

9.7.1. Elements of cultural philosophy volume 1, pp. 1 to 111.
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Contents: see p. 219; study notes, see p. 208

Preface.

First year's material

The ontology or metaphysics brought up “all that is, insofar as it (something, ‘reality’) is”. This in two ways.

1. As already said in Platon’s track Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322): ontology, the core subject of all philosophy, brings up “being as being”,--i.e. reality as reality (insofar as something is something).

2. As G.W.Fr. Hegel (1770/1831) said: to philosophize is to examine whether and how beings, “being”, can “really” cope with and solve tasks (data with the sought or asked belonging to them).-- That was the material of the first year.

The second year

It dealt with everything that calls itself ‘religion’,--from the most archaic (‘primitive’, ‘traditional’) to the most secularized (‘enlightened’, ‘rationalistic’). Special attention was paid to New Age (New Era) in which especially the ancient sacred ways of thinking and living are either actualized or even radically re-established.

This cultural movement, which from Romanticism onwards (\pm 1790) began to stand out against the dominant rationalist Enlightenment (Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung), preserved the time-honored religious heritage without rejecting the essential achievements of rational thought and life.

Our philosophy of religion was thoroughly ontological:

1. does religion capture reality (being)?
2. Does religion ‘really’ solve problems (data and its associated problems)?

This third year

This third year reads “elements of cultural philosophy.” -- ‘Elements’ means “axiomata, presuppositions, which define something”.

We define ‘culture’ as the way in which reality (being) is grasped (Aristotle) and as the way in which tasks are tackled and solved in the midst of that reality. Tasks point to a reality which is unfinished, not (sufficiently) worked out, and which is awaiting finishing, further elaboration.

Culture refers to the ways in which such unfinished realities are addressed.-- Here is an initial, approximate (lemmatic) definition.

CF. 02.

Sample 1.-- , 'Culture'. Is a term. (02/05)

To “define,” to give a definition, means to “identify. The identity or singularity of something is that by which it is distinguishable from the rest of “being” (reality). To define therefore means to ‘identify’ something with itself in such a way that it becomes distinguishable from all other data. With the identity of something always goes the difference (distinction/separation).

Talking about ‘culture’ implies identifying it, i.e. giving it a definition which distinguishes it from the rest.-- More than that, culture - we shall see later - begins with the correct - at least as correct as possible - definition of a given with its wanted or demanded (the task). So that we have a twofold reason for first of all dealing with what defining is right.

A theory of understanding.

So we are talking, in the course of this treatise, about the concept of culture.-- So let us first define what a concept (a thought representation) is.

We rely on a traditional work in this regard: *Ch. Lahr, S.J., Cours de philosophie, I (Psychologie / logique)*, Paris, 1933-27, 491/ 500 (*L'idée et le terme*).

Understanding.

Lahr, in a modern interpretation that emerged only after the middle ages, uses the term ‘idée’ to denote ‘understanding’ (concept). One can do this on the condition that one knows well that ‘idea’ is not used here in the antique-medieval, Platon-dated sense.

A term is a fact (being, reality) as far as it is present in the human mind. A term is one or more words or signs (a diagram, for example) that represent a concept.

Note.-- Summative induction. ‘Induction’ is:

a. from one or more specimens (‘elements’) to all conclusions (generalization; metaphorical induction);

b. decide from one or more parts (‘elements’) to the whole (all parts) (generalization; metonymic induction).

The summative or “summative” (summing up) induction is from all copies or parts separately to all copies or parts collectively conclude.

A teacher has improved all the copies (separate treatment). At the end she adds them up and records that addition in a number, e.g. 32. She “summarizes.

CF. 03.

Or: a clockmaker who wants to put together an alarm clock - a whole alarm clock - first counts up to know whether he has all the parts of the whole alarm clock in front of him. When he has gone through them all separately and summarized the number in a figure, he 'summarizes'.

One can see that summative or summative induction differs from ordinary, amplificational (i.e., information expanding) induction.

Lahr, o.c., 499/500 (*La division*) and 550/556 (*La méthode générale: l'analyse et la synthèse*), deals with what we call summative induction. -- The division of a totality into its copies or groups of copies or into its parts or groups of parts relies on summative induction.

Thereby one method, the comparative (comparative) method, appears as the instrument. 'Compare' here means "to see more than precisely one given (being) together, i.e. simultaneously."

Note.-- Do not confuse 'compare' with one of its meanings, namely 'equate'!

Comparison lapses into two forms.

Lahr, relying on *R. Descartes* (1596/1650; founder of modern philosophy), in his *Discours de la méthode* (1637), II, puts it as follows.

1. -- To divide every difficult-to-identify fact ('difficulté') into as small parts or specimens as possible. Descartes called this, in a language specific to him, 'analysis', i.e. division.

2. -- From there summarize the copies or parts until the totality (class (collection)/system) is reached again. This is called Descartes 'synthèse', brain composition.

The ancient Greek thinkers

They call that double operation 'stoicheiosis', (lat.: elementatio), arrangement.

In passing: *E.W. Beth, De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde van Parmenides tot Bolzano*, (The philosophy of mathematics from Parmenides to Bolzano.), Antwerpen/Nijmegen, 1944, 30; 35, talks at length about the stoicheiosis.

Also *T. van Dorp, Aristotle on two workings of memory: platonic reminiscences*, in: *Tijdschr.v.filosofie* (Leuven) 54 (1992): 3 (Sept.), 457/491, discusses the "anamnesis" (lat.: reminsentia), the ability to see through totalities in an orderly fashion (stoicheiosis),-- distinct from "mnèmè, Lat.: memoria" (the vague summarizing remembering).

In other words: what Descartes called "analysis/synthesis", the ancient thinkers called "stoicheiosis in virtue of anamnesis".

So much for this digression.

CF. 04.

Content/ scope.

With all logicians of the great tradition, Lahr distinguishes between conceptual content and conceptual scope.

a. -- *Content* (lat.: comprehensio).

These are the cognitive traits of the given in our mind that collectively (system) constitute the essence, i.e., the identity, of the given referred to in the concept.

b.—*Extent, Scope* (lat.: extensio).

This makes up the things (data) to which the content strikes (i.e., whose content can be said to strike out).

In a diagram: all that is = size;

a pretty girl = content

together: all that is - a beautiful girl

All/ whole.

All who have read Platon carefully know that these two concepts play a prime role in his “dialectic” (thinking).

In that tradition, Lahr distinguishes

a. distributive notions (such as: all people; class (collection)) and

b. collective notions (so: all man; all mankind; system).-- In mid-century, scholastic Latin: omnis homo (omnes homines); totus homo; tota humanitas.

The mid-century scholastics (800/1450) thus distinguished a “totum logicum” (a class) and a “totum physicum” (a system or system).

One can see that in the “all/whole” pair, summative induction and comprehension scope play a role.

Comprehension

1. -- There are transcendental or all-encompassing concepts. Thus: ‘something’, ‘being’, ‘being’, reality (in the strict ontological sense), ‘given’. They can be said to be of radical everything and of everything of everything. They are the object of ontology.

2.-- There are non-transcendental concepts.

Thus: **a.** Singular (“this person here and now”) (also: individual, idiographic);

b. Private (“these people here and now”) (also: kind, specific);

c. Universal (“all people here and now”) (also: general, judicial, generic).

Reverse Proportionality.

“This flower here and now”, “this kind of flower”, “all flowers” show that as the content increases in terms of properties (characteristics), the size decreases. Thus, there are far fewer beautiful flowers than flowers! The adjective (quality-word) “beautiful” increases the content but decreases the “domain” (size)!

CF. 05.

3.-- There are also collective non-transcendental concepts.

The classical books of logic mostly mention only the distributive notions of singular/private/universal.

But in matter sizes there are also:

- a.** one-part (“this part here and now”),
- b.** multipart (“these portions here and now”) and
- c.** total (“all parts here and now”) concepts.

Simplified: some terms refer to one or more parts, respectively (arbitrary) portions; others to the whole.

One takes for example *Thassilo von Scheffer, Die Kultur der Griechen*, (The culture of the Greeks), Köln, 1955. The book clearly talks about “the culture” of the ancient Greeks.

a. There are diachronic encompasses: the Cretan, the Mycenaean, the early Hellenic cultures.

b. There are synchronic dimensions: state life, religion, art, philosophy, science.-- Whoever studies partial culture learns about the whole culture but from one ‘perspective’ or ‘sample’ (and thus very limited). Thus e.g.: one who studies the early stages of Greek culture becomes familiar with the later ones in the sense that run-ups, precursors etc. of the later ones can be found in the early ones.

For example: whoever takes a closer look at the life of the polis (state life), soon encounters e.g. religion or philosophy (and thus the whole culture).-- These are examples of ‘whole-isation’, (it is not a collection but a system), i.e. deciding on the whole of culture through perspectives or samples, which concern parts.

Similarity/Coherence.

Those who contemplate the foregoing find that ‘ordering’, ‘harmology’ or order theory is the name) o.g. comparative method relies on connections. These are twofold: **a.** similarities and **b.** correlations.

Thus, the class (collection) relies on at least one common property (which is a similarity): all instances of a class are similar to each other!

Thus, the system (system) rests on at least one common characteristic (which is a similarity), namely, the fact that all parts belong to precisely the same whole. Hence they show coherence!

That very thing allows us to induce summatively, i.e. to summarize many separate data into one totality.

Conclusion.-- “All cultures, “whole culture,” “the whole of cultures” are terms that define the object of this course.

CF.05.1.

Sample 2.1.-- Definition of the singular. (05.1/05.2)

Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Cours de philosophie*, I (*Psychologie Logique*), Paris, 1933-27, 537, says: “Non datur scientia de individuo”, concerning the singular (individual) no science is available. For “omne individuum ineffabile”, all that is singular, is not amenable to general formulas. Thus the scholastics (800/1450).

The boundless variety (synchronical) and the equally boundless change (diachronical) of data in the real world around us prevents one from building up a universally valid ‘science’ about the varied-changing.

Sciences, such as geography and history, limit themselves to a kind of network of generally valid statements.

They are - to use a recent term - ‘nomothetic’ (‘nomos’ = general law; ‘thesis’ = drafting), i.e. they formulate ‘laws’ that apply to a plurality of e.g. landscapes (geography) or events (history).

Romanticism and its “individual understanding”.

Romanticism (+/- 1790), going against the abstract-general thinking rationalism of modern times, breaks with tradition and stands “idiographic sciences” for the ‘being’ (i.e. that by which something - in this case: something individual - differs from the rest of being or reality) is, for Romanticism, first of all singular being, rendered into a singular concept, which in turn is amenable to a singular definition.

‘Idios’, in ancient Greek, means ‘singular’; ‘grafia’ means ‘representation’; consequence: idiography is representation of the individual.

As *an aside*, what is called a “monograph,” i.e., a study about something singular, is essentially idiographic.

The definition of springing.

Bibl. sample : H. Pinard de la Boullaye, S.J., *L'étude comparée des religions*, II (*Ses méthodes*), (The comparative study of religions, II (Its methods)), Paris, 1929-3, 509/554 (*La démonstration par convergence d'indices probables*), (The demonstration by convergence of probable indices).

This text is one of the very rare texts on our subject.

1.-- Again, the rule of defining is: **a.** the whole given; **b.** only the whole given (delineated opposite the rest).

2.-- In the absence of axioms (general definitions), one falls back on separate ken traits, but in such a way that one accumulates them (cumulative method) until one is sure that the essence of the individual given and only its essence are represented.

CF. 05.2.

The definition rule of conimbricenses.

The *Jesuits of Coimbra* (in: *In universam dialecticam Aristotelis*, Coimbra, 1606) composed, in the Latin of those days, a formula.-- “Forma,-- figura, locus, stirps, nomen, patria, tempus -- unum perpetua lege reddere solent.” - We explain this distich or two-line verse.

1.-- ‘Unum’, literally: the one; i.e. the only thing, which exists precisely once, is the definable or original.

2.-- *cumulatively*, i.e., thanks to enumeration, one typifies the single.-- The name seems to us the first thing that comes to mind (‘nomen’).-- Around the name - e.g., Roxanne - one can ‘singularize’ or ‘individualize’ by enumeration.

3.-- *Further impose first*: ‘locus’, place, residence, e.g. (Roxanne lives) in Antwerp; ‘tempus’, time, e.g. date of birth (Roxanne was) born on 02.02.1994.

Thus, Roxanne is situated synchronically and diachronically. A singular definition, after all, is ‘concrete’ (‘concretum’, in Latin, is ‘fused’, ‘intertwined’, ‘interlocking’ with the rest). It defines, identifies, including the rest.

4.-- *Additional features* - instead of axioms, unless one denotes these features as “singular axioms - are:

- a. ‘forma’, form of being, in Roxanne’s case: woman;
 - b. ‘figura’, appearance, being, in this case e.g. large in stature.
- These characteristics concern the person himself.

5.-- *Additional features* are further (concrete, i.e. in the vicinity:

- a. ‘stirps’, gender, in Roxanne’s case: from a wealthy family;
- b. ‘patria’, fatherland, e.g. Netherlands from which she came to live in Antwerp.

The only, unum, define the conimbricenses: “id cuius omnes simul proprietates alteri convenire non possunt”, that whose whole (system) of knowledges cannot be peculiar to anything else.

Convergence (concurrence).

As in a treasure hunt, defining the singular proceeds: trait after trait accumulates (= cumulative method) and thus our attention converges toward that only which is definable.-- Romanticism is right!

CF.06.

Sample 2.-- 'Culture' as a concept to be defined. (06/07)

The whole of culture, present in all cultures and in the whole of cultures: such is the object of this course. To articulate the totality of culture means to "define culture."

-- **Bibl. sample** : Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Cours de phil.*, I, 496/498 (*La définition*).

To represent a fact in its "essence" (understand: identity by which it differs from the rest of reality) in signs (words, graphs, figures, diagrams, etc.) is to give it an essence determination or definition.

Thus a description, if it means one's own identity, can be a definition,--a comprehensive one then.

A story can also define: think of the courts where stories can represent a decisive (legal) definition. A report (short or detailed) can define.

A discourse, too, can do that: think of the phenomenological discourses of a Husserl or a Scheler, which depict a phenomenon - something that shows itself to the consciousness paying attention to it - in its essence (identity) correctly - as correctly as possible.

A set of axioms -- think of Peano's axioms that, a century ago, "defined" the whole positive number -- can articulate a very exact definition. -- as long as its own identity is accurately represented.

Lahr, o.c., says, in the wake of the scholastics:

a. the entire data ("Omne definitum") and

b. display only the entire data!

One recognizes the concepts of "all/whole" and "identity" (articulated in "only").

Word and business definition.

a. One can define 'nominal' (lat.: nomen, name). By quoting from a language system those terms which accurately represent the given in its essence. Thus, e.g., the term 'culture' can be clarified, indeed defined, using terms from our language. By using synonyms ... as 'civilization' or 'civility' e.g. or by a set of other terms which form a sentence.

b. One can define "real" (lat.: res, the thing itself). By "in the field" ("field work"), detecting and noting the necessary and sufficient elements that make a culture or several cultures what they are (identity) into a concept.

CF. 07.

It should be noted, however, that real or objective definition includes nominal or verbal definition: e.g., those who write down the culture of the Zaireans “on the spot” use the terms which the Zaireans use and their translation into e.g., Dutch.-- The linguistic system is the frame of thought in which the definition settles!

Note.-- The definable and only the definable! Yes, which does not, however, prevent comparisons with what is beyond it from shedding a stark light on the definable. ‘Culture’ and ‘lack of culture’ illuminate each other. Precisely because of their contradiction. By their difference.

The brief definition.

Usually, when we employ the term “definition,” we think of a short sentence or at least a full sentence.

Ch. Lahr, Cours de phil., 501/509 (Le jugement et le proposition), ((The judgment and the proposal),), explains what a judgment, expressed in a “proposition” or statement (sentence), is.

Lahr quotes Aristotle: “to pronounce something from something” (“katègorèin ti tinos”) is to pronounce a judgment.

Indeed: to speak of the subject, which in model-theoretic language is called the original (that about which one seeks information), “in terms of” the saying, which in model-theoretic language is called the model (that which provides information), is to judge.

Well, in a judgment that defines, the model is totally identical with the original. I.e.: one may substitute the predicate for the subject. After all, they coincide. For the predicate expresses the whole subject and only the whole subject.

For example, “a human being is a biological being endowed with spirit”. Since “biological being endowed with spirit” can only be said of a human being, such a term is a definition which immediately typifies the whole human being.

Thus A. Toynbee typifies (defines) culture as “responding to a challenge”. If, in his sense, one knows what is to be understood by “challenge” and “response,” then this can be one of the possible definitions of “culture.

This description is analogous to “solving the problem (correctly)”. -- Immediately we have at our disposal (what Platon calls) a lemma, i.e., a global and provisional notion that can serve as a working hypothesis (heuristic notion) in the following pages.

CF. 08.

Sample 3.-- ‘Lematic-analytic’ definition. (09/10)

By way of introduction:-- “Of Platon of Athens (-427/-347; founder of the Academy) it is reported: ‘The first to give the research by analysis into the hands of the Thasian Leodamas’. (*Diogenes Laërtios*, III: 24).

This consisted in presupposing what is sought (= requested) as already given and examining that sought for its relations.

The main characteristic of this method is to present what one is looking for as already known. - Basically, it would be better to use the term ‘prolepsis’ or ‘lemmatical method’ rather than ‘analysis’, since the analysis of the network of relations in which the sought is woven is only the second step which is possible thanks to the presupposition of the sought as already given.” (*O. Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus*, III (*Der Idealismus der Neuzeit*), ((The Idealism of the Modern Era)), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 48).

Willmann, o.c., 49, mentions that François Viète (Lat.: Vieta (1540/1603) introduced this lemmatic-analytic method into mathematics by using letters instead of numbers. Think of a formula like “ $x = 2 + 3y$ ”: in letter arithmetic one can perfectly perform arithmetic operations without knowing what precisely ‘x’ and ‘y’ mean. This is because the unknown (x,y) is treated as if it was already known (the sought or asked for is presented as already given).

Viète titled his book “*In artem analyticam isagoge*” (literally: Introduction to Analysis). Hence the name “analytic method”.

O. Willmann, Abriss der Philosophie, Wien, 1959-5, 137, adds, “Of such a nature are analyses that begin with ‘Suppose the problem had been solved.’

This is the method on which the whole algebra relies. (...). The higher mathematical analysis and the analytic geometry are called ‘analysis’ or ‘analytic’ by virtue of the fact that they examine quantities as lemmata on their relations.”

This is to demonstrate briefly how fruitful platonic “analysis” (reductive reasoning) that avails itself of a lemma can be.

The definition of ‘essence’. (08/09)

Ontology proceeds no differently.

Of this *O. Willmann, Abriss*, 366, gives an example. We dwell on it now because it is of bearing significance for the whole further course.

CF. 09.

The “essence” of gold.

Thinkers who misinterpreted ancient ontology sometimes scoffed at the ontologists’ (metaphysicians’) concern with “the being” of things.

(1). ***John Locke*** (1632/1704; founder of the Enlightenment)

said, as a nominalist (i.e., as one who presupposes only nominal definitions and no real ones (catching the essence itself)), that “a goldsmith knows much better what (the essence of) gold is than the ontologist with all his reflections on the essences.” The reason in Locke’s view is clear: a goldsmith deals with really given gold (of which he does not know “the essence” but does know the various properties in his praxis). He tests it (“so many carats” e.g.). He forges it into a beautiful jewel etc.

Thus, he arrives at a practical but very business or real definition that relies on sampling.

From this, Locke concludes, energetically, the claim that “metaphysical speculations (= groping insights)” concerning the nature of gold are “empty.

(2). ***O. Willmann*** (1838/1920; Catholic thinker and educator),

as a realist (i.e., as one who presupposes not only nominal but also real definitions concerning the essence of things), answers.

To claim that e.g. gold exhibits both existence (actual existence) and essence (way of being), i.e. exhibits its own ‘being’, means, in ontological perspective, that a number of characteristics or properties (of which e.g. a goldsmith or a jewel-loving lady experience a part) distinguish gold from the rest of reality.

Note.-- It is invariably that dichotomy (complement) “being/rest of reality” that is decisive.

Willmann emphasizes that the number of characteristics referred to are not randomly concatenated but constitute a “totum physicum,” a system or coherent whole. Which is clarified e.g. in the chemistry of gold.

But Willmann adds something else.-- Before samples (induction) have been applied to gold that probe what gold is, the “metaphysical being” is “ein X, eine qualitas occulta” (“an X, a hidden property”).

In other words: a lemma!

CF.10.

The “essence” of culture.

We now dwell on precisely one of these determinations of being, namely that of *Arnold Toynbee* (1889/ 1975); British cultural historian, known for his twelve-volume *Study of History* (1934/ 1961).

A.-- *Existential definition.*

‘Existence’ means, in ontology “actual existence”, peculiar to all that is something.-
- Since Soren Kierkegaard (1813/1855; founder of existential thought), however, ‘exist’ means “to live as actually existing; human-in-the-world.” So that neither God nor e.g. an animal, a plant, a stone ‘exist’. Only the human being exists.

Structure (‘being’) of existing.

Notice.

Given: A human situation (e.g., a sick child; e.g., a flood).

Requested: A way out or solution to the problem that answers both the given and the requested.

Actual Solution.

In Hegelian language, the solution is only ‘wirklich’, real, i.e. problem-solving, if e.g. someone, a doctor or a healer, really heals the child, -- if the government, with the help of e.g. the army, really eliminates the flood.

In existential language (task) thrown into a situation with the given and the requested, one tries (actual solution) to “make true” a design (of way out).

B.-- *Toynbee’s definition.*

This is twofold.

a. -- *Existential.*

A “challenge” - Toynbee’s name for “task” - calls for an “answer” - Toynbee’s name for “actual solution. So what is culture? It is the answer to a challenge. -- One sees that Toynbee’s definition is an essentially existential one.

b.-- *Elitist.*

Time and again, in difficult, yes, unfeasible situations (‘challenges’), one finds that not the great masses but a few, a selection or ‘élite’, find the ‘answer’. - This resourceful and rescuing elite has been around since the times of the archaic cultures. They are then called “bringers of salvation”.

As *Herder lexikon Ethnologie*, Freiburg/ Basel/ Wien, 1981, 85 (Kulturheroen), says, they are also called “culture heroes” (culture heroes). Often they are half animal, half human beings who founded useful plants or animals or institutions and are often revered as “mythical ancestors.”

CF. 11.

Sample 4.-- A 'metaphysical' definition of 'culture'.

When one opens *A. Lalande, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, (Technical and critical vocabulary of philosophy,), Paris, 1968 -10, 615, one comes across one of several definitions of "meta-physical.

Rather than coinciding with ontology or general metaphysics, "metaphysics" becomes, in the parlance of e.g. *Alfred Fouillée, Avenir de la métaphysique* (The future of metaphysics), (1889), "defining something in such a way that an understanding of all that is reality is incorporated into it.

In other words, one puts forward some concept of total reality - e.g., a materialistic concept of being (in which all that is can only be material being or reality) -; after which one "explains" something - e.g., the human mind, e.g., culture - from that materialistic) concept of being.

In that (materialist) case, things like "human spirit" or "culture" are in their essence material things.-- Which then amounts to a kind of special metaphysics, which draws out "the essence" of things within the totality of all that is.

One can also call this a "life and world view" governed by an interpretation of all that is reality.

As Fouillée says: every human being has a - so understood - 'metaphysics'. We add: every culture is a metaphysics so understood. Thus *Pl. Temples, Bantu Philosophy*, Antwerp, 1946, that the Bantus have "their own all-embracing philosophy," governed by the concept of 'life force' ('power') such that every being is defined as some form of life force. Even the 'God' of the missionaries is referred to by the Bantus as a "giver of life force" and thus as the final source of magic.

Aristotle provided this ambiguity with the concept of being(de).

"One does not achieve any definition of something that would indicate by which that something is distinguishable from all other things, by calling that something 'a being'. For, if one says of something that it is 'on' (being, this is valid as an empty term ('psilon')). (...). (*Peri hermèneias 3, in fine*).

Thus: when I define a girl as "something," I am only saying what can be said of all that is something. But a girl is 'something' that is "a young woman".

In other words, "being" is the most general lemma,--a void that is fillable by all that is something. No panacea by which one "knows everything"!

CF. 12

Sample 5.-- An axiomatic definition. (12 /14)

‘Axiom’, in ancient Greek, is all that is so valuable that it should be presupposed either practically or theoretically.

Our definitions of ‘culture’ -- to give a (right, real) answer to a challenge (Toynbee); a type of metaphysics -- boil down to axiomata, valuable things that can be put first.-- But let us first define ‘axiomatically’ the phenomenon of ‘whole positive number’ so that we see clearly what defining is.

E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde van Parmenides tot Bolzano*, (The philosophy of mathematics from Parmenides to Bolzano), Antwerpen/ Nijmegen, 1944, 63v., gives us the Aristotelian concept of “axiomatic definition”.

Note that we say “definition” because the axioms or prepositional phrases describe a scope or domain, in this case the integer positive number, and only that domain. Which is typical of define.

1.-- A certain domain (scope) is represented in sentences (propositions, axiomata). Nothing is represented outside that domain.

2.-- All statements concerning that domain are ‘true’ (in the antique sense of ‘apparent’) and in such a way that they are ‘true’ (apparent) only as a system. I.e.: the terms and the statements must not contradict each other.

Behold the two main properties of axiomatic defining. A domain is represented in interrelated terms and nothing outside of them.

Application. (12/13)

C.-I. Lewis, *La logique et la méthode mathématique*, (Logic and mathematical method,), in: *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 29 (1922): 4 (déc.), 455/474, gives the axioms formulated by G. Peano (1858/1932; one of the founders of mathematical logic) concerning the domain of the whole positive number. We give them in the conversational form.

Logical terms.

‘Class’ (notion, collection), ‘if, then’ (entailment, implication), ‘being a member (copy, element) of’.

Numerical terms.

‘Number’ (a class), 0 (zero), a, b (numbers).

In doing so, the following propositions (axioms) are expressed that represent the phenomenon (what shows itself) ‘number’ (positive, whole) as a domain.

CF. 13

A.-- Numbers

1. The successor of a number.

If a is a number, then $a+$ (the successor of a) is also a number.-- For example: $0 + = 1$; $1 + = 2$.

2. Different numbers.

If a and b are numbers and if the successor of a ($a+$) is the same as the successor of b ($b+$), then a equals b .

In other words, two different numbers also have different successors.

3. -- The mathematical "induction".

If s is a class of which 0 is a member and if every member of s has a successor within the class s , then every number is a member of s .

In other words: if a characteristic is inherent in 0 (and any other number), it is also inherent in all other numbers.-- One extends the information concerning one number to all others. Amplificational induction.

4. -- The (integer) positive number.

If a is a number, then the successor of a is not 0 . -- In other words, every number is either 0 or some other positive number. Indeed, if a number had as its successor 0 , then it would be $-1+$ (the successor of -1).

Here it is clear that the whole domain of positive numbers and only that whole domain is described in 'true' (reflecting the essence of the positive whole number) sentences (axioms). Thus Peano makes clear the phenomenon of "positive integer" in a phenomenological description, - 'true' (alèthès), evidently. It is an eidetic phenomenology because it defines all possible positive integers.

B.-- Operations.

We mention these in passing.

1. Sum.

If a is a number, then $a + 0 = a$.-- If a and b are numbers, then $a + b+ = (a + b)+$ (then the sum of $a +$ the successor of b is equal to the successor of $a + b$).

2. Multiplication.

If a is a number, then $a \times 0 = 0$.-- If a and b are numbers, then $a \times (b + 1)$ equals $(a \times b)+ a$.

Note.-- As shown in *Th. L. Heath, A Manual of Greek Mathematics*, New York, 1963, one can also define the integer positive number differently. The ancient Greeks placed the 'monas' (the unit) first as an entity in itself. The concept of number began only from combining the unit with at least one other unit: thus, for the ancient Greek definition, the number two was the smallest number! Didn't Thales say that number was "monadon sustèma", a combination of units?

CF.14.

'Being' of the (positive integer) number.

A number (collection) expressed in numbers has a reality. The number or sign in which the number is "depicted" is itself "a reality.

1.-- Content and scope (domain) of the concept of reality ('being').

M. Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, (Introduction to Metaphysics), Tübingen, 1953, 138, says: "(In Platon's language) 'ousia' (being) can mean two things.

1. 'Presence' ('Anwesen') of something that is present (*op.*: given).
2. This present in the 'what' ('was') of its creature form".

P. Fürstenau, *Heidegger (Das Gefüge seines Denkens)*, (Heidegger (The Structure of His Thought)), Francf. a. M., 1958, adds, "Here lies the origin of the distinction between existentia, Dazsein, and essentia, Wassein." -- Note that the two constituents of being, actual existence (existentia) and beingness (essentia), determine each other.

In other words, something has the existence of its essence and vice versa.

A night dream is something. A wishful dream, a utopia, a science fiction are something. The incongruous is absolutely nothing. For the absurd or incongruous has no mode of being of its own and therefore no existence of its own. But dreams, utopias, science fictions have their own mode of being and therefore their own existence. Namely in the minds of those who pursue dreams, utopias, write and read science fiction. What "exists" in the mind and only in the mind, really exists and is non-nothing! But it does not have the existence of anything outside the mind. What exists outside the mind has its own kind of existence that differs from that in the mind.

Therefore, of all that is, it can be asked whether it is there (existence) and what it is (essence). Or still, "How real is it (existence)?" And: "How is it real. (essence)?" In which both aspects are intertwined.

2.-- Content and size (domain) of the (positive integer).

The number is something. One calculates with it. Science, exact science especially, works with it constantly. Number has a being, its own existence and at once its own essence. It exists in the mind but not as the dreams e.g., because in the data, number relations are ascertainable outside the mind!

Two apples are twice an apple existing outside the mind. Although '2' exists only in our mind. - The number is immediately a huge cultural asset: it solves many problems. Even if only when we pay a shopkeeper!

CF. 15

Sample 6.-- Identical culture. (15/16)

CF. 11 we saw, with Fouillée, that “metaphysics” (in a narrower sense) is to define something in the light of an all-encompassing concept.

Do we possess comprehensive concepts? Yes, because CF 04 we saw that the terms ‘something’ (= non-nothing), ‘being(s)’, ‘reality’ represent transcendental or all-encompassing concepts.

But also the concept of number covers such a transcendental concept: of all that is, it can be said whether it exists in one copy or in more than one.

In other words: one can talk about it in terms of numbers. This means that numbers are ‘models’ (information providers) with respect to everything.

This is the basic reason - apart from the aforementioned arithmetic with numbers - why number is such a huge cultural phenomenon.

We now turn to the basis of this fact. That basis is identitarian reality. None other than Hegel once said that identity is “*die einfache Grundbestimmung der traditionellen Logik*” (the basic feature of traditional logic).

Hegel misjudged this. For he challenged that basis. Because he confused identity with “immutable substance” or “atomism. He rightly rejected any “substantialism” or “atomism” that has no change and no relations.

The identitive range (differential).

Full or total identical -- partial identical (analogous) -- total non-identical.

Behold the differential that dominates traditional (ontological) thought.-- Indeed: something is only totally identical with itself, but it can be partial-identical (analogous) with something else; yes, it can be totally non-identical (different, removed) with something else.

Because Hegel saw not that differential but only one of the terms of that differential, he thought he should ironize traditional logic.

The logical square.

All/ wholly

some/ partly yes

some/ not at all

all/ not at all

One sees that this is a double differential in which the previous one is depicted.-- Reread CF 02 (*induction*); (04*all/whole*).

CF. 16.

Henology (unitary theory).

One - partially one - non-one. Behold another differential in which the identitive is depicted.

“To them” in ancient Greek is “the one”. Henology is therefore the bringing up of “the one”. The ancient thinkers from the paleopythagoreans (Pythagoras of Samos (-580/-500)) and the eleates (Parmenides of Elea (-540/-475)) onwards were talking about “the one”.

But - again - they were talking about “the one” including “the many”! In other words: they thought in systechies (pairs of opposites) and differentials (fans). These governed all that is. They are all-encompassing concepts.

Note how a multiplicity (a collection or system consisting of a multiplicity of copies or parts) is brought to unity by virtue of similarity or coherence (*CF 05*), i.e., relations or connections.

Which immediately puts the comparative or comparative method at the center as the method par excellence. For to compare is always to think something including something else, -- to see something in a relation to something else.

As an aside, it is not surprising that the Aristotelian list of categories (basic concepts) exhibits as its core the antithesis pair “something/relation” (usually: “substance/relation”).

Where is strict identity in the midst of multiplicity (non-identity)? All copies of a class (“totum logicum) exhibit one identically common property and thus belong to the same class: under that point of view they are identical.

All the parts of a system (e.g. a crystal, a plant, an animal, a human being, a landscape, an axiomatics etc.) - “totum physicum” - exhibit one identical common property and thus belong to the same system: under that point of view they are identical.

Conclusion.

Identity and its variations are the pedestal of ontology and logic. But this is precisely what helps solve countless problems. Thus, identity and its variations are an enormous cultural asset.

Thanks to this identity and its range we order the sometimes very confused data (anamnèsis/ stoicheiosis (*CF 03*)); yes, we can proceed in an orderly fashion. Otherwise we perish in a swirling ocean of disorder.

CF. 17.

Sample 7.-- Tropological culture 17/21

Do we now dwell on a language phenomenon, the trope. Tropos', in ancient Greek, means reference. A reference or, to speak with Derrida, a 'trace' implies that one finds something including something else. Thereby the auxiliary verb 'to be' reveals itself as a referral expressing language.

1.-- The metaphor.

She is an equation that abbreviates a noticed similarity.-- "That woman is a reed." In noticing that woman, her pliability and volatility dawns on her including something that is in its way pliable and volatile, the reed-in-the-wind. Not the reed in itself ("substance") but in connection ("relation").

Aristotle's two main categories -- something/relationship -- are at play here quite obviously.-- There is a "trace" (reference) from that woman to the reed-in-the-wind. Thus we think of them together and all at once.

Ontological.

We do say, and linguistically correctly, "That woman is a reed." Not that she is totally identical with reed-in-the-wind. Well part-identical or analogous. 'Anology' is, after all, "being partly identical partly non-identical". Under one viewpoint, sample, perspective, the woman is identical with reed-in-the-wind.

2.-- The metonymy.

She is the equation that abbreviates a noticed coherence.

"Apples are healthy" (Aristotle's example).-- Eating apples causes (consistency) in part health. Hence, "Eating apples, if properly deliberated, is healthy". That experience brings the concept of apples to include health. That causal or causal connection is expressed in abbreviated terms, "Apples are healthy."

Ontological

'Apples' and 'health' are two separate things. But framed within the causal framework, they are parts of the same whole or system (the dynamic system of health construction). Under that single viewpoint (sample, perspective) they are identical.

Note.-- The logistic replaces the smooth verb 'to be' with 'to imply' (which is as ambiguous as 'to be'): "That woman implies the pliability and vicissitude of the reed"; "Apples imply health".

CF. 18.

Conclusion.

Tropes are the abbreviated wording of something including what resembles or is related to it.

Note -- One can also phrase it semiotically. -- “To sèmeion” is ancient Greek for “the sign.” In the language of Galenus of Pergamon (131/ 200; Greek physician with centuries of influence), “technè sèmeiötikè” meant the physician’s diagnosis through symptoms (semeiotics).

Ch. S. Peirce (1839/1914; American pragmatist) developed the foundations of a current, highly practiced theory of signs.

Characters are data that refer to something else. Because they resemble (metaphorical signs) or are related to (metonymical signs).

A metaphorical or ‘iconic’ sign is e.g. a map that resembles the landscape depicted in it. An ‘indicative’ or metonymic sign is e.g. a signpost associated with the landscape.

Especially since Ch. Morris distinguishes three aspects:

a. Syntactically (the sign amidst other signs: so e.g. the words of a language amidst the rest of the words);

b. Semantic (the sign as a reference to something else: e.g. the term ‘donkey’ meaning the domain of all possible donkeys);

c. Pragmatic (the sign as instrument: e.g. I use a head nod as a signal to a fellow human being). Within this last aspect is situated the sign as a means of understanding between people (which is the object of the signification Van Lady Welby).

It is seen that the tropes articulate sign value abbreviated. Semantic.- Characters are realities that acquire countervalue (referential value) if they are thought with other data included.

Thus, reed-in-the-wind is ‘sign’ of a pliable-changeable woman. Thus apples are “sign” of health. -- Thus, smoke is “sign of” fire and gives rise to the maxim “Where there is smoke, there is fire.”

Thus, the symbols of mathematics or of logistics are “signs” that stand for data within mathematical or logistical contexts: when thought without including mathematical or logistic axioms, they are pure blackened paper.

CF. 19

The synecdoche

‘Sun.ek.dochè’, in ancient Greek, means “to grasp something at the same time as something else”. One can translate “co-measurement.

Whereas in metaphor and metonymy resemblance and coherence are central, in metaphorical and metonymic synecdoche the relationship “collection/copy” and the relationship “whole/part” are central.

1.-- *The metaphorical synecdoche.*

“One soldier remains at his post” says the captain to all the soldiers before him. He does say “just one”, (specimen) but means “all” (class).

“Teachers are not late” says the inspector to one teacher who comes in: he does say ‘teachers’ (plural) but still means first of all one teacher (singular).

2.-- *The metonymic synecdoche.*

“The beard is there” people say. They name the part (that stands out, characterizes, yes, brandishes) but mean the whole.-- “The congregation counts two thousand souls”: they do say the part out (souls) but mean the whole people!

Conclusion.-- With class (all/non-all) and system (whole/part) as prepositions, the synecdoche says something but means something else within those concepts. The specimen or part is thought to include the class or system and vice versa.

Note -- reread CF 02.

The generalization thinks one or more copies including the totality (all copies). Like the metaphorical synecdoche.

The ‘whole-isation’ thinks one or more parts (portions) including the totality (all parts; the whole). Like the metonymic synecdoche.

In other words, the same insight is at work in synecdoche and in induction.

a. -- *Metaphorical induction.*

It rests on similarity.-- This water and that water boil at 100° C.. That parable provokes including the rest of all water: we generalize and say, “So all water boils at 100° C.”

b.-- *Metonymic induction.*

This city quarter (the Meir, for example) and that city quarter (the harbor quarter, for example) have a very diverse economic life. If we consider the whole city (‘whole-isation’), we conclude that the whole city has a varied economic life which can differ greatly from one quarter to another.

CF. 20

The cultural value of the tropics.

Money - coins, papers - is a metonymy for goods with economic value. For money by convention represents valuable things: food and drink, lands and homes, workhouses and factories, books and TV - sets etc.

The connection between money and goods makes it possible for us to “trade” goods metonymically. What a simplification! Can ye see us exchanging a sack of wheat for a nice book? Tropics are a great cultural asset.

But we limit ourselves to language.-- When we introduce figures of speech by saying, e.g., “Thou smart one” when someone commits a stupidity (we think the stupidity including its opposite), we break the monotonous language and introduce playfulness.

Poetry is fundamentally nothing else. Enrichment: the problem of linguistic poverty is thus solved and thus culture is founded. Tropes are figures of speech.

Associative psychology. (20/21)

Stylistic figures such as the metaphor and the metonymy or the synecdoche are the presupposition of associations.

We “associate” (connect things) based on similarity or connection. The association or thought connection listens to the formula: “If a is thought including b such that when a is thought of b, then b is an association of a”.

Bibl. sample : Théodule Ribot (1839/1916) was an experimental-psychologist and thinker. We cite his *La psychologie des sentiments*, (The psychology of feelings), Paris, 1917. O.c., 171/ 182 (Les sentiments et l’association des idées). Ribot shows how our mind, as a capacity for value, involves, i.e. associates.

1.-- Similarity (metaphor).

For a young man, if he resembles her son, has the same age and so on, a mother may feel pots of sympathy arise as a spontaneous reaction.

There is a “trace” or reference from the young man to her son who is absent but shows up in her mind.

For example, there are fear responses that are called “unthinking. One has once suffered an insult because of someone. Another similar one spontaneously arouses the same reaction.

One sees the partial identifications at work. In virtue of similarities that turn something into a metaphor.

CF. 21

2.-- Coherence (metonymy).

Ribot uses the term “adherence” or “apposition”. -- thus the feeling that a lover originally lived through for the very person of his beloved, he transfers to what is related to her: her clothes, her furniture, her home.’

Envy and hatred cool their anger or disappointment on the inanimate objects associated with the hated or envied person.-- For example, the Iranians cooled their anger on the American flag in order to target the USA. Or they damaged the US embassy.-- Metonymic behavior! So much for the identified phenomena.

Now the interpretation.-- Ribot: “One knows that the association of thought contents was reduced to two basic laws, the similarity law and the contiguity law.” Ribot calls this by a psychological term that became very familiar, “transfert” (transfer), - transfert par ressemblance, transfert par contiguïté (transfer by resemblance, transfer by contiguity).

He labels such a tropological behavior as “something under-detected” but - he adds - it involves an “influence souvent latente mais efficace” (an influence that is often hidden but achieves its goal).

Conclusion.-- The psychological applications of the tropics show that our minds, especially as minds and value powers, can act tropologically in their depths. - With or without valid reason. For an association may be irresponsible and therefore unreal.

Take an example. Someone once had an unpleasant experience with a teacher. Since then a trauma, an injury, has remained. Since then, when he hears about that teacher, even more, when he hears about every teacher, he reacts poisonously. He thinks, since then, the rest of the behavior of that one teacher and the rest of the teachers including that disappointing experience.

This is a generalization or induction that is usually unfounded. -- The ancient Romans captured this in a maxim: “Ab uno disce omnes” (Starting from that one case expect the same in all cases).

In other words, the resemblance makes the rest become metaphor for the one case.

We have the impression that such behavior is much more frequent than many would like to admit. What problems metaphors and metonymies can pose!

CF. 22

Sample 8.-- The structural culture element. (22/25)

On the extension of last chapter we now turn to what structuralism has to offer us.

Bibl. sample :

--- *Ferdinand de Saussure* (1857/1913) had three pupils who, after his death, chronicled his views on linguistics *Ch. Bally/ A. Sèchéhaye/ A. Riedlinger, Cours de linguistique générale*, Paris, 1916.

-- Further: *B.T ouasaint, Qu'est-ce que la sémiologie?*, (What is semiology), Toulouse, 1978;

--- *D. Ducrot et al, Qu'est-ce que le structuralisme?*, (What is structuralism?), Paris, 1968;

-- *J.M. Broekman, Structuralism* (Moscow/Prague/Paris), Amsterdam, 1973

Moscow, Prague, Paris were once the centers of structuralism, growing in stages, starting in 1915. Originally at home in language - and literature it was extended to e.g. anthropology (ethnology), mathematics (Bourbaki), philosophy.

Language - later any phenomenon - is dissected ("analysis") as a "totum physicum" (a system) of mutually distinct but axiomatically related parts.

CF 03 (stoicheiosis). -- One immediately looks for structure: accidental data - e.g. the sounds within a language - are analyzed as elements that show an order(s). One finds, for example, rules which characterize a language as a language. The terms 'system' and 'structure' are basic terms.

Semiology.

We saw *CF 18* something about Peirce's semiotics.

De Saussure has his own theory concerning the sign: he characterizes them as "representing the signs (language signs in the first place) within the life of a society as structured system parts." De Saussure is talking about the spoken language first of all, because, for him, the written word is only an image, an additional tool (something in which he is criticized by J. Derrida, the deconstructionist, who puts the 'written' (in the minds of people) first).

The language phenomenon.

Basic terms in de Saussure's semiology are "langage" (the language phenomenon as a whole), subdividable into "langue" (language; the language system) and "parole" (language use; the spoken word. -- Language is, in principle, identical in every speaking individual, while language use is such that each individual is distinguishable from all other language users.

CF. 23.

The language sign.

Note that, in de Saussure's view, language is used when one speaks and writes, but also when one thinks, reflects, in silence. For - Platon already noted - when we think, we mumble inner 'words', as if with an inner voice.

The sign as 'signifiant' (Sa) / signifié (Sé).

Every 'signe', sign, consists of a sound and a meaning.-- The sound, le signifiant, the signifier, is object of phonology (do not confuse with traditional phonetics) which studies le signifié, the signified, the meaning, of it, 'analyzes!'

Applicable model.

The word "donkey" is, in our Dutch language system:

- a. a valid sound ('donkey' when pronounced internally or externally),
- b. but also that which is meant by that sound, namely, the thought 'donkey' or the donkey existing outside our mind. The meaning, le signifié, can also be something purely imaginary.

The sign system. (23/25)

This is the system-theoretical aspect.-- Any valid sound within a language is valid only insofar as it possesses its own being and thus is part of the system. Something by which it differs -- is distinct, "discriminable" -- from the rest of the signs. -- Again, the dichotomy or complement "part / rest".

The system, synchronous or diachronical.

Medieval Dutch differs quite a bit from today's: those who study our Dutch language system in its evolution - Romanticism (1790+), strongly attuned to historical development, was happy to do so - are engaged in diachronic linguistics.

De Saussure first of all kept it to synchronic linguistics.-- We now turn to that for a moment.

De *Cours de linguistique générale*, 170/175, synchronically distinguishes "des rapports syntagmatiques et des rapports associatifs."

The syntagmatic connection (we say: syntactic) makes the currently present ("in praesentia") signs one, while the associative (paradigmatic) connection makes terms that are absent ("in absentia"),-the complement (the rest of the language signs), one.

CF. 24.

1.-- Syntagmatic relationships.

These are the coherences that exhibit the algorithm (the ordered sequence of characters).

Do we take terms like “reread, against all, the life of man, God is good, if the weather is good, we go out”. All the words or strings of words (noting that a word is a string of letters) are singular or compound “signifiers” that make up the series of signs running in time.

For all their difference, they belong together nevertheless. This calculated, de Saussure calls “syntagma,” arrangement, juxtaposition.

2.-- Associative relationships.

On the basis of similarity/difference and coherence/gap either in sound (Sa) or in meaning (Sé), classes (collections) or systems arise as follows:

a.-- teach/ point; teach/ ice;-- teach/ shelter; -- let us go /let us protest;

b.-- teaching/forming/educating;-- education/culture/civilization.

In all differences these terms belong together by association: with one term one thinks - thanks to its inclusion - of others that differ from it but, in linguistic memory, belong to it. Although absent, they are somewhere present in the background.

One sees that similarity and coherence (the latter syntagmatic or associative) are decisive. Reread *CF 05; 16*.

Note.-- *E.W. Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics, Antw./ Nijmegen, 1944, 36v., cites Platon, Philèbos 18b/d:*

“When someone - either a god or a divine human being (according to an Egyptian story, it was Theuth (= Thoth; *CF 10* (cultural hero)) - noticed that all that is sound is infinitely different from one another, he was the first to recognize:

1. that amidst that infinity of differences the vowels were not one but many, and again

2. that there were other sounds which, although not vowels, nevertheless possessed a certain sound value, and that there was a certain number of these too and

3. he distinguished a third kind of letters which we now call consonants.-- Then he divided the consonants until he distinguished each one separately,-- in the same way the vowels and the semi-vowels. until he knew the number of these also.-- He called each of them and all together ‘letters’ “.

CF. 25.

Note that among the ancient Egyptians, Thoth continued as the mythical inventor, importer, of a great Egyptian cultural asset, the hieroglyphs.

Note further that summative induction (*CF 02*) plays the leading role here (“each of them (separately) / all of them together”). As a hermeneutical or organizing element amidst the chaos of sounds.

Platon ‘s text continues, “But he recognized that none of us could learn one of them separately without all the others. He saw through that this was a connection that made them all one. He also assigned to them one science which he called ‘grammar’”.

Here it is clear that Platon’s phonetics presupposed the notion of “system” (all/ all) as a norm, as an illuminating light. One notices this in two couplets: “each separately/ all together” and “one separately/ all the others”, (class and dichotomy).-- Which we have met so often!

Immediately one sees that what Platon does phonetically, Saussure does phonologically: analyzing the systemic character and its own structures. What antique wording calls ‘stoicheiosis’ (virtue of anamnèsis). (*CF 03*)

Note.-- The structuralists turned this ground scheme into a ‘metaphysical’ (*CF 11*) axiom: they defined anything and everything in such a way that system and structure of language were incorporated into it. The concept of ‘system’ (‘structure’) replaced the time-honored concept of ‘being’.

This some have called ‘linguisticism’, i.e. transferring what is true for language to non-language data. Language and its structured system thus becomes the all explanatory axiom.

Thus culture was conceived as a sign system,--as *J.M. Broekman, Structuralism, 122/129 (Structural Anthropology and Theory of Knowledge)* explains. Claude Lévi-Strauss used the linguistic, especially the phonological method to “ground” the scientificity of his conceptions of culture.

For linguistics has a far-reaching object, namely orderly language. Without that language no human life is worthy of the name. More than that: science, even where it defines business (*CF 06/07*), always processes a language system, by attaching a (scientific) name to each fact. The language system is the syntagmatic and associative system without which ‘culture’ is non-existent.

CF. 26

Sample 9.-- Judging. (26/28)

According to Platon, even inner thought is a speaking and that speaking is invariably a judgment. This judgment, according to him, decays into two parts: the ‘onome’, lat.: nomen, the subject (speech: subject) and the ‘rhèma’, lat.: verbum, the saying (speech: predicate).

Which returns in formalized form in the transformational-generative speech of *Noam Chomsky* (1928/ ...; cartesianizing literatologist). Cf. his *Syntactic structures*, ‘S Gravenhage, 1957 (A. Kraak/ W. Klooster, *Syntax*, Antw, 1968).

“The boy throws the ball” indeed decays into a nominal component (The boy) and a verbal component (throws the ball). In the indirect speech, this returns: “I saw your brother perform”:

- a. “I saw” (nominal and verbal component),
- b. “your brother acting” (that your brother (nominally) acted (verbally)), as Kraak/ Klooster, o.c., 90/92, say.

It is in this grammatical way that one “pronounces from something (nominally) something (verbally),” as Aristotle says.

Model Theory.

Thinking the subject including the predicate shows that the predicate contains information concerning the subject. Or : the original (unknown, subject), when compared with the model (known, proverb), includes (or does not, in the counter-model) the model.

Bibl. sample : *K. Bertels / D.Nauta, Introduction to the model concept*, Bussum, 1969, 28.

Linguistic.

The subject, if thought of as including the proverb, which is a part of the living whole of language, is such that one can speak of it in terms of the proverb as part of the whole language system. By association, we see ‘traces’ that refer to the subject within the linguistic whole of the proverb.

Language use, main component of culture, proceeds in the form of judgments. The proper understanding of judgments is fundamental to a theory of culture.

“Imelda runs.

Text and context regarding judging.-- We will now look at an example in more detail.

- 1.-- “Imelda runs”. -- This statement can mean two things:
 - a. “Imelda is a runner” and
 - b. “Imelda is (currently) running”.

CF. 27.

The more-or-less ambiguity of the expression “Imelda runs”, proves that the context provides the including for the correct understanding: one understands the text but including the context which, although (more times) absent, nevertheless counts and is indirectly ‘present’.-- This refers to the unspoken and to the (consciously) concealed.

2.1.-- “Imelda is a runner”.

In virtue of the connection (resemblance, a form of identity (CF 15)) between ‘Imelda’ and ‘runner’ one can speak of ‘Imelda’ in terms of “being a runner”. After all, she is one specimen from the “totum logicum” (class) of runners. For one actually says “Imelda is a runner.” -- When one sees her busy, a ‘trace’ refers to “being a runner”.

2.2.-- “Imelda is walking”.

In virtue of. the connection (coherence, a form of identity (CF 15)) between ‘Imelda’ and “running”, one can - indeed, if one sees them actually running, one must - speak of ‘Imelda’ in terms of “being running”. To the “totum physicum” (whole, system) of Imelda belongs the part “be current on running”, with which she does not coincide ‘totally’ but partially.

In both cases there is partial identity or analogy,-- metaphorical (class analogy) or metonymical (system analogy). This is how traditional ontology and logic think (the latter being the ontology insofar as there are “if-then-relationships” in all that is.).

Criticisms due to logisticians. (27/28)

Bibl. sample : G. Jacoby, *Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtschreibung*, (The claims of logisticians on logic and its historiography), Stuttgart, 1962 (especially o.c., 53/64).

The criticisms in question rest on a confusion between thinking as traditional philosophy with its own ‘akribeia’, accuracy, and thinking as arithmetic with its own akribeia or ‘exactness’.

A.-- Declaring relationships.

One can hear it said that, without “logic of relations” (the analogy of stoicheiosis), traditional logic cannot articulate a relation as it should be.

An applicative model.

“That church is bigger than/ smaller than/ as big as all the surrounding buildings.”

It is forgotten in logistic circles that traditional logic thinks not with words but with terms, - which, if need be, include more than one word.

CF. 28.

Thus the set of axiomata of Peano (*CF 12v.*) is actually one term, but expressed in a plurality of phrases and symbols. The symbols of logistics and mathematics also belong to the terms of traditional logic. We know that, in lessons in logistics and mathematics, the symbols and calculations are explained in everyday language!

B.-- *Stating a measurement model.*

Logicians repeatedly claim that quantitative statements are “exact” only in computational, formalized language.

An applicative model.

“That church is a hundred and fifty feet high.” -- Like the previous case, that expression is a meaningful one.

As an aside, as Aristotle notes, judging is based on explicit or concealed comparison. Which is evident here. When we compare (think including) “that church” with “one meter”, one of the many models of measurement, then we must multiply that one meter until the number of multiplied meters is identical with the church as height. That church, as height, is ‘part-identical’ or analogous to “one hundred and fifty meters”.

We therefore say, in traditional speech, not “That church is one hundred and fifty meters” but rather “That church is one hundred and fifty meters high.” The first sentence, however, can be used as a trope (*CF 17*), which expresses likeness in meters, yes, in number of meters and thus in numbers. Numbers are among the words or symbols that make up the one logical term “... meters high”.

Conclusion

One speaks of “that church” in terms of “greater than/ less than/ as great as” or “(one hundred and fifty feet tall).” Those terms and the words contained in them are meaningful, highly accurate statements.

So one does not say too easily that without an art language one cannot speak with accuracy.

In this regard, reference should be made to *Chaim Perelman* (1912/1984), the founder of current ‘rhetoric’. Exact scientists, including positivists, band the natural languages and value judgments from accurate speech as forms of ‘irrationality’!

Perelman has demonstrated duly that this dual bias is wrong. Cfr *Ch. Perelman/ L. Olbrechts, Rhétorique et philosophie*, (Rhetoric and philosophy), Paris, 1952;-- id., *Traité de l’argumentation*, (Treaty of argumentation), Paris, 1958.

CF. 29.

Sample 10.-- Clarity (interpretation). (29/31)

This is a chaplet of “hermeneutics.

‘Hermèneuein’, in ancient Greek, means “what one thinks, expressing, articulating, interpreting, interpreting”. “Hermèneutikè technè” (so *Platon, Politeia 260d*) is skill concerning interpreting, signifying.

Man is a meaning maker.

If anyone has emphasized this, it is Ch.S.S. Peirce (1839/1914; pragmatist). For him, any relation in itself - between inorganic data, between plant, animal, human realities - is already a form of interpretation.

When a stone crushes another, the crushed one denotes the crushing one! This is: he takes him for what he is as something transmitting, working out.

Man is only a signifier or interpreter on a higher plane. Do we dwell on this as an element of culture.

Our thesis will be: meaning is twofold. It is the conception of meaning, i.e. the grasping of (the meaning or essence of what is given). She is also sense-making, i.e. ‘hineininterpretieren’, putting a sense that is not present in the given, into the given.

Note.-- P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d’hermeneutique)*, (The conflict of interpretations (Essays in hermeneutics)), Paris, 1969, 8, says: “The connection between text indication (“exégèse textuelle”) and understanding of signs (“intelligence des signes”) is brought into play by one of the traditional meanings of the term ‘hermeneutics’ itself. Aristotle’s booklet on judgment is called “*Peri hermèneias*”, (lat. : de interpretatione), On interpretation.

This includes: the remarkable language of Aristotle regarding ‘hermèneia’ which means allegorizing but also very generally “sensible judging.” More so: sensible judging is ‘hermèneia’, interpretation, as “saying something of something”. -- Cfr *CF 26*.-- So that this little chapter is the outright continuation of the previous one.

Judgments.

Apparently, for Aristotelian ontology and logic, the person who judges is an interpreter(s).

But there is a judgment that captures the meaning, and a judgment that gives to the meaning a broader interpretation. Both are sense-making but very different. For one ‘identifies’ - while judging - something with something, where that second something can be very different from the first something. In the defining judgment, the second something is simply the first without more (*CF 07*: The model is totally identical with the original).

CF. 30.

In all other judgments, the judgments that grasp the meaning of something, and the judgments that interpret more broadly, the second is slightly different from the first (part-identical, totally non-identical) (Cfr *CF 27*).

1.—Grasping the meaning.

Here we are talking about the given “according to itself”, i.e. as given, in itself. When we try to grasp (the meaning or essence of) something - an event, a saying, a landscape - correctly, we pay attention to that something itself, in itself.

Note.-- Parmenides of Elea (-540/ ...), the founder of eleatic philosophy, left us with an expression: “being according to itself” (“Kath’heautou”).

This is: what is given (and requested) is according to the given (and requested) itself and not according to us. In other words, in modern terms: the object decides, not the indicating subject.

In Aristotle’s formula for “ontology / metaphysics” this is reflected as follows: “the being as being” (“to on èi on”).

2.—Interpreting the meaning.

Here it is both about the given (and the wanted) and especially about what that given (with its asked) provokes in the one who is confronted with it.

In other words: modernly expressed: and the object and especially the subject as an indicating being independent of the object.

Note.-- W. Leibbrand/A. Wettley, *Der Wahnsinn (Geschichte der abendländischen Psychopathologie)*, (Madness (History of Western Psychopathology), Freiburg/Munich, 1961, 60, cites a text by *Platon*, *Sophistès (Soph. 228)* where it is about ‘para.frosunè’, thinking beside reality. He who thinks too much in the shadow of reality is in delusion, in delusions, - is insane, ‘parafron’. Note that the counter-model is called “so.frosunè”, thinking reality itself.

The sharpest case of sofosunè, ‘real’ thinking (reality-based, objective thinking) is what e.g. the phenomenologist does: he pays attention to what is directly given and to nothing else. He pays attention to the phenomenon, i.e. what shows itself, as a phenomenon, i.e. insofar as it is a phenomenon.

The sharpest case of parafrasunè is the complete madness, in which the madman says of something that is completely outside the first something, which, in that case, is not the object but yet another occasion for whatever the object claims.

CF. 31

Let us note that thinking beside reality, as just defined, creates problems, while thinking according to reality solves problems. Which suggests that the latter is culture. Cfr. *CF. 10* (“Actual solution”).

An example.-- The concept of *responsibility*.

1.-- Sentence summary.

Responsibility’ in itself can be defined as treating - interpreting - a task (given + demanded) in such a way that, when treating it, one does justice to the involvement with one’s conscience -- Colloquially expressed: to let both the given and the demanded “come to one’s conscience”!

So: my child is sick. In conscience I cannot leave it to its fate. ‘Conscience’ is the common word for ‘ethical commitment’. By realizing that there are situations with rights and duties and even ideals.

Analytical.

Given: my child is sick.

Demanded: to do something to rescue it from that unholy condition.

Solution: either I can help it e.g. myself or I call e.g. a doctor.

Such a behavior is, in Hegelian terms, “wirklich” (*CF 01*), truthful, for one allows given and requested justice to be done, to come into their own.

2.-- Zinstichting.

Given: my child is sick.

Asked: to do something to save it.

Solution that is unethical, unscrupulous, is “I don’t care”.

The given and the requested, which are always one, do not come into their own.

Here, meaning is literally introduced. Founded in the punitive sense of the word. It comes not from the given and the demanded. But from a - cynical, pathological - subject.

The Latin tradition calls this “peccatum omissionis”, sin of omission. It is as if, in case of omission, the given and the asked did not even exist. Thus one thinks, in that barren case, outside or beside reality.

As an aside, according to *Paul Diel* (1893/1972; Austrian-French psychologist), in his *Psychologie curative et médecine*, (Healing psychology and medicine), Neuchatel, 1968, such cynical behavior is just as psychologically ill(ically) as neurosis,--yes, worse, sicker, more pathological, but with the appearance of cold reason and thus seemingly psychologically “normal. This explains why Platon speaks of para.frosunè, neven the task of thinking.

CF. 32

Sample 11.-- Phenomenon representation and interpretation. (32/37)

Let us resume the dichotomy of the previous chapter.

But now on the basis of what we call, in a very general sense, “phenomenon representation. In the representation of phenomena - in the form of a description or a story - the data coincide in a certain sense with the demanded in the sense that the demanded is to represent the data as correctly as possible. One sees that this is ‘sense conception’, i.e. grasping the given (in its essence) and putting it into words or interpreting it in signs.

The phenomenology of Hegel, which represents one main fact in its cultural-historical forms or modes of appearance,--that of Husserl, which represents the general being (‘eidosis’; eidetic phenomenology), the phenomenology of Teilhard de Chardin, which represents the evolution of life forms, are three types of a -- sometimes theoretically very complicated, indeed over-complicated -- phenomenological representation.

We begin with a sketch by the hand of E. Husserl himself. 32/34.

Bibl. sample : W. Biemel, Hrsg./ Einl., E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie (Fünf Vorlesungen)*, (The Idea of Phenomenology (Five Lectures)), The Hague, 1950, 31

Husserl, in that passus, wants to show that the utter doubt (“I doubt everything”) is an impossibility (incidentally, in the wake of R. Descartes). Reason: the very perseverance of doubting “everything” is undoubted! It is about the perseverance as an undoubted ‘given’ and therefore utterly or ‘absolutely’ certain starting point.

See here the text.

Given. -- I am living through something, e.g., a disappointment or frustration.

Requested.-- The absolutely certain demonstration of the experience or experience as an experience.

Husserl.-- “Every mental experience and even every experience without more can, the moment it is a fact, be made the object of attention and understanding.

Immediately she is, in this paying attention to herself, something that is utterly there (given). She is a given insofar as she is something that “is” (“Seiendes”), as something that is “this there. To question its being is meaningless”.

So much for the pure phenomenon view. But interpretation (interpretation) is also possible.

Husserl.-- “It is true that I can ascertain what type of ‘being’ that perseverance is and how this mode of ‘being’ is comparable to other modes of being.

CF. 33.

I can further consider what, in this case, “givenness” (*note*: the fact that something is given) means. Thinking further through, I can pay attention to the fact that I am paying attention to the very act of living through. (...).”

In other words: although this is inherent in the conscious experience itself as far as one is concerned, nevertheless the checking of types of being, of what is given, etc. is already interpretation, i.e. processing by the one who lives through, of what is observed.

The utterly certain.

Husserl.-- “In all cases, I am hereby constantly standing on absolutely certain ground. Such perception, after all, is and remains -- as long as it lasts -- something absolutely certain,-- a “this there,” -- something which, taken in isolation, is what it is.”

Husserl lapses into the antithesis pair of “existence/ essence” (already noted by Platon; CF14). Immediately he stands in full ontology. This is clear from what he says next.

Husserl.-- “Something by which I can measure -- it involves an unquestionable measure -- what ‘being’ and ‘given being’ can mean and, in this case, must mean. Of course with regard to the kind of ‘being’ and ‘given being’ of which ‘this there’ (*note*: the survival) is one sample”.

Husserl is looking for “a measure,” a standard, by which he can measure reality (“How real something is and how it really is”). But that, apart from phenomenon-representation, is already incipient ontology or theory of being.

In other words: what shows itself - phenomenon- , is something that is there.

Note.-- We keep it simple here. But those who want to know more about it and gain ‘knowledge’ about it, are referred to e.g.:

-- R. Bakker, *The History of Phenomenological, Thinking*, Utrecht/ Antw., 1964 (prehistory: -- Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty);

-- *Alph. de Waelhens, Existence et signification*, (Existence and meaning,), Louvain/ Paris, 1958 (phenomenological problems of all kinds);

-- R. Bruzina/Br. Wilshire, ed., *Crosscurrents in Phenomenology*, The Hague/ Boston, 1978 (phenomenological problems).

-- Regarding hermeneutics or theory of interpretation: O. Pöggeler, Hrsg., *Hermeneutische Philosophie*, (Hermeneutic Philosophy,), Munich, 1972 (Dilthey, Heidegger, Bollnow, Gadamer, Ritter, Becker, Apel, Habermas, Ricoeur);

-- P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d’ herméneutique)*, Paris, 1969 (*hermeneutics and structuralism (CF 22); hermeneutics and Freudian psychoanalysis; hermeneutics and phenomenology et al.*)

So much for the introduction.

CF. 34.

Now we show concretely, on the basis of an experience - frustration and aggression - what interpretation can be. Immediately this is a piece of practical hermeneutics.

A.-- Frustration/aggression.

Much has been written, of course, about that (causal) connection.--who is disappointed tends to attack, yes, becomes attack-minded. Behold the perseverance. -- Let us now consider how this can be interpreted.

B.-- Clarifications. (34/37)

We randomly select some interpretations.

a. The School of Yale.

Bibl. sample : R. Denker, *Aggression (Kant/ Darwin/ Freud/ Lorenz)*, Amsterdam, 1967 (// *Aufklärung über Aggression*, (Education about aggression), Stuttgart, 1966), 76/78 (Frustration-aggression hypothesis of the Yale School).-

(1). S. Freud (1856/1939; founder of psychoanalysis)

He stated in a number of assertions that if pleasure-seeking or pain-avoiding behavior is inhibited (met with opposition, resistance), then disappointment ("frustration") with in its wake attacking behavior) ("aggression") follows.

In short: omen (disappointment)--continue (attacking)).

(2). The School of Yale.

Like Freud, this streak typifies the attack as a "reactive" (responsorial) phenomenon, i.e., as a sequel to an omen.

1937.-- John Dollard, in a study of a group in the southern U.S., set forth as an axiom formulated in 1939 in *J. Dollard et al, Frustration and Aggression*, New haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1939.

a. Aggression is always, lawfully, the sequel to frustration as an omen.

b. Frustration always, lawfully, has as its sequel aggression. Whereby 'frustration' is indicated as an obstacle in the pursuit of a stated goal.

(3). The School of Yale.

In response to criticisms that the term "always" is not tenable (legislatively), N. Miller et al, *The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis*, in: *Psychol. Review* 1941:48, 337/342, put it differently.

a. Frustration can also be processed differently, -- without attack.

b. Frustration does always (lawfully) foreshadow seizure tendencies but not seizures that work themselves out.

CF. 35.

As an aside.-- A. Plack u.a., *Der Mythos vom Aggressionstrieb*, (The myth of the aggression instinct.), Munich, 1974, responds against the interpretations concerning attack(s) by S. Freud, K. Lorenz (1903/1984), Nico Tinbergen (1903/1994), A. Mitscherlich and argues that:

- (1) aggression is not innate (“active”) but reactive and
- (2) not universal. Said theorists rely on an impure induction, which is not haphazardly sampling and is too limited in number.

Great apes, for example, are “friendly” rather than attacking, and primitives exhibit a charity such that they survive in their circumstances.

Note.-- Mention should be made very briefly of *Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’s* acclaimed book, *Lessons for the Living (Conversations with the Dying*, Bilthoven, 1970 (*// On Death and Dying*, New York, 1969).

Therein, o.c., 48/140, it is explained on the basis of factual evidence that on the omen miscalculation - in this case: dying - does not always follow attack:

1. denial (“Surely that’s not possible. Not me!”), anger (“Why me already? I won’t take that!”), stuff (“I’ll keep my cool. Who knows I won’t escape like that!”), dejection (“I’ve had miscalculations all my life!”),

2. acceptance (“It’s everyone’s destiny”), are the whole set of phases or reaction types. Anger, typical of attack and assault, is only one reaction type.

b. The ABC theory.

Bibl. sample :

--- A. Ellis, *The Theory and Practice of Rational-Emotive Psychotherapy*, New York, 1961;

-- A. Ellis/ E. Sagarin, *Nymphomania*, Amsterdam, 1965 (*// Nymphomania*, New York, 1964).

O.c., 137vv.. -- The ABC theory concerning a person’s personality has a very curious hermeneutic.

A is the disappointing fact (e.g.: the nymphomaniac who goes from bed to bed and finds herself a disappointing case; e.g.: the doctor who says one is incurable).

C is the (final) reaction or interpretation of such a frustrating fact. The characteristic of the ABC-theory is that it situates the personal axioms (B) between the stimulus (A) and the reaction (C) in such a way that C is the result both of A and of those propositions.

Common sense.-- B as common sense reasons in such a way that the frustration is reasoned out and as calmly as possible. Does not dramatize. “It’s very disappointing. I can’t handle it yet. But I will get through it”.

CF. 36

The neurosis (the neurotic mind).

Here not the sense conception but the sense foundation prevails.

“I’m disappointing. It’s disappointing. It’s never to be digested!”. B. viz. “what one deludes oneself into thinking” (o.c., 138), causes in the first place (with in the background the frustrating situation) C, i.e. the overwrought, the dejected or whatever.

The authors : “I can’t bear this happening at point A! It’s awful! Horrible! Disastrous! It makes me a completely worthless individual” (O.c., 138). -- As o.c., 139, said: the neurotic reaction or interpretation is due not so much to the failure (A) but to the attitude, the “attitude,” toward the failure (B).

Sentence.-- The judgment of the sane and the neurotic mind expresses itself in judgments that are typical.

Those judgments, cited, o.c., 191v., are all true axioms, definitions predicated on failure.

E.g., “It is something inevitable that one will be completely confused by problems and disorders of others.” “Man’s happiness depends on outside factors and he himself has little power over his worries and concerns. “One must be duly competent, adapted and successful in all respects in order to consider himself a full human being.”

When a miscalculation passes through such axioms (= glasses), it is inevitable, unless one recovers, that negative reactions (denial, stuff, dejection,-- anger) will prevail.

Peculiar: the inner voice of such people formulates the axioms (*CF 26: The inner thinking*). From which it appears that judgment is disturbed.

c. The elevation hypothesis of W. James (1842/1910; pragmatist).

This interpretation appears in his *Variante van religieuze beleving (Een onderzoek naar de menselijke aard)*, (Variations of Religious Experience (An Inquiry into Human Nature)), Zeist/ Arnhem/ Antwerp, 1963 (// *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902)), 27/34.

“For religion, serving “The Highest” is never a yoke. Dull submission has been left far behind, and a willingness - which can assume every shade between joyful serenity and spirited delight - has taken its place.” (O.c., 27).

That very fact makes the truly religious man perfectly able to handle frustrations (“This earth is a valley of tears rather than an earthly paradise”).

CF. 37.

Not with the dull acceptance of the stoic, who looks down haughtily on those who cannot handle the disappointments. Not with the flight of the epicurean who retreats into his "little garden" to escape the frustrating world and seek a melancholy life of enjoyment. But with the sense of the sublime, which, according to James, is characteristic of the truly religious man.

Christianity - says James all the time - surpasses Stoicism which is purely moralistic based: "While the merely 'reasonable' exhortation (*note*: among other things, characteristic of the Stoic) requires an effort of will, Christian behavior is the result of the inspiration by a higher-order emotion (*note*: the sense of the sublime) which is present without an effort of will."

In fact, James defines every true religion as that sense of the sublime. -- "There is a state of mind -- known to religious people but to no others -- in which the urge for self-preservation has been replaced by a willingness to 'keep our mouths shut' and be 'nothing' in the 'flood', the 'torrents' of God.

In such states of mind, what we feared most has become the source of our security. The death hour of our 'moral' (*op.*: purely moralizing) attitude has turned into our spiritual day of birth." (O.c., 31).

"This happiness in 'the Absolute and Eternal' we find nowhere except in religion. It is distinguished from any 'natural' happiness, any joy in the present alone, by that element of exaltation to which I have so often referred." (O.c., 32).-- "An exalted sorrow (*op.*: frustration) is a sorrow with which we inwardly agree." (Ibid.).

This manifests itself in sacrifice: "The religiously happy accepts outwardly evil as a form of sacrifice but inwardly it knows that evil has been overcome forever." (O.c.,33)

James summarizes, "Religious consciousness is this intricate sacrificial act in which a lower unhappiness is held in check by a higher happiness." (ibid.).

"Religion thus makes what is in any case necessary into something easy and happy." (O.c., 34).

Conclusion.-- The proper handling of frustrations is a high form of culture, because it solves a main problem of life.

CF. 38

Sample 12.-- The identity axiom: grasping the meaning and interpreting the meaning (38/41)

We remain with our previous topic: sense/ sense foundation. But now applied not to an endowment (as Husserlian phenomenologists like to bring up) but to what one finds in all manuals of ontology, traditional and formalized logic: the identity principle.

Existence/ essence captured. (38/39)

Reread *CF 14* (“Reality”).

Husserl we heard say it, “This – there (*note*: it was about an inner experience),-- something which, taken in isolation, is what it is” (*CF 33*).

Classically expressed, the basic axiom that governs all being and all straightforward thinking of being:

“What is, is” (existence emphasized);

“What is so, is so” (essence emphasized).

To “prove” such a thing, i.e., to deduce it from prepositional sentences, is impracticable because, in order to “prove” those prepositional sentences, one needs all the identity postulate utterly or absolutely! This amounts to what traditional logicians call a “circulus vitiosus” a ‘vicious’ (irresponsible) circular reasoning.

Only form of evidence: the evidentiary or ready evidence. That is: if one with a sound (not e.g. neurotic or otherwise prejudiced) mind or ‘intellect’ is confronted with something that is there or something that is so, there is only precisely one reaction: to say that the something is there or that the something is so.

Note.-- In mathematics and logistics one expresses this ‘tautologically’: “a is a” (which is precisely one application of the principle or axiom of traditional logic (which uses mathematical and logistic terms as terms in addition to words of natural languages (*CF 27v.*)). The same is true of the equality (quantitative) “a = a” one type of mathematical equation.

Modalities of the principle.

‘Modality’ here means ‘variant’.

Bibl. sample.: Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Cours de philosophie, I (Psychologie Logique)*, Paris, 1933-27, 502/506 (*La proposition*).

Traditional logic talks about “quantity” and “quality” of judgments.

Quantity.

This applies to the concept dimensions (*CF 04*) of the subject:

a. singular/ private/ universal;

b. transcendental.

CF. 39.

Quality.

This time it is rather the saying.

“That wall is white” (affirmative sentence).

“That wall is white in a sense” (restrictive or reserve expressive sense).

“That wall is not white” (negative sentence).

Reread *CF 15* (identitive range). Note that the limiting phrase can also read “That wall is not white in a certain sense”. That very fact expresses the vernacular man with a stylistic device: “That wall is white and not white” (which does not violate the principle of contradiction, because it is a restrictive sentence).

Note.-- Two other formulations of the identity axiom are in circulation.

a. In terms of contradiction or contradiction: “Something cannot be (so) and not (so) at the same time and under the same point of view.”

b. In terms of excluded third: “Except for (so) being and not (so) being, there is no third (reality type).”

This is speaking in terms of a dilemma (two and only two possibilities are available).

Note that these two articulations are nothing new! They say, in other, explanatory words, precisely the same thing as the mere axiom of identity. For beyond absolute or all-encompassing being there is absolutely nothing (one then says with a figure of speech: “the absolute or utter nothingness”, -- which is absolute nothingness (one does not let oneself be fooled by the figure of speech)).

Note.-- The principle of identity is universally applicable.

“If that wall is white, in a sense white, not white, then that wall is white, in a sense white, not white.”

That repetition is the expression of the being (existence/essence) of that wall,-- the articulation of what it is (totally is, partially is, not is).

Always that identitive range. So much for the sentence summary.

And now the zinc foundation. (39/44)

The sense is a matter of evidentiality, readability. In ancient language ‘a.lètheia’ (lat.: veritas), ‘truth’ (understand: what shows itself as (so) being).

In the terms of Parmenides of Elea: “Being according to itself, as it is in itself, in itself”. Cfr *CF 30*--

Hence “What is true is true” . “What shows itself already (so) being, shows itself as (so) being”.

Immediately we have the transcendental “truth” or “apparentness” as a basic concept, side by side with the concept of “being” and “unity” (*CF 15: comprehensive concepts*).

CF. 40.

Conscience.

‘Conscience’ is all that is known as (so) being.

Which is not yet the same as all that is recognized as (so) being. Because between the pure knowing that something is or is so, and the beaming at it and acknowledging that it is (so), there is sometimes an abyss. The abyss of the conscious lie or the unconscious and subconscious repression.

Rereading *CF 30: para.frosunè and so.frosunè*, juxtaposing reality thinking and reality thinking. -- Or, in Hegelian terms, real thinking and unreal thinking.

The introspective method.

A number of psychologists rely on the introspective method.

Thus *Paul Diel, Psychologie curative et médecine*, Neuchatel, 1968.

This consists in observing, examining and dissecting oneself. Diel sees in it the only real method of knowledge of man, without which even the most rabid behaviorist can understand nothing of what goes on in people. After all, what would envy, for example, mean to the behaviorist if he/she had never, thanks to self-observation, experienced anything like envy? It would simply be a blind spot.

But - Diel adds - our self-knowledge is disturbed by untruths about ourselves. Especially our vanities disturb our self-perceptions. ‘Vanity’ means:

- a. ‘Emptiness’ (“That barrel is vain”),
- b. ‘Self-conceit’, i.e. bias concerning oneself such that one conceives of what is not there as being there and vice versa.

It is not gendered striving - as Freud presupposes - that primarily disturbs our (self) knowledge but our vanity. Thus Diel. And among other things, our vanities concerning sexuality, our own and that of others.

P. Ricoeur, Le conflit des interprétations, Paris, 1969, e.g. 171ss. 238, relies on the reflective method. In the wake of self-knowledge from Socrates of Athens (-469/-399), through *J. Nabert (Les philosophies de la réflexion)*, (Philosophies of reflection), to the present day, Ricoeur argues that philosophy is “reflection” (o.c., 322) and indeed reflection on oneself (Descartes, Kant, Fichte).

“I think” is an experience (of the mind) that is unmistakable and therefore “true” (evident). But this does not yet imply that a panacea, a cure, is at our disposal. Within that “I think” all sorts of things show themselves,-- true and false! The ‘I think’ is “a basic truth which, although unmistakably there, is nevertheless ‘abstract’ and ‘empty’” (o.c., 322)!

CF. 41

What does one do with this? In terms of self-knowledge and in terms of knowledge of the rest of all that is? But it remains what Diel says: thanks to self-knowledge we can discover whether we suffer from conscious or unconscious self-deception. Whether we understand the being according to itself (so.frosunè) or according to us.

“What (so) is, is (so)”.

One cannot think this without a minimum of respect for all that is “true” (evident and thus if necessary testable or findable). Reverence for the truth of what shows itself is a mental trait that shows itself through this phrase “What (so) is, is (so).” Undirected. But unmistakably as “that which is” (to use Husserl ‘s term). To respect is to recognize what (so) is.

“What (so) is, is (so)”.

One cannot mean this without a minimum of honesty. Honesty is reverence of one who, with the thorough engagement with conscience (responsibility; *CF 31*), surrenders to what is true, i.e., what shows itself to be already (so) and not otherwise.

In honesty, as the subject of (co-)responsible behavior, I say what follows: “If I am honest (with myself and also with what is given, as being there), then I must acknowledge “in conscience” that what (so) is, (so) is.”

In other words: the identity axiom is a matter of truth - what shows itself - concerning what is in itself (according to itself), and thus a matter of sense, but also and at the same time a matter of reverence for the truth as truth and of honesty with myself and towards the truth and thus a matter of sense or interpretation or interpretation, which is acknowledging. “According to me it is so according to what is in itself!”.

In ABC theoretical terms: what A is, is A! The given, even if disappointing, is the given. My B is such that I take A as A is. Thus my final reaction to the given A is ‘true’, but also honestly and reverently supported for all that is, i.e. for all that shows itself as being and thus turns out to be ‘true’. Cfr *CF 35 (ABC)*.

Conclusion.-- The principle of identity that is repeatedly found in ontologies, logics and logics and mathematics is the judgment, the expression of recognition, reverence and honesty,-- without which culture in the “true” sense is inconceivable.

CF. 42

Sample 13.-- The declining interpretation. (42/45)

Let us briefly consider a very current school of thought, deconstructionism.- **Bibl. sample:** *Theo de Boer et al, Modern French philosophers*, Kampen / Kapellen, 1993.

This booklet, one of many publications on dismantling thinking, includes eight contributions from eight contributors (active at the Free University of Amsterdam).-- It discusses:

M. Foucault (1926/1984), who, following in the footsteps of G. Bataille and M. Blanchot, attempts to dismantle power thinking, one of the influential factors within our Western culture;

J. Derrida (1930/2004), who, in the wake of M. Heidegger (“die destruktion”) and de Saussure (*CF* 22: structuralism) (what Derrida calls) seeks to “deconstruct” (“déconstruire”) “logocentrism” (practically: traditional Western ontology);

J.-Fr. Lyotard (1924/1998), who demolishes the claim of the comprehensive narratives (i.e. comprehensive interpretations of human history, such as e.g. the sacred history of the Bible or such as the progress belief of modern thinkers) and unmask them as thought constructs;

Julia Kristeva (1941/...) and **Luce Irigaray** (1939/ ...), who dismantle phallogocentrism, the claim of men’s thinking to the monopoly of absolute truth;

J. Baudrillard (1929/2007), who unmask the realm of signs within our Western society as a simulation culture;

E. Levinas (1905/1995), who debunks the all-encompassing egology (philosophy of self), which believes it captures all-encompassing being within an equally all-encompassing self or consciousness, from a Jewish standpoint;

P. Ricoeur (1913/2005), who, among other things, seeks to integrate the three critical thinkers, viz. K. Marx, Fr. Nietzsche, S. Freud, as unmaskers of modern self-conscious thought.

Guido Vanheeswyck, in a short review (strive), says that the term “deconstructionism” (which does fit e.g. a Jacques Derrida), does not clearly reflect the true content of the thinkers discussed in the work. He sticks to Woldring, who uses the term “hermeneutic philosophy” in his introduction.

The reason is: almost all discussants take as a given a text (of predecessors), with as requested a debunking interpretation! In ancient Greek: a ‘paraphrasis’ that is ‘eristic’.

CF. 43.

Note.-- One should not be too alarmed: Derrida, the leading figure (up to and including the anarchist interpretations given of him), himself says that, when M. Heidegger tries to “destruieren” the whole Western ontological tradition (“radikale Destruktion”), he is embarking on an impracticable task, for, in order to be able to do such a thing - says Derrida, - he would have to find a standpoint outside traditional ontology. Only then can one compare the two positions. Especially only then can the limits of traditional ontology become apparent. Such a thing seems unfeasible to Derrida.

Derrida himself said, in the course of a speech given in Los Angeles (1987) that Greece, Christianity and German idealism (Kant, -- Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) “ are foreign to him” for the reason of his Jewish origin. That explains a lot regarding Derrida’s deconstructionism.

Eristics. (43/44)

‘Erizo’ in ancient Greek means “I (contend)” (with or without hand).-- “Hè eristikè technè” means ‘eristics’ (disputing skill). Thus Platon, Sophistes 231st.-- The School of Megara was called “hoi eristikoi (filosofoi)”, the eristicians.

Bibl. st.: *E.W. Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics from Parmenides to Bolzano, Antwerp/ Nijmegen, 1944, 78/92 (Eristics and Skepticism).*

According to Beth, bringing up paradoxes is typical of the eristicians. This method consists in interpreting a text in such a way (hermeneutic method) that the contradictions (incongruities) are exposed. The so-called “reductio ad absurdum”. Thus, e.g., Eukleides of Megara (-450/-380; founder of the megaric school) did not attack the axiomata of texts but rather the inferences that flow from those axiomata.

That method already applied Zenon Van Elea (±-500/...; student of Parmenides). Aristotle summarizes his reasoning scheme as follows: “Neither thou nor I bring forth irrefutable proofs for what thou dost assert”. In other words, neither one nor the other possesses convincing, generally acceptable, “rational” grounds.

People have dismissed this eristic method as “Spielerei” or contention disease. But Beth says, o.c., 84: “The method of the counter-model (= the eristic refutation method) has been applied by modern mathematics and logistics with great success. Against the model that is being phased out, one posits a counter-model that one derives from the absurdity of the model.

CF. 44.

The infamous “proof from the preposterous” (if at least there is no more than model and counter-model present (“excluded third party”(CF 39)).

A socratic-platonic example.

Sophists claimed that only the “knowledgeable” (in modern language: the “rational”) man is the “good” (understand: livable, resilient, useful, virtuous) man.-- Lo and behold.

Now the winding down.

To which Socrates - Platon: “ If only the expert is the good man, and if the thief is an expert (in the larceny of goods, property of fellow men), then the thief is “a good man”“.

Something with which even the uprooted and nihilistic sophist would not so easily agree!

From the unacceptable conclusions of the model, one insinuates that the counter-model is acceptable. Rationally speaking. Reasonably speaking.

We do say, “rationally” or “reasoningly” speaking. For eristics is essentially counter-reasoning. It is essentially ‘para.frasis’, commentary. Textual commentary because it takes the opponent by his weak spot, namely his (personal or more general) axiomata and the unacceptable deductions therefrom. In this sense the “reductio ad absurdum”, the reduction to the absurd, is also an “argumentum ad hominem”, a proof played out against the person of the opponent who provided the text to be interpreted. Through his text one targets him.

Conclusion.-- We summarize.

1. Grasping the meaning.

When I think of the text, I think of the true meaning of the text.

2. Interpreting the meaning.

Following the text, I do think somewhat about the meaning of the text but rather about the unacceptable inferences that, in my opinion, via reasoning, counter-reasoning then, flow from the (meaning of the) text.

We shall see that, e.g., a Derrida still mixes many more than the logically rigorous derivable, unacceptable interpretations somewhere with the text,--in order to deconstruct the text under all possible points of view. Of which now a small example.

The notion of responsibility derridian “interpreted”. (44/45)

Bibl. sample: M. Lisse, *Le motif de la déconstruction et ses portées politiques*, (The motif of deconstruction and its political implications), in: Tijdschr.v.filosofie 52 (1990): 2 (June), 230/250.

CF. 45

Lisse, a.c., 247, cites.-- Micha Brumlik asks Derrida the question of responsibility regarding Nazism and concentration camps.

To which Derrida: "I am suspicious of the metaphysical concept of responsibility. Although incorporated into the language of human rights (into the presuppositions of every democracy,--into Western ethics and politics), yet that metaphysical notion has not been able to prevent, unhappily, Nazism and Auschwitz."

Note.-- In doing so, Derrida seeks to emphasize the impotence of concepts imprinted and incorporated into texts. Which, of course, any traditional thinker who worked on "metaphysical concepts" knew.

Yes, ordinary people know that e.g. basic concepts imprinted by education do not, at least for a part of the educated, produce the result that the educators expect from them. It is even certain that Derrida's deconstructive notions, in their turn, do not achieve the result that he, at least, wanted with them! As proof: he had to emphatically reject the anarchist interpretations of his philosophy! Platon, at the time, already complained that some of his students abused his dialectic "like dogs tearing each other apart"!

But Derrida continues,-- "On the contrary, very often the Nazi capital has itself employed the axiomatics with which Nazism was fought!"

Note.-- The National Socialists under A. Hitler also used the term "responsibility. But assuming Nazi axioms.

Derrida.-- "Not only did the governments let Hitler do it. Nor did the statements of intellectuals, the theoretical notions derived from this notion of responsibility, suffice to sufficiently stop Nazism. More than that, the opposite became true. A network of complicity was created at every turn. All this leaves us with a bad conscience to this day".

Derrida plays out the tragic fate of what he calls the "metaphysical" concept of "responsibility" against that concept itself.

In other words: he speaks as if a (metaphysical) concept also includes his senses! The irresponsibilities of people, who talk about 'responsibility', seem to be part of the concept itself! Which, of course, becomes so degradable.

C F. 46.

Sample 14.-- The reasoning. (46/47.1)

We saw it a moment ago (CF 44): “If only the expert is the good man, and if the thief is an expert (regarding larceny of neighbor’s goods), then the thief is “a good man.”

We have also noted in passing that traditional logic is ontology insofar as it is articulated in “if-then” sentences.

Let us now turn to that hypothetical sentence as such.

E. De Strycker, S.J., Concise history of ancient philosophy, Chapels, 1967-1, 103v. (*The Hypothetical Method*), mentions that Platon borrowed this method of reasoning from the mathematicians of his day. By ‘hypothesis’ he means “a proposition (judgment) assumed without proof (by the interlocutors within dialogical philosophizing), from which another proposition (judgment) can be derived.”

Deduction/reduction.

De Strycker notes two forms.

1.-- ‘Sunthesis’ (deduction).

“If A, then B”. Where A is a given proposition.

Thus “If only the expert is a good man, then o.m. the thief, insofar as expert, is a good man.”

2.-- ‘Analsis’ (reduction).

“If X, then A”. Where X is a sought-after proposition.

Thus: “If the moon slides in front of the sun, then there is solar eclipse”. As long as the first sentence or prepositional phrase is not proven, then the second sentence or post-sentence remains dependent on a proposition that has yet to be tested. Therefore, we have provided the prepositional phrase with X, unknown.

De Strycker

a. The ordinary method of the mathematicians of the time is deduction or ‘sunthesis’: they start from a set of ‘archai’, propositions, or ‘stoicheia’, elements, which they interpret as purely given (i.e. of which they do not seek proofs).

b. Platon, however, in dialectics (philosophy), wants to engage in foundational research and tries to find a proof for the axiomata postulated by mathematicians without any proof. That is ‘analsis’ or reduction.

One sees that the hypothetical sentences are really “stoicheiosis” (CF 03) but now in the form of “if-then” sentences.

One can see that the lemmatic-analytic method (CF 08) is a deductive form of reductive reasoning (one pretends that X is already A),--that the proofs from the absurd or *the apagogic method* (CF 44; “apagogia eis adunaton” says Aristotle An. priora 1: 7,4) is also a deductive form of reductive reasoning (from the absurdity of derivations from premises to other premises). All this is platonism. So it is even today.

CF.47.

Indeed: *I.M. Bochenski, O.P., Philosophical methods in modern science*, Utr./Antw., 1961, 93v., says: As J. Lukasiewicz (1878/1956; Polish logician) - incidentally following in the footsteps of St. Jevons (1835/1862) - showed, every proof is divisible into two major classes, namely, deduction and reduction." Expressed as follows:

Deduction: if A, then B; well, A; therefore B.

Reduction: if A, then B; well, B; therefore A.

Where induction (*CF 19*), which concludes from the copy to the class (set) or from the part to the whole (system), is one very frequent form of reduction. As Bochenski, o.c., 94, demonstrates.

"If all water boils at 100° C., then also this water and that water. Well, this water and that water boil at 100° C. (the result of testing experimentation). So all water boils at 100° C."

The axiom of necessary and sufficient reason or ground.

What does the peculiar preposition in Lukasiewicz's formulation "if A, then B" do? Or in our example "if A, then B" or "if X, then B"? That is the 'hypothesis'! of B, either the already known sufficient reason or ground (or at least the necessary reason, 'archai' or 'stoicheion') is stated or the necessary and/or sufficient reason yet to be found is expressed.

"All that is has either within itself or outside of itself a necessary and/or sufficient reason or ground 'archè' or 'stoicheion'))"

The logical form of stoicheiosis, orderly thinking, stands or falls with that axiom. Of which the proof has still not been convincingly (eristically irrefutable) but which is grasped by direct intuition.

According to *Ch. Lahr, Cours*, 531, to reason provisionally is to seek out unknown relations (*CF 15: identitive range*) between concepts, to uncover them. At least in traditional logic.

Again, what would we do practically and theoretically without reasoning skills? This is an invaluable cultural asset. -

CF. 47.1.

Reasoning as a phenomenon extension.

Resume *CF 13, ad 4 (The whole positive number)*.

Aristotle notes that a phenomenon (here: a domain) is represented by a finite number of axioms.

Applied to number sense.

Change axiom “If a is a number, then the successor of a ($a+$) is “in no case” 0 ”, to “If a is a number, then the successor of a ($a+$) is either 0 or not 0 ”. The phenomenon thus shown is and the integer positive and the integer negative.

The smaller the concept content the more comprehensive the concept scope: by dropping an axiom one can introduce e.g. $-1+ = 0$, i.e. the successor of -1 is 0 .

Phenomenology and definition.

This relationship is reciprocal. - Representing the given or phenomenon according to its essence is done in the form of e.g. axioms (as in the term ‘number’) or in the form of a text (longer or abbreviated definition: *CF 06v.*). Thus the text of a story shows the event to be defined.

The reverse is also true: it is precisely by defining, in a longer text e.g. or in a briefly held ‘definition’, that one sees the phenomenon, be it the whole positive or negative number or a building accurately described or whatever.

Conclusion.

1. What one sees, one represents in a phenomenon representation (axiomatic or not).
2. A phenomenon representation (axiomatic or not) does see the phenomenon, shows it as accurately as possible.

The reasoning is an “amplification” or knowledge extension of the phenomenon.

In this sense, reasoning is an extended phenomenology. Based on strict logical rules.

Appl. model.-- “If it’s before 7 p.m., then the boutique is open. Well, the boutique is not open. So it’s not before 7:00 p.m.

One recognizes the rule: “If A , then B . Well, $\neg B$ (not B). So $\neg A$ (not A)”.

(*J. Anderson/ H. Johnstone, Natural Deduction (The Logical Basis of Axiom Systems)*, Belmont (Calif.), 1962, 7).

From the closedness of the boutique one concludes, via “mode tolls” (the rule), to the hour that shows itself via that detour and thus becomes phenomenon .

Conclusion.-- Phenomenology shows the phenomenon. Reasoning demonstrates a phenomenon that is related to it (*CF 05*). From the showing to the demonstrated.

CF. 48.

Sample 15.-- Culture as a value system. (48/51)

CF 01 we defined “culture” as the way in which

- a. reality (‘being’/’being’) is captured and
- b. tasks, in the midst of reality, are mastered, solved.

Well, we saw that reality is grasped in sense and sense-making (CF 29vv: *interpretation, sense-making*) and reasoning (CF 46v.)

We saw - towards the object of interpretation and reasoning - that reality is interpreted (and reasoned about) as existential/essential coupling (CF 14: “*How real is something? How is it real?*”).

But there are further other interpretations of reality:

- a. as identity and its variants (CF 15: *differential*),
- b. as readiness or “truth” (CF 39).

Now all that remains is one great trait of reality to be grasped: ‘value’ (which makes a good, good).

Value(s). (48/50).

The term “value(s)” is originally a term of use in economic contexts. Use value of e.g. a basket of apples or exchange value of them is an obvious thing from time immemorial.

Philosophically, however, “value(s)” becomes something central from H. Lotze (1817/1881) onward. And in typical positivist climate.

1. The concept of ‘real(he)’ - in the eyes of a positivist(s) - is limited to all that is grasped with the senses,--preferably in the form of exact (mathematical-experimental) sciences. These look at all that is real, ‘value(n)free’! I.e. without wanting to make any value judgments. As purely sensory perceptible data.

It is evident that given such an axiomatic positive thinking becomes very quickly materialistic. Limited to what our earthly senses reveal. Reducing all that is not sensory, either to illusion or to some form of matter.

2. H. Lotze, in the wake of Christian Herm. Weisse (1801/1866; Hegelian but Christian devotee), experiences life as oriented toward values: these make up “the meaning of life.”

But “reality” in the positivist-materialist sense they are not. They are “a realm of values” in themselves. Her reality type he calls ‘moneys’. They apply -- have value, represent a good or goods -- without being positive and materially tangible.-- The ‘axiology’ (‘axia’ is in ancient Greek ‘value’; related to ‘axiom’, presupposed value) is immediately born.

CF. 49 .

1.-- The Neokantian axiology.

A first offshoot forms the Badener or Südwestdeutsche Schule.-- Wilh. Windelband (1848/1915), *Heinrich Rickert* (1863/1936) are figureheads.-- For Rickert, knowing is essentially value(n)grasping. His *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, (Cultural science and natural science), Tübingen, 1899, puts forward generally valid and normative values of culture. These are not grasped by means of positive natural sciences but by cultural science.

Human history, then, is essentially cultural history that involves the realization (by culturally minded people) of values within the material world.

In the wake of *Wilh. Dilthey* (*Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* ((Introduction to the Humanities), (1883) *Eduard Spranger* (1882/1963) develops an axiology -- a.o. concerning education. Education is essentially a cultural event in which 'culture' is a system of meanings and values,-- carried by a group of people as guiding principles for behavior.

Pedagogy has as its axiomatics a philosophy of culture.-- Following in the footsteps of *Franz Brentano* (1838/1917; *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Psychology from the empirical point of view), (1874)) who put intentionality at the center, *Alexius von Meinong* (1853 / 1920) developed his own axiology, to which his *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie*, (Psychological-ethical explorations of value theory,), Graz, 1894, testifies.

2.-- The phenomenological axiology.

Related to Brentano's "'love' characterized as reality" (i.e., sensing objective value(s)) and to Meinong's "emotional presentation" (i.e., offering oneself to feelings eliciting value(s)) is the "intentional sensing" of value (...) of *Max Scheler* (1874/1928; with *Ed. Husserl* founder of the Phenomenological school).

Scheler believes that values are grasped not so much by the intellectual side of our mind as by the sensing of our mind. 'Sensing' that is completely distinct from mere subjective feeling. For values 'apply' objectively. Scheler develops the ethical side. Morality and values go together.

Nicolai Hartmann (1882/1950) developed an axiology analogous to Scheler's but much more ontological.

According to *Jaensch*, both, Scheler and Hartmann, lapse into a dual system of value-free reality (in the wake of positivism), on the one hand, and, on the other, of valid values coming through primarily through the human mind.

CF. 50 .

3.-- The value-lativistic theories.

‘Relativism’ regarding value(s) is the view that value(s) apply only to a single person, a single group of people (e.g., a single ‘race’ or class),-- diachronically to a single epoch. Thus, universally valid values do not exist.

One example: Friedrich Nietzsche (1844/1900; the theorist of nihilism), who claimed that “die Herren der Erde” (practically: the cultural founders; cf. *CF 10*: elitist) impose the values invented on peoples and all humanity.

Note.-- Psychologists, sociologists, culturologists -- without solid ontological background -- fall very easily into such a value relativism: they forget that indeed limitedly valid values are findable but on the background of general peculiarities.

4.-- The “God-is-dead” axiology.

In the USA and elsewhere, a view is increasingly emerging that, now that religions are in crisis, now that “God is dead” (Fr. Nietzsche), humanity can replace religions and God with “values. In place of theology, then, comes axiology.

***The ontology on the good and values.* (50/51).**

Traditional ontology calls “the good” or “value” a transcendental property of all that is.

In other words, all that is something is amenable to value sensing, -- in the range from “positively valuing” over “appearing neutral” to “disapprovingly valuing.”

The dual value conception is thoroughly rejected: positive facts in themselves carry within them the objective reason for our value judgments.

In other words, they “apply” insofar as they represent value in themselves, “according to themselves” as Parmenides of Elea said) and not just according to us.

Bibl. sample: O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, 1959-5, 382/388 (*Die Transzendentalien*;-- esp. o.c. 371/388 (*Das Seiende und das Gute*), (The existing and the good).

It is Eukleides of Megara (-450/ -380; ll. of Socrates) who was the first to draw up the list of transcendentalities-his(the)/identity (unity)/ apparentness (truth)/ value (goodness)-.

Platon dealt with this more thoroughly. He enriched the one and the true of his predecessors with the being and the good.

CF. 51

Where the paleopythagoreans e.g. sought “the apparent (‘true’) connection (‘unity’)”, in their arithmology (theory of order), Platon dealt with reality with the main axiom “to ontos on”, the really real, and “to agathon”, the (really) good or valuable.

One can see from this that the all-encompassing or transcendental concepts are more than a kind of reality-filled concoction.

The range “value/unvalue”.

Between a highest value (accepted by many) (which is more often than not the divine or at least the sacred) and the absolute unvalue (which is absolutely nothing, since “the absolute unvalue” is a figure of speech) are situated values that are orderable according to some ranking, i.e. a “hierarchy of values. The different cultures show us a limitless variety of such rankings. We note precisely one such ranking for the reason of its cultural-historical effect or ‘reception’.

Platon, in his *Nomoi* (Laws), says, “Man applies gratitude to three possessions: the deities, his soul, his body.”

G.J. de Vries, *Plato’s image of man*, in: *Tijdschr. v. phil.* 15 (1953): 3, 430v., saying, “Hence the soul - as well as it ought to take care of itself (*Faidon* 115b) - ought to satisfy the desire that it should take care of all that is inanimate (*Faidros* 246b).”

Thus, e.g., a premature “liberation of the soul” from the body by suicide is impermissible in Platon’s view (a.c., 431).

One does not ascribe to Platon a radical dualism (soul/body) nor utter contempt for the body (which he never cherished). He does attribute rank.

His psychology recognizes three aspects of soul life:

a. the large sample that is focused on goods such as ‘diaita (implantation with home, food etc.), sleep (“the good sleep”), sexuality, economic labor;

b. the lesser lion attuned to honor (honorific);

c. the little person who is attuned to being (unity, truth, goodness).

Which proves that Platon doesn’t rate actual human beings very highly on the basis of a hierarchy of values. For - one notes correctly - the three soul parts are all valuation types. Which proves that Platon’s psychology was actually a psychology of values and at once a psychology of culture and education.

CF. 52.

Sample 16.-- Soloviev's value ranking. (52/54)

Vladimir Soloviev (1853/1900) belongs to the Russian Christian realists and passes as one of Russia's most thorough thinkers.

We dwell on one work, viz. T.D.M., trad., *Vl. Soloviev, La justification du bien (Essai de philosophie morale)*, (*La justification du bien (Essai de philosophie morale)*), Paris, 1939-2, 27/ 134 (*Le bien dans la nature humaine*), (The good in human nature).

O.c., 98.-- "A person who is in fact as he/she ought to be in conscience is a 'virtuous' person. In other words, virtue is the normal and in conscience imposed relation to everything. After all, one cannot think of qualities without relations".

Note -- With these words Soloviev defines what ethics is or morality. She is giving what is due to all,-- herself, the rest of all that is.

"But relation does not imply that there is no variety of relations"--when we distinguish ourselves from what is not ourselves, we must preface or define what is not ourselves in threefold ways.

Either we are dealing with something that is naturally lower than us or equal to us or higher than us."

Note -- Soloviev as a thinker-ontologist first pauses to consider what is given. That given he situates with respect to man. From this he concludes value judgments, which reflect what is given as value or 'good'.

"Logically it follows that our conscientious relationship to ourselves and others will also be threefold.

1. Thus it is evident that we should not value what is below our level of existence, as e.g. a streak inherent in our merely earthly nature, as if it were higher (let us say e.g. a divine precept).

2. Likewise, it would be contrary to what ought to be, if we were to situate a being of our level - let us say a human being - either below us (consider that human being as if he/she were an inanimate being) or above us (see in him/her a deity)."

Note -- Compare with *CF 51*: Platon's three levels: the Platonism of Eastern Christian realists is very evident.

All of this involves us knowing and feeling either superior or equal or inferior to everyone else.

CF. 53.

The five realms.

Typical of a Christian realist, Soloviev distinguishes the following levels of existence.

1. He calls the lowest degree “the inorganic realm,” of which he (o.c., 187) indicates the stone as a model.

2. Above that he situates “the plant kingdom” which both materially exists and lives (comes into being and perishes as a living being).

3. Higher up is “the animal kingdom” which exhibits life as well as a degree of consciousness regarding states (a dog wags friendly when it meets a familiar person but bites when it feels threatened).

4. What he labels “the human realm” rises above it in that man exists materially (inorganic), lives (vegetable), has animal consciousness (animal) but, above all, grasps the meaning of life in the light of conceptions, peculiar to his mind or rather his spirit.

5. Surprisingly for us Westerners who have learned to think secularized since the Enlightenment, Soloviev mentions as the most natural thing in the world “the Kingdom of God”: for as a Christian realist, he knows that the meaning of life is only fully and truly realizable thanks to the sacred or salvific history in which God in the Easter and Pentecost events -- which are central in all Eastern liturgies -- saves the meaning of life -- in the literal sense. -- Cfr o.c., 190ss..

Note -- At once we know more precisely what Soloviev means by “all that is lower than man” (stone/plant/animal) and what, in terms of human level of existence and culture, can be lower and higher (human and God’s kingdom).

Three basic feelings.

Soloviev distinguishes three value senses in human nature. We explain briefly. They seem to us to belong to the very basis of all culture.

a. *The sense of shame.*

This feeling arises, at least in normal circumstances, when one behaves below one’s human level. Even phallus services in paganism still bear witness to sexual shame in the sense that, including the realization that it may be inferior, they indulge in “excesses” that come across as shameful outside the ritual context. Thus Soloviev, o.c., 28/31.

In other words: as soon as someone behaves below his level (or below what he/she considers to be his/her level), shame will arise when caught.

CF. 54.

b.-- *The endearment (“compassion”)*.

As soon as man, in normal circumstances, encounters a fellow human being, an appreciation arises that is called compassion or, evangelically, “charity.

Main phenomenon (as a distinguished sample regarding compassion), according to Soloviev, is compassion, especially as pity.

“Generally speaking, the essence of pity consists in the fact that a given subject (= human being) senses in a compassionate way the suffering or distress of another,--i.e., that he/she feels sorrow to a greater or lesser degree and thus shows that he/she feels solidarity with the fellow human being.” (o. c., 35).

No serious thinker - he adds - denies the profound and innate essence of compassion, which, unlike shame, already exhibits itself - in a rudimentary way, that is - in many animals. Such a thing cannot therefore be the result of human education.

Note -- One thinks of the heartfelt endearment that emanates from mother animals when nursing, indeed, coddling young.-- “If the shameless (‘cynical’) man falls back to animal level, then the unmerciful man falls to below animal level.” (O.c., 35).

c. -- *The reverence (“piety”)*.

Toward that which is higher, man, in normal circumstances, feels not shame, -- not even fellow humanity, -- but reverence, awe.-- In this Soloviev sees the basis, in the nature of man himself, of all religion.

Already in animals, behavioral psychologists discern something like a rudimentary form of awe for certain animals. For humans (think trainers).

Thus Ch. Darwin, the evolutionist, says: “The religious feeling which we call ‘devotion’ is very complicated. It consists in a kind of love, in a total submission to a higher being (...). We see something in that nature resembling it in the deep attachment of the dog to its master (...)”.

Soloviev, o.c., 37, quotes Darwin.-- Darwin also mentions the monkey walking toward its guardian of preference. The submissive bondedness of dog and monkey differ much from their behavior toward their peers with whom they consider themselves the equals,

Conclusion.-- What kind of culture man would someone be who would know neither shame nor pity nor reverence and awe?

CF. 55

Capita selecta.

The method of exposition of this course is inductive, i.e. the text consists of ‘samples’ which aim at both generalization and especially ‘whole-isation’ (CF 19; 47).

However, the first section tried to put some logical consistency into the samples. That is now behind us.

Now “samples” also follow but in radically separate contexts. Why? Because the essential features of the phenomenon of “culture” were expressed in the first section. The following “capita selecta”, selected chapters, complete what was said in the first section and, above all, presuppose that first section.

Definition as induction.

Reread CF 47.1.-- Twice there was mention of knowledge or phenomenon expansion.

1. By changing the definition (e.g., changing the axioms concerning number) one changes (the view of) the phenomenon.

2. By reasoning especially, one generalizes (e.g., in induction involving specimens) or generalizes (e.g., in induction involving parts; e.g., in deduction or reduction-over-all) the phenomenon. Phenomenon first represented in a definition (long text; short held definition; axiomatic).

Go figure: people with a very defined axiomatics (i.e., presuppositions, e.g., in the form of biases) see only what that axiomatics shows. The other phenomena, accessible through (at least partially) other axioms, remain a dark spot.

Go and check the definitions that such prejudiced people draw up: they reflect their presuppositions or axioms! This implies that they are engaged in axiomatic induction, for through their/their preconceptions (legitimate or not) they make samples and thus see phenomena. Truly they see something. But what they see, -- what shows itself to them, is limited by their/its presuppositions.-- That is what we call “axiomatic induction”.

As long as these people realize that their view of reality is and remains limited, there is no problem: it is their hair method. The danger is that they do not realize this and fall into ideology that confuses one sample with all other, possible, complementary samples.

CF/CS 56.

Sample 17.-- The 'domain' ('scope') of the term 'culture'. (56/59)

Every concept consists of a conceptual content and a conceptual scope or domain. In other words, what does the concept of culture refer to (as a problem-solving concept)? We will now go into this in more detail.

Bibl. sample: J. Goudsblom, *Nihilism and Culture*, Amsterdam, 1960, 55/103 (*Culture*).

Introduction.

(1) Goudsblom starts from the Latin terms 'colère' and 'cultura'. 'Colère', literally: 'to cultivate', means to finish, to elaborate something that is unfinished (underdeveloped, unfinished). The given is the unfinished. What is asked for is to work it out. One sees the similarity with our previous pages where 'culture' means problem solving. A 'problem' always involves something that is unfinished. Problem solving always involves finishing.

As an aside, "develop" and "development" can also be used as a translation of "colère" and "cultura" if necessary. Thus, a "developed person" is a "cultured person".

(2) Goudsblom refers to *Cicero* (-105/-43; orator, politician, and writer), the great advocate of "humanitas," literally, "humanity" (i.e., developedness).

In his *Disputationes tusculanae* 215: 13, Cicero writes: "(model) Just as the best arable land, in so far as it remains uncultivated, will yield no harvest, (original) so also the mind which, in so far as deprived of philosophical training, remains something unfruitful."

In the Bible and among the ancient Greeks, "wisdom" means "development", the ability to cope with the problems of life. Consequently, 'philosophical training' in the broad sense of 'general development' means the ability to be 'real' (in the Hegelian sense: to cope with problems).

As early as *Herodotos of Halikarnassos* (-484/-425), called the "father of historiography" (better, with W. Jaeger: "investigator of lands and peoples"), in his *Historiai* (literally: "investigations"), one finds the term "philo.sophia" (wisdom desire) in that broad sense of "overall education" (still the ideal of Harvard University).-- A "sage" in ancient cultures was an "educated one."

CF /CS 57.

A series of definitions.

Drawing on Goudsblom in particular, we note a limited number of definitions that clarify for us the domain or scope of “culture.

A.I.-- The western ‘humanist’ tradition.

At the time, when announcing things from “the world of art and culture” in the radio, in the morning, people still used the term “culture” in the “humanistic,” rather narrower and elitist sense.

Johann Chr. Adelung, Versuch einer Geschichte der Cultur des menschlichen Geschlechts, (An Attempt at a History of the Culture of the Human Race), Leipzig, 1782.

Adelung defines negatively, i.e. by means of a counter-model: “The entire state, bound to the senses and therefore ‘animal’, i.e. the true state of affairs proper to “pure nature,” is “the absence of all culture.”

Axiom of Adelung is a difference, viz. “(Pure) nature/culture”. In other words: the fact that is worked on in all cultural work, is pure, un- and under-developed “nature”. Whereby ‘nature’ is used in a very narrow sense, i.e. “undeveloped and underdeveloped reality” (especially concerning the human being).

Adelung, in the spirit of the modern humanists and rationalists, calls this state, as far as being human is concerned, ‘animality’ (a term which e.g. Darwin still applies when he observes the firelanders (on the spires of South America). Even Hume, the top figure of the English Enlightenment, also calls negro-Africans “animalistic”! Meanwhile, ethnologists have corrected that misconception, of course.

The role of the ‘vanguard’.

The Russians, at the time, called the cultural spire “intelligentsia. -- It is an ancient experience: ‘models’ (= paragons, ‘examples’) attract!

Thus for Adelung “culture” is a characteristic of the whole people but still with a strong emphasis on that same whole people insofar as the privileged classes leave their mark on it. Which nevertheless amounts to a degree of elitism.

A.II.-- The planetary definition.

With an Adelung, Western man and his Western culture are the model.-- Others see it more broadly,-- ethnologically.

(1).-- *Gustav Klemm, Allgemeine Culturwissenschaft*, Leipzig, 1855-2; id., *Allgemeine Culturgeschichte der Menschheit*, Leipzig, 1843-1.--

CF/CS 58.

Klemm, following in the footsteps of E.F. Kolb, about whom more later, lists components to characterize the general domain of culture: family life, religion, science, art, all kinds of techniques, yes, even warfare. Klemm sees 'culture' as the result of interactions between:

- a. Nature (in the sense just described) and humanity and
- b. Mutualists.

Kolb and in his footsteps Klemm arrive at a concept of 'culture' that encompasses all areas of life. This is much broader than the humanist concept.

(2).-- E. Fr. Kolb,

E. Fr. Kolb, Culturgeschichte der Menschheit, Pforzheim, 1843-

1.-- The domain to which the term 'culture' refers, includes, apart from intellectual and moral formation (= a part of the Ancient Greek paideia (cfr W. Jaeger) or of the Ancient Roman humanitas); also the social institutions (think of the family e.g.) and material prosperity (think of economic labor e.g.) and even the body care (which has always been a part of the Ancient Greek paideia or formation).

Which gives us a solid, greatly expanded concept of "culture.

Note.-- Kolb and Klemm's 'interpretations' of the lemma 'culture' allow ethnology (ethnology) to use the (broadened) concept of 'culture' also when talking about 'traditional', pre-modern 'cultures'.

a. -- *Edw.B. Tylor* (1832/1917), the noted religious-ethnologist), in his *Primitive Culture* (1871), says that "culture" is "the intricate whole that includes skill (understanding), belief, art, legislation, custom, and any other abilities and attainments of man as a member of a society.

b. -- *A.L. Kroeber/ Clyde Kluckhohn*, *Culture (A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions)*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1952.

Culture, according to its authors, consists of conscious or unconscious tone images which become visible in behavior and which, by means of 'symbols' (signs such as certain words or forms of behavior (rites, for example)) are acquired and passed on as a characteristic of human groups.

In the background - according to proposers - values (*CF 48: Lotze*) arise. Which gives us an axiological definition or 'interpretation'.

One sees it: Kolb and Klemm opened the way to a general definition or interpretation.

CF/ CS 59.

B.1.-- axiological or value definition.

J. van Doorn/ C. Lammers, Modern sociology (A systematic introduction), Utr./ Antw., 1976-2, 105/140 (Cultural elements), says that culture involves values.

a. The antique term ‘axia’, Lat.: valor, value, meant something (being) that appears to be of such importance that it counts as a purpose, rule of conduct (norm), and expectation (investment) and is thus presupposed (‘axiom’).

b. Van Doorn/ Lammers say that values indeed function as ends (one wants to achieve them), norms (one judges behavior according to values) o. c., 112), as expectations (one wants an outcome from them; o.c., 115).

B.II.-- Singular/ private/ universal.

It is notable that previous definitions are rather or even exclusively sociological.

a. *Ralph Linton, The Study of Man*, New York, 1936;
-- *id., The Cultural Background of Personality*, London, 1947, defines “culture” as a general human phenomenon: what is formless becomes stylized.

In other words: culture is design.

b. This shaping (in the broadest sense), while situated in groups (sociological), is still incorporated into its members (psychological).

Thus Linton arrives at a range (= differential): culture is singular (individual), private (there is a multitude of (sub)cultures), universal (the general concept).

So much for a word regarding Linton’s theory of action.

C.-- Basic triadism.

Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture and Personality (Their Structure and Dynamics), New York, 1947, emphasizes it: the individual, as the subject acting in community and culture type, -- society, as the totality of individuals in communication and interaction, -- culture, as the system of values, -- they form a unity or system.

Talcott Parsons/ Ed.A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge (Mass.), 1951, sees “action” as interlocking personality/society/culture.-- Psychology/ sociology/culturology interlocking.

Mikhail Bakhtine (1895/1975) Russian thinker and literatologist, speaks of the voice that speaks (individual), the voice that is addressed (community) and the voice of culture as elements of any language use.

CF/CS 60

Sample 18.-- The concept of culture in Herodotos. (60/62)

Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-425) has left us a curious work,-- entitled 'Historiai' (Lat.: inquisitiones), explorations (investigations).

In it he gives an account of all that he - primarily as a businessman - saw or heard about on his travels around the Mediterranean and Black Seas either himself, as an eyewitness.

As a reporter - he is usually called "the father of historiography" (which does not correspond to reality) - he saw the countries and peoples (W. Jaeger) with the eyes of a businessman who, as a deeply religious man and thinker enlightened by the ionic-milesian natural philosophy, aimed at "wisdom" (Greek: "sophia", Lat.: sapientia), i.e. the widest possible information and the most thorough explanation.

As a historian he has incomparable value: his open eye to countries and peoples lies precipitated in his reports. Rarely has anyone - at least in that era - reproduced what he himself saw and heard told.

As an aside: clarifications can be found in *H. Verdin, Greek historiography (Different but similar?)*, in: *Our Alma Mater* 46 (1992): 2 (esp. 288/293).

Verdin discovers both myth and historiography in Herodotos.

This is nicely confirmed in *G.C.J. Daniëls, Religious-historical study on Herodotus*, Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1946: Herodotos' philosophy of religion is discussed there. One of the main themes reads: "As soon as there is a transgression ('hubris', Lat.: arrogantia) either in nature or in man(s), 'the deities' ('to theion', literally: everything that exhibits divine nature) intervene, in a steering manner, so that the deviation is corrected".

Herodotos applies this religious axiom, among others, to imperialist states: they move toward a pinnacle in a (often unconscious) transgression of borders and then, under the cybernetic influence of "the deity," perish.

Herodotos, the ionian.

Halikarnassos was in Karia, on what is now the Turkish coast. Ionia was the central coastal region of Asia Minor. One type of Greeks had settled there, the Ionians, after they had been driven out of the homeland by the Dorians (think of Sparta,--with its 'Spartan' customs).

CF/CS 61

Towns such as Miletos (vernacular: Miletus), where the Milesian thinkers, natural philosophers, lived, and Ephesus (vernacular; Ephesus), where Herakleitos was at home, testified to the Ionian culture refined since Homeric times (-900/-700).

The Ionian Greeks were, in part, businessmen and sailors who knew the inhabited world, the 'oikoumene', of those days, - from the Caucasus to Gibraltar, Well before Athens for example, Ionia brought it to solid prosperity and in the wake of that to high cultural flowering.

Comprehensive Method.

Since *Wilhelm Dilthey* (1833/1911; *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1883)) and *Eduard Spranger* (1882/1963: *Die Psychologie des Jugendalters* (The psychology of adolescence), (1924)) we have been accustomed to the 'verstehende' (understanding, comprehensory) method. However, already in Herodotos' work the result of the then current understanding method is clearly visible.

D.H. Teuffen, Herodot, (Sieben und andere Wunder der Welt), (Herodotus, (Seven and Other Wonders of the World) Wien/Munich, 1979, 46), writes: "Businessmen seek e.g. trade relations. Such a thing only thrives in a climate of mutual trust,--a kind of trust that can only come from accurate information about the business partner.

This especially in a world where totally isolated local cultures rooted in their own traditions lived side by side,--with relatively scarce connections.

As an aside, we call this "premodern multicultural" in one of its older forms. Tribes and villages or districts, in Herodotos' time, fragmented people. Which mostly made understanding difficult.

Herodotos, as a businessman, sought out people. His attention ("intentionality" (Franz Brentano)) paid attention to what was going on in those people. They, in turn, paid attention to what was going on in him. Thus rapport arose, - mutual understanding, -- mutual trust (in the fortunate case),

Isn't that precisely what constitutes the essence of Dilthey and Spranger's understanding method?

Multiculturalism.

This term consists of 'multi-' (Lat.: many) and 'culture'. It means the fact that people with sometimes very different preconceptions (dogmas, principles, mentalities, prejudices) live in the same society.

CF/CS 62.

They must therefore learn, willy-nilly, to understand that others are “different”!
They must learn to feel good in it!

The ionian Herodotos thought multicultural through and through! D.H. Teuffen, o.c., 19: “Herodotos writes with the will of neutral objectivity about the Greeks but also about the barbarians: he writes human history.”

Note.-- Note the ancient language: ‘barbarian’ meant “one who does not speak Greek”. Contempt was usually not so directly in there.

Teuffen, o.c., 46.-- “Herodotos testifies to impartiality regarding perception. With that type of perception he approached all phenomena peculiar to foreign cultures. Yes, with the same openness he even approached the cultures of Greece’s immediate enemies.

Note -- One takes into account that Herodotos was born in Karia, his fatherland, under the occupation of the Persians -- at a certain moment Hellas’ enemies par excellence -- and that, in his youth, he still experienced the Persian wars. Nevertheless, he showed understanding for all that was Persian.

Countries and peoples.

W. Jaeger in his *Paideia* types correctly! *J. Lacarrière, En cheminant avec Hérodote (Voyages aux extrémités de la terre)*, (Walking with Herodotus (Travels to the ends of the earth)), Paris, Seghers, 1981, lists the countries (and peoples) that Herodotos depicts:

Lydia, Persia, Babylonia (*Hist. 1*),
Egypt (*Hist. 2*),
Ethiopia, India, Arabia (*Hist. 3*),
Scythia, Libye (*Hist. 4*).

The first four “explorations” (investigations) are a comprehensive introduction to the battles story (five explorations).

Lacarrière: “The rare errors in Herodotos’s work made one forget too quickly that, at a time when everything was still to be explored, research and ordinary perception which was a correct representation of reality required the same creative qualities of man as those which we now - today - demonstrate in the exploration of the imaginary (‘l’imaginaire’).” (O.c., 258).

Lacarrière says: claiming that he was an “agent of Athenian imperialism” (as some leftists claim) is profoundly refuted by the factual data in his work. Thus o.c., 12/13.

CF/CS

Sample 19 : Herodotos' interpretation of fate" (63/65)

'Dramaturgy' is the theory concerning acting (stagecraft).-- The narrative or narrative nature of acting (stage: drama, comedy) opens it to destiny (destiny analysis).

Verdin reproaches, to some extent, Herodotos with a degree of remaining stuck in myth. The question, however, is whether Verdin does not thereby ignore Herodotos' intent.

For already in antiquity it was established that Herodotos was indeed a historian, and thus represented (the epidermis of) the facts, - as accurately as possible (which Thukudides later did much better), but "traced the presuppositions of all that takes place."

Well, the deeply religious though philosophically enlightened thinker that Herodotos was, believes that one of the presuppositions of the bare facts is located in myth.

Therefore, we dwell on *J. Lacarrière, En chemin avec Hérodote*, Paris, 1981, 36/39 (Une chasse fatale au sanglier (Histoire d'un homme marqué par le destin)).

The 'structure' (= generalization) of the tragedy is hereby exposed. For Adrastos, the '(stage) hero of the story, is a man who shows the signs of a fate, of destiny. In our vernacular: an unlucky man.

Note.-- For the ancient, tragedy was a "divine" model or paragon:

- a. the naked facts of (tragic) life, directly observable by everyone, are the foreground;
- b. what "the divine" (all that is deity) has "provided" (providence) is the background which, for those with sufficient mythic vision, shines through in and through the visible facts of (tragic) life. Herodotos testifies throughout his accounts that he still places faith in this dual structure.

Adrastos' History.

The algorithm (sequence) of facts is the following.

1. Kroisos (lat.: Croesus), the last king of Lydia (-560/-546), known for his borderline ("hubris") views on wealth and fortune, had two sons, including Atus (lat. Atys).

Kroisos once had a dream (mantic phenomenon): in his dream, he "sees" Atus, as a result of a spear thrust, dying. He therefore does everything possible to keep any weapon out of Atus' life.

2.1. Atus marries. During the celebration, a stranger shows up from the royal family of Phrygia.

CF/CS 64.

He asks to go through a cleansing rite ('katharsis'; Lat.: purificatio) according to the Lydian rituals. To which Kroisos responds.

2.2. Thereupon he questions the Phrygian: his name is Adrastos; he is the grandson of King Midas. "I have unwittingly killed my brother. I have nothing left. Here I seek an "asulon" (later: "asylum"), a refuge says Adrastos.

2.3. Kroisos: "Your ancestors were invariably my friends (*note*: understand 'friend/friends' in the antique-sacred sense). That is how I will treat you as well. Thou art at home here". Adrastos thus lives in the palace.

3. Shortly after, a giant wild boar is signaled. The hunt is organized. At some point Adrastos notices the animal he throws his spear but inadvertently kills Atus, Kroisos' son.

4. Adrastos realizes at that moment, more than ever before, what his name implies 'a.drastos', in ancient Greek, means "he who does not escape". The second, unintended act of fate drives him to the tomb of Atus, where he kills himself.

Explanation.

Since Homeric times, the ancient Greeks knew the concept of 'atè', fate. Some deity, metonymically also called 'atè' as the 'causer of 'atè', 'provided' (predestined) it so that it is inescapable. "Do what ye will: ye cannot escape it".

Another ancient Greek concept was 'daimon', spirit of fate. Eu.daimonia' meant the fact that, acting actively within oneself, one possessed a benevolent spirit of destiny; 'kako-daimonia' was the fact that one was driven, from the unconscious and subconscious layers of the soul, by a spirit of doom.

One sees the intertwining of the two concepts the atè is the externally - preordained fate in Adratos; his kakodaimon carries out what the atè has foreseen. So that he unwittingly causes his own failure.

Note.-- In biblical terms, this is a type of possession by one or more unclean spirits who act as destinies of this cosmos.-- It is this structure that Herodotos still religiously recorded.

Tragedy

The term "tragedy" includes "fatality.

Karl Jaspers (1883/1969; existential thinker) wrote a booklet about it: *Ueber das Tragische*, (On the Tragic), Munich, Piper, 1947.

CF/ CS 65.

The cultural value (problem-solving value of tragedy lies in the fact that it takes as given. a failing life (“ill-fated life”) and as requested takes on the “explanation,” the necessary and sufficient reasons or grounds. Every person who goes through a fate, good or bad, can ask himself the question, “What is behind that I succeed or fail?”

Jaspers points to the epics in all cultures that deal with that problem. Aischulos, Sophocles, Euripides are the three great tragedians who stage the problem, within the framework (axiomata) of ancient Greek religion. Shakespeare, Calderon, Racine,-- Lessing, Schiller and the tragedians of the XIXth century walk in that age-old track. Kierkegaard, Dostoievski, Nietzsche are “tragic thinkers”.

So what Herodotos offers in the story concerning Adrastos leads us into that great tradition.

Lacarrière says that Herodotos gives the story concerning Adrastos a diachronic structure that the Greek tragedy of the time exhibited.

1. A prophetic dream.
2. Adrastos unintentionally realizes the dream of doom during the hunt.
3. A messenger reports the calamity that has occurred.
4. Whereupon Kroisos erupts in tragic complaint.
5. The arrival of the hunters with Atus’ remains.
6. The hero’s funeral.

In other words: Herodotos doesn’t just tell stories loosely he structures his stories. Which some see too little of.

Lacarrière, o.c., 39, notes that some interpreters of Herodotos’ text on the subject claim that he was lying here.

Lacarrière considers such an assertion “a folly!” -- However, Herodotos did confuse a myth told to him with a historically ascertainable fact. ‘Atus’ was indeed a Phrygian god,--a vegetation god whose annual death (as annually with the seasons the plants die) was celebrated with ritual complaints.

Herodotos thus misunderstood what he “knew by hearsay.” He who proceeded otherwise with natural-philosophical akribe, accuracy, peculiar to the Milesians (Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximines), mixed a mythical story with a historical fact. -- Thus Lacarrière.

Note.-- Religious science has indeed established such myths and associated rites outside of Phrygia.

CF / CS 66.

Sample 20.-- Herodotos' natural philosophy method. (66/67)

The early Greek thinkers were labeled by the latter as 'fusikoi', Lat.: physicists, natural philosophers (also 'fusiologi'; Lat.: physiologi). Why? Because they called all that is (diachronically: all that was, is, will be), summarily 'fisis', Lat.: natura, nature.

'Nature' was then an all-encompassing (transcendental) concept that included both inorganic and living natures,--yes, that also included the entire invisible world (as e.g. the deities or what the Greeks called "the daimones"). Actually, that was a true theory of being or ontology captured in one encompassing concept.

It is precisely because of this that the natural wisdom - for that is what it really was - of a Thales, an Anaximandros, an Anaximenes was already really philosophy in the present sense, i.e. a study, a perception (phenomenology) as well as a comprehension (extended phenomenology) by reasoning, of all that is "reality" (being, being) in any sense.

A. Rivier, *Etudes de litterature Grecque*, (Studies in Greek Literature), Geneva, 1975, 344s., says that Herodotos contrasts his accounts (descriptions, stories, treatises) with the texts of the poets of his time, for he gives his sources:

- a. What he himself perceived ('opsis', 'gnomè');
- b. What he knows thanks to observers chosen by him ('historiè').--

Rivier, o.c., 346, adds that "it is evident that Herodotos and Thokudides of Athens (-465/-395; historian) are situated in the wake of the Ionian 'historiè' (*note*: here in the broader sense of 'method of exploration')."

Herodotos's accounts of his explorations - the title reads 'historai' (metonymic for reports concerning his explorations") - are therefore the representation of what he observed or heard - with the open eye of the Milesian thinkers.

Direct and indirect knowledge.

In his *Philosophical Methods in Modern Science*, Utr./Antw., 1961, I.M. Bochenski, O.P. (1902/ 1995: logician) talks about direct knowing (perceiving) and indirect knowing (reasoning). Cfr o.c., 25v..

Well, around -40, an unnamed Greek writer writes:

A. "Do you see, thinker, how Herodotos takes hold of your soul when he takes it through the lands, turning your hearing into seeing?"

CF/CS 67.

B. Still above the explorer (“historian”), however, stands the man Herodotos,--with his sympathy for the material he treats,--with his sympathy, driven by controlled passion, for everything that takes place and of which he traces the premises.

That very thing makes up the totally personal magic that Herodotos exudes.” (*D.H. Teuffen, Herodot, Wien/Munich, 1979, 20*).

Note - Note the dichotomy:

A. Herodotos “turns your hearing into (his) seeing (perceiving)” and

B. “he traces the presuppositions of all that takes place”.

In ancient - praise - words the direct and indirect knowledge of data is expressed.

That is typically Milesian! The Milesians saw the phenomena, “ta onta”(the being), i.e. the foreground, the directly visible and tangible side of the “fusus”, nature. But they did not dwell on it: they sought to make “ta onta”, the being of nature, intelligible (transparent) by tracing the “archè”, the premise (Anaximandros uses the term explicitly) or the “stoicheion”, Lat.: elementum, other term for “premise” (with the emphasis on “part” or “aspect”) of it (indirect knowledge). By ‘ta onta’, the boundless multiplicity of things that collectively make up nature, to ‘fathom’ (uncover the reasons or grounds for it).

As *Herodotos, Hist. 2: 33v.*, himself says: “opsis adèlon ta fainomena” (seeing what does not show itself, (takes place through) the visible things). Text to which *Fr. Krafft, Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft, I (Die Begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen)*, (History of Natural Science, I (The Foundation of a Science of Nature by the Greeks)), Freiburg, Rombach, 1971, 173, emphatically addresses in order to formulate the foraging axiom: “From the visible (the phenomenon) I conclude the invisible (the transphenomenal).”

Thales looked for the invisible in “the water” (as a smexy primordial substance), Anaximandros in “to apeiron” (the smexy, i.e. that which itself has no form but is present in all forms of nature, the being),

Anaximenes in ‘aër’ (air) or ‘psuchè’, breath (as smidgen realities).

Herodotos is less of an ontologist, more of a professional scientist but remains true to the foraging axiom: “through the phenomena to the reasons or grounds, -- to the ‘explanations’ of them.”

CF /CS 68

Sample 21.-- The concept of multiculturalism in Herodotos. (68/69)

Rereading *sample 20* for a moment, we find that the (tragic) poets also trace from a foreground (phenomenon), the life failure, the background (trans-phenomenal grounds). And so in this they do not differ from the Milesian natural philosophers. Only the type of reason or ground (foreground) differs.

In other words: the poets paved the way (especially from myth, which is invariably, if truly myth, axiomatic)!

What type of premise does the natural philosopher mention outside of the fluidic (= smug) primal substance (water, apeiron, air/breath)? Herodotos teaches us.

J. Lacarrière, En cheminant avec Hérodote, Paris, 1981, refutes the allegations (from leftists especially) that claim Herodotos was an ‘imperialist’, an ‘ethnocentrist’. ‘Ethnocentrism’ means privileging one ‘ethnie’ (people, culture) over all others. Which therefore means one-sidedness.-- Let us see.

Hist. 3:38 (Teuffen, Herodot, 46f.).

That text gives us an applicative model.

a. When Dareios, the “basileus” (high prince) of the Persians, reigned, he once had all the Greeks in his court called to him to ask them, “What must one give you that you may desire to eat your father, once he has died? Answer, “On no account do we commit such a crime.”.

b. Then he sent for the courtiers who came from the Indian tribe of Calatians (who eat the remains of their parents). When all the Greeks were gone, Dareios, through an interpreter, asked, “What must you be given so that you will be willing to burn your parents once they have died?” With a loud voice they cried out: “Don’t speak such godless words.

Herodotos’ concluding remark, “Such is the state of the conduct of nations.”

Note.-- One sees that, behind the foreground, the mentalities, expressed in statements, Herodotos means the background, the axiomata (presuppositions). Those “principles” are ethnocentric.

In the words of Ch. Peirce, they are idiosyncratic, straightforward (orthodox) or preferential and thus blind to other axiomata.

CF/CS 69.

The “absoluteness” (utter certainty) with which those involved reject what does not belong to their presuppositions shows blindness.

Herodotos’ openness.

Hist. 5:58.-- The Phoenicians (foinikians), between the Lebanon Mountains (Syria/ Lebanon) and the Mediterranean Sea, were a people who explored the entire Mediterranean as experienced sailors, Herodotos called “a barbarian people.”

Now there were, in Beotia (region around Thebes in Greece) migrants.

Herodotos: “They taught the Hellenes many arts and skills. For example, they taught the Hellenes many skills and abilities, such as writing, which - “it seems to me” (says Herodotos) - “did not know before”. In other words, a “barbarian people” (a non-Greek people) could be very valuable culturally, and could be a pioneer for the Greeks.

Herodotos’ multicultural.

It can be outlined as follows.

a. -- *It relies on logic, -- applied logic.*

He thinks of the presuppositions of nations in terms of axiomata -- the nameless admirer in -40 notes that Herodotos looks them up -- from which individuals and groups (nations, tribes) draw (deduce) conclusions. Their opinions, their customs, their value judgments are deductions from prepositions (which they do not question,--usually).

A culture, in his view, is thus a set, indeed a system of presuppositions, instilled by education, from which propositions are derived. Cfr *CF 12vv.* (An axiomatic definition).

b.-- *It relies on comparative method.*

Cfr *CF 15 (Identical culture).*-- The range or differential read fully identical/ partly identical (analogous)/ totally non-identical. Cfr also *CF 27;-- 39; 47v.*

When one proceeds in an orderly (harmological, ‘stoicheiosis’) manner, one can see the following variants.

The concordist unilaterally emphasizes all that is similarity and coherence.

The differenti(alist) puts a one-sided emphasis on what difference and gap is.

The identitarian reasoner sees both resemblance/ coherence and difference/ gap simultaneously. So that the notion of *analogy* (which implies resemblance, respectively coherence and difference, respectively gap at the same time) is central.

Herodotos, with his Ionic open mind, compares as objectively as possible. He therefore sees both similarity/cohesion (the Phoenicians are teachers of the Greeks) and difference/gap (they are ‘barbarians’).

CF / CS 70.

Sample 22.-- Herodotos' democratic method.

The multicultural idea in Herodotos also shows itself very clearly in his “democratic” method.

Note: ‘dèmonkratía’, in ancient Greek can mean “the confused control of the state by the rabble” (think of current populisms. Thus with Platon. -- “Democratic method” here means “iso.nomia” (“isos” = “equal”; “nomos” = “law”), equal rights of every citizen of the state under laws. Which amounts to dialogic method: the people talk it out among themselves.

Herodotos was an enthusiastic supporter of the democratic equal rights system, although not without reservations for the excesses of every democracy. The ‘polis’, city-state, Athens for example, tried to let everyone speak freely and boldly.

The sacred origin.

Bibl. sample : F. Flückiger, *Geschichte des Naturrechtes*, I (*Die Geschichte der europäischen Rechtsidee im Altertum und im Frühmittelalter*), (History of Natural Law, I (The History of the European Idea of Law in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages)), Zollikon - Zürich, 1954, 9ff..

Flückiger situates democracy in Homeric times. Homèros (Lat.: Homeros) lived, according to Herodotos, around -850. According to most current experts, what the Iliad and the Odusseia portray is at least as old as the IX century.

The consecrated rule of conduct.

Flückiger, o.c., 14.-- “The order of the day of the agora, the gathering of the soldiers for example, is also laid down in a sacred rule”.-- Whoever is authorized to speak receives the scepter, the symbol of Zeus, the chief god of the day. This places him under his protection and makes him inviolable.

Note: “taboo” -, “even when he opposes the army leader”. -- “The people’s resp. army meeting -- agora -- is a sacred space of life within a society still dominated by the archaic life of war. There, under Zeus’ protection, freedom of speech and freedom of conclusion reigns”.

Flückiger concludes, “Es ist die urform der späteren demokratie” (It is the original form of later democracy).

Applicable model.

Odusseia 2:37vv; 3:138. -- Diomedes, son of Tudeus, prince of Argos, takes the liberty, in the context of the army meeting, of taking a stand against Agamemnon, the general leader of the Greeks, at the siege of the city of Troy. “Atride, first of all against you, because of your lack of insight, I must act. For such a thing is themis, lord, in the assembly”.

CF/CS 71 (70.a)

Note.-- The ancient Greeks knew two periods concerning deities: **a.** the time before Zeus; **b.** the period under Zeus. ‘Themis’ predates Zeus’ time. It is the traditionally handed down law. Probably it stems - according to Flückiger - from the forms of deliberation within the house circle which constituted the essence of the themis period. Later the polis, the city-state, becomes the center of deliberation. Under Zeus.

Applicable model.

‘A.sulos’ means ‘inviolable’, taboo, sacred. Our term ‘asylum’ comes from it.-- Whoever takes refuge in a “hieron asulon”, an inviolable sanctuary, is, metonymically, by appellation, likewise inviolable. For he/she is under the high protection of the deity worshipped in the temple.

As an aside, this right of asylum (but deconsecrated, secularized) is still today one of the basic phenomena of so-called human rights (the rights of the individual human being).

Herodotos’s democratic discourse trumpet.

Teuffen describes Herodotos’s text formation as follows.

a.1. Homèros, whose texts consist largely of speeches (the basis of rhetoric), allows the various points of view on a theme to come into their own.

a.2. Herodotos, when he is writing down texts, gives the floor to everyone who has something to say about the theme being dealt with. He does not show the slightest preference or dislike.

As an aside, the later Roman writer Tacitus (55/119) called this “sine ira et studio,” without antipathy or sympathy.

b. Only after he has allowed all other opinions to speak does Herodotos present his own opinion. -- If he is not (entirely) sure about the facts, he shows this in the wording.

In other words: democratic writing is not ‘exclusive’ (‘exclusive’) but inclusive (‘inclusive’). Including (all) other opinions.

Platon’s dialogues reflect precisely the same structure: they begin with the opinions of others to end with one’s own.-- The Homeric agora is depicted in Milesian natural philosophy (Herodotos) and in Platonic “dialectics” (dialogical thinking),

This is still alive and well: people formulate problems around a theme. Science works in this way, among other things.

CF/CS 71.

Sample 23.-- Tone image/image. (71/75)

The ancient Greeks possessed a systechy (pair of opposites) “to archetupon (archetype, paragon)/ to apografon (copy, image, representation).”

This pairing is applicable to earthly paragons and their copies, of course. But there is a “mythical” (understand: sacred, consecrated) usage. Since this is so fundamental, we dwell on it for a moment.

M. Eliade, The myth of the eternal return (Archetypes and their repetition), Hilversum, 1964 (// Le mythe de l'éternel retour, Paris, 1949), 14/18 (Areas, temples and cities as imitations of heavenly archetypes), gives examples of sacred language.

E.g., “The oldest document on the archetype of a shrine is the inscription of Goedea (*note*: Goedea is the Sumerian prince of Lagash around -2,054), which refers to the temple at Lagash that he founded.

The king “sees” in a “dream” the goddess Nidaba who “shows” him a panel on which the beneficent stars are listed, and a god who “reveals” to him the design of the temple. (Cfr. *E. Burrows, Same Cosmological Patterns in Babylonian Religion*, in: *The Labyrinth* (Hooke, London, 1935, 45/70), 65v.).

Note.-- Note the religious science term “reveal” (Greek: apokaluptein, in the New Testament; e.g. *Matth. 11:25/27*), which is central to the term “apocalyptic. Note that ‘apocalyptic’ means not only ‘end-time revelation’ but also simply “revelation of secret, sacred realities” (as Jesus uses this in *Matt. 11:25/27* to indicate that his heavenly Father is “revealing” the kingdom of God (God’s workings) to “little ones”).

Similarly, “All Babylonian cities had their archetypes in constellations (*note*: which themselves were in turn the image or copy of ‘celestial’ constellations): Sippar in Cancer, Nineveh in the Great Bear, etc. (...). Sennacherib (Assyrian ruler from -705 to -681; he made King Ezekias of Jude indebted) had Nineveh built according to the plan (to archetupon) that had already been drawn up in very early times (*note*: one also says “in the beginning”) in the construction of the heavens. Not only does a model precede the earthly constructions but, moreover, this model is located in an “ideal” (= heavenly) sphere of “eternity” (Eliade, o.c., 15).

CF/CS 72.

Note -- The term ‘eternity’ means the origin of all that is time; so e.g. the origin of all (cultural) time periods. The term ‘origin’ means both what we now call ‘origin’ (cradle) and axiom (premise).

‘Eternity’ in the sense just described is brilliantly expressed in the Christian-liturgical ‘verse’ “as it was “in the beginning” (“in the beginning”) and now and always and in the ages of ages.” Past, present, and future,--i.e., in ontological language “all that was, is, and shall be,” are the (encompassing) “ages” (understand: epochs) that spring from “eternity.

Or still “Thus, the world that surrounds us (in which one experiences the presence and creative power of man),-- the mountains that man climbs, the lands populated and cultivated by man, the navigable streams, the cities, the shrines,-- all of this has an alien archetype. This is denoted either as a ground plan or as a ‘form’ or as a double. Without question, these exist only on a higher ‘cosmic’ (*note*: understand : non-terrestrial) plane.” (O.c.,16).

Two types of archetypes.

Eliade, in the work cited, is sometimes a bit sloppy in his use of language.-- “Cosmic” can mean both “heavenly” and “chaotic. He himself writes, “The desert regions inhabited by monsters (*note*: *Mark. 1:13* says that Jesus stayed in the desert “with the wild animals”), or the tracts of land not yet reclaimed, or the unknown seas on which no mariner has yet ventured, etc.” (o.c., 16) have a different archetype, -- a “chaotic” archetype that predates the shaping by heavenly entities (Eliade calls that “creation” but then that is in a non-Biblical sense)

Myth and rites.

Whoever ventures into the desert, reclaims a barren landscape, sails an uncharted sea, does not do so without transforming the chaotic models present there into ‘heavenly’ (ordered and thus harmless to man) models. He then invokes deities, heroes, ancestors, in order to have the new model ‘revealed’ (apocalypse), which is feasible for man and, by means of rites, to penetrate the chaotic reality (which comes across as something ‘unreal’).

CF/CS 73.

Not just the biotope: also the action.

So far it has been about cities, temples, landscapes.

Eliade, o.c., 12: “Let us now turn our attention to human acts (and, of course, those which are not merely automatic). They do not derive their meaning and value from their purely physical ‘reality’ but from the fact that they are the representation (to apografton) of an act “of primeval times” (*op.*: an act performed “in the beginning”), i.e. repeat a mythical primeval image (*op.*: archetypal paragon).

For example, feeding is not simply a physiological operation (...). Marriage and communal orgy (*note*: a sexual-magical rite) refer to mythical parables. They are realized anew because they were ‘sanctified’ (*in* the beginning) (‘in illo tempore’ (in that time; this is how the liturgical readings of Scripture begin); ‘ab origine’, since the origin) by deities, heroic figures, ancestors.

The “archaic” (primitive) man.

Eliade, o.c., 13: “Down to the smallest parts of his conscious behavior, the ‘primitive’, the ‘archaic’ man, knows no act that has not been ‘previously’ (*op.*: in eternity) posed and lived through by a ‘different’ (*op.*: higher) being: by a ‘different’ being who was not a (*op.*: merely earthly, secular) man. What he/she does has already been done. After all, life is an uninterrupted ‘repetition’ (‘to apografton’) of actions initiated by ‘others’”.

Note -- “These deliberate repetitions of precisely defined tonal actions suggest the presence of a highly original ontology.” (O.c., 13).

‘Ontology’ means ‘theory of reality’. Indeed: ‘reality’ - for the sacred or mythic minded - without the light of a revealed myth, and without the life force of a rite that brings about that myth, is ‘unreal’ rather than ‘real’. This means that whoever proceeds without that light and without that life energy becomes ‘unreal’ (not solving the problem). Becomes ‘void’ (‘chaotic’).

An entire philosophy of culture becomes abundantly clear with this.

CF/CS 74.

The Biblical Position.

To begin with, the Bible has its own radical concept of creation: “In the beginning” God created heaven and earth (*Genesis 1:1*). He creates out of nothing (*note*: out of nothing outside of himself, i.e. out of his own power of thought and life). While the ordering creation of above presupposes a disorderly reality, God’s act of creation presupposes nothing.

Two types of reality.

A moment ago it sounded: chaotic and “heavenly” (in ancient Greek terms: titanic and olympic). Now it sounds, “Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat; for in the day when you, man, shall eat thereof, you shall be subject to death.” (*Gen. 2:17*).

Indeed: unreal becomes man because he commits the sin that ends in death.

Which *Psalms 1:1/3* confirms, “Happy the man who does not follow the counsel of the godfearing (‘evil’) (...) but finds taste in the law of Yahweh (*note*: of which the ten commandments text (*Exod. 20:1/17* and *Deuteron. 5: 6/21*) offers a popular summary) and meditates on his law day and night. (...). All that he performs succeeds. None of that applies to the godly (‘wicked’),-- none of it”.

One sees it: if one keeps the code of conduct, the Decalogue or Ten Commandments law, which comes from Yahweh and applies “in the beginning and now and always and in the ages of ages”, only then does everything one does succeed. Man’s actions, insofar as “to apograpon”, the copy, of God’s law, only is “fruitful” and solves the problems,-- is thus “real

The counter model articulates *Psalms 4:3*: “that merging into nothingness,--that race to illusion.”

All that comes from “eternity” is real in the really real and not in the sham sense.

Thus, first of all, the crown of creation, man: “God created man in his image. In his image he created them. He created them, male and female.” (*Gen. 1: 27*).

The apocalyptic models of the above are also found in the Bible. E.g., *Exod. 25:40*, where the golden lampstand is prescribed by Yahweh: “Watch and perform according to the model (“to archetupon”) that was shown you on the mountain.”

See also *Exod. 26:30; 27: 8*. See also *Num. 8:4*. Cfr Eliade, o.c., 14v..

CF/ CS 75.

The pre-existing savior.

The Savior, before he acts redemptively on earth, already exists “with the deity.”

Thus in parsimony (the parsis are the descendants in India of the Persians who put forward Ahura Mazda, championed by Zarathoestra (Zoroaster), as the supreme deity): the Saoshent exists in advance while his “parousia” (= full saving appearance) is expected at the end of time.

Similar to this is *Daniel 7:13/14*: “I watched during the night visions (‘revelations’). Behold: ‘on the clouds of heaven’ (*note*: from eternity) comes one who looks like a son of man (*note*: one who possesses human nature).” Jesus applied that text - albeit in a self-serving way - to himself.

Eliade regarding the ideal future in the Bible.

O.c., 15v.. -- “A heavenly Jerusalem was created by God before the city of Jerusalem was built by the hand of man” Cfr. *Tobias 13:16*; *Isaias 60:1vv.*; *Ezekiel 40*. “To show Ezekiel the city of Jerusalem” (Rev.), God carries Ezekiel in transported condition up a very high mountain (*40:2*). (O.c., 15).

Similar to this is the “apocalypse” of Jesus concerning His own glorified state *Matt. 17:1*: “Six days after this Jesus took Peter, James and John and brought them, in solitude, to a high mountain. He changed shape before their eyes: his face shone like the sun, and his clothes became shining white.” Jesus’ full saving activity will also only become evident in the end times.

Eliade returns to this in his *The Sacred and the Profane (A Study of the Religious Essence)*, Hilversum, 1962 (// *Das Heilige und das Profane*, Rowohlt). O.m. o.c., 51/54 (*The myth as exemplary model*).

As *an aside*, K. Hübner, *Die Wahrheit des Mythos*, (The truth of the myth), Munich, 1985, points out that the present sciences, starting from their own axiomata, are neither as rational activities nor as truth contents superior to the myths, which, starting from other axiomata, engage with reality in a radically different way.

Gabriel de Tarde (1843/1904) and, in a more Freudian way, René Girard (1923), maintain that man imitates tone images (mimetism). Indeed: primitive man and at all sacred man imitates sacred tone images where secularized man merely imitates people.

CF/CS 76.

Sample 24.-- The structure of the Narkissos myth.- (76/78)

Do we now dwell on a single myth.

However, beforehand we need to expose the structure that finds an applicative model in that myth.

R. Godel, *Une Grèce secrète*, (A secret Greece), Paris, 1960, 236/239 (*Le destin*), is extremely apt for this purpose.

Stewardship.

CF/CS 60 (*imperialism*), 63 (*Adrastos*) already gave us two applications.-- Godel explains.

1.-- ‘Moira’, destiny share, is a basic concept. It corresponds to what is ‘rei.ki’ (a Japanese alternative medicine): ‘rei’ is the share; ‘ki’ is the omnipresent energy. “When an ancient Greek thinks of the share of ‘life’ that was allotted to him in the immeasurable context of universal life, that ‘portion’ appears to him as a part that was cut out for him (...).”

It is clear: the individual or the group has “a share” in the immeasurable energies of life in the universe. This dichotomy “share/whole” must be kept in mind if we want to understand not only ancient Greek but also any pagan philosophy of fate.

As an aside, it is thoroughgoing animism that is the axiom here.

2.-- ‘Anankè’, the mysterious destiny.-- By whom, by what does each part of the universe receive “its share”, moira? By the mysterious, to our rational mind -- our ‘nous’ (Lat.: intellectus) -- opaque anankè. “On it rests the mysterious order of the cosmos” (Gadel, o.c., 236).

As an aside, reread CF/CS 72 (*eternity*). It will become clear that “eternity” and “anankè” (the totality of all possible destinies) coincide.

The ‘gnomè’, right thinking, sign of ‘sofrosunè’, real contact with reality, adheres to the share.

But there is deviation possible: that is ‘par.ek.basis’, literally: taking a step outside the prescribed line,-- ‘aidos’, shameful behavior,-- ‘hubris’, boundary crossing,-- ‘parafrosunè’, unreal reality thinking (thinking beside reality, cherishing delusional images).

To this anankè responds by rectification (corrective): ‘rhuthmosis’, feedback, follows, as well as ‘ep.an.orthosis’, retrospective rectification,-- at the hands of ‘nemesis’, revenge (restoration of disorder),--

CF/CS 77.

set in motion usually by ‘phthonos’, the vexation, of deities, heroes, ancestors,-- carried out by an ‘alastor’, one who never forgets and leaves nothing unpunished (a tormentor),-- by the ‘erinues’ the goddesses of vengeance (‘vengeance’ means ‘correction’) or also the ‘moirai’, the goddesses of fate,-- by one or more ‘kakodaimones’, inwardly active ‘spirits’, -- and this in the form of an ‘atè’, a punishing fate.

Unless one undergoes a timely “catharsis,” a ritual cleansing of the error or deviation committed, performed by someone thoroughly versed in destiny.

Godel gives examples of deviations: wronging a defenseless person; defiling someone who begs your protection: so e.g. an orphan, an old person, a woman, a supplicant(s), a stranger, a beggar; defiling his parents either in actions or in words.

One can see it: a whole code of conduct sticks out in those examples.

‘Koros’, self-importance, self-aggrandizement.

Psychologically - according to Godel - it is striking that self-aggrandizement is the element that causes the measure to overflow and provokes correction. Tragically, this self-aggrandizement usually remains unconscious and thus the cross-border blind man himself prepares his own fate.

As an aside, this can happen to even deities who cross borders, deviate.

Narkissos (Narcissus).

Bibl. sample : P. Grimal, *Dictionnaire de la mythologie grecque et romaine*, PUF, 1988-9, 308s.

There are multiple versions, circumlocutions (paraphrases) of each myth. Grimal gives two of them. The first is that of *Ovid* (-43/+17; Latin poet), in his *Metamorphoses*.

Narkissos is the son of the river god of the Kefisos (a stream) and the nymph Leiriope. At his birth, both parents consult the blind seer Teiresias who replies, “If the child did not see, he would live a happy life.” Narkissos grows into a beautiful young man who, however, rejects any eroticism. He provokes feelings of love in a large number of young girls and nymphs without ever acting on them.

Among other things, the nymph Echo, Resonance, falls deadly in love with him but, like all other women, runs afoul of Narkissos’ rejection.

CF/CS 78.

In pure desperation Echo retreats, teeters away (her life force weakening) until only the echo of her plaintive voice remains .

The rejected women then turn to the goddess Nemesis, the cool, cold-hearted destiny restorer. This one designs the next “ate,” deity judgment.

One stifflingly hot day, Narkissos returns from hunting and bends over the water of a spring to quench his intense thirst. Suddenly he sees his reflection on the surface of the water. He falls instantly in love with his own reflection. He becomes so absorbed in it that - having become indifferent to the rest of the world - he stares at his own image over and over again. Gradually his life force ebbs away and he dies.

Even still on the banks of the Stux, Lat.: Styx, the river in the underworld, he seeks the mirror image! Such is the ate in him has grown to madness, parafrasunè.

On the spot where he died, a flower, the daffodil, arose.

Note.-- The crossing of borders must be understood within the axiomata of Greek pagan mythology: eros, the minstrelsy, is one of the main elements! So much so that those who do not respond to it are written off as ‘deviant(s)’. It is part of the moira! The second border crossing lies in the transgressive masculine beauty - sex appeal - of Narkissos and the koros, the self-esteem, which springs from it. Thereby he crosses his moira, destiny share.

The beotic (boiotic) version.

Narkissos is a native of the town of Tespiai, not far from Mount Helikon. Young, very beautiful, yet with disdain for eros.-- With him falls in love Ameinias. Narkissos rejects. When Ameinias knew of no renunciation, Narkissos sent him a sword as a gift. Ameinias gets the message and commits suicide with the gift in front of Narkissos. Dying, Ameinias invoked the curses of the deities. One day Narkissos sees his image in the water and falls deadly in love with himself. Driven to despair by his own passion, he in turn commits suicide. On the spot where his blood dried up in the grass, a flower arose, the narcissus.

Note -- One sees the same structure: what he did to others by crossing borders becomes his fate thanks to the deities.

CF/ CS

Sample 25.-- The essence of Christianity. (79/80)

“From the sixth hour the whole earth came into darkness,--until the ninth hour (*note*: from twelve to fifteen hours). Around the ninth hour, Jesus uttered a loud cry: “Eli, Eli, lama sabachtani? My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” (*Matt. 27: 45/46*).

These words are a paraphrase, their own interpretation, of *Psalms 22(21):1/2*. “My God, why hast thou left me to my fate? Far from saving me! These words I cry out,--My God, by day I cry to thee, and thou dost not answer”.

The same words become clearer when *Ps. 71(70): 9/1 2 is* added: “Do not reject me in my old days, when my life force gives way. Do not then forsake me. For my adversaries have it over me; those who target my soul(s) power conspire, “God has forsaken him. Persecutes him. Seize him: he has no one to defend him”. God, stay with me. My God, speed to my aid”.

The psalm is animistic:

The life force, the soul, resp. soul force is at the center. And in its failure, in its state of exhaustion.

Now we reread the Narkissos myth: that is also where the life force went out of Echo and that is also where, in retaliation, the life force went out of Narkissos. For ‘soul’ is invariably the seat of life-force: when the opponents of the old man “target his soul”, they wish him ‘dead’, exhausted and ready to die.

Dying, Biblically speaking: consequence of sin, is the fate of everyone. Jesus, in his mercy, wanted to suffer that fate. That is why he appeals to well-defined psalms (which, by the way, he prayed regularly) that express the exhaustion of the life force, the cause of death.

One will raise, rationally-secularly: “What does God come to do in this?” The answer is simple: the source of life-force, of “soul,” lies in the deity (pagan or biblical). So that God-contact is at the same time contact with the source of life-force! To feel exhausted is thus to feel ‘cut off’ from God. The theocentrism present therein has that origin or explanation.

It is against this background that we wish, with *Otto Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus, II (Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der Realismus der Scolastiker)*, (The Idealism of the Church Fathers and the Realism of the Scolastics), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 9, to describe Christianity in its essence (in that by which it differs from the rest).

CF/CS 80.

Willmann typifies Christianity through three moments, namely, the history of salvation before Jesus' action, his action itself, and its continuation after him) which are situated in one higher moment, namely, "eternity" (CF/CS 72; 76).

In doing so, Willmann relies on a New Testament text (2 *Tim. 1:9/10*).-- In it, the writer says what follows.

1. The "counsel" (that which determines our fate) of God, Yahweh/ Trinity, is the origin of everything,--among other things, of the fact that God "calls" us to His salvation.

In other words : God calls us to a happy destiny from His eternity.

2. That counsel is valid, present from all eternity to all eternity (from the beginning and now and always). But through the mouth of prophets, Jesus, apostles it breaks into the consciousness of earthly people. And that in three moments, past, present (Jesus' time), future.

Behold in plain words what 2 *Tim. 1 :9/10* says.

Willmann could have added another scripture that is even broader: "Thanks to faith we see that the worlds (the 'aiones', the ages in the limited sense of time periods) came into being thanks to a word from God. Thus out of the non-visible the visible came into being".

The invisible here stands for "eternity. *La Bible de Jérusalem*, Paris, 1978, 1738, footnote, says in this regard, "The belief in the creation by God of the worlds is a beautiful case of insight into 'the invisible' before they were created, the realities existed in God from whom all things emanate."

Note.-- Christian Platonism.

Albinos of Smurna (+/- 100/ +/-175), a late Platonist, is the first to identify the essence forms (what makes them what they are) of things of these visible worlds with God's thoughts on the subject.

If we see a tree, we know that in God's mind that tree already exists "from all eternity." So with everything.

Platon set us on that path but only Albinos elaborates that thought. So that thinking Christians could - in Albinos' wake - harbor a Christian paraphrasis, their own interpretation.

CF/CS 79. (bis)

Sample 25 (bis).-- Language and culture. (79a/ 80a)

(Greek) antiquity remains a constant source of inspiration regarding our current (cultural) problems. What follows proves this beyond doubt.

We live, especially since the current media (TV, radio, magazines etc. m.), in a culturality or 'multiculture' in which the same term can have more than one meaning. What is called: 'ambiguity'. And this includes confusion.

Please reread *CF/CS 61 (Multiculture)*, 68vv. (*The concept of multiculture in Herodotos*), 70v. (*Democratic method*).

Only in a democracy does multiculture get some place in which it can live and breathe. Non-democratic systems, such as today's Nazis, fascisms, fundamentalisms and integrisms, Soviet systems, stifle multiplicity by a dictatorial "concordism," in which all differences are smoothed over.

Nominalism.

Nomen', Latin, means 'name' as a word sound. Nominalism' is that premise which tries to maintain that the meaning of the 'nomina', word sounds (plural), is decisive for our understanding of reality. Reality gives us names, not insights into reality.

The empty shells there names we fill in - according to private or singular "whim" (understand: autonomy). Nothing more.

Euripides of Salamis (-480/-406).

The third most famous tragedian, after Aischulos (Aeschylus) and Sophocles (Sophocles), contemporary of Herodotos, puts it as follows.

In *Foinik.* 49gvv.: "If 'good' and 'wise' were the same everywhere, there would be no more dispute among men.

In fact, only the word sounds, used by the people, are the same everywhere. What is meant by them, however, differs from region to region".

Note.-- Reread *CF/CS 68*, where Dareios confronts Greeks and Kalatians with each other's customs (Greeks with Kalatian usage and Kalatians with Greek usage) the one exclaims "crime"; the other "wicked words.

In other words, 'good'/'evil' e.g. are identical according to word sound, non-identical according to content ('filling').

Those who adhere to this and do not investigate further observationally (theoria) are called, since the Middle Ages especially, "nominalists.

CF/CS 80 bis

Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410).

Protagoras (Lat.: Protagoras) is the head of the First Sophistic (Protosfistics), which played a leading role in ancient Greek thought from -450 to -350. The main problem that the “first sophists” embarked upon was:

a. The fact that only the names were identical, while the (sometimes greatest) disagreement prevailed regarding the reality indicated by those names;

b. The resulting problem of “in the name of what” (i.e., in the name of what axiom) can we now justify our actions? The “justification question” or “foundation or foundations question” is central.

“We have names but not consensus, unanimity, agreement on the meaning of names.

Humanism’.-- Still today, at the end of the XXth century, Protagoras is honored as a ‘humanist’ by the Humanist Alliance.--

‘Humanism’ is thereby defined as follows.

A.-- By itself, i.e. “according to itself”,

as Parmenides of Elea said, no “being(s),” i.e. reality, is “good” or “bad,” “wise” or “foolish,” “the best” or “the worst” etc. “In itself” means “independent of individual or group judgments”. Reality is simply a pure ‘lemma’ that one interprets according to one’s own, humane (hence ‘humanism’), interpretations. Man is central but as an autonomous, radically independent, interpreter/interpreter.

B.-- Since being,

i.e. what makes something distinguishable from the whole rest, is ‘neutral’, i.e. purely meaningless stimulus to interpreter there is no basis tied to being -- opinions, individual and especially public, are the first, obvious rule of conduct.

Appl. model.-- “The best” -- The best, for Protagoras, is therefore what the consensus of all (absolute consensus,-- never existing) or rather of the majority decides on the matter.

Assertiveness (“pushing through”).

In order to arrive at a concrete measure, for example, pushing through is necessary! This pushing through in a democracy is done by efficient rhetoric, which teaches the skill to push through an opinion (‘thesis’). In order to enforce understanding. For example, in the agora, the public assembly. Or in court.

Or in business.-- Money, sign of power, then, played a power-filled role. Those who have money, give, can “assert” their opinions.

CF/CS 81.

Sample 26.-- The foundations crisis. (81/85)

To understand what follows properly, it is good to read *CF/CS 71vv. (Tone Image/Picture)*. why? Because it is precisely the ‘tone images’, which ‘show’ the deities, that get into the culture crisis. We explain. Since the “first sophists” live the cultural critique very deeply, we take them as a model.

Bibl. sample:

-- G. Romeyer-Dherbey, *Les sophistes*, PUF, 1985.

In that good little work Protagoras, Gorgias, -- the two leading figures,-- further: Lukofron, Prodikos, Thrasummachos, Hippias, Antiphon, Kritias, are discussed.

-- J.-P. Dumont, *Les sophistes (Fragments et témoignages)*, (The sophists (Fragments and testimonies)), PUF, 1969. This excellent little work discusses, o.c., 9/19, the axioms of Protestantism.

1.-- Main axiom.

Human knowledge is limited to sensory perception which goes no further. *Theoria*, Lat.: *speculatio*, ‘contemplation’, i.e. perceptive penetration into what happens to extend beyond the senses (‘the transcendental’, including the sacred), is thus inaccessible.

Dumont: from this flows a materialism that limits the world of life to the earthly, the “secular” or “secular” or the “profane.”-- This earth and its possibilities constitute the biotope of the sophist.

2.-- The derivations (deductions).

We will dwell on the secular, desacralized conception of law, as F. Flückiger, *Geschichte des Naturrechtes*, I (*Die Geschichte der europäischen Rechtsidee im Altertum und im Frühmittelalter*), (The History of the European Idea of Law in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages), Zollikon - Zürich, 1954, 98/124 (*Die Wandlung vom mythischen zum begrifflichen Denken*), (The transformation from mythical to conceptual thinking), sets them out.

From myth to rationality.

a. There was first the archaic culture of the Greeks the animistic-sacred story, the myth (*CF/CS 72 (Myth and rites; 75 (Hübner);-- 63vv. (Adrastosmythe); 76vv. (Narkissosmythe)*), governed as a basic axiom the doing of things. From this the mythic man deduces.

b. Then there is the comprehensible thinking, which aims at ‘rationality’, understand: earthly use of the ‘ratio’, reason.

From basic concepts - axioms, “principles”, presuppositions - the demythologized man deduces his actions. These principles he/she finds in the opinions of people,-- his own or those of the groups - cultures - in which he/she lives.

CF / CS 82.

The principles of the “first sophists” exclude, practically, all that is incorporeal (“immaterial”), viz:

- a. the general concepts (abstraction is non-existent) and
- b. the sacred realities (such as e.g. deities).

After all, these two escape earthly perception. The names (nominalism) for those two “realities” do not correspond to any sensory, day-to-day perception. They are, for the time being at least, “empty names.” Concepts without sensory testability.

A.-- *The archaic-sacred (mythical) legal forms.*

These rely on “apokalupsis” (revelation) and on “aretai” (miracles). The seers and magicians are their representatives. The mythologists are their spokespersons.

A.I.-- *The theme law.*

Its mythical (theological) basis was -- according to Flückiger -- titanic (“wild”) goddesses such as Gaia, the Earth Goddess or Earth, and Themis, the goddess of law.-- Distinguishable in essence, the two are not.

S. Paul calls such beings or numina “elements of the(ze) cosmos,” i.e., the factors that govern the(ze) world and thus make it intelligible.

They are goddesses of fate, for they determine the fate of people and of things. That fate is outlined in the myths in its general outlines, revealed in the revelations of the seers and influenced in magic.

They are - to speak with N. Söderblom - ‘Urheberinnen’, causresses. The causal domain par excellence of these goddesses were the family (family and sibbe), private property, hospitality (through which one was temporarily or permanently included in the family).

Among the nobility, the social upper class, the privileges (thus the royal power) of the “forefathers” belonged to the domain of destiny. This explains, at least in part, the concept of “dynasty” (royal house).

The theme law.

It was a mother’s right: marriage and blood and kin, the core of it, revolve around women, mothers.

Note.-- In some cultures today family (family and sibbe, the joint relatives are the center point.

So with the Tuaregs, a Berber tribe in N.-Africa. The husband belongs to the social class of the wife. So do the children.

CF/CS 83.

Whoever is the spouse of the queen inherits the throne.

As with the ancient Greeks of the tribal era, however, strictly political and legal work is a man's job.

A.II.-- *The thicket law.*

The mythical foundation here is Zeus with Hera (Lord), the main couple. Surrounded by a whole system of deities, heroes, daimones who each had their affordance domain.

This new generation of deities is called "Olympian deities": they conquered supreme rule in a theomachia, a battle of deities on the occult plane with the titanic deities (including Themis).

As an aside, this is the structure of polytheism (polytheism).

'dikè' means, first of all, 'calculated behavior'. Thus e.g. a customary law.

But Dikè with a capital letter is the causal agent whose domain is the Zeus law that rules life in the polis, the city-state.

The Dikèrecht.

Alongside the Them law, in time, comes the Dikè law, namely in the city-state. No longer the nobility, as before, but "the people" consisting of politeis, citizens (excluding the slaves and slave women), are the bearers of this new legal order.

The agora, popular assembly, decides. Under the guidance of the deities of the Dikèrecht one tries to reach a consensus or unanimity.

Only slowly - often through fierce struggle - were the rights of the Themis order (family law) pushed back or fused with legislation by the will of the citizens in the city-state system.

B.-- *The sophisticatedly-dubbed legal system.*

In the spirit of the first Sophists, the archaic legal order (Themis and Dikè) as mythically justifiable definitively went into hiding: "Law became unilaterally paternal and rational" (thus literally Flückiger, o.c., 123f.).

Crisis of Faith

Protagoras of Abdera, the head of the first sophists, said: "The existence of deities is 'dark' and earthly life is too short". Most probably he wanted to say that the existence of deities is a matter of seers, of initiates. Thus inaccessible to everyday reason based on sensory perceptions.

So that 'belief', in the fideist sense now, is an opinion among many other opinions. 'Publicly' such an opinion is too weak to build consensus as in archaic cultures.

CF/CS 84.

Thus religion became a matter of individual opinion. Nothing more. But with a shadow side: the earthly opinions that replaced religion were divisive, dissensual! Were there differences in the religions among themselves, there were also differences in the rational systems they replaced.

The secular foundation.

With its demythization, Protasofistics became a foundational crisis of culture.

B.1.-- *The crisis of tradition.*

What had been considered “sacred: ‘inviolable,’” up to that point, was pointed out by the Sophists as the product of autonomous human decisions. Yes, as the product of human autonomy to the degree of arbitrariness.

The ancient religions were thus “explained. One of the sophistical hypotheses was: the “good old law” is, after rational examination, only a product of the ruling class. So that the “sacred magic” that was woven around it is popular deception. So that all that was once tradition became “suspect. “We have been led to believe that it was the will of deities. But it turns out to be the work of man.”

In the early days of Proto-sophistic, therefore, it seemed that in the midst of such a crisis of values, “there were no real foundations left.” That - now that the foundation that founded order had been lost - “anything was possible”, indeed “anything was allowed”. This among many.

B.11.-- *A new foundation.*

Flückiger, o.c., 87: “Later sophists nevertheless tried to find a rational-earthly foundation in the name of which one can justify actions.

The group dynamics of the time that saw the group as an autonomous entity needed justification: “What lives in the group, in society, became law” but what did it rely on? Basic concepts were a necessity.

(1) *Natural Law.*

“The Sophists were the first to found a natural law” (o.c., 88). The “antropinè fuisis” Lat.: *natura humana*, was a foundation.

1. *Medical model.*-- The doctors of the time reasoned as follows: one treats someone with an ailment with a method of medicine that is adapted to his “own nature” or way of being.

2. *Legal original.* -- Each individual, each group possesses an “own nature” with its own needs and possibilities. After rational deliberation the individual or the group can go ahead and establish the “right” adapted to its own nature,-- without deities, without myths, revelations, magics. Autonomous or independently deducible.

CF/CS 85.

Flückiger: “Both the brutal right of the stronger and the right to life of the weaker could be rationally derived from ‘one’s own nature’.”

Thus law was actualized, yes, reestablished.

(2) Other basic concepts.

Universal, common properties came to be exposed through the investigation of (one’s own) nature - *historiè fusikè*, Lat.: *historia* (*inquisitio*) *naturalis*, founded by the Milesians - which could serve as an axiom for justification.

Thus: one or another sacred enthusiasm (‘mania’) as in “the old times”.

Similarly: ‘to *hèdu*’, the lustful (all that is pleasant or useful), basis of hedonism. So - what Euripides calls - “*thumos*”, inspiration, drive (which can lead to irrational action) expressed e.g. in great passions (honor, hate/love).

Pluralism.

J. van Breda, Pluralism, in: *Alternative* - 1975: Nov., 21, defines “pluralism” as follows.

1. Philosophical significance.

The doctrine that puts multiplicity first with regard to all that is is called ‘pluralistic’. This is opposite to ‘monism’, which as a philosophical system is a doctrine of unity (all being is one). For example, Spinoza (1632/1677).

2. Sociological.

A society which, because no two people are quite the same and never feel quite the same, never think quite the same, actually reflects such diversity regarding individual nature in a variety of organizations, -- in mean tolerance regarding life and world views “living in society,” is pluralistic.

A pluralistic democracy - according to van Breda - will therefore be a form of state in which every citizen is free to stand up for his views, to recruit for them, to organize with like-minded people, to strive for power in the state with - legal - means, and possibly to share this power with like-minded people.

Above all, one feature: pluralism is ideological, i.e., regarding axiomata, neutral,-- except regarding its own basis.

The Protosofistic ran into its own pluralism.

CF / CS 86

Sample 27.-- The concept of freedom (86/88)

Beginning with a text.

W. Peremans, *The Greek Freedom (Message and Warning)*, Hasselt, 1978v..

We are in full IVth century (-400/-300).

The time of the “first sophists”.

Peremans -- “Exhausted by the long warfare, Greek man now demands above all “peace and rest” for himself,-- personal gain and material gain. The individual enriches himself while the state impoverishes itself. He no longer worries about principles that used to apply, no longer feels bound by laws and worship, and frees himself from obstructive regulations and laws.-- The concept of ‘freedom’ takes on a different content”. (o.c., 16v.).

Now here is Platon’s rendering

“I can well imagine that a ‘democratic’ (*note*: populist) state, thirsting for ‘freedom’, will not be able to keep up the pace and will start to revel in the unadulterated wine of ‘freedom’ (...).

1. Leaders who have nothing and subjects who have everything to say: that is the slogan! Such a thing deserves all praise and honor both public and private (...).

2. The father gets used to placing himself on an equal footing with his son and to being afraid of his children. The son considers himself “as good as the father”: he neither spares nor respects his parents, because, yes, “he wants to be free.”

3. In such a state it is the master who fears and flatters his disciples while the lords students look down on their teachers from the heights.

4. Things are no better with home teachers.

5. Young people place themselves on an equal footing with the elderly: they take on them in word and deed. Old people adapt themselves to such youth; they exhaust themselves in jokes and jests: in order not to give the impression of being squeamish and bossy, they imitate the youth.” (*Polit.* 8: 562v.)

Works like Peremans’ as well as e.g. *A.J. Festugière, liberté et civilisation chez les Grecs*, (freedom and civilization among the Greeks), Paris, 1947, or *M. Pohlenz, Griechische Freiheit (Wesen und Werden eines lebensideals)*, (Greek freedom (essence and becoming of an ideal of life)), Heidelberg, 1955, outline the development of the concept of freedom:

- a. archaic (the law restricts wild liberty),
- b. anarchic (lawlessness),
- c. internalization (anti-democratic systems silence freedom).

What Peremans and Platon portray is the second stage, the anarchic one.

CF/CS 87.

One rereads *CF/CS 84* (“*autonomous human decisions*”) and remembers that this behavior as autonomous is the same as behavior “according to one’s own (autonomous) nature” (*CF/CS 84*). Which then is the same as “free. And free at that.

Freedom Today.

That the whole problem of Protosfistics is applicable to our time, for the most part, is shown by what follows.

Bibl.st.: *M. Danthe, La liberté et ses collisions*, (Freedom and its collisions), in: *Journal de Genève* 04.10. 1989.

Writer, observer during the XXXII-es Rencontres internationales de Genève (October 1989), reports on one of the speaking events.-- The general theme was “Usages de la liberté” (“How one can make use of freedom”).

The second speaker was the Italian thinker Salvatore Veca (familiar with I. Kant as with Anglo-Saxon philosophy).

Two types of freedom.

Veca identifies two types of freedom in our culture. This duality was introduced in 1958 by Isaiah Berlin (1909/1997; of Jewish origin), who is a professor at All Souls College (Oxford) and has shaped several generations of the British élite.

A.-- Negative freedom.

We -- I, you, each of us in principle choose on our own (// according to our own nature) what we desire. What is decisive is that we feel something is valuable (to us).-- with one caveat: not to harm one’s fellow man. The latter is duty.

Axiom: only the person himself who acts is really informed regarding the value at stake.

Consequence.

a. All that favors indulging oneself, with the proviso of not hindering one’s fellow man, is ethically and “politically” (= for society) “good.

b. Institutions -- economic, social, political -- , to the extent that they enable that negative type of being free, are “good. -- Veca: that type of freedom is characteristic of traditional liberalism.

B.-- Positive Freedom.

We - I, you, all of us - are only really free to the extent that we choose what we should desire in conscience. In other words, to the extent that we can fulfill a destination (purpose, meaning of life).

Axiom:

an ideal is put first. This is called Veca “rational” living (in the narrower sense of that term), i.e., justifiable by our (ideals-aligned) reason.

CF/CS 88.

The question arises, “What ideal? Why? Because we live in a society that is so pluralistic about ideals that precisely one ideal becomes unthinkable for all.

Since the church(s) lost hold of the Western mentality, one lacks one controlling ideal. As G.Fr.W. Hegel said, “A developed people without metaphysics, -- what an otherwise frequently adorned temple is without a supreme sanctuary.”

The proper role of an ideology.

Bibl. sample : Jacques Delors, *La grande misère des politiques*, (The great misery of politics), in: Le point 31.08.1995, 37.-- The former president of the European Commission reasons as follows.

1.1. In European democracies, there is a conviction that a profound economic reform is necessary that closes the chasm between those who find work (and are therefore “with it”) and those who do not find work (and are therefore “excluded”).

1.2. The disease from which our European democracies suffer is one that plummets any serious attempt to fundamentally overhaul society. The name of this disease: “le désenchantement” (the disillusionment).

2.1. As causes of that malady, serious people point to - Delors said - :

a. the economic prosperity during the “glorious thirties” (1960+) with the comfortable life associated with it and mind-numbing;

b. the “materialism” (CF/CS 81) which, in individuals and groups, breeds selfishness.

J. Delors dwells on a fact thereupon.

2.2. “Since the last few decades, ideologies - he means liberalism with its ‘free market economy’ and communism with its managed economy - have lost their grip on people. For liberalism is clearly showing its limits and communism has collapsed.

To that, Delors addresses *Alain Leroux, Retour à l'idéologie (Pour un humanisme de la personne)*, (Return to ideology (For a humanism of the person), PUF. Leroux defines ideology as follows.

“A coherent, open, and comprehensive set of principles which are set forth for the purpose of presenting an image of the life of man in society.”

Note.-- This amounts to saying that, after the metaphysics of the middle ages lost its leading role as the ideal of society (the clergy was replaced by the intelligentsia), a new - yet to be found - ideology is sought by Delors. To make freedom into positive freedom.

CF/CS 89.

Sample 28.-- Justification of law. (89/92)

It sounds surprising, to say the least: law, once reason, especially autonomous reason, interferes with it, needs “justification,” accountability!

Today, in the midst of our cultural critique (which is, among other things, a crisis of values), the question is as follows: “Is justice justifiable?”. To such an extent does today’s intelligentsia (the intellectual-artistic vanguard) doubt everything that is not immediately given.

Bibl. sample : M.W. Fischer, Hrg., *Worauf kann man sich noch berufen? (Dauer und Wandel von Normen in Umbruchszeiten)*, (What can still be relied upon? (Duration and change of norms in times of upheaval)), Stuttgart, 1987.

The title speaks for itself: “On what does one still rely?” Or, “In the name of what does one justify something?” The famous “justification problem.

In the language of Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurter Schule), in search of the foundations or axioms for his ‘critical’ theory of society, it reads: in our ‘post-metaphysical’ thinking (now that traditional metaphysics is being questioned) we are left with “a theory of argument.” Without religious dogma. Without even some rational metaphysics.

Which is to say: without generally valid, at least generally accepted prepositions (in which fixed, universally accepted axioms are expressed). Which in turn means: with only singular (individual) or at most private (valid for limited groups) prepositions (in which axioms valid for a single person or groups are brought up for discussion). Does one see the fragmentation? The pluralism? The divergent thinking within the same society?

Ottfried Höffe’s attempt.

Höffe is a German thinker who teaches in Fribourg, Switzerland. In his *La justice politique*, he attempts to justify the law, especially concerning state power and social justice.

We rely on the report by M. Hunyadi, “*Légitimer la justice? Pas simple!*”, (“Legitimizing justice? Not easy”), in: *Journal de Genève* 03.08.1991.

A.-- The run-down of the “critical materialists”.

Karl Marx (1818/1883), (in his critique of ideology), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844/1900), (in his genealogy of morality), Sigmund Freud (1856/1939), (in his psychoanalysis of morality) have radically challenged the possibility of justifying any morality within which law and justice are situated.

CF/CS 90.

Marx: the morality that governs a society is imposed by the “ruling class” (in Western Europe, the property-rich bourgeoisie).

Nietzsche: the morality that governs a society is the expression of the “*Wille zur Macht*” (the desire for power).

Freud: the morality that governs a society is the expression of (repressed/suppressed) drives in unconscious and subconscious layers of the soul.

There is no longer any question of conscientiousness in the higher sense of the word in these three ‘critical’ perspectives or axiomations. In other words: there is no longer any question of a ‘metaphysical basis’. All behavior is situated in the human being (psychologism) or in society (sociologism).

B.I. -- A rebuilding of the ‘foundation’.

1971.-- Against the diminishing materialist atmosphere, *John Rawls* publishes his *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford, Oxf. Univ. Press).

The work has been interpreted as the magna charta of a democracy that, in a more universal sense, embodies liberalism. Which is evident, among other things, in his *Political liberalism*, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1993.

Rawls reframes the justification of morality and particularly law. Admittedly in an indirectly utilitarian sense and without going into the higher idea of ‘right(ability)’.

B.II.-- A justification of morality and particularly law.

Ottfried Höffe tries to expose the high idea ‘straight’.

Hunyadi outlines as follows.

1.-- The fact that one human being coerces another “in the name of justice” and in the process designates himself as “just” is radically disputed by anarchism. Thus, for example, every government is not only in fact but in principle “unjust.”

Note.-- We refer here to Murray Rothbard who claims that “the state is theft” and appeals to total privatization of state power in the USA. He calls himself a libertarian.

2. -- That any political ruler can act “in the name of a higher law” than the actual position of power is fundamentally disputed by positivism. For there are no “higher standards” anywhere that are immediately evident to any earthly human being. Exist only actual standards introduced by the people themselves.

Höffe goes against both lines of thought.

He rejects both anarchism, which opposes any state power, and positivism, which notes only the factually determinable state powers as naked fact.

CF/CS 91

Höffe posits the ideas of “right” and “justice” as axioms. From this he deduces that not every actual state power is justifiable in conscience: thus there are just and unjust state powers. This is against the positivists. There are indeed just and therefore justifiable state powers. That against the anarchists and libertarians.

By what does one see - the ‘kritèrion’, Lat.: criterion, means of distinction - that a state power is just or unjust? One can tell by the fact that it holds as an ideal the (higher) law.

Höffe tries to make this true by doing “descriptive semantics.”

- a. describe the meaning and significance of words - e.g., the word “justice
- b. with the intention of deriving eventual norms from it or exposing them in it.

Thus, a law is explicable under three points of view.

- a. That law is good insofar as it achieves the goal through appropriate means.
- b. It is good insofar as its purpose is the welfare of its subjects.
- c. It is good insofar as it is morally justifiable in addition to being efficient (a) and welfare-enhancing (b).

Hunyadi’s critique.

“The whole work hinges on the idea of ‘justice’. -- but how presently prove that idea theoretically? After all, we live in a climate in which “the nature” of things or “the nature” of man or “the values independent of man” are in doubt.

Note.-- The terms “nature” and “values” are used in this sense in their universal (metaphysical) sense. Not in the singular or private sense. After all, since the “crisis of metaphysics,” concepts such as “(general) nature” or “being” or “(objectively valid) value” have become pure question marks. Not to say “pure word-sounds” (*nominalism*; CF/CS 79).

Hunyadi argues that Höffe is committing a “circulus vitiosus” (circular reasoning): in order to prove the idea of “justice” he assumes in his preface that this idea is already evident and thus proven somewhere!

In other words: the demanded (GV) is presupposed in the given (GG). One proves by putting forward as proven what is yet to be proven.

CF /CS 92.

From metaphysics to rhetoric.

‘Metaphysics’ is concerned, traditionally, with the ‘elements’ or ‘presuppositions’ (‘stoicheia’, ‘archai’) that govern all of reality.

Rhetoric is persuasion theory. Rhetoric is situated in singular or private circumstances,-- not in universal ones. It tries to ‘prove’ what, given the interlocutor(s) or the audience and its own mentality (axiomatics), is provable. Nothing more.

Do we dwell on this aspect regarding legal doctrine.

O. Ballweg/ Th.-M. Seibert, Hrsg., *Rhetorische Rechtstheorie*, (Rhetorical Legal Theory), Freiburg/ Munich, 1982.

Nineteen studies introduced by Ballweg. The argument on law is decisive. But this one is rhetoric. Nothing more. No more philosophy of law but mere theory of law.

Legal life stands or falls - according to the proposers - with the understanding, i.e. the grasping of the concrete situation. Knowing which texts of the law were applied or not is second-rate. Man is above the text!

Return we to Höffe’s *Politische Gerechtigkeit*.-- When he wants to “foundation” law and justice, i.e. to derive them from prepositions, he presupposes -- Hunyadi points out -- what he has to prove.

Thus, it can be said that he is engaging in circular reasoning and thus not proving anything.

But it is not that simple in practice. Even anarchist theory and positivist theory use the concept of right (“just”). The anarchist calls the state unjust. On the basis of what does he label the state as unjust? On the basis of right and justice as already given! The positivist calls law “merely positive,” i.e., mere fact, with no higher standard.

How does the positivist arrive at the clear - and provable - distinction between “factual” and “higher”? On the basis of an intuition which presupposes that something higher in terms of law (ability) can exist even though it is not sensually given!

Both anarchist and positivist live by the light that precedes and that the idea is called “right(ability)” in traditional metaphysics.

But it is true: there is no more than rhetorical argumentation in favor of such a universally valid and higher idea ‘right(ability),’. Practically, anarchist and positivist also commit circular reasoning.

CF/CS 93

Sample 29.-- The principle of sufficient reason or ground (93/95)

Do we now dwell on the pedestal of all reasoning, namely, the principle (axiom) of sufficient reason or sufficient ground.

As *H.J. Hampel, Variabilität und Disziplinierung des Denkens*, (Variability and discipline of thought), Munich/Basel, 1967, 17ff., says that “classical logic” presupposes prepositions, which, incidentally, are only called “laws of thought” in modern times.

The author reduces them to two:

- a. the principle of identity (which merges with the principle of contradiction and the principle of excluded third party) and
- b. the principle of sufficient cause (ground).

The terms ‘stoicheion’, lat.: elementum, ‘element’, (i.e. something that helps something exist and make it what it is) and ‘archè’, lat.: principium, principle (i.e. something that governs something and thus must be known in order to understand that something) are commonplace from the earliest Greek philosophers and scientists.

Platon says “Nothing exists without reason” and thus formulates in the form of a sentence or statement what all his predecessors presupposed as an axiom.

Leibniz (1646/1716) formulated as follows: “Nothing happens without having a cause or at least a reason that determines it. Such a determining reason is something that can serve to account a-priori for why something exists precisely this way and not the other way around.” Cfr. Hampel, o.c., 18.

Accurately articulate.

“If A (reason, ground), then B (given) (understandable, sensible, ‘reasonable’).”

In praxis, B is there first: B is what shows itself (phenomenon, given). Only then does the question arise “How to understand B?” or “How is B intelligible?” The answer to that question is “If A, then B” (again and again subverting ‘intelligible’).

The reason or ground that makes intelligible can be found within A, the given, or outside it. Which brings us, with the latter, to comparison (“comparison” in the sense of “confronting something else” (in this case: something that is situable outside of A but still related to it)).

Conclusion.--Completed: “If inside or outside B A, then B (understandable)”.

Note.-- With A Noiray, dir., *La philosophie*, Paris, 1972-2, 242s., one can include the French term ‘fondement’ (English: ‘foundation’), here. The work distinguishes two types of foundation.

CF/ CS 94

a. *Ontological.*

The reality - even if it were a utopia, an imagination, a dream, yes, the incongruous or absurd - that makes a reality comprehensible (“explains”), is the ground of the latter.

b. *Logical.*

Logic, since Aristotle especially, is ontology insofar as it expresses itself in “if-then” sentences. The prepositional phrase introduced with “if” is then the ground of the postpositional phrase. “If VZ, then NZ (conceivable)”.

Life as reasoning.

Let us take an ordinary judgment: “I see it raining outside. The unspoken reasoning here is “If it is raining outside, then (I have the right, yes, the duty to say) ‘I see it raining outside’. The fact that it is raining acts on our (logical) mind: it is “justified”, “justified”, “founded”, “justified”, to claim that it is raining outside.

H.J. Hempel, o.c., 18, cites *H. Dingler, Das Prinzip der logischen Unabhängigkeit in der Mathematik (zugleich als Einführung in die Axiomatik)*, (The principle of logical independence in mathematics (at the same time as an introduction to axiomatics)), Munich, 1915, 4.

Dingler talks about the principle of identity, the principle of sufficient reason, and says, “Surely I cannot logically prove these foundations in turn. After all, such a thing would put the logic to be proved beforehand!”.

So the question arises, “How do we know that e.g. the principle of sufficient reason is valid?”. If this cannot be done with concatenation of logically conclusive sentences, how can it be done? Hempel: Since W. Dilthey (1833/1911) and W. Wundt (1832/1920), the thesis has been held that direct experience (living through; perception) is the reason or ground of thought, -- among other things, of the great axioms such as the principle of sufficient reason or ground.

Hempel cites E. May, *Am Abgrund des Relativismus*, (On the precipice of relativism), Berlin, 1941,-- “All these principles are but different ways of expressing the original experience which consists in the fact that something lived through, at the very moment it is lived through, is lived through precisely as this and not something else.”

One sees that May is talking about the identity principle.

From which Hempel concludes: the directly lived through is at once understood and expressed in the sign system of a language.

Thus, when working out a logic, for example, it becomes an ‘axiom’.

CF/CS 95.

The reasoning method.

Life that employs the highest principles of logic (ontological logic) proceeds as follows.

A.-- *Problem/Solution.*

The ancient mathematicians, faced with a (mathematical) problem, proceeded as follows.

Problem.-- A distinction was made between given (GG) and demanded (wanted) (GV), for one distinguished between direct knowledge (observation) of what shows itself immediately, the phenomenon (= GG), and indirect knowledge (reasoning) of what can be shown, the wanted (GV).-- The solution bit into the two aspect and with input from other information.

That this antique duality is still valid is shown by *I.M. Bochenski, O.P., Philosophical methods in modern science*, Utr./Antwerp, 1961, 2svv.. The author situates in direct knowledge the (Husserlian) phenomenology as a description of the given (phenomenon). In indirect knowledge he situates language analysis and especially the strict reasoning that exposes the demanded (deduction and reduction).

B.-- *Reasoning.*

Since Platon we have had the duality of ‘sunthesis’, deduction, and ‘analisis’, reduction.

These two basic forms of reasoning remain central. Witness: Bochenski, o.c., 93v.: J.Lukasiewicz, following St.Jevons (1853/1862), showed that all ‘argumentation’ is classifiable into two major classes.

1.-- *Deduction.* “If A, then B (understandable). Well, A. So B” .

For example, “If all girls are beautiful, then this and that girl. Well, all girls are beautiful. So this and that girl are beautiful”.

Note.-- The premise of that reasoning is an ordinal “if all, then some”. -- So much for forward or deductive reasoning.

2.-- *Reduction.* “If X, then B (understandably). Well, B. So X”.

For example, “If all water boils at 100° C., then this water and that water (samples). Well, this water and that water boil at 100° C.. So all water boils at 100° C.”.

Note.-- Again using as a basis the theory of order: “if all samples, then some samples”. One recognizes in this the hypothesis and this in the form of the induction (generalization, generalization)

So much for backward reasoning. Deducing takes a special form in reasoning “ab absurdo” (from the absurd) and reducing, backward reasoning, is recognized in lemmatic-analytic reasoning.

CF/CS 96

Sample 30.-- Rationalism(s).

Bibl. sample : M. Müller/ Al. Halder, *Herders kleines philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Basel/ Freiburg/ Wien, 1959-2, 141/143 (Rationalismus).

Rationalism is twofold.

A. rationalism.

Without capital letter, in the general sense.-- May be defined as follows. In ABC terms.-- A, all that is, B. is approached from reason (Lat.: ratio), C. so that from it arises 'rational', i.e. responsible or at least accountable behavior.

That "reason" expresses itself in singular, private, universal, yes, transcendental (all-encompassing, ontological) concepts that are processed in if need be logical-strange thinking.

From Platon to Hegel, such a "rationalism" prevails. Hegel, for example, says: "All that is human is only human because it is brought about by thought. Man and rationality are equated,--albeit in many variants. The principle of sufficient reason or ground is the artery of such rationality. One wants to live responsibly.

B. Enlightened rationalism.

What is called "enlightenment" (Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung) is a historical part of the general rationalism outlined above. It is situated in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. It springs, essentially, from R. Descartes (1596/1650) and even more clearly from J. Locke (1632/1704).

People like Copernicus (1473/1543), with his heliocentric revolution concerning the solar system,-- Tycho Brahe (1546/1601), Johannes Kepler (1571/1630; think of Kepler's laws),-- especially Galileo Galilei (1564/1602), with his exact method (mathematics + experiment) in natural science, paved the way to modern or "enlightened" rationalism. In particular: the rigorous (natural) science ideal conquers philosophy which from then on wants to become "rigorously scientific".

Compared to what the ancient Greeks had founded on mathematics and science and philosopher or rhetorician, enlightened rationalism was considered an updating, indeed a radical re-founding.

Rationalism, narrow (enlightened) or broad, stands or falls on the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient reason or ground. The following pages will show us how these principles are subject to vigorous debate.

CF / CS 97.

Sample 31.-- Foundation(al)ism (fundamentalism, integrism). (97)

In order to act, we all need a foundation, “foundation”.

People who want to impose such a foundation on all in order to “fund” a society are called “foundation(al)ists” or “fundamentalists” (those who want to preserve the integrity of such a foundation at all costs are called “integrists”).

The foundation of all behavior is the given.

That which shows itself, the ‘phenomenon’. -- Now there is a limitless multiplicity of ‘data’ which can thus serve as a basis, as a starting point, for action (reasoning, among other things).

The “cogito”.

‘Cogito’ is Latin and means “I think”.

P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d’herméneutique)*, Paris, 1969, 233, says that Descartes, with his cogito, is situated in the whole series of ‘reflective’ philosophies (Socrates’ “Take care of your soul”; Augustine’s “inner man”; Kant’s “Ich denke”; Fichte’s ‘Ich’; Husserl’s egology (‘I doctrine’)).

P. Diel, *Psychologie curative et médecine*, Neuchâtel, 1968, sees the introspective method, but logically purified, as the foundation of all scientific psychologies.

What prompts these people to pin themselves down around the self and his inner life,-- around reflection (la réflexion)? The need for a premise or foundation!

Descartes e.g. to get out of the utter doubt of late mid-century thinkers: ‘think for a moment’. “I doubt everything.” That means that the fact, phenomenon, given that I ‘try to doubt everything’, is undoubtable!”. Also: Descartes reasoned correctly: “Cogito. Ergo sum” (“I think, am aware of myself and my thinking. So I am (something real”).

It would have been better if he had said: “I think. So my thinking is there”, because the ‘I’ remains something mysterious!

Husserl does not commit this fallacy: he commits “phenomenological reduction”: he reduces (limits) the phenomenon to the pure phenomenon, that which shows itself immediately and only that which shows itself immediately. The I, for example, does not show itself so directly: so it is “put in brackets” (it does not belong to the given but to the asked). Husserl describes, i.e. defines at length, what he perceives, knows immediately.

CF/CS 98.

Sample 32.-- The sufficient reason in Kafka's works. (98/100)

Living is o. m. living reasoning. This is then called "existential reasoning", where "exist" means "to live as" a human being in our world. One and then even artistically superior model of such reasoning can be found in the works of Kafka.

What has appeared on Kafka is indistinguishable. One work: *H.J Schoeps, On man (Reflections of modern philosophers)*, Utr./ Antw., 1966, 119/141 (*Franz Kafka: the belief in tragic position*).

Schoeps, with *Max Brod*, Kafka's friend, edited *Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer* (When building the Great Wall of China), 1931, an excerpt from Kafka's estate. More so he is of Jewish descent and thus well placed to penetrate the living world of Kafka, who was also a Jew.

As an aside, Schoeps became a Christian.

***Franz Kafka* (1883/1924).**

The terms "Kafkaesque" or "Kafkaesque" have become commonplace since decades. *Kafka's* works - think of *The Trial*, for example - are among the most widely read in the world. They have been filmed, adapted for the stage, set to music -- even in secondary schools they are presented as 'reading material'.

Especially since World War II (1939/1945), Kafka has been counted among world literature.-- Some claim that as many commentaries were devoted to Kafka as to Shakespeare.

This is despite, or rather because, Kafka's works exude a very bizarre atmosphere: they therefore attract mainly contemporary people who find in them an artist's rendition of their own bizarre sense of life; they repel others through the 'Unheimlichkeit', unsafety, and incongruities of all kinds.

Do we now dwell with Schoeps on a few "elements" or "presuppositions" that typify Kafka.

The talmudic end time doctrine.

'Talmud' literally means 'study', 'teaching'. The Talmud is one of the Jewish holy books. Theological insights of Old Testament law scholars are recorded in it.

Among other things, there is the Talmud of Jerusalem and the Talmud of the Babylonians (by Rab Asji (352/427) and his successors.

The Talmud strongly shaped Kafka's mindset. See here how.

1.-- The Talmud contains a prophecy of doom: one day, at the end of time, "the end times" will come.

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As an aside, this is common to Jews and Christians,--with the difference being that Jesus, for Christians, ushers in the end times in its first phase, while for Jews “the messiah” is yet to come.-- Traditionally, associated with the idea of “end times” is: all kinds of horrors; a global upheaval etc. .

The Talmud: “Then the faces of the end-time people will be like the faces of dogs.”

Note.-- For your information.-- Howard P. Lovecraft et al, *Le Necronomicon*, Paris, Belfond, 1979 (// *Neville Spearman, The Necronomicon* (1978)), in its way, harbors an end-time doctrine and especially an end-time prediction, in which “monsters” will rule this earth. The book - or rather, some eighteen leaves - were written by Abdul al-Hazred, a mad poet in Yemen around 700+. The title was “Al-Azif,” a term used by the Arabs to represent the nocturnal humming of insects. In the case of the *Necronomicon*, this is supposed to metaphorically denote “the hum of demonic beings” who will rule on earth in an end time.

As an aside, the banned book was already published in 1571, in Antwerp, under the title: *John Dee, The Necronomicon (The Book of Dead Names)*.

Its bizarre nature is reminiscent of the bizarre in Kafka’s works.

2.-- Kafka must have had the impression that this prediction might well be realized in our time and its confused and confusing culture.

As Lovecraft (and the group around him) somewhat similarly points out our time and its culture from “the hum of insects.”

In other words, we are experiencing “the end of history.” This is a theme that can also be found elsewhere.

Steering background.

Already pre-socratic thinkers postulated the following as a scheme of the genesis of things and of the destiny of mankind

Something - a landscape, a person, a culture - is either purposeful or consciously pursuing a goal (finalism, teleology). But that something can deviate from its purpose. That provokes, sooner or later, a corrective - “feedback” say today’s cyberneticians. This corrective becomes perceptible in the form of some calamity, which invites recovery.-- Aristotle knows that scheme very well.

CF/CS 100.

Kafka's steering 'law'.

See here how Schoeps, o.c., 123vv., cites a little work by *Kafka - Zur Frage der Gesetze* –(On the question of law), which speaks of the laws as they were understood in Jewish circles.

1.-- The “theologians” - including the Chassidim (whom Kafka describes as a kind of nobility) - are very vocal about “the laws. Schoeps: “Kafka lives in the constant impression that he is ruled by laws he does not know” (o.c., 123).

Note.-- The worldview in this regard exhibits a dual structure.-- There is, on the one hand, “the nobility” (the theologians), the law-givers, and, on the other, “the people” (“am ha-arez”), the hearers. The latter are “am ha-arez”, ignorant.

Kafka feels like **a.** an ignoramus like the people **b.** but still as someone who has come so far in his analysis of the laws that he wonders if the laws are not fake. This could indicate a crisis of faith.

2.-- Schoeps, o. c., 124vv.. -- The great mass of “the people,” in contrast to the law-givers, “the nobility,” departed from the laws.

3.-- Schoeps, *ibid.* -- An aberration, interpreted in a straight Jewish sense, provokes a divine judgment (“gesera”).

One sees the three-part scheme of sacred or salvation history. The “big story” of the Bible. Paradise/ Fall/ Restoration.

Afterthoughts of a dog.

This is the title of a work by Kafka.

A “dog” - an end-time man - tells how “the people” of the “dogs” have already gone astray many generations back. This error or sinfulness weighs heavily on today’s canine race.

Note.-- This brings to mind Jeremiah 31:29: “The fathers have eaten green grapes, and (as a result) the teeth of the sons are sharp.”

The present dog genus **a.** carries the burden of a debt of the fathers, **b.** but cannot interpret that debt. That debt is and remains an ‘x’, an unknown.

Schoeps: “What *The Tracking of a dog*” says about our “dog’s culture” can be found in essentially all of Kafka’s literary works. Emphasizing the absurdity or incongruity of suspecting but not being able to interpret the sufficient reason or ground of the present cultural calamity. Our cultural criticism is, in its true, salvific cause, an ‘X’.

CF /CS 101

Sample 33.-- *The Trial at Kafka.* (101/102)

So how does Kafka interpret his theological presuppositions and experiences into artistic models? This is what we will now examine in more detail.

Odradeck.

This Slavic word means “departed outside the law.”-- The “dog person” in our cultural critique is more and more without a human ‘I! More and more he/she becomes a ‘thing’ : an ‘it’. Just like the objects we use in our technological society.-- Thus Odradeck “takes on the meaningless - absurd - form of a yarn spool.” (Schoeps, o.c., 131). Thus, Odradeck becomes “an automatic running mechanism”.

***Der prozess.* (The trial)**

This is the title of Kafka’s most famous novel. It would never have seen the light of day had Max Brod, Kafka’s friend, done as he asked, i.e. destroyed the manuscript.-- There has even been discussion about the proper order of the chapters. Brod, according to some critics, would have ordered them wrongly!

The screenplay (story).

A. Joseph K. was still in bed one morning when he was told that a trial awaited him. Neither the subordinates nor the person questioning him knew the reason or grounds for his guilt. Nevertheless, he was provisionally released.

B. When he “appears,” both judge and audience are “bizarre. -- The steps and interventions on his behalf only complicate “the case.” Like Huld, his lawyer, fails Tintorelli, a painter who wants to help him.-- In a final conversation with a priest, he talks about “entering the law” (a parable).

C. On the eve of his thirty-first year, “two gentlemen” come to get him, take him outside the city to kill him with a butcher’s knife “like a dog.”

Ground structure.

This one is twofold. Riddle/ decode. Both the process of Joseph K. and our culture.

1.-- *The Riddle.* Joseph K. is indicted by a secretive and higher court. The file of charges is not accessible to either Joseph K. or his lawyers.

Note.-- One recognizes the X that is corrupting our culture .

2.-- *The Unraveling.*-- Joseph K. attempts to trace the guilt for which he is being prosecuted. He also appeals to lawyers for this purpose.

CF/CS 102.

Their main task is to guess from “signs” (traces) the contents of the file. “To deduce from the interrogations, e.g., the content of the file that forms the basis of it, -- that is very difficult.” (Schoeps, o.c., 130).

Or still, o.c., 129: “So from the character and form of the punishment one must try to find the ‘X’ of the sin,--even if a real verification cannot succeed.-- This is precisely what happens in Kafka’s work. Both in the great novels and in the little stories this motif recurs again and again as a tendency: to want to determine from the nature of the punishment (*note* model) the essence of the guilt (*note* : original).”

A comparison.

One is familiar with Umberto Eco’s infamous novel, *The Name of the Rose*, Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 1985 (// *Il Nome della Rosa*, Milano, 1980).

The subject is called Eco himself, o.c., 53, with a bizarre term “a great and heavenly massacre.” The method the work reflects is that of Sherlock Holmes: in 1327, the Franciscan William of Baskerville investigates a crime. And does so as follows: “The notions of which I availed myself in order to imagine a horse I had not yet seen (*note*: compare Kafka’s guilt which he cannot but bring before the gaze of his mind), were thus ‘pure signs’ just as the prints in the snow (*note*: horse hooves e.g.) were signs of the concept of ‘horse’: one only avails oneself of signs and of signs of signs when the things themselves are missing.”

Cfr A. Blanch, *The semiotic rose of Umberto Eco*, in: *Streven* 51 (1984): 5 (Feb.), 439/ 448.

Note.-- U. Eco is a semiotician, a sign theorist. This reflects somewhat in his novel. One can compare it to the traces that J. Derrida repeatedly makes central, i.e. references to ‘things’ that repeatedly ‘fleetingly’ appear and fade away.

So that, with Eco and Derrida, but also with Kafka, we end up in the post-modern sphere: modern reason, indeed reason without more, is so confronted with the indecipherable that it must actually be declared un-rue.

Her representations of the given (GG) are again and again constructions, not actual reflections of the given: and the requested (GV), e.g. the reason or ground, keeps escaping. Solutionless! We know, postmodern, that we do not know!

CF/CS 103

Sample 34.-- *The ambiguity of a work.* (103/105)

‘Ambiguity’ means that one datum (GG) A, o.g., a set of presuppositions on the part of the interpreter(s), B, elicits a plurality of meanings as interpretations (C).

We apply this briefly to Kafka, who provoked contradictory “receptions” (receptions, interpretations).

1.-- *A psychiatric interpretation.*

Let us turn to Dr. Hesnard, *L’univers morbide de la faute*, (The morbid world of fault), Paris, 1949. Hesnard talks about “the world of sin guilt.” He puts it as follows: “This dark and incongruous, incomprehensible and tyrannical guilt weighed leadenly on the whole existence of this artist.” (O.c., 441s.).

Specifically, “Kafka behaved - throughout his life and in all the fields in which he was active - as a culprit who cannot figure out the proper nature of an unforgivable error.

Well, precisely that Kafkaesque world - he described it in all his works - is our pathological world of debt.” (Ibid.).

Note.-- Read e.g. *Dr. med. Trygve Braatoy, Uit de praktijk van een psychiater* (From a psychiatrist's practice), (*A popular introduction to medical psychology and psychiatry*), Utrecht, 1939, 180/190 (*Some reflections on religion in psychiatry*):

“If one is involved in psychiatric work, one will be struck by how much patients fret over religion and morality. The problems of morality almost always bear a more or less obvious stamp of religious sinfulness.”

Very noticeable - and often as a predominant feature of the clinical picture - are such debilitating states of anxiety in - what is called - “the melancholic depressive.” (O.c., 180).

Braatoy, as a ‘*verstehend*’ physician, addresses the decisive question, “Why/why does this disease manifest itself as an incessant, religious nightmare in which the patient(s) is not left alone for a moment by his burden of sin, his regret and repentance?” (Ibid.).

Note.-- To that question Braatoy answers with a reference to a certain type of predication and religious doctrine: “A cruel god, -- something by which the melancholic/melancholic is actually right in his / her reasoning. For from such a god one cannot expect an understanding of his difficulties”. (O.c., 189).-- That is just one statement. Nothing more.

CF/CS 104.

The role of “the father”.

This abstract word, typical of psychoanalytic language, often plays a role in the analysis of “the case of Kafka” among psychiatrists and psychologists of all kinds.

The “absurdity” in Kafka’s works would be due, among other things, to his impotence in the face of his “authoritarian” father.

Braatoy, with his concept of God, brings us very much closer to the true Kafka as his works show him. It is not about the transient “father figure” but about the God of the Jewishly-denominated Old Testament of the Bible.

2. An agnostic interpretation.

Where the atheist denies God or deity there the agnostic says he does not know whether God or deity exist.

Albert Camus (1913/1960)

He is, among existential thinkers - an outlier - and writes: “In any case, Kafka’s work reflects the problem of the ‘absurd’ in its entirety.” This text is cited by W. J. Simons, *Timeless topicality of Kafka only belatedly recognized*, in: *Spectator* (Ghent) 30.08.1983, 36.-- We explain.

A.-- Camus. The exasperated agnostic.

Camus is agnostic as well as moral: “I do not believe in God but that does not make me a God-denier (‘athée’). “The notion of God is ineradicable in the heart of man” (*Le mythe de Sisyphe* (1942)).

He expresses his ethical, moral concern as follows: “The brutal fact of evil in the world of an all-powerful and infinitely good God is an annoyance” (*L’homme révolté* (The rebellious man), (1951)).

B.-- Camus, the prophet of the existentially absurd.

The term “absurd” is used here not in the purely ontological sense (the unthinkable, the impossible) but in the “existential” sense: to “exist” is to “live as a human being in this (incomprehensible) world” whereby the “incomprehensible” becomes a constant annoyance.

One sees it: Kafka struggled with an analogous problem.-- The absence of God robs - according to Camus - the world of justification and explanation: that is the reason or ground of the absurd.

“Human existence for those who do not believe in immortality is an utter absurdity” (*Le mythe de Sisyphe* (1942)). “To live, then, is to “faire vivre l’absurde” (to bring the absurd to life).

Consequence: “There is only one real philosophical problem: suicide” (*Le mythe de Sisyphe* (1942)).

CF / CS 105.

In passing: Le Point (Paris) 14.08.1993, 50/64 (Relire Camus) devotes a piece of text to *Camus'* lively topicality among today's French youth: "For the young, *L' étranger* (the stranger), (1942) is a celebrated book. And Camus plays the role of life guide" (a.c., 60).

3.-- Schoeps' Jewish interpretation.

We give an outline: "If Z (sin guilt), then S (punishment). Well, S. So Z". This is perhaps, at least according to Schoeps, the basic structure of Kafka's works. But not without one more term: S is phenomenon, but Z (the sufficient reason or ground) is a pure mystery. A pure mystery that annoys. That 'grounds', 'founds', 'justifies' the absurdity of life on this earth in our epoch.

So "If Z (sin guilt) and so radically enigmatic Z, then absurd S (punishment). Well, life exhibits an enigmatic ground or reason such that punishment appears absurd". The punitive character prevails. Without sufficient reason, such a punishment is absurd. Kafka can be situated in the (post)modern experience of "the absence of God".

Skepticism, which accepts nothing except the immediately given (phenomenon), to the exclusion of all that is transphenomenal.

Agnosticism, which brackets a transphenomenal God or deity as unknowable, or at least unacknowledged,

Atheism, which denies God and deity,---they formed one major aspect of Kafka's environment.

Schoeps: Kafka was by birth a Jew. Beliefs that had become "mythical" (understand: "good for primitives") in the eyes of his contemporaries (and perhaps himself) nevertheless made him look forward again and again to what, in Jewish parlance, is called "the law.

In other words, although critical of his own religion, Kafka was nevertheless "post-religious," that is, marked by at least one religious thought, "the laws.

Consequence. -- That which in Kafka's eyes is "the catastrophe" consists in the fact that present-day humanity, being deprived of the notion of being a creature of God, loses the very traits which characterize it as a person(ly): it thus becomes individually a thing or lifeless thing (Odradeck) and socially a nameless mass. Cfr. Schoeps o.c., 131.

Note.-- Schoeps, o.c., 119, then compares Kafka to F. Nietzsche where he speaks of "the death of God" in our culture.