Course 9.8. Elements of current philosophy

Third year of philosophy 1995/1996. Higher institute for pedagogy VII-the olympiadelaan 25 2020 Antwerp

Introduction (01/04)

The first year was a familiarization with ontology, the basic subject of all philosophy. The subject or theme of ontology is being, i.e. all that something is, -- all that is real. And this in so far as it is something or actual. Being as being,-- according to the ancient formula of Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322; the great metaphysician of antiquity). --

The second year dealt with all that is religion, insofar as it concerns religion that has not been secularized or secularized, i.e., religion that still remains true religion. In our twentieth century, religion is reviving, especially in the form of what is called "New Age": in this sense, it is an integral part of our twentieth century. However, it will hardly come up as a current form of thought in the course of this third year, because it is supposedly known.

The third year dwells on current philosophical currents. These are situated in a strict ontological framework of thought. This means that we do not simply describe the currents - according to their main points - : they are measured against what the time-honored ontology or philosophy of being provides us with as an absolute framework for thinking.

We begin, however, with a few overviews which help us to navigate through the maze of current thought currents. Only then do we dwell on their real value.

Books! Book it! Books!

What is a strictly philosophical book? A novel can be a philosophical novel. In the sense that it illustrates a philosophical thesis. Even a film can be philosophical in the sense that those who are philosophically educated grasp much more clearly the thesis or proposition that is made true in it. If we now consider that in the year 1990, in France alone, more than 38,000 books were published, we realize that, in this introductory course, we have to make a choice, and a random choice at that - which is what 'induction' is.

Thus we mention very briefly the revue 20 Ans (Paris), No 72 (1992): août, 92/95. A British couturier, *Ces années-là*, (Those years), tries to explain to the French twens the main trends of the 1950s and 1990s.

We look at how;

1950+: main tendency, socially speaking, is to reform society through planning ("reformisme planificateur"); the meaninglessness ("l' absurd") of existence - existing - is raised by Jean-Paul Sartre (1905/1980; top figure of French atheistic existentialism), among others;

1960+: main trend is the contestation movement; stands out, in those years, Louis Althusser (1918/1990; Marxist who introduces a kind of structuralism into neo-Marxism);-- meanwhile the main focus evolves from pure (existentialist) philosophy to sociology.

1970+: main tendency becomes "la subversion" (subversion); comes to the forefront, in France always, Roland Barthes (1915/ I980; top figure of literary structuralism), representing the shift from sociology to linguistics (linguistics).-- Socially speaking, especially from 1902 onwards, all that is socialism (especially in its communist forms) comes to a deep crisis.

1980+: main trend becomes "la compétivité" (the ability to compete). The catchword of the rising liberalism; Jean Baudrillard (1928/2007), who studies the role of signs, i.e. all the messages that people exchange in our consumer society at the end of the twentieth century; this while publicity (marketing) takes over the role of linguistics.

One can argue endlessly about this sketch: France is not the only country, first of all; sketches are always too summarizing. Nevertheless, this sketch gives a first approximation. This all the more that the fact that "20 Ans", a magazine for twens, publishes such a thing indicates that the thinking appeals even to the young.

Fr. Dufay, *La mode philo,* in: Le Point (13.05.1991), 45, notes that French students/students suddenly leave the exact sciences and gauchism (new or extreme left) behind to study Descartes, Hegel, Heidegger et al.

Much to the surprise of the pros in philosophy. They are often pure professional scientists who want to learn "a useless philosophy". If only to examine their own profession to its foundations. They are also students at business colleges who find philosophy worthwhile but especially ethical philosophy: "business ethics" ("Is a firm a machine to make a profit or is there also a business morality?") in the first place is the motive to philosophize.

As an aside, New Age (Nouvel Age) has also crept into philosophy: the fact that a lot of students/ female students - for the final dissertation - choose something like Buddhism points to it! "Buddhism is strongly in vogue in corporations and in the midst of top scientists" (so says Dufay).-- To wit, a few overviews.

Six major streams.

With I.M. Bochenski, O.P., *Geschiedenis der hedendaagse Europese wijsbegeerte* (History of Contemporary European Philosophy), DDB, 1952-2, which we consider to be the basic work of this course, one can distinguish, including quite a few reservations (as the author himself says, o.c., 47v.), six "schools" of doctrine. They are visible between WWI (1914/ 1918) and WWII (1939/1945).

1.-- *Empiricism* or the philosophy of matter (materialism), which is the continuation of mainly traditional empiricism (better : empiricist rationalism);

2.-- *idealism* or the philosophy of idea, a continuation of traditional modern idealism (especially in the wake of Kant and Hegel)

3.-- the philosophy of *life*;

4.-- the philosophy of *being* (phenomenology);

both tendencies break with the main currents of the xixth century;

5.-- the philosophy of "*existence*" (existentialism) and

6.-- the new *metaphysics*, both trends which are typically twentieth-century.

Note at once: under the title "philosophy of matter," Bochenski groups B. Russell, neo-positivism, and Marxism,--strainings that differ sharply from one another.

Under the title "philosophy of life," he groups Dewey and Klages, who differ greatly from one another.

While the Baden idealist school combines both idealism and philosophy of life (historicism) and existential phenomenology (Scheler) into an eclectic whole.-- Doctrinally, then, it is a matter of separating and combining.

Two striking methods.

The 'logistic' or mathematical logic includes Platonists (the founders were mostly Platonists), Aristotelians,-- nominalists (who are anti-Platonists), pragmatists and even Kantians.

Logistics includes predicate and group logistics, as well as relations logistics; it is an application of semiotics or signology (W. Morris) in the wake of Ch. Peirce.

Phenomenology (Fr. Brentano; Edm. Hwsserl) does not give priority to signs as in logistics, but to phenomena, i.e. to everything that presents itself to consciousness. This method includes, besides the strict phenomenologists, almost all existentialists and a part of the are-thinkers or metaphysicians.

Now it is the case that many philosophers do not employ either of these two methods,--that others wish to employ the two simultaneously.

In other words, either none of the two, or one of the two, or both.

Traditions.-- What is now called "intertextuality" (the fact that later thinkers paraphrase previous ones) stands out: Platon revives in Whitehead, Aristotle in Driesch, Hartmann, thomism, Plotinos in some existentialists, Thomas Aquinas in thomism, the younger scholastics in phenomenology and neopositivism, Leibniz in Russell.-- One may add: ancient erist thought in deconstructionism (Derrida).

Note -- *Analysis or language analysis*. -- The analytic method is too important not to outline it.-- Analytic philosophy can be started with George Moore (1873/1958), known among other things for his telling title The Refutation of Idealism (1903).

Moore wants, by means of 'analysis' of language, i.e. terms, judgments and reasonings - the scheme of traditional logic -, to discover what terms, judgments and reasonings really mean. First the terms and judgments, then the value of the reasonings! In this way he thinks he can discover "the truth" in that language.

'Analysis' includes
1. concepts that are clarified (e.g., the concept of "good" in morality: whether "good" coincides with "pleasant");
2. judgments that are broken down into their constituent parts.-- Add to this concepts that are used in different ways.

Moore adheres to the common language ("ordinary language").
A Russell will try to "construct" a language of art as precisely as possible -- using mathematical logic (logistics). Which constitutes a second type of language analysis.

As an aside: analytic philosophies - generally speaking at least - do not identify language with its syntactic element: language is a representation of reality.--

Thus language analysis differs from structuralism, which thinks semiologically, i.e., in the line of de Saussure, conceives of language as a system of relations existing in itself between 'phonemes' (sounds which make up language), where the reference to some reality (the semantics and the pragmatics) is put in brackets.-- Which does not prevent structuralism from being called, in its own way, "a language analysis".

Note -- G. Frege (who researched the foundations of mathematics) introduced a pair of opposites (systechy): "Sinn/ Bedeutung". In analytic-Anglo-Saxon parlance: 'sense' and 'reference'. The model is famous but shrewd: the terms "morning star" and "evening star" encompass two contents of knowledge and thought (a celestial body that is in the firmament in the morning or in the evening). This is "der Sinn" (the concept connected with these terms).-- when, however, it appears that both terms, in fact, refer to one and the same planet Venus, then it is clear that they have one and the same 'Bedeutung', i.e. refer to one and the same reality.

Note -- In traditional logic this is partly wrong. By what? Because 'morning star' points to Venus as far as visible in the morning and 'evening star' points to the same Venus as far as visible in the evening. As long as the term 'Venus' is not explicitly mentioned, it does not count as a reference to anything. In other words, the example given by such a celebrity is confusing.

It is better to depart from conceptual content and conceptual scope. One should not confuse language terms with logical terms: one and the same logical term can contain more than one grammatical term and vice versa.-- But the example does lead us into language analysis! - So much for methods.

I.M. Bochenski, O.P., *Wijsgerige methoden in de moderne wetenschap*, (Philosophical Methods in Modern Science), Utrecht/ Antwerp, Aula, 1961 (// Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethoden, Bern, 1947), deals much more thoroughly with the main methods.

The work distinguishes**: a.** phenomenological and semiotic, **b**. deductive and reductive methods.

Twenty Years Later.
Bochenski's work dates from 1952.

Let us take a look at C.Bertels/ E. Petersma, red*., Filosofen van de twintigste eeuw*, (Philosophers of the twentieth century), Assen/ Amsterdam/ Brussels, 1972.-- The classification is as follows.

1.-- *Philosophy of language:* Russell, Popper, Wittgenstein, Ayer, Ryle, Chomsky, where one feels the analytic philosophy, at least with Russell, Wittgenstein, Ayer and Ryle (with the materialistic tendency).

2.-- *Phenomenology and philosophy of existence*: Husserl,-- Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau - Ponty, Ricoeur. Existentialists apply the phenomenological method (Husserl).

3.-- *Neomarxism (social criticism):* Bloch, Marcuse, Habermas (Frankfurter Schule), Kolakowski (with the materialistic basic philosophy).

4.-- *Structuralism*: Lévi-Strauss, Foucault (with semiology as the basic philosophy (de Saussure)).

Again: such classifications are to be accepted with reservation, but they provide insight.-- Thus, the editors note that the philosophy of science is discussed only sideways -- in Russell and Popper -- neglecting Breithwaite, Carnap, Hempel, Nagel, and Suppes.

Another twenty years later.
B. Delfgaauw/ Fr. van Peperstraten, *Beknopte geschiedenis van de wijsbegeerte* (Van Thales tot Lyotard)), (Concise history of philosophy (From Thales to Lyotard)), Kampen, Kapellen, 1993, gives, as regards the twentieth century, what follows.

1.-- *Analytic philosophy*.
This becomes "Anglo-Saxon philosophy" due to the increasing input of the United States.

In passing, mention should be made of: E. Oger/ F. Buekens, ed., *Denken in alle staten (Negen profielen van hedendaagse Amerikaanse filosofen)*, (Thinking in all states (Nine profiles of contemporary American philosophers)), Kapellen / Kampen, 1992.-- Quine, Goodman, Davldson, Putnam -- further evolved from neopositivism -- Dennett, Rorty, Nagel, Kripke,-- Rawls are mentioned.

In passing: Rorty is quite well known in the Dutch language area.

2. -- *Subject-oriented philosophy.*
This includes a mishmash: histori(ci)sm (Dilthey), neo-Kantianism (Cohen/ Natorp (Marburger) and Windelband/ Rickert (Badener)), phenomenology (Husserl, Scheler, Hartmann), philosophy of life (Bergson,-- Spengler, Klages), existentialism (Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty), hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoeur).

3.-- *Social Criticism.*

Marxism and the Frankfurter Schule (Horkheimer, Marcuse, : Adorno, Benjamin), Bloch. Fromm.-- The second generation of the Frankfurter Schule: Habermas, Apel (both: theory of communicative action).

Political philosophy: Berlin, Arendt, Rawls, Nozick, Lefort.-- This current is very isolated from the other three which do interact more, if only because all three are philosophical of language.

4.-- *Structuralism and differentiation*

Structuralism: de Saussure,-- Jakobson (Moscow, Prague), Troubetzkoy,-- Lévi - Strauss, Barthes, Lacan, Althusser.

From structuralism (mainly French) emerges poststructuralism (postmodernism, differential thinking) : Foucault, Levinas, Derrida (dekonstructionism), Deleuze, Guattari, Baudrillard, Cixous, Irigaray, Kristeva,-- Lyotard.

The notion of difference is indeed central both in structuralism and in post-structuralism (which radicalizes the notion).

It is clear that language is central. Something which enables (post-)structuralism to communicate both with the analytic philosophies of language and with the hermeneutics (see previous lines).

So much for a few schematic overviews.

One more work: Guy Sorman, *Les vrais penseurs de notre temps*, (The true thinkers of our time), Paris, Fayard, 1989.

Sorman is also the author of *Sortir du socialisme*, (Getting out of socialism), Paris, 1990.-- In which the collapse of the socialist systems -- source of inspiration and model of social criticism -- is highlighted as an omen of nationalisms, strong, charismatic figures (populists) and dictatorships that endanger democracy.-- The work belongs to the political philosophy cited above.

See here how Sorman brings up the strains.
1.-- *Cosmology*.-- Carl Sagen, James Lovelock.
2.-- *Chaology* (complexity theory).--Ilya Prigogine, René Thom.
3.-- *Theory of evolution*.-- Stephen Gould, Edward O. Wilson, Motoo Kimura.
4.-- *Cultural criticism*.-- Claude Lévi-Strauss, Noam Chomsky, Zhao Fusan.
5.-- *Free thinking*.-- Bruno Bettelheim, Thomas Szasz, Marvin Minsky.
6.-- *Polemology* (war science).-- Ernst Nolte, Edward Teller.
7.-- *Communism/Facism*. Milovan Djilas, Youri Afanassiev, Kenji Nakagami.

8. -- *Liberalism/ libertarianism (anarcism).*
Friedrich von Hayek. Murray Rothbard. -

9.-- *Underdevelopment theory.*
Octavio Paz, Ashis Nandy, M. S. Swaminatan.

10.-- *Religion*.
René Girard, Claude Tresmontant.

11. -- *Foundations.*
Karl Popper, Ernst Gombrich, Isaiah Berlin.

Sorman met the thinkers personally and gives a brief biographical note.-- One can see that he deals with the subjects (thematics) rather than the methods-struggles and school formations. The philosophies of science and political philosophies are also discussed much more clearly.

Next work.-- Theo de Boer en a, *Moderne Franse filosofen* (Modern French philosophers), Kampen/ Kapellen, 1993.-- Eight staff members of the Free University of Amsterdam introduce eight thinkers.-- Woldring, in his introduction, characterizes the eight as hermeneutic thinkers. This is: they take as given a text; they interpret it (which is hermeneutics). But -- what is striking -- they interpret unmaskingly, deconstructively, eristically.

M. Foucault (1926/ 1984) unmasks comprehensive power thinking. J. Derrida (1930) unmasks ('deconstructs') the text as a claim to absolute truth, Fr. Lyotard (1929) unmasks comprehensive history thinking (the grand narratives). Julia Kristeva (1941) and L.Irigarey (1939) unmask the all-encompassing 'phallocratic' (men's) claims. J. Baudrillard (1929) unmasks Western civilization as a simulation culture. E. Levinas (1905) unmasks the all-encompassing I-philosophy (egology). P. Ricoeur (1913) cautiously unmasks tradition.-- This school of thought has gradually become more influential.-- as far away as the USA (Derridism).

Theme. -- The French alternative revue *Autrement*, entitled "A Quoi pensent les philosophes?" (What do philosophers think), gives us what follows.

1.-- *Modernity.*
Habermas (second generation Frankfurter Schule) and Derrida (deconstructionism or philosophy of deconstruction) define "the modern" as, among other things, all that deconstructs the premodern traditions (the Western ones in the first place). Where Derrida is evidently postmodern.

2.-- *The sciences.*
The foundations of the logical, mathematical, physical, chemical, biological and human sciences are "examined" for their soundness; for they form the foundations on which the whole of scientific work rests.

Now these 'axiomata' (postulates) control the view of the piece of reality that a science studies.-- That then is philosophy of science.

3.a.-- *Morals (morals).*

Our societies struggle with questions of conscience: on what does morality rest? (its presuppositions or axioms); What about manipulating genes? What about chemical weapons? What about permissive behavior that is increasing? In the name of which values (= presupposed 'goods') shall we form our conscience?

This then is philosophical ethics or moral philosophy.

3.b.-- *Law.*

Law is a part of morality: it regulates living together. In our societies there is justice and injustice. Think of "the excluded" (those who cannot find work, housing, or a homeland (migrants)). We think of the mafias who terrorize our fellow men on the basis of the balance of power and thus create lawlessness. In the name of which values that regulate community life shall we make laws, introduce a jurisdiction?

That is the philosophy of law.

So much for the themes and issues as *Autrement* tries to summarize them.

The two 'cultures' (09/11)

About thirty years ago, the physicist C.P. Snow - almost against the literary-intellectual 'vanguard' of his time (in particular the existentialists) - gave a lecture in Cambridge, in 1959, entitled "*The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*". The text became circulated (was published in Encounter). A long supplement was written in 1963.

Until the infamous book appeared: C.p. Snow, *The Two Cultures and A Second Look*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1964.-- The book is still topical, as duly noted by P. Cortois, *Snow en de "twee – culturendiscussie'* (dertig jaar later), (Snow and the "two-cultures discussion" (thirty years later)), in: The Owl of Minerva (Journal of History and Philosophy of Culture) vol. 11: 2 (Winter 1994/ 95, 121/132, p. 5).

Within the Western world - and beyond (we add) - two lifeworlds have emerged and ... grown apart.

Snow sees the world of the physicist - rather conflated with 'innovation' - and that of the man of letters - rather conflated with tradition. - He, as a physicist, is 'scientist', i.e. convinced of the truly scientific level of the (natural) sciences. But he regrets that the world of scientists has gradually become more distant from the world of "the humanities". Indeed: where is the time when one spoke of "art and culture" and of "science" (thereby insinuating that science is not "culture")?

Note.-- V. Dascombes, *Philosophie analytique versus philsophie continentale*, (Analytical philosophy versus continental philsophy), in: Critique (Revue gén. des publ. Franç. et étrang.),1987: march, 240/254, touches our problem of "two cultures" sideways. -

"In France, the rare 'analytic' philosophers protest against the small space allotted to them in education and publications.--.

In the USA, it is the 'continental' verses: the American writers who think 'continentally' - who complain about being pushed aside by the 'analytic' establishment. (...). For the because the Anglo-Saxons mean by 'continental philosophy' seems to come down thoroughly to this: the hermeneutical mode of thought that is primarily German in inspiration, and post-structuralism, a vague label that one sticks on recent French thought."

The author, a.c., 249.-- "When we do philosophy, are we rather 'scientists' or rather 'essayists' "? One will have to conclude with me that the opposition "analytic thinkers/continental thinkers" is no longer as clear today as it was when one could say: Analytic philosophy: that's ''Moore and Russell. "Continental philosophy: look at Hegel or Dilthey."

Or even fifty years later, "Analytic philosophy: that's the analysis of the language of manners. Continental: that's phenomenology. Today, however, that contradiction has become blurred". -- Which shows that the contradiction does still exist.

Note -- J. Nida-Rümelin, Hrsg*., Philosophie der Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen van Adorno bis Wright*, (Contemporary Philosophy in Individual Presentations from Adorno to Wright), Stuttgart, Kröner, 1991, talks about more than a hundred philosophers (life sketch, works, reception).

The introduction says that Husserl (phenomenology, "continental philosophy") and Frege (analytic method) are the pioneers of the two main currents in Western philosophy today, namely the phenomenological and the analytic. Which proves that "the two cultures" still exist! - So much for a word about the two foundational currents.

The concept of culture (11/14)
Snow employs a basic concept. Let us dwell on that for a moment.

Bibl. : J. Goudsblon, *Nihilisme en cultuur*, (Nihilism and Culture), Amsterdam, 1960, 55/103 (Culture). An enormous amount has already been written about civilization or culture. We will limit ourselves to this sample.

The author starts from the Latin terms: 'colere' and 'cultura' which mean to 'elaborate' (something) (into something better). Cicero (-105/-43; orator, politician and writer), advocate of what he called 'humanitas' which can be translated by 'cultura' (which 'works out' the unformed human being into a formed human being), says, in his *Disputatigones tusculanae* 215: 13: "Just as the best soil (model), if left untilled, will not yield a harvest, so too the spirit (original) will remain unfruitful without philosophical training.

As an aside: one understands "philosophical training" in the broad sense of general education" -- The dual sense of the term 'cultura' has remained in modern languages - 'culture'.

A.I.-- We turn first to the Western definition. And this is with a first variant, namely, the 'humanistic' definition (the narrower one).

Joh. Christ. Adelung, *Versuch einer Geschichte der Cultur des menschlichen Geschlechts*, (An Attempt at a History of the Culture of the Human Race), Leipzig, 1782.-- "The whole, to the senses bound and at once animal state, i.e. the true state of things peculiar to (pure) nature, is the absence of all culture."
Adelung posits a difference "nature/culture". Nature is the starting point of culture.
Ellte.-- For Adelung "culture" is indeed a characteristic of the whole people but only insofar as the privileged classes leave their mark on it.
In other words: Adelung puts forward a cultural vanguard without thereby excluding "the whole people". On the contrary.

A.II.-- Our Western definition can also be broader. To a general one! E. Friedrich Kolb*, Culturgeschichte der Menschheit*, (Cultural history of mankind), Pforzheim, 1843.

A. ascribes as a domain to the concept of culture besides intellectual, ethical-political education also social institutions and material prosperity as well as bodily development.-- Which gives us a broadened concept of culture.

Gustav Klemm, *Allgemeine Culturwissenschaft*, (General Culturscience), Leipzig. 1855-2; id., *Allgemeine Culturgeschichte der Menschheit*, (General CulturHistory of Mankind), Leipzig. 1843-1, 1855-2, assigns as domains: family life, religion, science, art, techniques, yes, martial arts. 'Culture' is the result of the interaction between people and nature and immediately of the interaction between people themselves.

In other words, all areas of life can be cultivated and together make up culture.

B.1.-- The planetary definition is exposed by the typical ethnologists (cultural ethnologists).

Sir Edw. B. Tylor (1832/1917), the noted ethnologist, in his *Primitive Culture* (l871), says that "culture" is that intricate whole which includes knowledge/skill, belief, art, legislation, custom and any other abilities and achievements of man as a member of society.

B.II.-- In a similar vein: A.L. Kroeber/ Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture (A Gritical Review of Concepts and Definitions)*. Cambridge (Mass.),

1952. -- Culture consists of tones, expressed or unspoken characteristic of behavior, acquired and transmitted through symbols which constitute the characteristic of human groups.

The essence of culture comes down to the ideas acquired in history and in particular the values attached to them.

Note -- All these definitions imply that philosophy, as systems of thought and values, also belongs to culture.

C.-- Emphasis is placed, as an entry to a philosophy of culture, on the action theory of Ralph Linton, in his *The study of Man*, New York. 1936, and also The Cultural Background of Personality, London, 1947.

For Linton, culture is threefold: 'culture' is the name for:
a. a general human phenomenon
b. the shaping of it in groups
c. the individual processing of it in members of groups.

Which gives us a range (differential) "general/ private/ singular".

D.-- A final trait that will stay with us.-- Talcott Persons / Ed. A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action,* Cambridge " (Mass.), 1951, sees 'action' as personality/society/culture. Which gives us a situating of culture in behavior.

Before that, Pit. A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality* (Their structure and Dynamics), New York, 1S47, spoke of the individual, as a subject acting in society, society, as the totality of individuals - in - interaction, and culture, as a system of values, norms, meanings.

"Psychology involves sociology and sociology involves psychology.

Both involve understanding and vetting culture" (T. Parsons / Rob. Bales, *Family, Socialization and interaction Process*, Glencoe (111.), 1955.-- So that we acquire a triad: psychology/ sociology/culturology.

Mikhaïl Bakhtine (1895/1975), Russian thinker and literatologist, advocated a similar structure: language use - the great theme of contemporary philosophies - is the dialogue of the voice that is addressed. Cfr T. Todorov, *la conquête de l' Amérique* (La question de l' autre), (the conquest of America (The question of the other)), Paris, Seuil. 1982.

This gives us a concept of culture in a nutshell. It will help us to distinguish within the philosophies 'cultures', as Snow put it at the time. Cultures which are sometimes diametrically opposed to one another. Cultures also which find their breeding ground within a single cultural area: the USA, for example, is a cradle of 'analytical' thinking, while "old Europe" gives rise to something like more-than-analytical thinking.

Note -- whoever says "culture" says "education": the educator has as a given, the culture within which the youngsters must be situated. The task (the demand) is: to teach the young people the culture.

By the way: the term 'paideaia', translated by 'humanitas' (Cicero) for the ancient Greeks, included philosophical education. It must be repeated that among the ancient Greeks 'philosophia' was broad (Herodotos 1: 30) and narrow (Platon, who wanted to breed specialists), as C. De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* (A Collection of Texte), I (Thales to Plato), Leiden, Brill, 1950, 2, says. One knows that Isokrates, unlike Platon, understood the concept of philosophy in the broad sense,--as general education and not as subject specialization.

Note.-- "Only intellectuals believe that intellectuals understand the world better than everyone else." (Panajotis Kondylis (1943)).

As M.Terpstre, *Panajotis Kondylis*: "Only intellectuals think that intellectuals understand the world better than others" in The Owl of Minerva (Tijdschr. v.Geschied. and Wijsbeg.v.d. Culture), v. 11:2 (Winter 1994/95, 99/120, excellently set forth, the Greek-German thinker, of Marxist stock, is a historian of thought-which he calls "ideas" (in which Platon's definition is, of course, not to be found)-from the Renaissance to the present.

Kondylis summarizes the "ideologies" of modernity (which is essentially tradition and enlightenment wrapped up in a social and thought war) in three terms: conservatism, liberalism and socialism. With which we have a piece of political philosophy.

Kondylis is of the opinion that these three currents are over. That we are entering a new era. Especially the collapse of communism has made it clear "once more" (a.c., 114) that the political concepts familiar to us have become superfluous.

After all, it is only now - after the cold war - that the deeper motivations that will determine the coming planetary politics are emerging. These are, as it were, being accumulated into a gigantic explosive in the course of the stormy political history of the last twenty years (1975/1995).

We must prepare ourselves for violent conflicts in which the greatest danger will be not even war but the continuing state of unbridled lawlessness. In particular, the deadly struggle for the just distribution of the necessities of life may well be imminent on a global scale.

Thinking in such a dramatic survival situation seems useless. However, there will always be 'intellectuals' who will "offer their ideological services for the good cause (!)".

Intellectuals have always done nothing more than generate lifeless constructions of thought! In the opinion that they know better than all other people!

Sample 1 .-- ontology. (15/20)

Fleetingly we have tried -- on the basis of a few writers -- to get a first global view of what may be called "current philosophy." Striking is the extreme diversity, indeed a whole range of contradictions,---take between the new philosophies of being and the deconstructive strains! In contrast to the professional sciences which have become somewhat themselves, philosophy, while being somewhere one, is a polemical activity to a high degree: one thinker wants to get it on another! -- That is why we dwell on the heart piece of the great tradition.

Ontology.

'On' (genetically 'ontos') in ancient Greek meant 'being', i.e., something that is there, something.-- 'Logos' at that time meant "to bring up responsibly." -- 'Ontology' is therefore "responsibly bringing up all that is." -- Since 'something' is the same as 'reality' -- in the sense that as soon as there is 'something', there is 'reality', no matter what -- , one can translate 'ontology' in good English by 'reality theory'.

The doctrine of reality, as practiced in the great tradition, posits a difference "something / nothing." -- This fans out into a range or differential "something / relative nothing / utter or absolute nothing".

When in the sky there are no clouds, we say "There is nothing concerning clouds". This does not imply that there is nothing at all: it merely asserts that there is nothing regarding clouds. This is the relative or relative nothingness.

In other words: there is nothing in a limited sense.-- What the "absolute nothing" might be, is and remains forever obscure. From what? Because it amounts to the fact that there is "absolute nothing"! Now, as soon as there ever was, is, will be anything, absolute nothingness is radically and forever excluded.

So that the differential above holds word-for-word but not matter-for-word : after all, the third term on the right corresponds to utter or absolute nothingness in reality! So that ontology always oscillates between "something - and relative-nothing". -

The notion of 'reality' (being(s) or something) as transcendental.

'Transcendental' (do not confuse with the Kantian or Husserlian transcendental' which refers to the thinking subject) contains the Latin term 'trans-cendens' transcending.

'Transcendental' within traditional ontology at least, means 'all-encompassing' because transcending all possible realities that turn out to be findable within the overall or total reality.

So that we find a second difference "transcendental/ categorical", where 'category' means not all that are(s) but all that are(s) within the uncomprehending -- complicated being -- without -- more.-- Thus 'something' is all-encompassing or transcendental but "this something here and now" is categorical.

All that is categorical can serve as samples - endless in number - taken within the totality of being or total reality. 'Being(the)' (conceptual content).

What we have just explained is the conceptual scope of the term 'reality' or 'something' ("All that is anything, i.e. not-nothing").-- But what then is the knowledge and thought content of these so general terms?

a. The question "how real is something?" is answered by saying, "That something is here before us." In other words: it is there! It is approachable, findable. This is called, in the line of what Platon already recognized, "existence" or being factually given.

b. The question "how is (that) something real?" is answered by saying: "That something here in front of us is a book! What something is, is called, again since the medieval thinkers, 'essence' or being of something.

To sum up: That there is something and what it is, is the knowledge and thought content of the term 'something' (reality) or 'being' (being).

One sees that, in our use of language at least, the term 'being' as a verb is twofold: it means whether there is something and, if so, what it is.-- Now, one can ask that after all!

Note: 'reality' is opposed to nothing.-- We are already facing more than one 'difference' (something/ nothing; -- transcendental/ categorical; -- existence/ essence).-- Do we return to "something/ nothing" -- A literary fiction - a science fiction novel e.g. - , a dream - a nightmare e.g. - , something that becomes ("but - so the common man says - is not there yet") - e.g. a profession that grows - : all these 'things' (other word for 'things') are realities! Perhaps not in a certain day-to-day use but certainly in ontological language use: 'being(s)' is not opposed to 'fiction' or 'dream' or 'becoming', which are types of being or 'categories. A fiction, a dream, a becoming is something, is non-nothing.

In other words: they are "realities! Although their existence is not situated outside us (fiction, dream) or in the already actual or full reality (in or around us), that existence is there. As a given. As "unmistakably there". As resistant when we, obstinately, want to pretend they are not there. At least to the extent that we are honest, i.e. want to acknowledge that if something is there, it is there.

The laws of being.

That honesty compels us to make the only but all-encompassing statements - laws (i.e., judgments that apply always and everywhere) - that concern all reality as reality. The basic difference "something/nothing" shows itself in them, in the form of judgments.

1.-- "All that (so) is, is (so)." -- Confronted in our honest consciousness with something that has penetrated to our self-consciousness -- e.g., the fact that someone gives me a sign -- , I cannot but say, "It is there" (as a sample or applicative model of all that is as given),

2.-- "All that is not (so). is not (so)." -- Faced with absence, I can honestly (morality is evidently always involved) say nothing but "It is not there" or "It is not so".

Note.-- Now, to express the radical difference between something and absolutely nothing in a clear way, traditional ontology says that there is a "third" law: "Between being or being like that and not being or not being like that, there is no intermediate term.

In other words: either something is (so) or it is not (so)! One can call this the primal dilemma "either/or" (Latin: 'aut'). But this 'third' law adds nothing to the two previous ones!

All this implies that the difference "something/ nothing" appeals to us in our 'conscience' : if we are honest and to the extent that we are, all that is somewhat real appeals to us somewhere in the depths of our personality. This appeal to us (conscience) is the basis - in essence the only one - of everything which is 'moral' (behavior which acts responsibly, i.e. takes account of given realities).

One says: ontology "founds" morality.

The other transcendentalities.

O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philsophie* (Philosophische Propädeutik), (Outline of Philsophy (Philosophical Propaedeutics)), Wien, Herder, 1959-5, 382/388 (Die Transzendentalien), gives us an explanation of this.

With the concept of 'being(the)' - as we saw just before - is inevitably linked a claim to our conscientious honesty, the basis of morality.

In other words: ontology and ontologically founded or responsible moral philosophy (ethics) are distinguishable but not separate.-- This means that 'being(de)' encompasses more than existence; essence in the sense that 'being(de)' addresses us somewhere. This addressing and, what is more, claiming of us exhibits the following features.

1.-- The basis is and remains - according to e.g. Thomas Aquinas, the great scholastic mid-century thinker - the pair 'ens/ aliquid': 'ens' is 'something' in itself, while 'aliquid' is 'something' insofar as it is distinguishable from the rest of all that is.

The one (ens') is "substance" (that which exists in itself); the other is that same substance or selfhood insofar as it is involved in something else ("aliquid").

By the way: the difference 'substance/relation' has been discussed since before Aristotle, among others with the paleopythagoreans (with their 'systechies' or 'pairs of opposites') and is, with Aristotle, the artery of his list of categories.

In other words: something and something different from the rest are comprehensive concepts,-- collectively.

2.-- The pre-Platonic - Pythagorean and Eleatic - thinkers brought up two transcendentalisms, viz. "to hen" (lat.: unum), the one (only) or coherent, and "to alèthes" (lat.: verum), the apparent (one usually translates by "the true" but that is deceptive), i.e. all that shows itself ("what comes out of its hiddenness").

Indeed, we have always spoken of "differences", that is, couples which, however different or separated, are nevertheless one; we have spoken of what is approachable, discernible, unmistakable there, resistant to our dishonesty: that is the apparent. Or what shows itself. What is 'phenomenon' ('phenomenon' because it appears).

One cannot speak of 'something' or "something as far as different/separate from something else (the rest)", without that something showing itself evidently, having shown itself, or will show itself!

And peculiarly: as soon as we are thus confronted with the apparent, the duality ("difference") "something/nothing" or also "something/ something distinguishable/ separable from the rest" emerges: in other words: we see the apparent in some connection. In its unity with the rest.

In passing: as we shall see, this "unity" always comes down to either similarity (difference) or coherence (gap).

Unity in or of that something (with something else) and obviousness are always given along with it. - Unity and clarity ('truth' is usually said) are also transcendental.

3.-- Platon continues as the one who - with the previous transcendentalisms - added the good (understand: all that means value somewhere). With his characteristic emphasis on 'being(the)' as not ostensibly real but really real: "ontos on", being in a way!

So that one can say that Platon added both the really real and the valuable (in his language understand 'really' valuable or good) to the already discussed comprehensive concepts.

Indeed: our reaction of honesty includes, as a premise, reverence.

The counter-model 'dishonesty' is clear: those who do not 'respect' the apparent in its evidentness can afford the luxury of being dishonest. But that is then, ontologically - morally, someone who loses his 'honor' - something that is exposed in reverence and honesty. 'Honor' here means "the right to be valued as conscientious, anchored in real reality and in real values and goods."

So much for transcendentalism. They are - seen in a light ontology - like a common light that illuminates (our behavior).

Defining.
'To define' (to determine a concept) is to say what something is and whether it is there. Defining is an eminently ontological activity.

Now there are two fundamentally different definitions. -- Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Cours de philosophie* (Psychologie, Logique), (Philosophy courses (Psychology, Logic)), Paris, 1933²⁷, 498/499 (Définition de mots et définition de choses), (Definition of words and definition of things), says in this regard as follows.

In passing: the subject is the unknown (original); the saying is the known (model).

When we say "The absolute nothingness is 'something' that does not exist", then "the absolute nothingness" is the original or unknown (in the sense of undefined e.g.) where only one model fits, i.e. "that nothingness is and is utterly nothing". Where it is assumed that the saying is already at least vaguely known (model).

When we say "What (so) is, is so", this is not a meaningless tautology, as some thinkers superficially familiar with ontology once dared to assert (we say 'dared, for, if you contradict them, they also say "What (so) is, is (so)!"), but adding the only appropriate model to the subject or original. When one speaks of the (apparent) his(de), one can, in all honesty, use only one model to define it correctly: 'his(de)! Otherwise one does not respect its real identity (hence the name "identity principle or axiom".

1.-- *Verbal or nominal definition.*
When one - in order to define something - appeals only to the existing language system (which in its lexicographic form can be found in dictionaries, in part) and thus, from that language system, extracts terms that fit (which can be model terms of) the subject, then one is defining nominally or word by word.

2.-- *Business or real definition.*
With the "words" one certainly has a start (for those who already know the terms of the definition). But there is another type of defining or representing being and factuality.

For example, paper.-- To define that, one can extract a finite number of terms from the language system: "something usually white, thin, light and the like more". But one can also do it differently.

'Paper' -- at least a few years ago -- was a kind of linen that was pulverized, reduced to a paste, made white thanks to a chlorine bath and the like more.

That too is defining, i.e. using a finite number of terms to represent what 'paper' (wax) is.

But here we refer to the industrial method of production which is represented in terms taken again from the language system. The first model is the industrial production. The corresponding linguistic model is the set of terms representing the industrial process that makes paper "exist".

Sample 2.-- ontology as metaphysics. (21/26).

'Metaphysics' is mostly another name for ontology. -- Yet there is a different language.-- I.M. Bochenskl, *Geschiedenis der hedendaagse Europese wijsbegeerte*, (History of Contemporary European Philosophy), DDB, 1952-2, 218, says in this regard as follows.

"According to the currently prevailing views, the distinction between metaphysics and ontology consists in the fact that ontology studies being and existence -- think of essence and existence -- in a general (i.e. transcendental) sense, while metaphysics seeks to give an explanation of the whole of reality in a non-transcendental sense.

Bochenski expresses this in an unsuccessful way by saying that metaphysics makes existence judgments (which ontology would not then do) and thus involves a theory of knowledge (gnoseology, elaborated into epistemology) and that metaphysics is not concerned only with individual problems but - at least in principle - wants to achieve an explanation of the totality of all that is.-- We are now going to interpret this very clearly.

1.-- *The categorical emptiness of the concept of being(s).*

By claiming that something is 'real' (being, being, something), one is of course claiming "not nothing" but it is so vague that one can pretty much do nothing with it: it is a mere point of departure. Nothing more.

O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, 1959-2,453, cites Aristotle himself in this regard (Peri, hermèneias 3, in fine).

"One does not achieve any definition - sèmeion - that would render of something the essence by calling it a being. Also: if one says 'being' ''on', (of something), this is an empty term ('psilon'), for it does not express anything. 'On', 'being', only acquires meaning in connection with something else. Without that other, there is no thought". -

Note.-- Expressed in terms of 'transcendental' and 'categorical': being(s) is model for all subjects without distinction. That one subject becomes distinguishable from another (= categorical things) is due to the addition of something other than an all-encompassing concept

E.g., "A girl is something". Of course! All that is not girl is also something! The distinctiveness of the term "girl" comes from something other than the low term "something"! For example, "A girl is something that is human and of the female sex and still young enough not to be called a grown woman. Thanks to these features, one can make 'girl' distinguishable from the rest of all that is!

What does that mean? That to think that ontology is a "panacea" for "knowing everything" without first having taken samples on the subject is a mistake and not a small one! Ontology is not a panacea! What a lot of metaphysicians have forgotten in the course of the systematic expositions that bear the name "metaphysics". Calling something "something" is a lemma, a preposition. One presupposes that what will be brought up will bloat (make manifest) "something" ("reality") somewhere.

"All that is gold."
O. Willmenn, o.c., 366, says what follows.

(1) J. Locke (1632/1704), the founder of the English Enlightenment, said - as a nominalist - that a goldsmith knows much better what gold is, than the metaphysician. In other words: that the 'speculations' (conjectural knowledge) concerning the being (essence) of all that is gold are 'empty'.

The reason is obvious: a goldsmith handles real gold! He forges it into jewelry, for example. He can verify how pure it is (= carat number). Thus he arrives at a business definition that is based on samples.

(2) O. Willmann, a Platonizing ontologist and metaphysician, answers as follows:-- Willmann - as a realist (conceptual realist) - says: claiming that gold e.g. exhibits both essence and existence, means that a number of characteristics which e.g. a goldsmith can attribute to the metal in question on the basis of experience, have not coincidentally come together but constitute a "totum physicum" as the medieval metaphysicians said. In current terms: the essence of the element 'gold' consists of a number of properties which together form a system (coherent whole). Which exhibit 'unity' (one of the ontological-transcendental concepts).

But Willmann, as a matter-of-fact ontologist, immediately adds: for sample (induction) supported probing of gold, the being" (plus the existence) of gold is "ein X, eine qualitas occultat" (an x (unknown), an obscure property).

In other words: an ontologist remains silent about gold until the connoisseur of gold adds to the concept of "being", which is something empty - psilon (as Aristotle said) - the characteristics determined by positive research (definite = based on observations), represented with the correct terms from the language system.

2.-- *The same categorical emptiness in other terms.*

Do we now dwell on "strange things": many scientists who have no real ontological knowledge poke fun at "being" (of the metaphysics). But do not listen to their words but see their actions. W. Fuchs, *Denken met computers*, (Thinking with Computers), The Hague, s.d. (Knauers Buch der Denkmaschinen), vrl. o.c., 237/238.

Fuchs, o.c., 234v., says: the technician and especially the physicist are often confronted with the problem of a 'box' (switchboard) - either of natural or artificial nature - which cannot simply be taken apart, to see what is inside. That is the given. Now for the requested one.

For reasons of 'efficiency' the given thing is referred to as a 'black box', because for the time being it conceals its 'structure' (another word for 'being' - equally empty!).

The term 'structure' - a word which today is constantly used as a stopgap for unknowns - is nothing more than the fact that the features which are inside the box did not come together by chance but constitute a 'unity' (coherence, system), whereby the term 'structure' replaces the term 'unity'. Nothing more.

The behavioral descriptive or "behavioral" method serves to expose the Black Box. One applies an (electrical) stimulus - input - to see how the closed box reacts to it (output).

Thus one learns, without knowing the inside, directly, if there is order in it and how that order is put together (existence / essence).

Fuchs continues.-- The "black box method" originated in electrical engineering. But exact natural sciences have always used this method. He refers to his work "Modern Physics" where he talks about the experimental research on atoms and atomic nuclei.

Fuchs emphasizes the mathematical moment in the black-box method.-- After all, today's mathematics designs "schemata" - schematic operations among others - and "rules" that represent structures - again, the panacea word.

Semiotically (sign theory), mathematical reality - because mathematical entities are also non-nothing - makes up a system of relations that combine signs among themselves. That then is mathematical syntax.

Semantics.

'Semantics' is that part of peircian semiotics that deals with the relations between syntactic signs and honor or other non-mathematical reality. Then the abstract signs and operations acquire (semantic) meaning. Before that, they are a kind of lemma or possible reality outside themselves. Consider Einstein's formula "$E = mc^2$" By itself, that formula is an "equation" (see the "=" sign). The proper relations between E and mc^2 are represented in it by the '=' sign. Nothing more. What E, m, C and C^2 might be does not appear from the pure formula. It is a lemma.

Fuchs.-- The mathematical entities are models which may be transferred to the field of other sciences than mathematics. They are then given e.g. a physical content or meaning. In this case: E = energy; m = mass; c = speed of light.

Such an application of abstract, empty formulas, then gives 'structure', in ontological language "the being (and the existence)" of things which at first sight seem to be invisible. - of things which at first sight have nothing to do with mathematics. Those empty formulas are then 'models' (abstract models, which in the saying provide information e.g. about physical data).

Note -- Fuchs rightly refers to "physical models"-- When a builder has to design a house, he often obtains good information (which can then serve as a model) about his design when he builds a house in miniature, with pieces of wood and so on. This is then a pre-existing 'realization (model) which, to the extent that it is similar in form down to the details, provides all the more information. That is called "isomorphism. This too serves to expose the structure' (the unity of the parts).

The black box already present in the mind of the designing architect becomes clearer, more real (where 'reality' here means "that which he wants to realize, i.e. the house to be built). With such an 'x' in his head he sets himself at his work table and constructs what makes his vague model (in his head) more concrete. He can show that to the builder (who is not much served by the design in the builder's head!). The house-in-the-small provides information to the builder.

Heidegger's model.

M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, (Being and time), I, Tübingen, 1927, 1, 17, says: "To be human - in Heidegger's German 'Dasein' - is to be in a well-defined way, i.e., because he himself 'is', he immediately understands something like 'being'." - For Heidegger, being human is a privileged access to transcendental being.

Such a thing amounts to starting from a sample (which is and remains real and pure induction), namely what I, as a human being and insofar as a human being, know about what being, my being in the first place, is, in order to extend this knowing, this information, to the totality of "das Sein". That is extrapolating from being human.

How to judge such a thing?

1. As far as we exist, this is indeed a beginning. We know what "being there" is, since we "are there"!

2. But is the "being there" of all that is not - us, the same as my "being there"? That can only be decided by an endless series of other samples! For now, the "being there" that defines man is just a lemma, a vague something that sets off. Nothing more. The rest of the universe (being) remains an "x".

What does somewhat justify Heidegger's privileging of being human is the fact that, as spirit-gifted, we have a transcendental concept of being.

But ... there Aristotle appears and warns us: without something else than that comprehensive concept of being, that concept of being remains 'vague' - psilon, something empty! That vague concept does set one on the road but only gives information in unity with something else, namely something categorical.

Which amounts to saying that Heidegger wanted to construct a kind of 'metaphysics' - "to construct metaphysics" means: to fill the empty notion of being with something other than that empty notion - that was 'existential', i.e., made being human central.

One can do that, of course, but whether Heidegger, without a whole series of samples concerning what being human actually is ("positive material"), will get that much further than the previous metaphysics he has so "completed," is highly questionable.

The critique of a mathematician.
Bibl. : P. Cortois, *Een herdenkingscolloquium voor Jean Cavaillès*, (A memorial colloquium for Jean Cavaillès), in: Tijdschr. v. philos. 47 (1985):1 March, 161/164.

Jean Cavaillès (1904/1944) was a versatile thinker who was executed in 1944 at Amiens as a resistent.

Mathematics has about three 'foundations'.
Logicism, formalism, and 'intuitionism'--which we will not dwell on now. Only this. These foundations of mathematics are somewhere 'philosophical'. And this is where the shoe pinches.

Cortois articulates Cavaillis' thoughts.
"More generally (i.e. outside of these three schools), can the philosopher any longer be the legislator who defines the limits within which mathematical thinking can develop? The ambition to define, ground or reduce "mathematics" to something else from an extra-mathematical standpoint is not legitimate.

It is precisely the mixing of mathematical reasoning and philosophical speculation that is responsible for part of the confusion in the problem of foundations."

Note.-- Aristotle would say: the ontological system of concepts is only 'psilon', empty material! Without the supply from outside the ontology one cannot do metaphysics of mathematics and its entities! If one does, one confuses domains that are worlds apart.

Cortois: "Mathematical problems require technical and mathematical solutions, even if they are at a different level of abstraction and comprehension than the original problem.

Note -- In other words, mathematical questions first require mathematical solutions.

Cortois: "However, the philosopher must develop an internal commentary. This is: to develop a reflection that unfolds the nature of mathematical praxis from within (...)".

In other words, if one wishes to develop the philosophy of mathematics, which is one form of metaphysics, namely the metaphysics of mathematics and its activities, the empty notions of ontology cannot be used as long as they are not supplemented by what mathematicians already know about their subject.

To want to "deduce" mathematics from preconceived metaphysical concepts is to want to conjure up something empty (concerning mathematics)!

Sample 3.-- Ontology as a theory of order (harmology). (27/35).

So far we saw that to philosophize is: to know and handle transcendental concepts. That the same philosophizing is: to see the basic role of those same transcendental notions - something (as far as it differs from the rest)/ apparent/ one/ good (value) - with the emptiness concerning categorical things.

Now we come to the ontological ordering. How do we order all possible data (data = being, things)?

1. *We do this by comparing them.*

The comparative method is therefore a typical ontological method. It is applied again and again, even if one never thinks of it.

Ch.S. Peirce saw this clearly. As basic categories with which everything can be clarified, he saw 'first', some given. Immediately with that 'first', he saw a 'second', a second fact.-- Note: do not confuse 'compare' with 'equate'! To 'compare' here means - "to see relations", "to confront more than one data with each other". -- So that ordeleer is 'harmology', i.e. to put together. Which then again includes seeing totalities, within which one situates more than one data.

2. *Seeing similarities/differences and connections/ gaps.*

We also put things in order by seeing similarities/differences and connections/ gaps -- Platon, following in the footsteps of the palaeopythagoreans in particular, clearly recognized this.

Consequence: two basic concepts recur again and again in his ordering thinking: 'all' (similarity) and 'whole' (cohesion). In ancient Greece, the seeing and fitting together of data was called 'stoicheiosis' (lat.: elementatio). The main requirement for this was 'anamnesis' (lat.: reminiscentia), which differed considerably from 'mnèmè' (lat.: memoria), the vague memory or consciousness. Indeed: 'anamnesis' means organizing consciousness, working in an orderly fashion when thinking of a group of data.

Note.-- It may be recognized that what we call here 'order theory' is called "logic of relations" in recent logics (mathematical-accounting logic).

1. *The identitive range.*

It is a classic truism to say that analogy (i.e., partial identity) plays the leading role in ordering in traditional ontology and logic (which checks the "if-then" relations in all that is). Yet this turns out to be false.

The analogy, after all, is the middle term within a differential.-- The ordering or interlocking practiced by traditional harmology (relational science) relies on one scheme: two or more "things" (being, data) are either totally identical (they coincide) or partially identical (analogous) or totally non-identical (totally different).

Total or overall identity occurs only, in the acute sense at least, with something that is identical with itself. In that case there is only one data.-- The partial identity and the total non-identity always presuppose at least two data.

The logical square.
The so-called logical square is also a fan.

all	some do
some not	none (all not)

can be placed in square form (which is a configuration): hence the old name.
One recognizes in those four elements the universal, the private and the zero sets.

The logical square system theorem.
A 'system' is a set of parts, components, portions, which, although different, are nevertheless related.
The logical square is: whole (all parts) - part (not all parts) - no part.
These two variants of the logical square are ontological variants. For with every mental activity they go hand in hand like a light that precedes light.

In traditional logic they occur under the name "immediate or immediate deductions". Thus e.g. "All girls are of the female sex. You don't have to have studied logic to see that.

Or still: "All girls are of the female gender. No girl is a female. Everyone can see immediately that there are contradictory judgments being made here ... without ever having taken a lesson in logic.

These are traditionally called "immediate deductions." They are immediate because one does not have to make a traditional syllogism to deduce them logically rigorously (although there is such a syllogism behind them).

Therefore, they count as "entailed with every mind activity." The terms "all", "none", "this... here and now" are terms that come straight from the differentials mentioned above. The same applies to the system deductions: "If the whole, then all parts or so".

Note.-- 'Fuzzy Logic' is nowadays, in technological environments, in. D. McNeill / P.Freiberger, *Fuzzy Logic* (Bodoni) sets out a kind of applied logic that works with differentials instead of hard opposites. For example, since a few years the Japanese industry has been marketing products - vacuum cleaners, for example - that have such "floating logic" built in. Terms such as "freezing cold / cold / lukewarm / warm" are quantified (converted into mathematical terms) so that e.g. "20% warm" or "70% lukewarm" can be processed mechanically.

2.-- *Unit theory (henology).*
An ancient way of expressing the differentials reads: one - partially one - not one.

Indeed: in this language one starts from a multiplicity that can be brought to unity. This on the basis of similarity/difference and/or cohesion/gap.

Totalities.
What Platon called 'all' and 'whole', the medieval scholastics call 'totum logicum' (class/collection) and 'totum physicum' (system).

In virtue of one identic common property, all elements of a class form one class (collection).

In virtue of one identic connection, all parts (components, portions) of a system (system) constitute one system.

One sees the transcendental concept of 'unity' - CP (= Current Philosophy; this course) 18, giving its full measure here.

Note.-- Again: this insight, an insight into being, is given with all mental activity: one does not have to have learned class logistics or systems theory to see immediately that a bunch of red objects - to follow Husserl's example - constitute one and the same concept that applies to all (possible) red things as its own domain (extent) of the concept 'red'.

Likewise: one need not have studied systems theory to the hilt to see immediately that a body is coherent and constitutes a "coherent whole" (system).

A child who holds an object quickly learns that it is connected. It seems to take longer for a child to learn to 'collect'.

In other words: the traditional unified theory interprets a light that illuminates.

In passing: compare the differential on CP 15 (something/relative = to some extent nothing/absolutely nothing) with what we just saw: 'differentials' dominate the traditional ontology!

Linguistic.

In the case of the class (collection) the common property is identical in all the elements or members. In the case of the system the whole is identical, because the parts (components, parts) of a whole - however diverse they may be: think of all that makes up a bird's body (anatomy, physiology) - have one and the same common characteristic, namely to belong to one and the same whole.

So that the concept of 'class' (collection) is included in the concept of system itself in its own way.

Linguistically this has the effect that when we see one or more specimens of a class, we see them including the rest of the class and say: "That here and now is one specimen" (emphasis added: of one and the same class). The terms we extract from the language system perfectly express identity.

Linguistically this also has the consequence that, when we see one or more parts of a system, we associate them, as de Saussure very correctly says, with the rest of the system and say: "That here and now belongs to the city of Antwerp" because we see e.g. the Meir including the whole city! The terms that we extract from the linguistic whole do not lie: they express identity. This is sometimes very clear: "This is now the busiest part of Antwerp".

Note. - When e.g. Hegel thought he could ridicule identity as "die einfache Grundbestimmung der traditionellen Logik" (the basic determination of traditional logic), this betrays a. that he saw correctly b. but radically misinterpreted.

Indeed, one often confuses 'identitarian' with 'substantialist' or 'atomistic', so that thinking in identitarian terms, as outlined above, would make thinking and correctly expressing relations or changes impossible.

No: to work identitively is to work comparatively-synchronically and diachronically, i.e. to see more than just one fact including, in relation to, the rest. Thinking identitively is in other words - saussurian - associative thinking: seeing in a context, if necessary in terms of the rest. In Hegelian terms: seeing the place and meaning of something in the context of the "living whole" (Hegel's favorite expression) in which it is situated.

Note.-- That comparative relations seeing constitutes the essence of traditional logic (because ontology) is already abundantly clear from Aristotle's table of categories.

They are all 'sustoichiai', systechies (pairs of opposites). The basic systechia is 'ousia', lat.: substantia, independence (i.e. something insofar as it exists in itself)/ "pros ti", lat.: relatio, relation (i.e. more than one independence insofar as they are related to each other).

The rest of the table: "quality/ quantity", "time/ space", "being active/ passive", "proposition/ site". Aristotle sees them not only "in themselves" (substantial, atomic) but always "including" or "associated with".

3.-- Associating.
We used a very old term just now. In the wake of de Saussure, the semiotician-structuralist.-- The definition may read, "If when one thinks of a one thinks of b (if one thinks of a including b), then b is an association of a."

This presupposes that a and b are "thought connected" o.k.a. some identity: we associate on the base of similarity /difference and/or coherence/ gap.-- In other words, associating is an indentitive activity.

Associative psychology.
Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*, (The psychology of feelings), Paris, 1917-10, 171 / 182 (Les sentiments et l'assocaition des idées).-- Ribot was an experimental psychologist and thinker.

In the cited text he shows how the mind as a capacity for value -- see CP 19 (the good as transcendental property of all that is) -- involves, i.e. associates,-- values including.

(1) Similarity.
To a young man, if he resembles her son, has the same age and so on, a mother may suddenly feel a sympathy arising. In that strange young man she projects her own son.

On the basis of resemblance (common characteristics) - there are aspects in both young people that are identical - she is referred to her own son. There is -- to speak with Derrida -- a trace to something absent, which is not immediately given, namely her son.

Ribot gives a second example.-- "Thus there are fear reactions that are called 'unconsidered'.-- A deeper penetrating perception, however, can trace them to a similar explanatory ground as in the case of the spontaneously sympathizing mother, where similarity was at work."

Note.-- The letter carrier who has been bitten once by a dog on her tour thinks all subsequent dogs including that one biting dog! She partially identifies -- analogy -- all future ones with the one biting!

(2) *Coherence.*
Ribot uses the term "adherence" or "apprehension. - The feeling - again, the mind, part of our spirit, which is value capacity - that a lover in love originally lived through for the very person of his mistress, he transfers, - "transference meaning" to her clothes, her furniture, her home.

Ribot gives another model: envy and hatred cool their anger on the inanimate objects that belong to "the enemy(s)." For the same reason: "apprehension"/"adhesion".

In the absolute monarchies, by transfer, the worship of the monarch is also directed partly to his throne, to the emblems of his power.

Note.-- In eroticism, this explains 'fetishism' (not in the religious-historical sense): is 'fetish' all that is not a living person and yet eroticizes. Indeed: a pair of panties, a bra in a display window,--a perfume without any connection to anyone can be eroticizing.

So much for the phenomena. Now the interpretation.

Ribot: "We know that the association of knowledge contents has been reduced to two basic laws: the law of resemblance and the law of adhesion.

Ribot calls this "transfert" (transfer): "transfert par ressemblance/ transfert par contiguité". (transfer by resemblance/ transfer by contiguity). -- Such metaphorical (resemblance) or metonymical (coherence) behavior of the mind as a value capacity labels Ribot as something that lives 'in hiding' that often "signifies a latent but purposeful influence." --

Ribot's explanation is expressed in traditional-ontological and -logical terms: identitive. Relationships are experienced, felt.

4.-- *Tropology.*
The ancient rhetors often dwelt at length on the means of stylization in a text. Thus they discovered the tropes, viz. metaphor and metonymy, connected with two types of synecdoche (literally: co-authorship), viz. metaphorical and metonymical synecdoche.

Let us now examine briefly how they are identitive.

(1) *The metaphor.*

Both metaphor and metonymy are comparisons expressed in a linguistically abbreviated form.

The comparison that sees parable expresses itself as e.g. follows: "That woman is a reed. At the sight of that woman one thinks of a reed folding in the wind.-- Both exhibit an identical trait (common trait,-- indicating gathering): pliability. As is evident upon conscious comparison. From that woman runs a 'trace' (reference) to reed, i.e. from one pliability to the other.

The term 'be' as an auxiliary verb expresses this perfectly: "That woman is a reed". This is: under just one point of view (which is partial identity or analogy, metaphorical analogy) she is the same. So that 'being' here means "under point of view of ... being".

Note.-- Modern and postmodern logicians accuse the concept of 'being' as an auxiliary verb of 'multiplicity' and thus uselessness.

To which we reply that it is only a question of analogy and that the famous 'implication', core of logistics and mathematics, is just as 'many-sided' because that implication expresses all possible "if - then" - connections; For example: "Eating involves being hungry".

But also: "Eating involves taking the time to eat". The implication "eating/ being hungry" and "eating/ taking the time to eat" is quite different in reality. And yet: every logistician uses the same implication sign' (an arrow)!

The metaphorical sign.

A map as an illustration, due to a high degree of similarity, is a metaphorical sign : the structure (or the essence) of the real landscape is the same in both cases.

(2) *The metonymy.*

The comparison that sees coherence expresses itself, e.g., as follows: "Apples are healthy" (Aristotle's example of metonymic analogy). At the sight of apples one thinks - associatively - of causing along with other foods of health by (eating) apples.

Again: the comparison is expressed linguistically in shortened terms: 'Apples - as a factor of health - are healthy'. Where the term "are" as an auxiliary verb co-expresses something like the relation "cause/effect".

The relation "cause/effect" makes up one system or system: a dynamic system that includes food and health creation.

'Being' here means "being a co-cause of ..." Which does not indicate absolute multiplicity but partial identity or analogy.

The unity (transcendental property) here is not resemblance but coherence: eating apples implies that apples do not resemble health but co-cause health. Not resemblance but coherence!

The metonymic sign.
A signpost does not resemble, as the map does, the landscape that is partly depicted in it, but is related to it: "Antwerp" means "Whoever continues on this road will arrive in Antwerp with time".

They The types of the synecdoche.
reflect the aforementioned but introduce all/not all and whole/not whole. The relationship "collection/ copy" and "whole/ part" is central.

(1) *The metaphorical synecdoche.*
"A soldier does not leave his post" says the captain. He says "a soldier" but thinks "all soldiers". -The school inspector at the outset : "A teacher does not arrive late"! Meaning : "All teachers do not come late". --The metaphorical synecdoche pronounces the copy but means the class.

(2) *The metonymic synecdoche.*
"The beard is there". One says "the beard", (a part) but thinks "the whole man of whom the beard is".

The beard, with the rest of the appearance, forms one whole or 'system: Not resemblance as in the metaphorical synecdoche but coherence. -- That means (partial) identity. The synecdoche thinks identitively.-- So it is also in the expression "The parish has two thousand souls" (where 'souls' (part cared for by the pastoralist) stands for -- trace is to, refers to, co-means -- people to whom those souls belong).

5.-- *Two types of induction.*
'Induction' is from one or more specimens or parts decisions to - amplificative induction - the whole class (collection) or all parts (the whole).

Note.-- The summative induction.-- Whether a teacher counts all the copies - wet-counts - or she counts all the pages of one book, the axiom is, "If all copies/parts separately, then all together." The "sum" or totality in its first form comprises the "sum" in its second form.

The amplificative or knowledge-expanding induction proceeds by sampling:

a. metaphorically: from the same class or set, it takes at least one instance to bring out at least one common property (the partial identity):

b. metonymically: from the same whole or system, it takes at least one part (portion) to extract at least one partial insight (partial identity or analogy) on the whole.

One sees the synecdochic structure of both forms of amplificative induction.

Summative/ amplificative induction.

One noted that the summative induction is always the core -- the tested core -- of the amplificative.-- This is perhaps most evident in statistical induction.

In an opinion poll, for example, one takes a thousand samples (subclass) from a population (class). One adds these together: which is summarizing (i.e. summarizing all individually in all collectively). Then one says e.g. "One thousand people who were tested give 73% for that candidate".

From the tested ones one reasons generalizing--extrapolating--to the testable ones. What was summarily said in the summative induction then applies, until further investigation, to the entire class. This is amplification.

The metaphorical induction or generalization.

It rests on similarity.--If this water and that water (summering) boil at 1000 c., -so we inductively associate-all water will boil at 1000 C. From a partial class (samples) we reason to the total class.

The metonymic induction or make a whole (situate a part of something in its whole).

It rests on coherence.-- I study the economic life in Antwerp. I get to know the Meir (note : a shopping street in Antwerp) and the harbor district. Two samples. Everywhere I bump into the rest of the city as an economic entity.-- I summarize.--"If two parts exhibit many foreigners as economic actors, then all other parts will also exhibit many foreign economic actants." -- My understanding is partial, of course. But both parts shed light on the whole. I can imagine the whole thing! This is not generalizing or summarizing as in a collection, it is making the whole. A whole is more than a collection because it contains a structure that a collection of separate elements does not have.

As an aside: in over-complicated - complex - totalities, such a generalization is the only doable method of induction, usually. If you want to take apart spaghetti, you have to be groping!

Sample 4.-- Ontology as hermeneutics (theory of interpretation). (36/42)

'Hermèneuein' in ancient Greek is "what one thinks, put into words". But also means "to interpret" ("interpret").

'Hermàneutikè (technè) e.g. in Platon, *Politeia* 260D - can mean the skill concerning interpretation.-- Here we use it in the two meanings.

Aristotle's interpretation of text ("exégèse textuelle") and understanding of signs ("intelligence des signes") is informed by one of the traditional meanings of the term 'hermeneutics' itself: Aristotle's booklet on judgment is called "*Peri hermèneias*" (lat.: de interpretetione). In particular: it strikes me that in Aristotelian language 'hermèneia' is not limited to allegorizing but is also the name for any sensible judgment.

More than that: sensible judgment is 'herrnèneia', interpretation, to the extent that it means "to say something of something".

Note.-- With that, the main thing is given.

The meaning of something

For ontology, according to Aristotelian doctrine of judgment, which is a primary part of its logic, the person who judges (expresses proposition) is an interpretant(s). Now, to judge is invariably to pronounce from an original (subject in the sentence) a model (saying). Or, as Aristotle himself says : "to say something of something".

To judge is to "identify.

Identitatively speaking - ontology in the traditional sense - to say something of something is to 'identify' that first something with the second something. In the definition, that identification is total. In all other judgments, that identification is partial.

Two ways of identifying.

Two striking ways of making sense will now be discussed.

1. -- *Grasp the meaning of something*

When we try to correctly grasp "the meaning" of something -- an event, a saying -- we pay attention to that something and its "meaning," i.e., what it is" itself, in itself.

Thus the term 'responsibility' in itself can be defined as
a. a given
b. containing a demand (problem), to be treated in such a way that one, in solving the problem, takes up one's involvement with one's conscience. Expressed in folk terms: one lets both the given and the demand 'come' to one's conscience!

So: my child is sick: I cannot leave him to his fate in conscience. That is (ethical) responsibility.

Given: my sick child.

Requested: to do something to save it from that unfortunate condition.

Solution: either I can help it myself or I ask for someone's help.

In Hegelian terms, that behavior - that interpretation turned into behavior - is 'responsible', because 'wirklich', i.e. in really responsible feeling with the given and the demanded, doing something about it. Wirklich' in Anglo-Saxon language is everything that 'grasps' both the given and the demanded and which responds to the demand.

In other words: all those who do not answer to the asked (and through the asked to the given) .... are 'unreal', because such a person lives outside reality where he / she has place and meaning.

Parmenides of Elea (-540/ ...), founder of eleatic philosophy, left us an expression: "being according to itself". That is, not what is given and asked for according to us or so, but according to the given and asked for itself. In other words: the object decides, not the subject.

2.-- *Create a meaning: To give a meaning other than the original.*
Given: my child is ill.

Requested: assistance.

Create meaning: "I don't feel responsible for that request".

In colloquial language: "I don't care".

In other words: the given and the demanded are grasped according to their meaning (conception of meaning) but the final interpretation and the behavior that originates from this, does not correspond to the demanded (and through the demanded to the given).-- The given and the demanded do not come into their own in the solution. The person who thus interprets and acts according to that interpretation, "does not do justice to" the child and his sick condition.

Here meaning is literally 'introduced', founded: because meaning does not lie in the given and the asked. It is brought in from outside.

As an aside: in the tradition, the omission of duty, irresponsibility form that is common, is called "peccatum omissionis", sin of omission: it is as if the given and the requested did not even exist.

In the Sophistes, Platon at some point talks about 'para.frosune', thinking beside reality. While 'so.frosynè' means to think reality itself.

Schematic.
1. *Grasp the meaning*.-- At A (given and requested) I think A.
2. *Create a meaning.--* At (better : n. a.) A I do think somewhat A but especially B which can sometimes be -A (non-A). In response to A something which in itself does not necessarily go together with A, namely B, is introduced.

Note -- When one reads J. Derrida carefully, one finds that the differential meaning includes both, and grasping and creating meaning (possibly in the diminishing sense of -A (non-A)).

Since it is always situated in the overall history of meaning -- from the ancient Greeks and even before to the present and long after us, meaning, interpreted deridically, is always "A différer", to be postponed, because never finished. The meaning present invariably refers to ever escaping and thus "absent" meaning. So that we are - to speak with Kafka - 'unfertig', unfinished.

The difference between pure phenomenology and hermeneutics.
a. The phenomenologist, i.e. phenomenon descriptor/narrator, adheres strictly to the given which here coincides with the asked, because the asked, in representing data and asked as they are in themselves - in our consciousness - is precisely all that is given.

b. The hermeneuticist does begin with the representation of the phenomenon (sense) but transcends this phenomenology in order to introduce other interpretations which do not necessarily belong to the given. Precisely because of this he becomes an interpreter, as Peirce says.

A J. Derrida goes to the differential extreme in this, because he includes, in his concept of 'interpretation', both the conception of meaning and the preferably deconstructive foundations of meaning in their fundamentally endless number.

Judgment as 'hermeneusis' (interpretation).
Aristotle said it: "Katègorain ti tinos", to say something out of something. Whether the subject - original (unknown) - is purely imaginary, as in a science fiction judgment, or given in our everyday or professional science determinable world, is of no importance. Logic is not epistemology i.e. epistemology. Epistemology, as an ontology concerning - testable - data, examines whether the subject actually exists, yes or no.-

Let us now examine a little more closely how judging as interpretation proceeds.

Original/ model.
Bibl. : K.Bertels/ D. Nauta, *Inleiding tot het modelbegrip*, (Introduction to the concept of model), Bussum, 1969, 28.

We repeat : the subject (which is given) acts as an unknown (original). The saying (what is known) has the role of information.

"In terms of".
To say something about something is to speak about something "in terms of" something else.-- But this means that one has "terms" at one's disposal. These are taken from the language system which is, as it were, endlessly available.

To judge is to situate the subject in the living whole (Hegel's term) of language so that one can speak of the subject in terms of the saying. We saw that this is done identitively, i.e. by association based on similarity/difference and on cohesion/ difference. Cfr. CP 30 ("On seeing"); 31 (Associating).

There are references -- traces -- in the subject that point to the saying as information.

Note -- It was noted that in traditional ontology and its logic not words but terms are valid. Thus, the relation (= partial identity or analogy) "greater than" expresses a single term in two words. The reverse can also exist: one word encompasses more than one co-occurring term.

1.-- *"Anneke is a runner".*
By virtue of connection, understand: partial identity, between Anneke and being a runner one can speak of her "in terms of" being a runner.

In passing: synecdochically (CP 34 (Mataphoric)) Anneke is one specimen from the "totum logicum", the class (collection), of runners. One can speak of it in terms of "(Anneke is) a (runner)". When one sees them busy, a trace runs from her to that collection.

2. -- *"Anneke walks".*
Attention: in everyday language this proposition can mean "Anneke is a walker". Behind this we consider a second interpretation: "Anneke is currently walking".

The multiplicity of "Anneke is walking" shows that the context alone can reveal the correct meaning.

In other words: the context provides "the including" with which the expression can be correctly understood.-- The absent in the present text is the context that helps decide the correct meaning (sense) of the expression.

By virtue of the connection, understand: partial identity, here - not of resemblance as in the example above but - of connection between Anneke and walking can, indeed, must - if one actually sees them walking - one speak of her in terms of walking.

In both cases, one falls back on a model because there is partial identity (analogy establishable.-- In the case of "Anneke walks," there was even partial identity between the sentence and the context. Text and context are "one" somewhere (the transcendental concept).

Quantitative models.
One can still hear logicians claiming that traditional logic has no place for relations among others of a quantitative nature.-- Let us examine that.

1. - *"That church is larger than all the surrounding buildings".*
One sees that here the term "are" is combined as an auxiliary verb with the term "greater than. As Aristotle put it: without a categorical co-expression -- here: greater than -- 'being' means 'nothing' (understood: nothing categorical). Cfr CP 21.

One fails to see that this is not a sensible expression: the relation (relation) and that of a quantitative nature between given 1 (church) and given 2 (all surrounding buildings) is correctly rendered.-- The detour of the logistics of relations is not necessary to speak sensibly!

2.-- *"That tower is one hundred and fifty meters high."*
A measurement model is introduced here: 'meter' - Again: the relation between given 1 (tower) and given 2 (meter) is perfectly expressed in combining the (without categorical signifying term empty) 'be' as auxiliary verb and "meter high".

Note.-- As Aristotle put it : to judge is to compare. Here it is evident: church and all surrounding buildings are compared quantitatively ("greater than"); tower and meter (high) are compared in quantitative terms.

Where is the absolute necessity of the detour along the so-called "exact" logistics of relations (of a quantitative nature)? Where is the inaccuracy? Even the language of manners, as the recent 'neo-rhetoric' made clear, has its own 'akribeia' or accuracy.

So far we have been talking about part-identical (analogous) subjects and sayings.

"Including".

We had been talking so far about the linguistic aspect in judging.--Do we dwell for a moment on the understanding.

"That church is massive."

It is evident that the term "massive" is indeed one word but at the same time a term which only becomes meaningful "including" what is so that the other is "massive".

In other words, the phrase wants to say "massive (in comparison with e.g. ourselves, the environment and so on)". 'Massive' is but understandable "including" what is non-massive. The term 'massive' is present. That against which something is 'massive' is absent from the text.

In this sense at least, J. Derrida, with others who speak again and again of the unspoken ("le non-dit"), is right: there runs from 'massive' a trace to that against which something is massive.

And that in such an ordinary sentence as "That church is massive"! -- In ordinary language, one should not speak "in terms of" the inexpressible in many cases. The context is there. In computational logic, however, purely explicit signs and operations must be done. But then logistics is also arithmetic!

Defining judgments.

Bibl. : Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Cours de philosophie* (Psychologie. Logique), (Philosophy course (Psychology. Logic), Paris, 1933-27, 496/499 (La définition); 620/ 622 (La définition empirique).

'Defining' is ambiguous.

A judge e.g. gives - of a crime - after investigation and counter-investigation a legal definition: 'X is guilty of ...'. In which there is also a value judgment, of course.-- We are talking here about the essence definition.

Lahr: a definition is a judgment in which the saying (model) expresses the whole scope (domain) and only that scope to which the conceptual content of a term refers. De omni et solo definito (in mid-century Latin). -- Which is by no means always easy, in practice.

The ancient definition of "justice".

Platon, Politeia 1.-- The text can be summarized as follows.

1.-- The thesis (judgment) of Kephalos (lat.: Cephalus).-- The conversation (dialogue) is about 'justice' (understand: conscientious living).--

According to the socratic-platonic method one should reach an essential definition. That definition should summarize all justice and nothing but all justice in one conceptual content.

Kephalos's definition reads, "Justice is always telling the truth and always getting justice done."

2. -- *The Thesis of Socrates* (Platon)

By the way: here 'antologia', making remarks, is done.-- Ever since Zenon Van Elea (-500/ ....), Parmenies' thinker, deployed early eristics -- the skill of refuting or, as Popper says, 'identifying' -- in ancient Hellas, in response to the concept of (synchronic) multiplicity and the concept of (diachronic multiplicity or) change ('movement').

Platon, through Socrates, applies 'sunthesis' (deduction) here: deducting conclusions by reasoning from preconceived statements. One thinks of axiomatic mathematics. This is called, with Platon, forward dialectics. Or 'progressive' dialectics.

Given: one or more propositions (prepositions).
Asked: what follows logically from these? (post-phrases).
Application. -- Let us assume - provisionally - that Cephalos' definition is correct, what can be deduced from it?

In other words, what (theoretical and practical) inferences may be expected?
"If a friend, in good spirits, entrusts you with weapons, but later, having become insane, asks for them back, and if you, Kephalos, give them back to him -- he is entitled to them (according to your definition) -- will not someone say that, on that assumption, you are acting righteously,--that, in other words, you have an ethical duty 'to give back weapons to an insanity'?"

The crux of the reasoning lies in an ironic conclusion: a. acting righteously b. is tantamount to giving (dangerous) weapons to an insanity! The unspoken, in this ironic conclusion, is, "Do you not see that your righteousness includes iniquity?" For whoever gives (returns) weapons to someone who may become dangerous in their possession, is co-responsible (and complicit) in (with) the eventual misdeeds of the person to whom one provides weapons.

The unacceptable conclusion shows that - unspoken - a definitional error stuck in the thesis of Kefalos. Only thus does Kefalos begin to grasp the correct meaning (sense) both of 'justice' and of his own definition.

5.-- *Ontology as logic (theory of thought).* (43/49).

One has already established it: this course aims to be as thoroughly logical as possible.

a. This is first and foremost due to traditional philosophy which, since the time of the ancient Greeks, has put logic first as one of the main conditions for philosophizing.

b. It is also due, and not least, to one figure who has made logic, in its ancient, medieval and recent forms, the object of study par excellence, J.M. Bochenski, O.P. (1902/1995).

Bochenski was born in Poland in Czuszon. He began his studies in Lwow and Poznàn. He experienced WWI (1914/1918) a few miles from the Eastern Front.

In battles with the Bolsheviks he was wounded. His studies made him a Kantian (Kant was the great Aufklärer). But he converted and became a monk, Dominican, in 1927. Further studies - doctorate in theology (he became a doctor five times) - made him discover philosophical logic.

At that time logic was rather scorned, except in Poland. This subject is for philosophy what laboratory tests are for the explorer. It is a test without which one quickly falls into speculative thickets or ideological prejudices (according to Guido Küng, professor in Fribourg (Switzerland), a student of Bochenski).

After all, the logician tests:
a. the solidity of the axiomata (foundations, premises) and
b. the consistency of the propositions of a philosophical system.

"If there is anything I wanted to achieve during my life, it is to bring a little order to the brain. So that one tells fewer follies!". Thus, in his sappy way, Bochensky. In 1939 he was in Poland. Got hurt. Arrested. Escaped. Continued the fight against communism in England. Witnessed the campaign through Italy by Polish troops. A radical anti-Bolshevik, he never accepted Yalta nor the occupation of his Poles.

He was a professor from 1945 to 1972. Founder of the Institute for Eastern Europe. He became known as one of the best specialists on the communist world. His *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus* (Handbook of World Communism), sold more than a hundred thousand copies. West Germany made him its expert in the trials that led to the conviction of the "Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands". South Africa. and also the Swiss Federal Council consulted him regularly.

On the subject of reason and faith, Bochensky was abundantly clear: "I am thoroughly a follower of reason, partly because I believe!" With them, believing was as natural as thinking. In contrast to those who no longer think strictly logically and even less possess any faith at all, Bochenski never perceived faith and reason as contradictory, since the two powers founded each other.

With Bochenski a picturesque figure disappears in Fribourg (Switzerland): from his Jaguar he jumped into an airplane (at sixty-seven he obtained his pilot's license)!

Bochenski's picture of the history of logic.
According to him, the theory of thought had three main periods: ancient logic (IVth / IIIrd ed.), scholastic-medieval logic (XIIth / XIIIth ed.) and mathematical logic (XIXth ed.).

Between these short flourishing periods hang long periods of neglect. - Modern thinkers in particular (XVth e. and following) suffer from an appalling lack of logical formation.-- except for one thinker: Leibniz.

Nor does he rate the dialectic of Hegel and Marx highly: it lacks **a.** solid foundations and **b.** strict logical coherence.

Finally we refer to the Dutch translation of one of his best works: *Wijsgerige methoden in de moderne wetenschap* (Philosophical methods in modern science), Utrecht/Antwerp, 1961 (// Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethoden (Contemporary methods of thought), Bern, 1947).

Traditional logic.
Bibl. : G. Jacoby, *Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtschreibung* (Ein Diskussionsbeitrag), (Logisticians' Claims on Logic and its Historiography (A Discussion Paper)), Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1962.

Jacoby's thesis.
a. There have been, since halfway through the XIXth century, many logics (class logic, propositional logic, modal logic etc.)

b. But there is only one traditional, "formal" logic.
 Its scheme is clear, since centuries:
a.1. understanding,
a.2. judgment,
b. reasoning. Where reasoning is central: logic is the breaking down of "all that is logical, i.e. correctly deducible." In German "folgerecht". Consistent.

Its language form is "If, then" (i.e. the conditional or hypothetical sentence).

Deductive and reductive reasoning.

Since Platon, known under the names 'sunthesis' (deduction) and 'analusis' (reduction), and even before him, among mathematicians, one distinguishes two main forms of correct deduction from prepositions of postpositions.

1. -- "if a, then b.-- well, a, therefore b".

"If A, then B" is the lemma, the prepositional implication, also called 'encompassing'. Well, if (logic thinks strictly in if - sentences, for it is not an application of logic like epistemology) the pre-sentence is present, then logically, i.e. correctly reasoned, the post-sentence follows from it.

The axiomatic-deductive method in mathematics and in logistics are applications of this.

2. -- "If x, then b.-- well, b. So x".

This is the lemmatic usually called "analytic" - form of "deduction! ' The deduction, in the previous form, remains the essential core of all reasoning. But in the 'analytic' case one is looking for a hidden present preposition. In antiquity Platon passed as the founder of the lemmatic-analytic method.

It is present in all inductive reasoning which is a synecdochic form of reduction. - It is present in all search of unknown factors. Thus in experimental science.

The entailment (implication) as partial identity (analogy).

Like ontology as a unity theory (CP 27), traditional logic is identitive, i.e., based on the range "totally identical/partly identical (analogical)/ totally non-identical".

For, we think of B that resembles or is related to it (metaphorical or metonymical analogy). Relying on that, we rightly think that B is "proper to" either A (certain premise) or X (sought premise).

In other words: logically strict, we associate both terms.-- In his way, Josiah Royce (1855/1916), pragmatic-personalist, in his *The Principles of Logic*, New York, 1917, founds logically strict thinking on a doctrine of order: "Logic is the general science of order".

In other words: correct inferences are based on objective relations (which are precisely the object of traditional harmology). In other words: first the logistics of relations; only then the other branches of logistics!

The role of concepts and judgments.

If reasoning is the object of traditional logic, what role do concepts (opponents sometimes reduce traditional logic to a "logic of concepts") and judgments play?

1. - *The concept* is all that is real somewhere, insofar as it is present in our consciousness in the form of a representation ('understanding'),". In this sense, logic is nothing but ontology that elaborates unity theory into reasoning theory: 'being(the)' anyway is the processed material in our reasoning. Even if it were purely fictional. yes, contradictory (as in the reasoning "from the absurd or incongruous"). The absurd, in the strictly logical sense, is nothing but the unthinkable and therefore impossible and therefore radically unreal counter-model of what is real.

2. *Judgment* - we saw, just before this - is an interpretation of what is 'real' somewhere. Well, reasoning consists of at least two interpretations or judgements of concepts, in the form of a hypothetical sentence. It is precisely the hypothetical sense that is the object of logic.

Jacoby, o,c., 10.-- Just as ontologically reality in itself -- whether we consciously realize it or not -- is present outside the knowing-thinking subject (I, you, the others) ("subjektfrei" says Jacoby). i.e. objectively, in the presenting data, so logically are the objective identities behind the concepts, turned into judgments, in the reasonings carried out by the subject (I, you, the others).

Jacoby's work is one long proof, together with those of his many sources from the logical traditions, of that thesis which we make ours by virtue of what precedes.

Peirce's typology of reasoning.
Bibl. : Ch.S.S. Peirce, *Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis*, in: Popular Science Monthly 13 (1978) 470/482.-- We take his famous bean example.

a. Deduction.
All the beans in this bag are white,
This handful of beans comes from this bag.
This handful of beans is white,

Note that Peirce omits the terms 'well' and 'thus' but supposes them. He leaves them out in order to better accomplish the conversions ('transformations') from one reasoning to another.

It is immediately clear that the terms "all" and "this handful" stand for total class (universal concept) and partial class (private concept). Thus one can conclude from all to a part in an 'analytical' way, i.e. in the form of an "immediate deduction" (CP 29).

In other words: deduction is necessary.

Note that "All beans are white" actually relies on a prior "summative induction": if all separately, then all together!

b.1. Reduction (induction).
This handful of beans comes from this bag.
This handful of beans is white.
All the beans in this bag are white.

This is clearly one form of generalization, i.e., from subclass to total class.-- There is also 'generalization' (from subsystem to total system).

The reduction is always 'synthetic', in the sense that one can only be sure of the correctness of the generalization (or generalization) by experimentally checking the rest (the untested specimens) for whiteness.

"If at least one or some, then all" is valid only after further investigation. The conclusion is hypothetical (a lemma).

b.2. Reduction (hypothesis).
This handful of beans is white.
All the beans in this bag are white
This handful of beans comes from this bag.

Peirce also calls 'hypothesis' in the strict sense 'abduction'. Which is a term to be avoided. "If this handful of beans is white, and if all the beans in this bag are white, then this handful of beans comes from this bag" is also 'synthetic', i.e. only after further testing experimentally certain. Until then, it is uncertain. The conclusion is also hypothetical (= lemmatic).

Modal logic.
Only the modalities 'necessary' (= 'analytic') and 'non-necessary' (= 'synthetic') are involved. The types of reduction ('analusis' in platonic language) exhibit possible truths or decisions.

Foundations research.

The famous foundations research - e.g., of mathematicians or other systems researchers (structuralists) - hinges on Peirce's third type of reasoning; namely, hypothesis. This is "If X, then B. Well, B. So X".

We take the non-necessary derivation because, as Father Bochenski says, philosophers - moderns in front (except Leibniz) - do not pay sufficient attention to their postulates and their proper scope. There is an X (or even usually more than one X), i. e. one (or more) unexamined or merely hypothetical prepositions, which governs the whole system or fragments of a system.

Why do we rely so heavily on foundationalism, i.e., X-ism? Because seeing what is given becomes blinded by one or more Xs. After all, in axiomatics - since Platon and Aristotle - there is only one 'domain' to draw 'evident' from; CP 18 (The transcendental concept of 'truth') insofar as an 'axiom' or 'foundation' ('premise') is explicitly present

In this, people like Derrida are right who methodically seek to search out "le non-dit" what is not explicitly brought up but concealed the rest, in whole or in part, controlled.

Phenomenology and axiomatics.

Sometimes it seems that a phenomenologist is anything but an axiomatist. But this is a grave mistake,

The given, i.e., the phenomenon or what immediately shows itself to consciousness, is the demanded. When thinkers, by secret or concealed axiomata, limited in their seeing of what is given, think' that they will thus gain sight of the full reality, they are mistaken.

The famous ABC theory of Ellis and Sagarin, two American psychologists, can be enlightening here: with A, the given (phenomenon), my mind, B, works in such a way that I can actually see A.

Well, the explicit and even more so the unexpressed axiomata (foundations, 'foundations', 'principles') are 'B', i.e. openness creating or openness restraining axioms that open or ('at least) partially restrain the mind. Such that the domain, A, is sometimes only very partially visible to the phenomenological gaze.

Ontology, reality theory, is very acutely aware of this!

J. Taels, *Soren Kierkegaard as philosopher* (Wijsgerige Verkenningen), (Soren Kierkegaard as philosopher (Philosophical Explorations)), Leuven, 1991, attempts to make intelligible, in the Dutch: language area, the peculiar philosophizing of the father of existential thought (e.g. Heidegger's foundational research on traditional ontology; e.g. the French, atheistic existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre).

Thus, he clearly rebuffs the widely held - and self-founded by lack of direct examination of Kierkegaard's texts - opinion that Kierkegaard is "an irrationalist." Or someone who would not have the slightest sense of coherence among his fragments of thought, among other things because Kierkegaard fiercely resists "the system" (i.e. Hegel's, which he indeed reinterprets in his own way).

But - what particularly interests us here and now - Taels also refutes - like Kierkegaard himself - another widely spread misunderstanding, namely that philosophizing is possible without any presuppositions.

As already, at the time, Otto Willmann made it very clear: the. (eighteenth century) enlightened minds thought they could judge everything "without any prejudice"! As if they could stand over an outside and above any point of view that was limited! As if they could hold some sort of "divine" viewpoint that governs everything!

Atheists assume - unsuspectingly mostly - that they "see" everything in full truth with their "neuter", unbiased, eye: they also mostly hold the opinion that whoever is godly is impotent as a thinking being and therefore not to be taken seriously.

The famous "prejudices" which the enlightened fought against as e.g. "backward", "middle-aged" and the like, are all axioms. But the axioms of the illuminators are themselves also prejudices! They blind their view of the total reality, of which the believer in God 'sees' a part that the atheist or secularist does not, for reasons of prejudice or 'B' (Ellis/ Sagarin).

This is why - as Bochenski, among others, underlined - logic is so decisive: one sees with one's axioms or prejudices! That's all one sees! That is why the scheme is "If X, then my opinion(s). Well, my opinion(s). So X". So revealingly logical.

Sample 6.- Ontology as 'readiness' (truth). (50/61).

After logic, a chapter of epistemology. Or rather 'epistemology', because, as a science theory, epistemology is only a part.

The light that illuminates, is the ontological truth, understand: a.lètheia, apparentness. That which is palpable, discernible, unmistakable there, has "emerged from obscurity", shows itself, is "phenomenon" or "fainomenon". The object of all phenomenology.

Methodology.

'Methodology' usually counts as 'applied logic'. This is and remains correct, of course. But logic deals with "all that is insofar as it is amenable to if-then sentences."

In the broader sense, discovering something along with calling its name is like an if-then sentence : "I see a friend coming over there. I say, 'Hello, Joseph'".

In other words: if it is Joseph, my friend, then it is normal that I greet him with "Hello, Joseph".

In other words: if one wants to pay attention, reality is full of "if-then phrases"!

Now it is more about method as phenomenology or phenomenon representation.
George Boas, *An Analysis of Certain Theories of Truth*, Berkeley, Cal., Univ. of California Press, 1921, gets us started.

He distinguishes several "styles" of discovering reality and correctly representing it.

1.-- *Subjectivist theories.* (50/51)

That which makes it possible to speak of 'truth' (evidentially) without question is the perceiving subject, individually or collectively.-- That which impresses in a 'convincing' way comes across as 'true' (real).

1.a.-- *Cognitive hedonism.*

The given is what shows itself as a phenomenon. The demanded thing in such a theory is that it comes across as pleasurable in the very broad sense. Thus e.g. something that gives a pleasant sense of usefulness or utility is 'true'.

This occurs in many forms. Consider the biased person: he/she actually seeks only what confirms his individual opinion - which is always there. Which is indeed "a pleasant thing". Think of the tradition-minded: he, she, seeks, fundamentally, only what confirms the group opinion already present: if this happens, then that confirmation comes across as 'pleasant'.

Also the arguing proponent -- most moderns and postmoderns -- acts with respect to perception and representing perceived things in such a way: that the proposition he/she advocates confirms, comes across as 'welcome' and thus 'agreeable' and thus it is 'true'.-- Ch.S. Peirce has, at the time, spoken at length about those three types of truth-openness.

1.b.-- *Knowledge doctrinal argumentation*. (51/52)
Another form of shifting what is true to the subject, individually or collectively, is the theory that advocates the argument as the sole or principal form of truth access.-- "Can ye prove it?" That's what it sounds like here. That means convincingly prove it in the form of logical argumentation anyway.

Rhetoric.
In addition to philosophy and professional science, the ancient Greeks also knew "eloquence" or "tèchnè rhètorikè".

1. Rhetoric emerged on the island of Sicily, following processes of land redistribution and the like. In this sense, it was a true doctrine of eloquence. Learning to argue well. So that "it goes in". So that understanding is established "by the power of words". In the course of time ancient rhetoric grew into, besides judicial, political (in the agora or public assembly) and 'epideictic', i.e. acting with all possible techniques of persuasion. In the latter the first sophists were decisive.

2. Under the emperor Augustus (-63/+14) rhetoric was developing into a real doctrine of communication and interaction, which above all studied everything that was literary.
In it, text formation was a decisive thing. A text, spoken and especially written, comes into being in five phases or aspects.

a. invention
(heuristics), with Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-425) either 'autopsia', to know thanks to one's own observation, or 'historia', research, which produces data materials.

b. arrangement
(harmology, ordering), which 'orders' the order of parts of a text.

c. design
(stylistics) that expresses the final text. These last two elements were called by Herodotos, 'logos', orderly arrangement and stylization of the text. -- For the spoken word then followed memorization and recitation.

It should be noted in passing that a Chaïm Perelman (1912/1984) can pass as one of the founders of rhetoric as a theory of argumentation. Against the neo-positivists (CP 03 (Empiricism); 04 (Art language); 06 (Philosophy of language)) and especially against Frege (CP 05), who paved the way for the contempt of the natural and colloquial languages, Perelman maintained by means of very solid argumentation that non-artificial speech can also be logically valid. Cfr Ch. Perelman/ L. Olbrechts, *Rhétorique et philosphie*, (Rhetoric and philosphy), Paris, PUF, 1952; id., *Traité de l'argumentation*, (Treaty of argumentation), Paris, PUF, 1958.-- This gave rise to what is now called "neo-rhetoric".

Note.-- Against the truth claims of this and the previous purport may already apply what Zenon of Elea (-500/ ...), pupil of Parmenides, observed in his time: when two or more propositions are "defended" with arguments, "founded", "proved", this usually ends in a "neither thou nor I prove anything". Already

Aristotle summarized one of the theses of the epicurean Zenon in this way. Aristotle called that type of assertion "dialectical" (the parties present valid but insufficient arguments) or "rhetorical" (the parties reason with unexpressed forms of evidence).

As an aside, totally worthless subactivist truth claims are not: they can count as lemmata, provisionally accepted hypotheses.

2. -*Testing theories.*
In order to go beyond the purely subjective point of view, some form of testing is necessary.

2.a.-- *The coherence theory.* (52/53)
This view sees truth exposed in the fact that separate elements of an argument come to "harmony" with each other.

Logically, this means that there is no strict contradiction or incongruity in the exposition

The notion of a "logically coherent system" is the premise par excellence here.-- A very small example we saw in CP 42 (Socrates' argument that Kephalos' thesis of conscientious action always contains contradiction) where it is pointed out, via the inferences, that a thesis can contain contradiction. Kefalos' reasoning and argument exhibits a logical cleavage: it is not coherent' ('consistent').

One application.

G.-G. Grenger, *Pensée formelle et sciences de l' homme*, (Formal thought and human sciences), Paris, 1967, sets out, in a brief introduction, what meanings the term 'structuralism' may already exhibit.

A. The notion of 'language system' of de Courthenay and de Saussure.

B. The Bourbaki mathematics - e.g. in the form of a set theory inspired by G. Cantor which proceeds axiomatically-deductively and formally - moves the language system from the ordinary language to the 'formalized' languages.

C. Martial Gueroult, *Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons*, (Descartes according to the order of reasons), 2 vols., 1 (*L' âme et Dieu*), (The soul and God), 2 (*L' âme et le corps*), (The soul and the bod), Paris, 1953, moves the notion of a coherent system from language and arithmetic to the structure of a philosophical system. "The notion of structure as introduced by the structuralists on history of philosophy consists in considering a work (understand: a system of thought) in itself as a relatively closed and independent system which the structuralist wishes to fathom as a system." O.c., 3. Thus Granger.

As an aside: unlike a language (and even then) and unlike a rigidly axiomatized mathematical system, philosophical systems are such that their elements are not determined solely by their location in the system. In other words: a philosophical system is never totally closed. According to Granger.

Boas calls such theories 'relational', i.e. one-sidedly aimed at relations. Here the mutual relations of the parts of a philosophical exposition e.g. the (relational) truth of a philosophical system comes to light thanks to structural analysis. This is the examination of how the parts correspond to each other,

2.b.-*The correspondence theory*. (53/58)
This is perhaps the most traditional view.-- The relation that applies here -- it is thus again a relational theory -- is that of ... the knowing - thinking subject in an encounter with the given. The given and the thinking subject in which that given is depicted is decisive.

This theory has been mostly phased out in recent decades. Literally: 'dismantled'. By people who, when they would think up their points of reality, would find that they too had arrived at their 'truth' somewhere thanks to an encounter with some data.

Note.-- The discussion between immediatists and mediatists is too complicated to go into in detail here.-- Nevertheless, this.

(1) As Ch. Lahr, *Cours de philosphie*, I (Psychologie, Logique), Paris, 1933-27, 1 3/125 (*Diverses théories relatives à la perception*), (Various theories of perception), explains briefly, 'mediatism' means that conception of encounter "subject/object" which asserts that as subjectively closed individuals we do not grasp the object, the reality, especially that of the 'outside world', except indirectly.

Medium: i.e., e.g., through sensory impressions that ultimately permeate us, our consciousness, somewhere.-- in passing: the Cartesians, with the emphasis that their founder, R. Descartes, placed on "la sens intime" the inner perception, invariably tend toward mediatism. The soul, for Descartes, was a pure "angel" (purely immaterial) in a machine" (the body as a material-mechanical system). The question then naturally was, "How do we know that the (sensory) impressions which then nevertheless penetrate somewhere to our 'soul' (understand: consciousness) are 'true'?"

(2) As Lahr also explains: the 'immediatism' is that view that our consciousness gives out on the data, the 'reality'.

The commonsensists - Thomas Reid (1710/1796; leader of the "Scottish school") being the founder - oppose "le sens intime" as advocated by Descartes with his "angelism": for them, "la sens commun" (Claude Buffier, S.J. (1661/1737)) "the common sense" (not to be confused with "common sense") exists in all of us which, in grasping an observed fact, always associates the principle reality of the observed. We do say "principled," i.e., one assumes that the observation offers "reality" "until further notice," i.e., until the contrary appears.

Commonsism, in its modern way, takes up the ancient correspondence doctrine of Platon and Aristotle and later of mid-century scholasticism.

In its way it also recaptures the intentional psychology of Franz Brentano (1838/1917) - by our paying attention to what is given, we experience reality - and in its wake of e.g. 'n Meinong (1857/ 1927), -- both members of the Austrian school which partially recaptures scholasticism, - with its notion of "intentio" (prima and secunda).

As an aside, the 'intentio' is "paying attention to" (paying attention to) or "focusing our consciousness on" some reality, even if that 'reality' was nothing but an imagined something.

The first attention ('prima') is the ordinary, day-to-day attention that is pretty much always 'directed' at everyday things.

The second attention is the attention attached to the (first) attention. This is: 'reflexive' or looped attention. E.g. when we think of thinking of something.

Derrida.

Derrida is a much writer of very high eristic level. His works are not always easy even for his fanatics - and he has very many of them - yes, object of very heated discussions sometimes. After all, his works are hermeneutics/ commentaries, yes, commentaries of commentaries. Thinkers like Platon, Rousseau, de Saussure (especially) are taken at their texts - we know the expression "taking someone by the scruff of the neck" - so that Derrida, by skillful maneuvers in the matter of interpretations of all kinds, have come to include ... yet another interpretation in the endless series of interpretations in which each one of us - according to him - is literally "trapped", squeezed out of the text he is "dismantling" ("deconstruction").

His interpretations stand or fall with "the primal script" ('écriture'), i.e. the relations of signs - language signs in the first place - in which we literally think. Without that network of signs (messages) which refer to one another through contradictions, there is as good as nothing.

Derrida writes, speaks, thinks as if there are only pairs of opposites of signs. These are exposed in all that we, by inner word, think, in all that we, by speech, communicate!

In other words: if there is anyone who dismantles immediatism with regard to subject-object 'the encounter', it is he. To that extent he is a mediator.

This was shown, among other things, in a quarrel between him and Ricoeur and Jeanne Parain-Vial, in Montréal (as J. Parain-Vial, *Tendances nouveiles de philosophie*, (New trends in philosophy, Le Centurion, 1978, 90, mentions): there is no such thing as 'first' perception! What does exist is the primordial background of bubbling interpretations (l' écriture or primal writing) in which every being who practices thought is, as it were, suffocated as an individual who would like to be in direct contact with the given. We are absorbed in the endless bubbling up - the primal drift of signs (acoustic, written, spoken, etc.) from which we - I, you, we - catch something that in us - in me, you, us - becomes an individualized sign again,-- for the umpteenth time.

J. Parain-Vial, o.c., 86.-- Derrida criticizes -- or rather "deconstructs" -- Husserl's theory of perception. "That perception does not exist (or at least what is called 'perception'),--that it does not play the role of origin and that in a sense everything 'begins' with the representation ('représentation') ..."

One knows that the texts of the mid-century top thinker of scholasticism, S. Thomas Aquinas, teem with the term "quodammodo" in a certain sense.

In the traditional doctrine of judgement one distinguishes between subject and predicate in such a way that the predicate is excluded from the subject. However, when some modality is introduced (which either concerns the subject, such as "some", or the predicate, such as "in a certain sense"), this modality or proviso introduces a shading which can sometimes profoundly change the meaning of the sentence. Here we are never talking about the modality 'not' (as e.g. "Everything does not begin with the representation") but rather all shifting (introducing differentials) modalities.

Notice how - sly fox that he is - Derrida, in the discussion with dissenters who ask him questions, introduces "in a certain sense". So very casually! So unnoticed almost. It is almost "un non-dit", something that is not explicitly said!

That - that modality - is what the great tradition calls "cum grano salis" with a grain of salt. - Stylistically, it comes down to this: with a modality, one can claim anything and never actually refute it. For "in a sense" Derrida, no matter how he exaggerates, is always and everywhere right (which is a universale, something that is universally valid).

J. Parain-Vial, o.c. 82.-- Derrida, in the discussions, cites, among other things, the art gallery at Dresden.-- There one exhibits a canvas by Teniers, which itself depicts a gallery with a painting that in turn depicts a gallery with painting and so on endlessly.

Thus Derrida draws himself as wandering in that endless series of galleries with representations of representations of representations ... As if there were not also 'reality' outside that gallery! That is hypermediatism. In the long run, there is no longer a given reality which is depicted in our consciousness - possibly with the necessary inaccuracies - but only an endlessly transmissible image in itself in which we wander, cut off from what is depicted.

That the representations of the data are passed on in a cultural-historical series - 'paraphrasis' in ancient Greek words, signs of all kinds, that is correct. But meanwhile, except in the case of mediatists/ mediatists, it is also about what is depicted and in fact depicted.

That we are "culture-historically determined" in a series of traditions regarding terms, judgments, reasoning of all kinds, is true. But, except in the case of those who look only at the terms and not at what those terms mean concerning data, ... it is always more or less about the data about which one speaks in terms!

One more question.
If Derrida claims that there is no data but only image (not of data because there shouldn't really be but of what?), how does he distinguish 'data' from 'image'? Is there then any 'difference' ('différence') between 'given' and 'image'? Or do 'given' (what is depicted) and 'image' as totally identical simply coincide?

How then does one explain that all languages articulate the two terms in a pair of opposites? Or are 'given', i.e. what is depicted, and 'image' only totally identical in some sense?

Thus one of the hottest points in the discussion of the correspondence theory concerning 'truth', i.e. the apparentness of what is.

Note -- J.M. Bochenski, O.P., *Wijsgerige methoden in de moderne wetenschap*, Philosophical methods in modern science, Utr./Antw., 1961, gives us insight into

a. *The descriptive method*, which proves its value especially in husserlian phenomenology (ancient rhetoric also already knew, in its way, description, narration and report), and

b. *The reductive methods,* which apply e.g. in natural sciences or in human sciences (think of the verstehende or 'understanding' ('comprehensive') method of W. Dilthey (1833/1911: Geisteswissenschaften)). -- These are quite different from the purely semiotic (sign theoretic) and axiomatic-deductive (logistic and mathematical) methods, which belong rather in the mediate worlds.

A. de Groot, Methodologie (Grondslagen van onderzoek en denken in de gedragswetenschappen), (Methodology (Foundations of research and thought in the behavioral sciences)), 's - Gravenhage, 1961-1, 29, gives us the scheme of the businesslike, word-by-word definition.

The "cycle of empirical-scientific inquiry" as he calls it, begins - to the regret of the mediatists - with observation, generalizes to inductive results, deductively derives tests from what was achieved, and ends with a value judgment.

That's pure correspondence theory! Stage 1 (observation) and Stage 4 (testing) are literally bathed in data. Stages 2 (induction), 3 (deduction) and 5 (value judgment) are the 'mediations', i.e. what our minds extract from the data, i.e. images.

2.c.-- *the 'voluntaristic' theory of truth.* (58/61)

G. Boas ends with apparently that view of evidentiary truth which 'lies' to him! Distrustful of some caricatured and even simplistic representations of the previous theories, correspondence theory included, he opts for the intervention of the will to investigate.

Every 'representation' - he claims - is only a 'mediate', i.e. a sign (the data are already signs) that is interpreted. This interpretation itself needs to be tested. How so? Whoever, on the basis of a given (sign which has already been interpreted), keeps an eye on a goal which is connected with the given, so that in the form of an experiment, i.e. an empirical thing, "feels" the given, i.e. the sign (information) present in the given, and its interpretation, will find experimental 'truth', clarity.

Ch. Lahr, S.J *Cours de Phil.* I (Psy. Log.), Paris, 1933-27, 583, defines 'experimentation' as follows: "by an intervention of the human will, 'artificially', provoke the manifestation of phenomena", such that within circumstances by the one who provokes, well-defined circumstances (which are entirely under control), the hypothesis (lemma) one wishes to test is either confirmed or refuted.

Proposing this aspect as decisive for truth involves 'experimentalism', an eminently Anglo-Saxon: tradition.

Lahr, o.c., 604, cites Francis Bacon of Verulam (1561/1626; known for his seminal work *Novum organum scientiarum* (1620)).

By means of models that 'speak' (a form of obviousness!) Bacon draws three methods.

1.a. The pure empiricist rationals resemble ants who are content to accumulate 1. materials' (data) without coherence or resemblance.

1.b. The a-priori or pure rationales resemble the spider who 'produces from her body admirable webs: full of refinement and symmetry but without solidity or usefulness.

2. The experimental rationals, on the other hand, resemble the bee which extracts from the flowers (the data) the materials of its honey, but then - thanks to its own skill - elaborates these materials into nectar, among other things.

Only in this way - says Bacon - can one put one's hope in the close union of experience and reason, whose separation - a dismal thing - hitherto sent everything to confusion in the sciences. (*Novum Organum*).

At once we have in a nutshell the three main tendencies of modern rationalism since the end of the Middle Ages.

It is quite clear that, behind G. Boas' book and its emphasis on the sign which is present in the data itself and awaits our interpretation there, it refers to Ch.S. Peirce.

For Peirce, after all, the reality surrounding us and also present in us is full of signs, i.e. information. These signs - he explicitly says that, with regard to our thinking's reference to reality, he is a "scholastic realist" mid-century realist (conceptual realist) - are represented, as well as possible, in our thinking signs, i.e. our ideas. Those two signs or information types, in the object and in the subject, are articulated within the sign system of language in language signs, writing signs and speaking signs.

In his *How to Make Our Ideas Clear*, in: Popular Science Monthly, Bd. 12 (1878): 286/302, Peirce articulates his pragmatic maxim - pragmatic. maxim -: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive (we imagine) the object of our conception to have (that the object of our thinking will have) (also 59-2) Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." (R. Berlinger, Hrsg./ Kl. Oehler, Uebers., *Ch.S.S. Peirce, Ueber die Klarheit unserer Gedanken*, (Ch.S.S. Peirce, On the Clarity of Our Thoughts), Frankf.a.M., 1968, 62f.).

In other words: the pragmatic rule, or the rule geared to effects, says that one only knows what a concept actually means, i.e. in one's own reality, if and insofar as one "works with it" - experiments - .

Note.-- Reread CP 42, where Socrates- Platon provoke 'inferences' in order to know what precisely Kefalos' definition conceptually means.

In other words: What will this concept (theory) - if one applies it (them) - amount to?" is the main question of the pragmatic maxim.

Note.-- Of course, this maxim was misunderstood in that it was interpreted not from Peirce's axioms but from its own, to which it is attached.

Peirce: "This maxim has been called a septic and materialistic principle"-- In fact, it is merely the application of the one principle of logic recommended by Jesus: "by their fruits you will recognize them".
Which means that this maxim is closely aligned with the thoughts of the gospel."
"Nor should we interpret the term 'practical bearing' - practical bearings - in a low and sordid sense."
Behold what Peirce himself added.

Note -- Peirce could have added a "pragmatic maxim" mentioned in our earlier catechisms. We simply quote, in the old language:

"The fruits of the Holy Spirit".
These twelve, which the Holy Spirit works in us, are: love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, longsuffering, gentleness, faithfulness, morality, honor, purity -- Because, as it is said, one knows the tree by its fruits, so by the fruits of the Holy Spirit one knows especially in whom the holy spirit dwells, and then who is righteous".

One can see that this juicy-archaic text knows the pragmatic maxim very well.

Peirce was - seen in this way - merely the mouthpiece of an ancient tradition which he expressed, admittedly, in a difficult English text.

Note.-- Hegel hinted at by Fr. Engels. (60/61)

Why do we dwell on Engels' interpretation of Hegel? Because it conceals a theory of 'truth' (apparentness) which is valuable. Thus, this fits perfectly with what comes before.

Bibl. : Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosphie,* (Ludwig Feuerbach and the Exit of Classical German Philosophy), Stuttgart, 1888-2, in initio.

Theme: Hegel's adage (maxim)! "Alles was wirklich ist, ist vernünftig. Und alles was verünftig ist, ist wirklich" (Everything that is real is reasonable. And all that is reasonable is real), (*Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*). (Basic lines of the philosophy of law), -- Listen to Engels' commentary.

In Hegel's language-not in that of many among those who interpret them from his strange axiomata-not everything that actually exists is immediately "real.

For real also means, for Hegel, "all that correctly grasps a given and correctly resolves the demanded associated with it." In this sense, and not in any other, Hegel's adage must be understood.

'Actual' is therefore 'vernünftig' reasonably justifiable. In short, 'reasonable' or 'rational'. Also, 'real' is the same as 'necessary'. After all, the given with its own demand requires, necessarily, i.e. as a solution in an emergency, an 'actual' solution.

If and in so far as that solution grasped and realized the demanded, then it appeared whether that solution was the right, reasonable, necessary one. Only then does its truth appear.

 Truth' in the pragmatic sense: "What are the effects regarding problem solving?". The proposed solution is known by its fruits: if it meets "expectations", it (appears to) be the "true" solution. When both the given and the demanded come into their own, then it appears - evidently - the true solution is revealed.

Friedrich Engels.

One or another government measure - e.g. concerning taxes - once enacted, is only 'real' (the true measure) in so far as it fits into the totality - "the living whole" says Hegel - of the state.

If it turns out - evidently - that the measure is 'bad' (untrue), but it is not withdrawn, then one of the things that becomes apparent is the 'badness' of the subjects, who do not react and do not block the unreality of the measure.

Note -- Revolutionary theory.

The pragmatic 'truth' (clarity by means of the effects) is - if there is 'unreality' (of solutions) and if this 'unreality' penetrates a sufficient number of minds which are moreover prepared to intervene actively - sometimes revolutionary.

Hegel always speaks with enthusiasm about the French revolution (1789/1799). For, according to him, the French monarchy that was "by God's grace" (the formula interpreting the sacred character) had once been "real" (when the mentality together with the historical situation awaited it) had become "unreal" (no longer problem-solving) and thus no longer "need.wendig" (responding to a need) and thus no longer reasonable, i.e., with the reason that tests reality, no longer justifiable, justifiable.

The French Revolution "destroyed" (deconstructed) the monarchy. For that monarchy was "the unreal" and the revolution was "the real". At least so were the expectations of the time.

Fr. Engels.

"Thus, in the course of development, all the former becomes unreal, loses its necessity, its reasonableness. Peacefully, when the former is wise enough to make way. In a violent way, when it resists that necessity".

Note.-- Thus one sees how mèt Marx, Engels turns a spiritualist theory, which if properly understood is good, into a materialist sense, "turned upside down".

Fr. Engels.

Just as the bourgeoisie, through big industry, competition, and the world market, unsettles all firmly established institutions in the practical sphere, so the Hegelian philosophy unsettles all concepts which lay claim to definitive, absolute "truth" and "absolute" human situations which correspond to that "truth.

For her, nothing exists that is definitive, 'absolute', 'sacred': of everything and to everything, she demonstrates impermanence. According to her, nothing exists except the uninterrupted process of becoming-and-decaying, of the endless evolution from the lower to the higher.--

In other words: Marx, Engels imitate the bourgeois paragon but against the bourgeoisie!

Sample 7.-- Modernity. (62/77)

Having clarified some -- not all -- of the main points of our position, we can now discuss directly the current philosophies.

The first theme, of course, is to delineate "all that is 'modern'" against "all that is premodern" and "all that calls itself postmodern."

Origins.-- Let us consider a cultural-historical vocabulary.

1. Our current term "modern" derives from the Latin "hodiernus" -- a term that, from +-500, was also pronounced "modernus" -- which meant "present/ current/ contemporary" (which we now sometimes render as "in being").

2.-- *Middle Ages language.*

From 900 onward, this term is used in ecclesiastical circles (the clergy beginning to dominate the culture as the "cultural vanguard") in two ways.

a.-- meliorative.

Enterprising,-- aware of the latest data (facts, conceptions) -- "being with it" -- ;-- open-minded, yes, sometimes liberal.

b.-- pejorative.

Preoccupied with all that is new or shines because it is new or seems new;-- fashionable,-- actualistic (rising in the passing moment), carried by the momentum of current, passing currents;-- light-hearted (not going deeply into matters).

3. -- Modern usage.

Between 1520 and 1650 especially, the term 'modern' is first consciously used to denote 'non-medieval' or 'post-medieval'.

The basic meaning remains 'meliorative': 'present/ actualist' especially progressive, progressist.

Characteristic of the Renaissance period, i.e., the Trecento in Italy,--peak period under Pope Leo X (one of the Medici) (1475/1521),-- later, in France, under Francis I (1494/1547),-- eventually across the West.

One of the titles of that time is 'transitional period' (i.e. from pre-modern-medieval to modern).

Thus, a brief semasiology (theory of meaning). Now the analysis of content. Because everything that is postmodern or postmodernist in any case settles with everything that is called modern. The debate since Romanticism (1790+) has revolved around the progressive, the belief in progress.

The two-sided modern sense of life and world.

Reread CP 61 (Uninterrupted process of rise and fall): Engels, as a cultural analyst has seen very correctly! The bourgeoisie, starting in the late medieval cities, first in Italy, challenged the time-honored, "sacred" and fixed elements of culture. It has remained so to this day.

The modern sciences.

Hand in hand with the rising and victorious bourgeoisie - "die Bourgeoisie" say Marxists - modern science emerged.

G. Van Steendam, *Wetenschap op zoek naar ethiek*, (Science in search of ethics), in: Our Alma Mater 39 (1985): 2, 81/117, points out, in the introduction, the "double face" that the sciences. once that they are modern, exhibit.

On the one hand an extremely constructive aspect, on the other a very dangerous one! This has penetrated even to the common sense, including the common people, and has become, in almost all industrialized countries especially (but not only), Ecolo-pacifism.

After all, the modern sciences, especially in their exact (empirical-mathematical) forms (Coppernicus, Tycho Brahe, Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei (1564/1642; founder of exact science)), are 'positive' ('firm') in the sense that they merely try to describe facts, from one point of view or another.

On the understanding that ethical values - because 'value-free' (as it is often called) in the strict sense they are never, ever - are left out of consideration.

When one talks about the 'freedom of values' of the propositional sciences, one always means the ethical (whether or not accompanied by religion or so) values.

This is also what is called the 'reductive' to the earthly-usable, 'secular' or 'secular' essence of the typically modern professional sciences.

We now know, once we have emerged from the frenzy of progress, that modern sciences and the techniques associated with them do not only create prosperity and above all well-being.

Let's think of "the social question" in which a small number of money-earning people try to control the entire economy while neglecting the prosperity and above all the general well-being of the large, working or job-seeking masses. What e.g. a Karl Marx sensed very clearly.

This explains CP 07 what is listed there as 'social criticism' or "communism/ fascism, liberalism/ libertarianism (anarchism), underdevelopment theory."

Without the 'bourgeoisie' and the modern professional sciences - MacLuhan spoke of 'professional idiots' - all these things would be virtually non-existent.

The modern "lifestyle.
One could now also speak of 'lifestyle' (life-styling).-- Marshall Berman, *All that is solid, melts into Air* (The Experience of Modernity), London, 1885, typifies as follows.

'Modernity' is viewed by Berman from the point of view of the sense of value (CP 19, 31 (The 'good')): our transcendental sense of value(s) is such that it e.g. overconfidently appreciates (progress frenzy) or fearfully repels (doom).

Berman.-- Is "modern" the merging or alternating of hubris, in the face of what one thinks one can dare, handle, and fear, in the face of all the threats that challenge what one thinks one can dare, handle.

a.-- Modern man lives through, to speak with Goethe, a Faustian sense of life: with his contemporaries, in the line of the great early figures of modernity, he sees unprecedented possibilities, -- designs, innovations,-- we add: revolutions. This is the language of the sense of power.

b.-- The same modern man -- Berman always says -- easily experiences the invariable changes in his sphere of life -- changes which he himself, as a man of power, brings about -- as threats, uncertainties, risks. Tomorrow it can already be different.

Especially philosophical.
a. Tradition-bound man (premodernity) lives from solid certainties imprinted by tradition.

b. Modern man, as an uprooted person, is at home in an atmosphere where everything is in question. Religion, morality,-- job security, marriage security, etc. have become uncertain. "All that is solid, melts into air" says Berman: "All that is solid, 'solid', melts away into the air,--weakening."

Behold what a Berman, after thorough analysis, thinks what 'modern' sense of life can be.

Revolutions. Revolutions. Revolutions.

Revolutions have always existed. But the modern - series - of revolutions has one main draw, namely, the very "foundations" or "foundations" of the cultural system are "challenged.

The term 'revolution'
'Revolution' was originally an astrological-astronomical term. One thinks of the title of one of the founders of the modern exact method concerning sciences (natural sciences, of course), Nicholas Coppernicus (1473/1543; polar canon) "*De revolutionibus orbium coelestium libri sex*, Norimbergae, 1543".

Not only Coppernicus but e.g. also a Chaucer (Geoffrey Ch.: 1340/ 1400; English poet) only knew the astronomical sense of the term in 1391.

But, once the modern era arrives, the meaning shifts. Not surprisingly: in the political field alone, there are 1642 and 1688 (English revolution) 1776/1783 (American revolution) 1789+ (French revolution), 1917 (Soviet revolution), 1949 (Chinese communist revolution). To mention the most notable.

P. Hazard, *Le crise de la conscience européenne* (The crisis of the European conscience), (1680/1715), Paris, 1935.
O.c., 3/29, is titled "De la stabilité au mouvement," from the stable to the unstable.

The term "metabletics" (the doctrine of psychological change) fits here.

Hazard.-- "What a contradiction! What abrupt transition! Between 1680 and 1715.

1.-- Rank, discipline, order (of which the authority took the assurance), dogmas firmly controlling life. The majority of the French population thought like Bossuet (1627/1704; Bishop of Meaux, known for his theological treatise *Discours sur l' histoire universelle* (Discourse on universal history), (1681).

2.-- Coercion, authority, dogmas: behold what those who immediately followed, the XVIII-th centuryers, spit out
Suddenly France thinks like Voltaire (1694/1778), known for e.g. *Candide ou l' optimisme* (Candide or the optimism), 1759; mockery of Leibniz' optimism), *Essai sur les moeurs et l' esprit des nations* (Essay on the morals and spirit of nations), (1760; Bossuet's antithesis)."

"In other words - said Hazard - a revolution.

The religious revolution.

Hazard. - The XVII-d' centuryers are established "Christians": they put forward an order of law founded on deity; they know themselves to be secure in a society whose classes are unequally judged.-.

The XVIII-d' centuryers are against established Christianity: for them, "merely human" nature is the "basis" of any order of law. They dream only of one thing: "égalité" (equal justice).

Note. - This is what happened in France within a few decades and is spreading to the whole of Europe and, in our days, to the whole planet: a revolution in foundations.

In our ecclesiastical midst there is a complaint that we no longer know what religious doctrine to give to "our" children. Why? Because at the end of the XVIIth century a subversive, permissive, libertine-atheist-materialist revolution took root in the minds of a new cultural vanguard.

"The rich within itself Roman life of the clerical churches (the Protestants still live off the Roman breeding ground)" held back that revolution in the children until after W.O. II (1939/1945). But the media, in the hands of an often libertine-atheistic-materialistic vanguard, have thrown open "the closed pillar" of the churches - including the orthodox ones in the East - with all its educational consequences. We. Believers, have been 'modernized' since then.

Explanation.

H. Barth, *Revolution und Tradition (Ein Versuch zur Selbstverständigung der Philosophie)*, (Revolution and Tradition (An Attempt at the Self-Conception of Philosophy)), in: Saeculum (Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte (Munich)) 14 (1963): 1/10, can serve as an explanation.

While the article focuses on the French Revolution (1798+), it falls wide of the mark.

a.-- Between the Renaissance (Francesco Petrarch (1304/1374; humanist) and after him, in his 'humanist' track), on the one hand, and 1769 (start of the French Revolution), on the other hand, there are shifts in thinking.

The Archbishop of Cambrai, François de Salignac de la Mothe - *Fénelon* (1651/1715; known for his *Aventures de Télémaque* (1699)), expresses in his *Télémaque* a merciless criticism of the social abuses within the already declining Ancien Régime (sacred monarchy). From a 'modern' Christian point of view.

In his political philosophy, Fénelon does not put the royal monarchy or even "the wild masses" first but the sovereign people.

Thus J. J. Rousseau (1712/1778, *Le contrat social ou principe de droit politique* (The social contract or principle of political law), (1762);-- *Emile ou sur l' éducation* (Emile or on education), (1762)) favors three revolutions:

a. An educational one (Emile), who seeks to put authority. order, tradition in parentheses to preach "a return to (mere human) nature."

b. A political one (Contrat), which seeks to put authority, order, traditional sovereignty "in question;

c. A religious one, which turns from the "positive" (understand: revelation-based, Biblical) religion to the "natural" religion, in rouaseauistic variant: pre-Biblical primitivist, religion.--

Rousseau.-- "Thou trustest in the present established order without remembering that this order is subject to inevitable revolutions (...). The empire-sized man becomes a "little man." The rich man becomes a poor man. The autocratic monarch becomes "a subject." (...). We are approaching the state of crisis - "l' état de crise" - and the century of revolutions." (Emile).

Note.-- What a Fénelon stands for in post-Christian spirit, that Rousseau stands for in post-modern spirit. For Rousseau is still thoroughly modern, but in such a way that with him the modern postmodernizes of itself. With Fénelon speaks the premodern man who sees through and modernizes established Christianity, which has become a lie in the face of the gospel.

b.-- Always Barth.

After the French Revolution. - Thus: Alexis de Tocqueville (1805/1859; *L' ancien régime et la révolution* (The old regime and the revolution), (1856)) in 1850: "At present it is clear: the 'tide' is rising. We shall not see the end of the unprecedented revolution".

Thus: Maurice Joly, in a work with the curious title*: Conversation in the underworld between Machiavelli* "Conversation in the Underworld between Machiavelli (1469/1527; Il principe (The Prince); humanist political thinker) *and Montesquieu* (1689/1755); L' esprit des lois (1748); enlightened-rationalist political thinker)", published in 1854, talks about "l' ère indéfinie des révolutions" (the endless period of revolutions). Thus: Jakob Burckhardt (1818/1897; *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien)* (The culture of the Renaissance in Italy), puts it as follows: "die ewige Revision" (the eternal revision). The main feeling in his days he calls "das Gefühl des provisorischen" (the feeling that it is all only provisional).

Thus: Constantin Frantz, opponent of Bismarck and proponent of German and European federalism, in his *Naturlehre des Staates* (Natural theory of the state), (1870): "The provisional is the general characteristic of the present situation."

H. Barth on Modern Philosophy (68/77)
Barth believes he must point to two thinkers of great stature who articulate the revolutionary nature of modernity not only politically but especially philosophically.

Immanuel Kant (1724/1804: pinnacle and crisis of modern philosophy), the great "Aufklärer" (enlightened rationalist mind) had two periods:

a/ a precritical, 'dogmatic' and

b/ a "critical" one. Criticism, main draw of his thought, began in 1781, with his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. (Critique of Pure Reason), Kant is a rationalist through and through. And yet: precisely with that persistent rationalism he breaks through tradition and thus prepares the second modern philosophies..

Barth. (77) -- Kant sees two powers controlling culture (CP 11):

a/ The dogmatism. based on traditional metaphysics (CP 21; 22 (self-aggrandizement of metaphysicians). This refuses or bypasses the basic research as understood by the enlightened minds, pure or empirical rationalists (CP 59 (Bacon)) or, even more, experimental rationalists. They are rooted in a tradition. Of which they accept the foundations as lemmata, hypotheses, which they try to "make true" through inductive reasoning.

b/ "*die kritische Vernunft*" the critical reason, which grasps the depths of the crisis of traditions, religious, moral, political etc. and tries to explain or exorcise it. For with Kant begins the German idealism that will end in a Hegel and a Schelling, who in their romantic (Schelling) or romanticizing (Hegel) way try to found a new, "modern" metaphysics.

b. -- G.FR.W. Hegel (1770/1831; German or 'absolute' idealist). who discovers an analogous duality in Hegel.

a/ The positive (understand: tradition, dogmatically (= in full confidence) presupposing). Called 'positive' in Hegelian parlance,

1. All that actually exists, all that is established, traditionally rooted,

2. insofar as it claims to be imperishable, 'sacredness' (inviolability, taboo character), inviolable and thus the object of deep veneration and devotion such that it carries this through,-- if necessary by violent means.

Here a foundational inquiry, understand: foundational critique, is inhibited.

As an aside, the familiar scheme "Identity (what one is)/ self-assertion (standing firm mordantly)/ denial (against what doubts that identity)" comes through here clearly in Hegel's characterization of dogmatic-traditional thinking.

This threefold schema can be summarized as follows: "I am what I am/ I hold this up/, against everything."

As an aside: already the ancient magical-mantic world exhibits this mordic -staying itself-through thick-and-thin!

Note: Hegel represents a second modernity: he is called 'positive' (understand established) not only e.g. the archaic presuppositions or the antique or the middle ages (i.e. all the premodern ones) but also the - in his eristics first of all meant - (first) modern axioms such as the eighteenth century 'philosphes' in France, exhibited them (think of the French materialists).

In other words:
a. all that in the Hegelian broad sense of the terms is called prejudice, superstition of all kinds, philosophical dogmatism (in which the later, the critical Kant had already preceded him; of course).

b. the negative (understand: all that challenges the traditions (the first modernity included) in a way even more thorough than the first modern thinkers had done it.

"Philosophy as critique" subjects - always Barth says - all the "positive" (established, already existing) to a critical value judgment (an "evaluation" as one has recently learned to say).

In doing so, "all that is reasonable" (i.e., all that is somewhat justifiable by (German-idealist reason) plays the decisive role. We have that higher, CP 60 (All that is "real" is reasonable). What we said then, on the basis of Engels, who interpreted very correctly, is here, by Barth, put in a cultural-historical framework.

Hegel may have been finished as a 'scholar', but he was, according to Barth, a very practical thinker - he incorporated e.g. economics very emphatically in the second type of modern philosophy and paved the way there for e.g. Marxism - : ethics and politics (= the twofoldness which the ancient Greeks already considered worthy of the name and which today has led to the human sciences). Marxism - : ethics and politics (= the twofoldness which the ancient Greeks already considered worthy of the name, as the culmination and completion of all philosophy and which today has been reduced to the famous human sciences, about since the 1950+), - ethics and politics were for the very practical Hegel the crowning glory of his 'speculative' philosophy.

Indeed: just as the theoria, thinking through the data of experience, did not include the world and the flight from life for the ancient paleo-Pythagoreans and Platonists, so too did "die Spekulation" for Hegel. 'Speculate' for him was to go deeper into the data than one usually does.

New dialectic.
The old dialectic was
a/ discussion skills, if necessary up to and including the degree of quiet platonic dialogue,
b/ seeing the being as all that was, is, will be. This means that one does know and appreciate the imperishable and stable but, in the midst of the disorder and evolutions or revolutions of humanity as it is in fact, places the unstable, changeable, revolutionary at the center.

Not only like a Descartes or the French socialist materialists of the XVIII - the century but much more profoundly. Thinking itself as an act, i.e. as an activity, becomes 'dialectical'. This is:

a/ the living (former/ present/ future) whole of total or transcendental reality is the only object of thought;
b/ in that living, becoming, evolving (from lower to higher), revolutionary whole, assign place and meaning to all data detectable by inductive sampling.

That only is the second modernity that thoroughly reestablishes the first, especially Cartesian, modernity critically grounded by Kant.

Reread CP 61 (Revolutionary Theory) and you will easily and quickly grasp the artery of the new dialectic as Hegel finally created it.

Note -- Those who would like to read a comparatively easy booklet on the term "dialectics" are referred to P. Foulquié, *La dialectique*, (Dialectic), Paris, 1948. The booklet talks about traditional dialectics and, o.c., 41/122, about *la dialectique nouvelle*, (The new dialectic), which is partly philosophical (with Hegel and Marx e.g.) and partly scientific (with e.g. Bachelard or Gonseth),-- the latter in order to free itself from some one-sided axiomata of Hegel or Marx and to be able to proceed in a purely scientific way.

The direct reason for the scientification of the German- idealist (Hegelian) or Marxist dialectic was:

1. the will to still preserve a remnant of metaphysics, i.e. a total view of the whole of reality, amidst the - CP 01/14 - current philosophical chaos; such that what the professional scientist studies as his own domain as a "specialist", can be given a place and a meaning within the living whole of fluid reality.

2. Further: to preserve the main features, and only the main features, of any healthy, i.e. unbiased, dialectic, in the present sense.

The main features.
a. Dialectically, professional scientific work is also dialogue, -- for and with the research community and within its framework.

b. Dialectically, professional science is also a matter of pairs of opposites (systechies) in that everything is complementary to everything else (the basic law of ancient stoicheiosis);

c. Dialectically, all that is subject science is one organic whole (organicism).

This is expressed, among other things, in the application of a maxim of J.Fr. Herbart (1776/1814): "Everyone should respect all subjects. Everyone should be a virtuoso in just one subject".

One can think this naive in our days, in view of the enormous proliferation of professional sciences: yet every real scientist is inclined to hear the other specialists speak as much as possible, --in order to arrive at an overall view (a remnant of metaphysics)

d. Dialectically, professional scientific labor is also something that exhibits history-character ("historicity").

Even the axiomata, the foundations, must undergo constant revision "Les notions doivent être retouchées ou, comme disent Bachalard et Gonseth, 'dialectisées'"

The notions, the axiomatic framework within which the scientist situates everything, are in constant need of revision, of "dialectization.

Behold what, in a number of cases, the Hegelian (and Marxist) "second modernity" has become professionally scientific.

Hegel 's so-called "deduction
Bibl. : G.A. van den Bergh van Eysenga. *Hegel*, The Hague, Kruseman, s.d.

O.c., 67, outlines the author what that is "hegelian dialectic"-- One still reproaches Hegel that from a-priori axiomata, i.e. from the - understand: his - thinking, he "deduced, deduced" "all things" (typical of classical metaphysics). This is to demonstrate the necessity of "all things".

To begin with, one can already feel that his "adage" "All that is real is necessary" was not thus interpreted as he did.

A certain Mr. Krug challenged him, in this sense, to one application viz. "Let Hegel 'deduce' from 'the concept' (with Hegel it is 'all that was, is, will be') the existence of every dog and every cat".

Hegel, in 1802, replied to this with a treatise "How ordinary human reason conceives philosophy,-- clarified on the basis of Krug's works

What, in Hegelian parlance, does "deduce something" mean? It means that outside broader - dialectical - coherence something - take cats and dogs - cannot exist and cannot be thought (made intelligible).

In other words: something is indispensable as a 'moment' (understand: living - changeable element) within a larger whole. And : something is incomprehensible as it is, without seeing and thinking it as a moment within the (understanding of the) living whole.

Something entirely different -- in the style of the first modern rationalism which does not think from within the living whole of things -- is "proving existence"-- From (the understanding of) the living whole which makes up all that was, is, will be. one can point to and understand meaning and place of.

Actual existence is not a matter of deducing from anything: for existence is a (inductive) given. It needs no (deductive) 'proof'!

The first modern rationalism (from Descartes to Wolff and even the Kant of his pre-critical period) tears apart every separate fact (which is grasped by induction) and 'reasonableness' (in the Hegelian sense i.e. understanding every separate fact within the totality in which it - as a moment - is encountered, not deduced).

"It belongs to the great merits of Th. Häring, *Hegel* (Sein Wollen und sein Werk) (Hegel (His Will and His Work)), Berlin, 1929, that he has found the golden thread connecting Hegel's youth with his mature work.

From the beginning, Hegel opposed the abstracting contemplation and disintegration of the living. Gradually he began to apply his concrete method of contemplation to thought itself.

Henceforth he will see 'lifted' not only the contradictions of being but also those of concepts into higher living unity." (Häring, o.c., 668f.).-- Thus van den Bergh van Eysenga, o.c., 68v..

In a treatise Hegel shows, within the cosmology of his time, that e.g. the solar system is a "dialectical living whole" with its own nature of being: no celestial body may therefore be considered "in itself" (as the first European rationalism did). No, every planet, for example, only acquires place and meaning if one situates it in the encompassing solar system.

That and only that is "Hegelian deduction" of e.g. every planet. Thus Hegel wants to designate reason, in the sense ascribed to it by the second, German-idealist rationalism, in e. g. every planet within the solar system.

It is clear that his deduction first functions as a lemma in the inductive probing of the positive facts in order to become meaningful in a synthesis (the final picture of the positive data) - always provisional.

We do say "always provisional", because if anyone was aware of the provisional nature of our positive (firm, inductive) findings, it was Hegel who built the provisional into reason itself. Precisely because of this, reason became 'dialectical', i.e. aware of its historical character (historicity)!

By the way: it is precisely this provisional aspect that Marx and Engels applied to the social question, in the form of dialectical materialism (which differed radically from the first non-dialectical materialism, in the French XVIIIth century for example, in that it introduced the German idealism of Hegel into rigid materialism).

Hegelian "rationalism".
"All science postulates, tacitly at least, that in the positive facts 'reason' ('thinking', 'thought') is hidden and that our poor human reason fits on it like the poor key" (Van den Bergh Eysenga, o.c., 77).

That "reason" can be found in the data of the experience of professional scientists and that our - poor, individual - reason brings this "objective" "reason" (meaning "sense") present in the things themselves to subjective consciousness through its scientific work (above all, because already pre-scientific knowledge is our reason) is convinced by all scientific thinking, even if it cannot be proved in any case.

Note -- What van den Bergh van Eysenga, o.c., 78, says here as a convinced and expert Hegelian, shows that the presupposition of the objective 'reason' or sense, intelligibility, present in the data itself, is a lemma which is presupposed without proof but which is like a light which, among other things, illuminates our modern, scientific work.

Note.-- This is still an offshoot of the ancient idea of 'light metaphysics'.

That this metaphysics of light appears somewhat 'pantheistic' to Hegel is due to the fact that Hegel does not fundamentally accept any existing religion but sees our poor, 'subjective' reason as a moment within the 'objective' omnipresent reason in things.

Our thought, subjective thought, and the thought in things, objective thought, they' two 'sides' of one and the same thing. Thus the author o.c., 78. He explains. "Only when in nature (note: things before they are worked by us, humans in our cultural labor.) are thoughts embodied, can human thoughts represent that nature according to 'truth'."

Philosophy is consciousness.

Van den Bergh van Eysenga, ibid., now articulates one of the main features of post-Hellenistic modern thought - up to and including existentialism, for example: "What may at first appear strange, namely that our thinking penetrates into the essence of things, becomes something that is self-evident as soon as we realize that we too belong to 'reality'. After all, that reality comes to consciousness and self-knowledge in us.

In other words, philosophizing is the culmination of the overall process of consciousness which is realized in the evolution of the cosmos and especially in the evolution of humanity.

That is the famous 'identity' of thinking (consciousness) and being as Hegel conceives them.

Philosophy without an "absolute beginning(sel)."

Van den Bergh van Eysenga, o.c., 81V., says, quoting a letter from Hegel to Sinclair (1811), "With what are we to begin?

1. Kant had already said that philosophizing could not start from something 'definite' but that "the true and straight" will only come at the end.

2. Hegel, too, wanted to know nothing of a "supreme foundation" from which everything else could be derived.

In a letter to Sinclair of 1811 he says about the beginning of philosophizing: "Foolishly the nonphilosophers in particular demand 'a beginning(s) which is something absolute' against which they cannot immediately bark.--'an incontrovertibly first reality, (...).

The 'beginning', precisely because it is a beginning, is imperfect. The whole of philosophy itself is nothing but one combat, refutation and 'destruction' of "the beginning(sel)." (...).

Those who therefore already have the idea of philosophy itself, the 'absolute' and Our Lord with all His glory at the beginning, have in any case little idea of philosophizing".

So much for Hegel's traditional metaphysical thinking which thinks it can or must begin to philosophize with "Our Lord and His entire glory"!

Dialectically-Hegelian seen: if there can already be a "Our Lord and His glory", then only at the end of (cosmic and especially) human (cultural) history! Thus, with the absolute becoming of all that was, is, will be, "deity" arises in the lean Hegelian sense.

Note.-- That a number of Hegel's disciples, the left wing viz. derive from this a new, dialectical a.theism, is only natural!

In other words, to speak of 'pantheism' in relation to Hegel is nonsense. If 'deity' already exists, it coincides with 'history'.

Note - The background, harmological.

E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde van Parmenides tot Bolzano*, (The philosophy of mathematics from Parmenides to Bolzano), Antwerpen/ Nijmegen, 1944, 103, says that Descartes adopted from Ramon Lull (1235/1315; ars generalis) a mathesis universalis: Lull say them as a system of first basic concepts and theorems from which, thanks to combinatorics, indeed, mechanical operations (think of a supercomputer), all separate sciences would be 'deductible'; Descartes as a generalized mathematical 'analysis' (Viète) and algebra.

O,c., 123v" Beth says concerning Leibniz that he adopted the idea of a mathesis universalis from Descartes and Lull, But -- says Beth, Leibniz up to and including his followers (Boole) wanted to construct them by means of mathematical, algebraic symbols (e.g., Boole's algebraic 'logic').

O,c" 141, Beth says: "The idea of a mathesis universalis, -- fiercely contested by Kant, was taken up again by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel -- the three great German idealists.

However, their rejection of the mathematical (note : algebraic) paradigm has led them to apply a style of argument that can never be satisfactory to a reader familiar with 'exact' methods of proof!

Note - 1. Beth speaks here as a representative of first rationality, who e.g. admires a first rate method in logistics,
       2. If Hegel in particular rejected the algebraic method of writing, it was because his very sharp mind recognized the weakly developed nature of the 'mathesis' at the time.

Whoever remembers what we said above about his way of thinking will see that at that time Hegel was right.

All this proves for the umpteenth time that the antique stoicheiosis (CP 27) has led a long life,-- 'metaphysics' as the filling up of the (according to Aristotle.) already, 'empty' concept of being) necessarily follows some form of ordering of (positive) data into a comprehensive (transcendental) 'synthesis' (total insight).

Note -- "There is truth in the following text by Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel (1772/1828) - known for his *Philosophie des Lebens* (Philosophy of life), a foundational book on German Romanticism) - :

"Supposing that these revolutions (note: the Protestant reform of the Catholic Church; the political revolutions) are not simply destructions brought about by 'nature', but that Providence - perhaps never before so clearly to the human eye - has acted upon earthly situations, then one may still hope that they are merely preparations for a restoration of order on a higher plane." (P.-L. Landsberg, *Die Welt des Mittelalters und wir*, (The medieval world and us), Bonn, 1925, 116).

This is the time-honored Catholic scheme, a. accept, b. purge, c. recreate on a higher plane.

Note -- Let's reread CP 08 (Modern French philosophers),-- there it is already "reduction" of the unsettled modern! Is there not the impression that what is called "postmodernity" or "post-nodernism" is in fact only a continued modernity? The authors mentioned there are "hermeneutics", interpreters. But their/their hermeneutics or type of interpretation is 'dismantling'.

Reread CP 68 (Kant's "dogmatism/criticism") and 68vv. (Hegel's "positive" "negative" (destruction)).

The proposers who deconstruct clearly situate themselves within the text along where they want to hit the thinker to be deconstructed "at the weak spots" (which is eristics or deconstruction method).

Don't the proposers repeatedly accuse those they deconstruct of being "dogmatic" or "positive"? Isn't their position repeatedly "critical" or "negative" ("destructive")?

The pair of opposites is analogous! Which means that the deconstructionists are "in the great modern tradition".

Derrida,-- *Oliver Taplin, Les enfants d' Homère (L' héritage grec et l 'occident),* Paris, Laffont, 1990 (Oliver Taplin, The children of Homer (The Greek heritage and the West),), (// Greek Fire (1989)), 201. recounts what follows.

In the course of a conference in Los Angeles, in 1987, Derrida looked at his own thinking from an autobiographical standpoint. He asserted what follows.

As an Algerian Jew but raised in France, he felt "an exile in his own country." Thus, he was driven to create "a space that liberates from the three great traditions" that he considered alien to his own intellectual life: ancient Greek thought, Christianity, German idealism. -- So much for Taplin's testimony.

1.-- We are not now going to use -- misuse -- the Freudian theory concerning rationalization to reduce Derrida's philosophizing to a revenge on his own very individual alienation from "the great tradition of the West."

2.-- What does speak clearly, however, is the enumeration of the traditions he breaks down: a, Greek culture, b. Christian culture, c. German-idealist culture. There is actually not much left of "the West"! He does admit that he cannot acquire a position of "outsider" outside that West.