarity. - This water and that water boil at 100° C. We associate the thought: all water, the whole collection of all possible samples, will boil at 100° C. We generalize in the belief that the rest of the set of samples will resemble those already taken.

2. -- *The metonymic induction.*

She relies on consistency.-- I get to know the Meir in Antwerp. But then I also get to know the port quarter. I associate the whole of the city of Antwerp. I 'generalize' in the belief that the rest of the system is related to it.

The people who come on the Meir or in the port quarter, also go through the rest so I get to know one economic life : sampled.

-- By taking a sample at two points from the whole of Antwerp -- how people make their money at two points -- I get an insight into the whole from the perspective of two parts. Of course : the more samples I take the more "whole" my view of the whole will be. The more real, i.e. corresponding to reality, my insight will be. -- that is generalization.

Remark -- Associative psychology.

To demonstrate, in a brief digression, that what was set forth regarding identitive method is valid and fruitful, the following. -

Bibl. st.: *Théodule Ribot, La psychologie des sentiments*, Paris, 1917-10, 171/182 (Les sentiments et l'association des idées).-- Ribot (1839/1916) was both experimental psychologist and thinker. The work shows how the mind, as a faculty of value, involves, i.e. associates.

1. -- Parable.

For a young man, if he resembles her son, has the same age and so on, a mother may suddenly, D, 12 (Immediate reaction as Derrida also lives through them) - feel a sympathy arise, o.g. resemblance - there are aspects (parts) that are identical (analogy) - the mother is referred to her son. There is a trace to something absent, not immediate data. Her son walks in unison with the young man,

Ribot gives a second example. -- "Thus there are fear reactions which are called thoughtless. -- A deeper penetrating observation, however, can reduce them to a similar explanatory ground as in the case of the spontaneously sympathizing mother, where similarity was at work." -- In other words: spontaneously we partially identify.

2. -- Coherence.

Ribot uses the term "aangrenzing". -- The feeling that a lover in love originally lived through for the very person of his mistress, he transfers to her clothes, her furniture, her home.

Ribot gives another model: envy and hatred cool their rage on the inanimate objects belonging to the enemy(s), for the same reason: posturing. -- In absolute monarchies, the worship of the monarch, is transferred to his throne, to the emblems of his power.

In other words: spontaneously the mind partially identifies person and what belongs to the person (coherence) (analogy). -- This is also how the erotic fetish proceeds : the object "is" the person!

A pair of panties, a bra, a perfume "are" (partly :analogy) the eroticizing person to whom they belong.

So much for the established phenomena. Now the interpretation. Ribot: "One knows that the association of thought contents was reduced to two basic laws, the law of resemblance in the law of contiguity." The tropological aspect he calls "transfert" ("transfer") : "transfert par ressemblance/ transfert par contiguité".

Such metaphorical and/or metonymic behavior he calls something "under-dokens" but it involves "une influence souvent latente mais efficace".

Note -- We recall how during a US/ Iran conflict maximum, at the time, the US embassy was damaged (metonymically : the part for the whole) or a doll depicting the US President was burned (metaphorically : the likeness for the depicted). - One sees associative signification, a curious form of signification, if not ... the only or at least the main one. What would signify be other than "associate"? This has as its basis (axiom): identitarian ordering,

C. -- Logic (theory of thought).

That traditional logic is identitive is evident from the whole - well-understood and not caricatured - tradition.

G. Jacoby, Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtschreibung, (Ein Diskussionsbeitrag), Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1862, is one long proof of that thesis.

Jacoby : there are many logics (class log., propositional log., modal log.) but there is only one traditional logic with "understanding/judgment/reasoning" as the schema.

Now, one must understand that scheme well: logic begins with the concept of "logical" ("folgerecht"), i.e. derived, correctly reasoned. This takes the linguistic form "if ..., then ...".

That logical relation between a preposition and postposition (implication or comprehension) takes two main forms known since Platon (and even before him among mathematicians).

A. "If A then B.-- well, A. So B". This is called Platon "sunthesis" (deduction).

B. "If X, then B. Well, B. So X". This is called Platon "analisis," reduction. This is because the analisis puts forward a lemma, X, an unknown, which is sought (the requested of the given B).

Both forms of reasoning rely on (partial) identities. With A or X, we think of B that is similar to it or related to it (metaphorical or metonymic analogy).

Thinking from this, we infer that B is proper to A or X.

In other words : the concepts and judgments are only parts of the basic form of the traditional logic "if..., then..." -- Says Jacoby, o.c., 10: reality in itself (**note:** take the term "reality" in the comprehensive sense of "all that is something," of course) -- whether we realize it or not -- is outside the thinking subject ("subject frei"), objectively, behind/ in the data that show themselves, so the objective identities are behind/ in the judgments and reasonings committed by a subject who thinks.

Note -- The entire work provides the notes and bibliography for this purpose.

Note -- In his way, *Josiah Royce* (1855/1916, pragmatic-personalist), in his solid little work *The Principles of Logic*, New York, 1912-1 1961-2, founds logical thought on a theory of order. Thus he says, o.c., 11: "Logic is the general science of order". Inference ("inference") viz. is based on objective relations.

Doctrine of Judgment.

Let us elaborate on the insight gained, i.e. the identitive basis, by reference to what judgments are.

Aristotle already said: "To judge is to "kategorein ti tinos", to pronounce something (else). Whether that something is imaginary or findable in our world and life experience has no logical importance (that would be of importance for epistemology e.g.).

How does this work? The first "something" is the subject ("subject" in the speech sense): the second is the predicate ("predicate").

The proverb contains information about the subject. That means, in model-theoretic language, that the subject is the unknown (original) and the saying is the known (if not it contains no information) (model).-- Cfr. *K. Bertels/ D. Nauta, Introduction to model understanding*, Bussum, De Haan, 1969, 28.

Linguistic : to see something (the original / subject) is to situate it in the understanding of the living whole that is language such that one can speak of the subject in terms of the predicate, i.e. the stock of words that the language system keeps available. By linguistic association, we express the traces that refer from the subject to the saying.

An authority argument.

P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d'herméneutique)*, Paris, Seuil, 1969, 8, says on this point: "The connection between interpretation (in the sense of textual explanation: exégèse textuelle) and understanding (in the broad sense of understanding signs: intelligence des signes) is fostered by one of the traditional meanings of the term 'hermeneutics' itself: Aristotle's booklet on judgment is called "*Peri hermèneias*" (lat.: de interpretatione), Notably : it is striking that, in Aristotelian language, 'hermèneia' is not limited to e.g. allegorizing but is also the name given to any sensible judgment. More so : it is the meaningful judgment that is "hermeneia," i.e., interpretation, to the extent that it "says of something.

Models.

Now let us dwell for a moment on singular judgments

1. -- "*Anneke is running.*"

O.g.v. the connection - identity - between Anneke and being a runner one can speak about her in terms of "being a runner." After all, she is one specimen from the "totum logicum" (collection/ class) of "runners. Understood: (Anneke is) a (runner).-- When one sees her busy, a trace refers to that collection.

2. -- "*Anneke walks*".

Attention: in everyday language, that judgment can mean "Anneke is running." Here, however, we take the second possibility: "Anneke is (currently) running." -- The multiplicity -or plurality of the expression "Anneke is running" shows that the context provides the inclusion for correct understanding. One understands the sentence but including the context, which, though absent, still counts somewhere and is -- to speak derridianly -- "present.

O.g.v. the connection -- identity connection, here of coherence,-- not as in the previous example, resemblance -- between Anneke and walking one can, indeed, must -- if one wishes to correctly represent an actual perception -- speak of her in terms of "walking.

In both previous cases there is identity: being Anneke/ running and Anneke: running, but she is not total identity but partial identity, i.e. analogy. The first time metaphorical, the second time metonymic analogy, Precisely the analogy "grounds" the associations and the judgment the association expresses.

The traditional-logical pronouncing of a relationship.

One can hear logisticians say that, without their "logic of relations" (understand : logistics concerning relations), traditional logic cannot express a relation as it should,

Take an example. -- "That church over there is bigger than all the surrounding buildings."

Not only does the term "is" go together perfectly with "greater than" ("is greater than" is a sensible expression), but what is more : we reread D. 28, where the traditional point of view is clearly brought up The ontology and the logic, based on that ontology uses not words but terms. The relation "greater than" consists of two words but expresses one concept, namely, the concept "greater than." The traditional logic of understanding contains not only "substantives" but also relation-expressing words.

General decision.

D. 33/41 (ontology/ tropology) can be concluded with this sentence: what de Saussure says about the associative side of language use can be logically rigorously founded from the doctrine concerning that well-understood identity and its variations.

Note -- The measurement model.

When we say, "That church is one hundred and fifty meters high," we are speaking of that church in terms of a measure or model of measurement, -- in this case, a meter. - - Here it is abundantly clear that, as Aristotle says, interpreting judgment is based on comparing (in the sense of "confronting"): when we compare that church to a meter, we multiply that one meter until the number of meters multiplied is identical with the height of the church.

In other words, in the language of traditional identity theory, that church, as height, and the one meter, if sufficiently multiplied, are identical. For the rest, that church and the one meter, are non-identical. Which gives as a result : partial identity or analogy.

It is a commonplace to say that analogy plays a leading role in classical ontology and logic (logic is the formulation of if-then relations in all that is). Yet this is incorrect: it is the whole range "totally-identical/part-identical/ totally non-identical" that is central. As stated clearly above D. 33. The analogy is, in that differential, only the middle term,

2.3. - *The differential critique of traditional ontology.*

We began - D. 04/21 - by outlining derridian differential hermeneutics. Then we dwelt on derridian philosophy of language - D. 22/41 -.

Outline Derrida's conceptions concerning the "meta-physics" thus serving as a target.

"A similar premise.

O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie (Philosophische Propädeutik)*, Wien, Herder, 1959-5, 14, cites a text that governs the following. This is a text attributed to Archutas of Taras (Tarantum; -445/-395), a Paleopythagorean.

As an aside, the basic concepts are 'analysis' (reductive reasoning: if X, then B) and 'synthesis' (deductive reasoning: if A, then B). Where the aim is an exceptional standpoint that allows for the mastery of all being.

"If someone were able to reduce (analysis) all classes (concepts, 'genes') to one and the same presupposition ('archa') and to derive from it ('synthesis') and to join them together ('synarthmèsathai' (*opm.*: here one gropes for stoicheiosis), such a person - it seems to me - comes across as the wisest and at once as sharing all truth and as the possessor of a point of view from which he can know god and all being as he has put them together - according to pairs of opposites - sustoichiai - and orders - taxei".

Frankly speaking: apart from stoicheiosis, based on a sought (but apparently not yet found by Archutas) anamnèsis (reminiscentia, orderly memory), which should act as a finding aid, something stands out here that may have found even more imitation in the course of metaphysics : the search for an absolute standpoint. Such that deity and all being are caught in one encompassing grasp and gaze.

Remember that well for what follows.

Given: Heidegger.

Asked: Derrida's interpretation. -- the fact that M. Heidegger (think *Sein und Zeit*) thematizes again and again is the traditional ontology.

His requested: "radikale Destruktion." Neither more nor less!

Derrida: "Heidegger's intention is impracticable." The reason: to handle such a thing, there must be a standpoint outside traditional ontology.

Only then can one compare the two positions, -- in particular, only then can one measure the boundedness of traditional ontology. Such a thing is impracticable for Derrida.

So what is doable? Taking one step outside our culture, which for more than two thousand years has been permeated by ontology, and thinking that one can simply emancipate oneself from it, as Heidegger believes, is impossible. However, one can 'deconstruct' 'déconstruer' oneself - within that long tradition - with the resources of that ontology.

What does "déconstruction" mean?

a. It is, of course, as the term makes abundantly clear, a negative labor. -- Recall how, in the course of a conference in Los Angeles in 1987, he said that Greece, Christianity and German idealism (D. 15) are "alien" to him. There is bitter little left of our great tradition after the elimination of those three constituents -- stoicheia, elementa, integral constituents!

b. It is also, however, to elicit from "the text," i.e. the corpus of metaphysical texts, entirely different insights from those advocated in the text itself. -- Using a neologism: to elicit "the other of the text." -- What that "other of" can mean.

Note -- Regarding M. Heidegger, we refer very briefly to *J.-P. Faye, Le piège (La philosophie heideggerienne et le nazisme)*, Paris, Balland, 1994.

It has long been known that Heidegger was a member of the National Socialist Party under Hitler. -- "Nazism" is the doctrine and practice elaborated by *Adolf Hitler* (1889/1945) in his *Mein Kampf* and which became official state doctrine in Germany from 1933 to 1945.

Germanism (the Germans are the purest race among the whites), totalitarianism (from conception to death the German/German is subject to the party and regime, under all cultural points of view), expansionism (forming Greater Germany was the objective), -- Primitivism (primordial mythological conceptions are the basis) these are some of the main traits of the extreme right movement that was Nazism.

Heidegger could not look past it and yet: never did he take a stand in a clear way to distance himself from the extravagances (think concentration camps) of the system that made all the planet shudder when the barbarities were exposed by the Allies in 1945.

Faye attempts to reveal one of Heidegger's most thorough intentions, namely, "I have tried, within National Socialism and in relation to that movement, to undertake a spiritual transformation" (according to Heidegger in 1945).

Heidegger targets traditional ontology, pedestal of Western culture. Just like the Nazis! Although more subtle, of course. Deconstructing the whole of traditional philosophy -- from Socrates and Platon to Nietzsche -- as nihilistic runs like a thread through Heidegger's thinking,-- Faye's book tries to prove this.

Attacking some "superior position."

Reread D. 42 the text of Archutas: a viewpoint is sought -- Archutas does not say he has found one; he merely poses the problem in such a way that deity and all being come into the grasp of knowing and thinking. -- that amounts to seeking "a higher position." All truth would then be in reach.

L. van Tuijl, inl./transl., Poe, Lacan, Derrida, The Stolen Letter, Amsterdam, SUA, 1989, contains the following.

1. Edger Allan Poe (1809/1849) an American writer with an eventful life and death (he died of delirium tremens) wrote a short story, *The Purloined Letter*.

2. Jacques Lacan (1901/1981), famous French psychiatrist who gave a structuralist turn to Freudian psychoanalysis (D. 24: structure), delivers an infamous lecture on Poe's story in 1955. In it he illustrated, using the story, the psychoanalyst's situation and work. He later included the text in his *écrits*, Paris, Seuil, 1966.

3. J. Derrida, some twenty years later, subjects Lacan's "text" (always the same theme) to a "deconstruction" ("deconstruction").

Why, he rubs Lacan 'dogmatism': like the detective Dupin in Poe 's story, Lacan takes a superior position! Above and beyond the episodes and complications, he knows concerning alias the truth.

Derrida: what Dupin and Lacan do possess is "their own truth" - beyond all involvement in the event (drama, psychoanalysis) - which they, however, "sell" as "The Truth (plain and final).

-- That is what Derrida also accuses -- and often not without reason -- traditional metaphysicians of!

Reread D. 06 ("Clear language" as panacea): there we have in caricature what a number of metaphysicians subtly exhibit. And what Archutes "seeks" as an open ideal.

However, it is striking again and again that Derrida sees not so much the message of the text itself (sentence summary: D. 10) for everything but the self-importance - the pretense - which may be "the other of it," It is then pretense - inquiry rather than text - content inquiry. Which amounts to sentence foundation (D. 10).

Frankly speaking: if there is anything that many intellectuals have adopted from Derrida - o.i., to the point of strong exaggeration - , it is that pretense-searching. It is with Derrida as if he constantly experiences his fellow man as a pretentious being. And it is the same with his intellectual and artistic imitators: woe to you if you cherish a base conviction! That is immediately "phased out" as pretension.

Since traditional metaphysics wants to arrive at universal truths, it is naturally the ideal target for pretension testers of all kinds who then, of course, claim "that no one possesses the truth" and "that there are only private and singular truths."

This course of action is known in the tradition by the name of "skepticism," -- an attitude that sees "dogmatisms" everywhere and "deconstructs" through eristics. -- On the full ground of which Derrida's epigones -- who understood him too well -- suffer, arbitrarily and sweeping every criterion off the table, denying every truth. This we saw D. 11 (Anarchist-lacking and permissive interpretation). It is therefore not surprising that Derrida has had to underline the orthodox doctrine -his own-: truth does exist!

Might there not - in passing - be some 'pretension' - counter-pretension then - in the constant tracing of 'the other' (the furtive pretension) in the texts that ... Derrida himself produces? By what right and in the name of what - so his opponents reason - does Derrida pose as the critic of truth pretension to demolish others in archly difficult and "hermetic" (the term is used by his own supporters) texts?