

9.2. *Elements of cultural philosophy*  
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*Contents: see p.85*

***Introduction.-- a philosophical method.*** (01/10)

Philosophy, especially since Platon of Athens (-427/-347), founder of the Academy, has had an essentially unique method of working. We outline it briefly now, in the wake of what was said in the First and Second Years.

**1.-- *Man as a soul situated in body, 'polis' (society) and 'cosmos' (ordered universe).*** We refer among other things to *E.PL. PSY. 15/16 (The harmonious soul)*.

***Model.--*** First of all, the term 'harmony' means 'integration', or also 'configuration'. Preferably - we are in Ancient Hellas - the configuration or 'harmony' is such that by its uncommon way of being it compels admiration and astonishment and is therefore 'kalos', beautiful. In other words: for the Ancient Greeks and very particularly for the Paleopythagoreans (-560/-300) and the Platonists, something is 'harmonious' to the extent that it contains goodness and beauty.-- So what follows,-- according to Platon.

**a. *Soul and body***

These are, in humans insofar as they are "all right," preferably cleanly joined together (which dilutes the infamous "Platonic dualism").

**b. *Singleton and 'policy'***

(literally: 'city'; 'city-state;--which made up the society of the time) these are preferably cleanly joined together.

**c. *Humanity and cosmos***

(Lat.: 'universe', universe, the totality of all that is). These are preferably cleanly fitting together.-- This threefold harmony especially dominates Pythagoreanism and Platonism.

***Counter model.***

***Bibl. sample :*** *G. Rouget, La musique et la transe*, (Music and trance), Paris, 1980, 267/315 (*Musique et transe chez les Grecs*), (Music and trance among the Greek).

The psychologically (severely or slightly) disturbed - the "possessed" - who, in response to an offense against body, polis, or cosmos, exhibits a disturbed soul (he/she is vulnerable and undergoing the wrath of a punishing deity), is subject to "divine madness" (understand: deity-induced disturbance). His mind is out of order. Immediately harmony is lost.-- Ritual dance and sacrifice can restore that harmony, in the context of a telestial or initiatory mania (sacred intoxication). See *E.PL.PSY. 72/73*.

### ***The dialogic and inclusive harmony.***

*Cf. E.PL. 114, 110/113* -. Last year we noted that for Platon a lesson in philosophy meant a “sunousia,” an intimate togetherness. Only in the context of such a philosophical ‘friendship’ does the spark of insight “jump over” from one student to another. With the Ancient Pythagoreans already this ‘thinking society’ was at work.

In other words, philosophizing was much more than a solitary individual delving into abstract things.-- Something like this was reinforced by religion: the student lived in “sunousia”; intimacy, with one or another deity who assisted him/her in the work of formation and exploration.-- This is the dialogic principle.

Platon - following Herodotus of Halikarnassos (-484/-425; the explorer of countries and peoples, known for his *Historiai* (Explorations)) - methodically begins with the expression of the opinions of predecessors and contemporaries. This is also found in the agora, the democratic public assembly: only after each citizen had expressed his opinion, did they make decisions. Again: not the obstinate or right-wing or preferential individual (cf. Ch. Peirce), but the individual in touch with the opinions of the others! So much for harmony or unification in a few of its consequences.

### ***2.-- Man as soul exhibiting “the noble yoke”.***

*E.PL. 34/37*-- ‘Zugon’, Lat.: iugum, yoke. *Xuzeuxis*’ (= *su.zeuxis*) is also used as a metaphor: two animals e.g. carrying the same yoke, for the plough or cart, are called ‘twins’.

Platon uses this metaphorical term to indicate the orientation of our soul with its spirit towards reality. This is called “noble” (*kalon zugon*) or “beautiful” because Platon only treasures and marvels at this peculiarity of the human “nous”, Lat.: intellectus, mind.

Indeed. **a.** The Primitives - among others through their magicians/magicians - already knew that knowledge (mantic) and magic (action) only work if the rule “*similia similibus*” (the same by means of the same, the original by means of the model) is respected. Direct knowledge and action on a reality (metonymic) and image metaphoric) are the instruments of Archaic mantra and magic.

In other words: if the clairvoyant or the magician really wants to have a grip on reality (solid knowledge, mantic; sure effect, magical) then his mind must be very accurately - akribos - attuned to that reality.

**b.1.** Among the Antique Greeks, Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (-518/-438), Paleopythagoreans (-560/-300) and Parmenides of Elea (-540/...) mention an analogous structure: “hupo tou homoinu to homoion” (by means of the like (model) the like (original)). Applied by Parmenides: “Being thought (model) and being (original) are the same”.

**b.2.** *Platon* - e.g., in his *Politeia* - mentions the same structure: what is visible (metaphor for “all that is real”; original), and vision (metaphor for “mind,” model) are a yoke, a twosome. In other words, our mind is the vision; reality is what is visible to that mind. Mind and being, as yoke or twosome, are in their togetherness a further example of harmony or merging, here as “being attuned to each other.”

**Notes:**

**a.** The Middle Ages thinkers (Scholastic: 800/1450), following in the footsteps of S. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430; the greatest church father of the Christian Antique West), called the yoke or twosome “intentio” (understand: orientation, attunement).

**b.** Franz Brentano (1838/1917; top figure of the Austrian School) reintroduced that Middle Ages concept into his psychology and, immediately, into contemporary philosophizing.

In the Intentional Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859/1938), intentionality or consciousness orientation (subjective noësis directed toward objective noëma) is central. In other words: as conscious beings we issue to the world.-- Thus we see that a Middle Ages concept is being actualized and re-founded. This gives rise to three partial approaches, which we now specify.

**A.-- Ontology.** (03/05)

Ontology or theory of reality. ‘Being’ and ‘being’ were, with the Ancient Greeks, the terms to represent the reality available to our minds -.,

Here is situated what Platon called ‘theoria’, fathoming. Our soul, situated via body in polis and cosmos, (**a**) perceives sharply (**b**) in order to understand and explain.-- Already the Paleopythagoreans called ‘theorikos’ someone who e.g. attends the Olympic games,-- not only for pleasure but to fathom its true nature - its ‘reality’.

The Romans rendered the term ‘theates’ (the one who practices theoria) with the term ‘speculator’, in the first sense ‘spy’ (one who observes accurately to know what it is). ‘Specula’ in Latin means ‘watcher’. They translated the term ‘theorein’ by ‘speculari’. Wanting to call ‘speculation’ that which is the essence of philosophizing (...): the investigation of what appears behind immediate observation, namely, the coherences. -- One compares this with what the Milesians (Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes) meant -- as e.g. Herodotos makes this true viz:

- a. ‘opsis’, the immediate perception,
- b. followed by ‘historia’, research into what is not immediately given.

It is not surprising, then, that Platon says in that vein that ‘epistèmè’, (true) science, is “theorike tou ontos” (to watch keenly as an observer all that is real in order to fathom it).

### ***Existence / essence.***

Ontology stands or falls with a pair that already Platon distinguished, namely, actual existence (existentia, in Middle Latin) and the mode of actual existence (essence, with the Middle Ages).

Indeed: the philosopher is targeting two sides of something! For example, “How cultural is something?” and “How is that something cultural? These culturological questions are merely applications of the ontological pair: “how real is something?” (existence) and “how is that something real?” (essence). This is what “the noble yoke” is focused on.-- It should be noted that “something” means “all that is non-nothing.

### ***The transcendental.***

Called “transcendental” that which exceeds, transcends, “transcends” all notions - universal, private, singular.

***Bibl. sample.*** : O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, (Outline of philosophy), Wien, Herder, 1959-5, 372, 384; id., *Geschichte des Idealismus, III (Der Idealismus der Neuzeit)*, (History of Idealism, III (The Idealism of the Modern Era), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 1086.

Willmann says that the quadrilateral “being (reality) / good (value) / one (all and or whole) / ‘true’ (intelligible)” is the summary of the “one / true” couple of Paleopythagoreans and the Platonic “being / good” couple. What does it mean?

For the Pythagoreans, all that was one - understand: all that is collection (all) and system (whole) - was immediately - ipso facto - 'true' (understand: transparent, insightful, comprehensible. They were, fundamentally, 'harmologists' (harmology is theory of order that examines the relations between (a multitude of) data).

For Platon, all that was 'being', (real), was really being insofar as it was 'good' (valuable), understand: really good. Only then was it immediately 'true' (understandable, sensible, acceptable to our minds).

**Expressed differently:** 'being' is something in itself, a given ('res' for the Middle Ages Scholastics), as distinct from the rest 'something' (aliquid, in Middle Ages Latin). Further: as totality (all, whole), being is one (which makes a multitude one); as object of understanding, being is 'true' (understandable); as object of appreciation, being is 'good' (valuable).

These transcendental notions are omnipresent. In all that we claim, they are present as presuppositions like a light that illuminates.

Thus, a culture is a reality (being). She is a collection of elements - cultural elements - that make up a whole or system (one). She is a set of values (good). Thus, she is understandable (true).

One sees it: if one understands the Antique terms correctly, they become the axiomata of our research, which is rooted in ontology as its basic premise.

**B.-- Harmology (orderliness). (05/08)**

Harmology or theory of order studies the relations between data. This by the comparative method.-- In Antique language this was called stoicheiosis, factors decomposition.

**Bibl. sample:** E.W. Beth, *The Philosophy of Mathematics (From Parmenides to Bolzano)*, Antwerp / Nijmegen, 1944, 29/56 (Plato),-- vrl. 30, 36, 38, 42. B

eth is one of the few who emphasize this aspect - a basic one in Platon and in the whole of Antique philosophy. 'Stoicheiosis' (Lat.: elementatio) means e.g. "the constructive construction from a number of primal elements" or still "the axiomatic construction of geometrical propositions into a system" (Beth, o.c. 3 ).

In other words: an exposition which, taking individual elements - stoicheia - as given, checks them by comparison for their connections (collection, system). A certain 'holism' (sense of totalities) is the basic condition. Typical of Antique thought.

### ***Induction.***

From a number of concrete examples, Socrates tries to determine what exactly we mean by a certain word or concept and what the constitutive elements are of the corresponding reality". (*E. De Strycker, Concise history of ancient philosophy*, Antwerp, 1967, 74).

One sees it: De Strycker ignores the stoicheiosis, but, in his rendering of that which is the study of the elements (stoicheia), namely induction, he unintentionally mentions them.

### ***Applicable model.***

O.c., 74.-- The Socratic induction -- literally De Strycker says -- considers a number of examples (samples from a collection or also from a system) in order to arrive at the elucidation of a meaningful connection (given in the language).

If **a.** a runner, a wrestler, a singer, e.g., **b.1.** can also run, wrestle, sing badly at will and **b.2.** does not fail against will, only then does the language say he is 'good'. Any skill, expertise, necessarily involves as elements **i.** performing, **ii.** performing well or badly at will.

Thus, in the Socratic-Platonic manner, a definition (determination of being) is literally constructed, namely, from elements - constitutive or determining elements - that can be found (verified) in reality. Thus one moves from a purely nominal or verbal to a real or factual definition.

### ***Collection/ System.***

When I take the Primitive culture of the Indians, I take one type - 'element' - out of the total collection of all possible cultures. That is the metaphorical induction.

When I take from the totality of Indian culture, for example, their agriculture, then I do not take the whole but the partial culture, the part or subsystem. That is metonymic induction.

***Conclusion:*** there are two types of sampling! In the first case, I situate the whole culture in the totality of all (possible) cultures (collection); in the second, I situate a part of it in the totality of the whole cultural system in which it belongs.

The first induction leads to generalization; the second leads to generalization. - Behold what Platon understands by "stoicheiosis" or element or factor analysis.

### ***Genetic theoria.***

“When our thought movement traces how something has developed from its inception, it is ‘genetic’ (from the ancient Greek ‘gennetikos’, literally: ‘genetic’, i.e. relating to genesis).-- Thus we think genetically when we trace, e.g., the genesis of a plant or the origin of an empire or the history of a text from its first draft to its completion.” (O. Willmann, *Abrisz der Philosophie*, Wien, 1959-5,51).

Thus, Platon attempts to trace the course of Athenian culture from the founding of the city and distinguishes phases (stages):

- a. beginning,
- b. growth - and - degeneration
- c. purge.

One class in particular, the “capitalists” of the time, caused the whole culture to degenerate into a great pursuit of profit with disadvantage to the culture of the mind.

### ***In passing:***

here we sense the influence of Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465), whose thinking was espoused by Kratulos, Platon’s teacher. As A. Rivier, *études de littérature grecque (Théâtre, Poésie lyrique, Philosophie, Médecine)*, (Greek literature studies (Theater, Lyric poetry, Philosophy, Medicine)), Geneva, 1975, 369/395 (*L’homme et l’expérience humaine dans les fragments d’Héraclite*), (Man and human experience in the fragments of Heraclitus), says, for the Heraklitean a human life is structured according to pairs of opposites (health and/or illness, waking and/or sleeping e.g.). Here: cultural life is characterized by two stoicheia or elements, which form pairs of opposites, i.e. bloom and/or decline, in the form of right measure and/or degeneration.-- That is then an example of “harmony of opposites”. -- A harmony consisting of elements that constitute pairs of opposites or ‘sustoichiai’ (systechies).-- That too is stoicheiosis or factor analysis. But then a diachronic instead of a synchronic,-- analysis that faces a dynamic system.

### ***Summative and amplificational induction.***

Imagine studying a number of civilizations (paratactic) or a number of parts of a civilization (hypotactic) and, at the end, summarizing the samples, then you have summative induction.

Imagine that one draws conclusions from there to other not yet studied civilizations or parts of a civilization then one is doing amplificative or information expanding induction. The latter, of course, is hypothetical (one presumes unstudied similarities). Which has not been proven.

### ***Inductivism.***

From collections (all) or systems (whole), induction takes samples. This is the case even with axiomatic-deductive systems: they presuppose, after all, at the outset a limited number of axiomata or postulates. That is, from all possible axiomata or postulates, they take a sample and thereby work out a limited number of propositions. Thus, traditional Euclidean geometry was replaced by another equally limited set of axiomata in non-Euclidean geometry: the non-Euclidean axiomata are a sample from all possible geometrical postulates.

Such is certainly true of cultures: Islamic culture has its axiomata or presupposed values; the Western Enlightenment rational has hers. Both choices are samples from all possible cultural values.-- All this is evident from the stoicheiosis or analysis of the elements -- here: axiomata or presupposed values -- of a geometrical system or a culture.

### ***C.-- Logic. (08/10)***

Third partial approach is the doctrine concerning conditional sentences in the form of “if, then”. We begin with an applicative model.

If the axiomata (presupposed values) of a culture are only a sample from the totality of all possible axiomata (values), then the value judgments of that culture are only restrictive judgments, i.e., valid subject to the fact that other presupposed values involve other value judgments.-- That is Platonic dialectic. Which we explain briefly.

### ***The hypothetical reasoning.***

Cfr. E. De Strycker, *Concise history of ancient philosophy* 103/104 (The hypothetical method).-- Platon distinguishes two conditional reasonings.

#### ***a. The ‘sunthesis’ or axiomatic deductive method.***

Here stoicheiosis proceeds from preconceived axiomata, from which one draws a number of ‘theorems’. The mathematics of the time proceeded in this way.

#### ***b. The “analysis” or reductive method.***

Here one starts from a proposition (e.g., an observation) and examines how it presupposes (here one looks for the ‘axiomata’).

In the scheme of Jevons-Lukasiewicz:

**a.** Deduction. If A, then B. Well, A. So B.

**b.** reduction : If A, then B. Well, B. So A.

The proposition “if A, then B” expresses the principle of necessary (and preferably sufficient) reason or ground on which the whole syllogism is based.

### ***The reductive reasoning.***

Let us take a singular - concrete example.

***Bibl. sample :*** Louisa L. Hay, *You Can Heal Your Life*, Groningen, De Zaak, 1986-1,



1988-5 (*You Can Heal Your Life*, Santa Monica, Ca., Hay House, 1984).-- This work is characteristic of New Age (New Era) and, in that sense, belongs to Counterculture and Postmodernity. The values put forward are quite different from those put forward by Modernity (since Galileo, Descartes and the Enlightened Rationalists). Part 5 of the work contains Louisa's life story (o.c., 167/176) and o.c., 136/165 deals with "the metaphysical workings."

### ***A sampling.***

Preposition (and thus stoicheion) par excellence is "If Ao (the factor that causes mischief), then B (the mischief caused). Well, Bo. So Ao". The factors at work in mischief are called, in Hay's parlance, "thought pattern," "mental cause."

*As an aside*, what is not explicitly discussed but invariably presupposed is a definition of mischief. An old formula read ("Bonum ex integra causa, malum e quocumque defectu" (If something is whole (nothing is defective), then it is good; if anything is defective at all, then it is not good).-- That too is a stoicheion or factor that defines Hay's method of "healing" (making whole).

**a1. Given.**-- Someone comes to Hay with a "problem" (= mischief),-- so e.g. hemorrhoids, nervous breakdown (examples she cites herself).

**a2. Requested** (sought).

### ***2. The solution.***

**2.1.** Hay's thesis is, "The problem is rarely - note the restrictive nature of the judgment - the real problem" (o.c., 30). In other words: problems are signs of something else (Bo is sign of Ao). They are merely symptoms (or a syndrome, a set of symptoms).

The first step in the reductive analysis is "what mental causes have caused this problem?" The mental causes can be e.g.: fear of boundaries, anger about the past, feeling burdened, being afraid to let go etc.. Also: egocentrism, overloading of communication channels.

**2.2.** Second step: "I am willing to release from my inner being the thought pattern - 'pattern' -- that created the calamity. -- This will is repeatable (to activate).

**2.3.** Third step: I incorporate a new thought pattern.-- For example, "I let go of everything that is not love.

There is time and space for all that I want to do. I open my heart and establish only loving communication.-- I am safe. I am healthy.” These are some of the phrases that “the new thought pattern” -

*As (salvific factor)* - articulate, With intended result: *Bs* (salvation).--”The new thought I repeat, for thus my healing process is underway.”

*Note.--* If in the course of the healing event new problems arise, then one repeats the three-part scheme.

*Conclusion:* the factors that make “healing” in Hay’s style understandable are=  
**a.** a reductive (tracing the cause) reasoning, **b.** a contrary thinking. (“The healthy factor in my mind I activate”). Behold stoicheiosis or factor analysis in a nutshell.

*Note:* From the mindset that William James once labeled “physician materialism,” this method must, of course, come across as “irrational” (positively scientific not justifiable). Yes, even as an object of ridicule.

And indeed: the power of (positive, -- meaning: imagining the favorable) thinking exists, but is it, apart from being necessary, also a sufficient condition for the cure of, say, a hemorrhoid or a depression. In some people this power of thinking is very great, but the great masses are not ready for it.

Consequence: a restrictive judgment (Hay’s method of thought “heals” insofar as it includes a necessary but perhaps not also sufficient condition for healing).

### *Factor Analysis.*

Stoicheiosis thus includes two aspects.-- An element (stoicheion) is:

**a.** a holistic fact, which is exposed when one breaks down a totality into its parts and vice versa (“If all the elements, then the totality. If the totality, then all the elements”).

**b.** A hypothetical or logical fact a factor, or parameter is that which, if posited as a hypothesis, makes something else intelligible (‘true’) within a totality. Because the factor is recordable in a conditional sense, it is also logical.

### *The title of this course.*

“Elements of Philosophy of Culture” deals with the ‘stoicheia’, the elements, which, if put first, make both the phenomenon of ‘culture’ and the philosophy around it logically understandable (transparent).

KF. 11.

**First sample: Towards a definition of 'culture'.** (11/16)

**Bibl. sample:**

-- L. Fèbvre / E. Tonnelet / M. Mauss / A. Niceforo / L. Weber, *Civilisation (Le mot et l'idée)*, (Civilization (The word and the idea), Paris, s.d. (a work that brings up the history of the terms 'culture' ('culture') and 'civilisation' ('civilisation')));

-- A. Hilckman, *Geschichtsphilosophie / Kulturwissenschaft / Soziologie*, (Philosophy of history / cultural studies / sociology), in: *Saeculum (Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte)*, (Yearbook for Universal History), 12 (1961): 4, 405/420 (a humanities approach: is there a science of culture and what then is "culture"?);

-- Norbert Elias, *The Civilization Process (Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations)*, 2 dln, Utr./Antw., 1982 (the original work, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation*, dates from 1939);

-- D. Roustan, *La culture au cours de la vie*, Paris, 1936 (on cultivating oneself);

-- Br. Maliowski, *Une theorie scientifique de la culture*, Paris, 1968 (// *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays*, The Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 1944: an approach from ethnology (cultural anthropology), including prehistory, folklore, as well as physical anthropology);

-- J. Goudsblom, *Nihilism and culture*, Amsterdam, 1960, 55/103 (*The concept of culture / Culture as a factor in behavior / Explaining culturology*);

-- H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, London, Faber and Faber, 1952 (the brother of the famous Reinhold Niebuhr describes, from the standpoint of a Protestant theologian (Yale University) the harmony of opposites that is Christ and culture).

Behold a poor sample from a cluttered mass of articles and books.

**Preliminary.** Cfr. E.RH. 47/49.

A. Ellis and E. Sagarin, among others in their work *Nymphomania*, Amsterdam, 1965, developed an ingenious theory of interpretation (interpretation) - a 'hermeneutics' (in German) - which they themselves called "ABC theory". 'A' is some 'being' (a given). 'B' is the set of presuppositions (in Platonic language 'hypotheses') by which a subject or a group of subjects approach the given. 'C' is the final interpretation or 'reaction'. Meaning" implies that B coincides with A (however difficult this may be in practice, our mind, in its openness to "all that is", is at least in principle capable of grasping the objective meaning of all that is given).

Sense is another form of interpretation: for example, our objectively directed mind can address the question of whether a given thing is “of value” to something or someone else. Meaningfulness is therefore interpretation in the second degree: first one must grasp the correct meaning of what is given; only then can one bring something into play that starts from something else.

Very specifically, ‘B’ means the prejudices -- which are also presuppositions -- of an interpreting subject, whether ready or not. Such preconceptions are a very common case of interpretation of meaning, -- very often an impediment to carrying through the correct grasping of the meaning.

***Objection.***

When one hears a lot of current intellectuals speak, it seems that we are so locked into our subjective prejudices that we cannot be “objective” at all.

To this we object what follows: if we are so subjective that there is no longer any objectivity, how do we know that we are radically subjective?

If we do not possess any sense, then we cannot possibly compare our sense foundation with the objective sense of what is given. And ... we find ourselves in a delirious state reminiscent of psychiatric patients,--except that we still know that we are ‘delirious’ where they no longer know. The fact that we know we are delirious proves that we are not just delirious and ... remain susceptible to meaning.

***First conclusion*** -- When it comes to grasping the essence of culture, we stick with the ABC theory just outlined, that we grasp the meaning of culture, while we also establish meaning as a result of culture. So not one without the other!

***Assembly/Disassembly.***

“Construction / déconstruction” -- “There are thus two interpretations of ‘interpretation’ - so Derrida writes. As well as of structure, of sign, of play.

**a.** One tries to decipher, -- dreams of “a truth” or “an origin” that escapes the play and order of the sign (...).

**b.** The other (...) affirms the game and tries to ignore “man” and “humanism”.

The name 'man' is taken as the designation for that being who - throughout the history of metaphysics or onto.theology (*note*: a term originating from M. Heidegger), - in other words, throughout his own history - has dreamed of "the full presence", "the reassuring basis", "the origin and the end of the game". -- In response to this quoted text, *H. Servotte, Literary Science*, resp. *Literary Studies*, writes in: *Our Alma Mater* 46 (1992): 3 (August), 265, which follows: "J. Derrida sees the play of language, the passing of signifiers (*note*: translation of the French 'signifiant(s)', the word-sound that contains a thought-content), the language that speaks in man and that has always been spoken,--as language precedes us."

**Notes.**

People like Derrida put the one who composes a text - the human being, center of traditional "humanism" - in parentheses; they stick to the word choices at work in the text and attribute those word choices only to something like "the language," a subtle entity that precedes us all and, in our text-making minds, predetermines the choice.

To which we note that indeed, carried by a tradition, we all engage in an existing language ('langue') and in a pre-given use of language ('langage').

But we note that this same language and its use are simultaneously created by us. Thrown into a language and its use, we design it at the same time. The linguistic human being is both passive subject and active subject. So the person who composes a text is more than 'foam' (Foucault) on the waves of language structures and language use. That is one.

Yet there is more: Derrida and thought associates overemphasize the fact that a text is a set of "signs" that fall into the grip of interpreters. This is, to begin with, correct. But here the distinction between the interpretation of meaning by the reader of the text and its foundation by the same reader of meaning emerges. In other words: a drafter and his text (a set of "signifiers") are not simply at the mercy of an audience and its sense-making!

**Conclusion.**--This is also the case for texts on culture: they are situated in a language and its use, but this does not imply that the subject is "nothing" or simply explicable in any way.

### ***Existence/ essence.***

Ontology of culture means first of all defining it in its being under two points of view:

- a. its existence (“How real is culture?” or, “Is it not fiction?”);
- b. its essence (“How is culture a reality?”). Cfr. *EK. 04.*-- That this is still valid proves what follows.

*E. Van Itterbeek, Europa (Huis van cultuur)*, (Europa (Huis van cultuur), Leuvense Cahiers, 107, 1992, has as a premise the question “whether there can be spoken of a cultural identity (*note* : essence) of Europe and in what this identity then consists”. In other words: existence and essence of Europe as a cultural concept.

### ***Descriptive and axiological definition.***

A word can be used neutrally, melioratively, and pejoratively. The neutral meaning is purely descriptive-narrative; the not-neutral meaning is either meliorative or pejorative.

#### ***1. Descriptive definition.***

*W. Jaeger, Paideia, Bd 1*, Berlin / Leipzig, 1936-2, 5ff.-- Steller says: no higher organized people lacks some ideal of education, but the law and the prophets in Israel, Confucianism in China, the dharma concept in India are nevertheless something that remains thoroughly distinct from what the Ancient Greeks called ‘paideia’, formation to more and higher humanity. Yes, the merely descriptive notion of “culture” is even -- according to a previously exasperated Jaeger -- applicable to the way of life of Primitives.-- The Positivist thinkers, in their Positivist-Scientific Culturology, uphold this merely descriptive meaning, which no longer founds value judgments. Such a culture amounts to “kataskeue tou biou; “Apparatur des Lebens” (the life-giving apparatus).

#### ***2.1. Axiological definition.***

Forming actual people into “higher” people was called “paideia” by the Ancient Greeks and was gradually considered a real ideal. Admittedly - says Jaeger - this cultural ideal is intertwined with the fortunes of the Antique Greeks and in that sense “grew historically.” Nevertheless, it became something that grew beyond these coincidences: they passed on this transcendent ideal as a legacy to the other peoples of antiquity and left it to us Westerners.

#### ***2.2. Axiological definition.***

*N. Elias, The Civilization Process*, defines “culture” as a narrowly European product: European civilization, viz, counts as “the” civilization par excellence.

It is a bit like the Antique-Greek model that identified greater and higher humanity with wisdom, i.e. expertise, preferably accompanied by conscientious behavior: Elias, as a sociologist, situates the “culture” initially with the nobility and later with the bourgeoisie here in the West who cherish it as an ideal:

a. control of the lower urges (eating and drinking, taking care of the nose etc. are subjected to distinguished rules),

b. peacefulness,

c. introduction of the distinction between ‘normal and ‘non-normal’ behavior. As an aside, even by the figurative sociologists, who are his disciples, this argument is fiercely dismissed as ‘Eurocentrism’ (our European culture, after all, is only one type among many). Which in turn points to the predominance of the neutral view over the axiological one.

### **2.3.-- Axiological definition,**

Kolt and Klemm.-- We are 1843 : two histories of culture appear. Both works continue the high tradition concerning culture, but especially *Klemm* involves within the sphere of “humanistic culture” also all that concerns material well-being. In his *Allgemeine Culturwissenschaft*, (General Cultural Studies), Leipzig, 1843-1, 1855-2, in particular, it appears that the concept of “culture” includes not only the “higher” culture, reserved for the non-manual strata of society, but also the “lower”, peculiar to the manual laboring class. “It is therefore clearly ‘culture’ when man cuts off the thick branch of the tree, sharpens it with a stone or in the fire, and then uses it to ward off something or to bring down animals (...) Culture is the result of the interaction between man and nature and henceforth of the interaction between man and nature.” Thus Gustav Klemm.

*In passing*, see *J. Goudsblom*, p.c., 59/62 (*Toward a General Concept of Culture*).

*Note*-- Also *D. Rouston*, o.c., 31/57 (*Culture et métier*), (Culture and profession), thinks in an analogous sense: all adults in our industrial-serving society are engaged in some occupation in which mental and manual labor become less distinguishable from one another.-- One sees it: “labor” (mental and manual) becomes central to the concept of “culture” that becomes nature formation.

We conclude with *E. Van Itterbeek*, *Europe (House of Culture)*: the question par excellence is what we should understand by the term ‘culture’.

Van Itterbeek situates this main question in the background of what he calls “the gap between the Antique-Classical concept of ‘culture’ (think of what W. Jaeger says about it), on the one hand, and, on the other, the present which he identifies with... “thoroughly commercialized, anti-popular or at least anti-popular and addictive lifestyle”.

**Note** Hilckman, a.c., asks whether the concept of “culture” is now either a clear-scientific concept or a nominally vague one or even a “misunderstanding. I suppose it is sometimes one thing and sometimes the other, depending on how one approaches it.

Hilckman says that it was only from 1750 onwards that terms such as “culture” and “civilization” appeared. What is also certain is that, in the Dutch language area, the words ‘civilization’ and ‘civilization’ come into circulation in the course of the XVIIIth century.

A first separate articulation of “culture” would, according to Hilckman, be found at:  
**a.** *G.W. Leibniz* (1646/1716; Cartesian Rationalist), in his *Novissima Sinica* (showing that for Leibniz both the cultural phenomenon in its totality and its the variety in a number of cultures were a clear-cut achievement);

**b.** *G. Vico* (1666/1744; Italian philologically oriented thinker), in his *Principi di una Scienza Nuova* (1725), a work of great after-effects, which articulates cultures as “nazioni.

**Note --** One paid close attention: the fact that the coming into use of terms like “civilization” or “culture” is rather late does not mean that before the XVIIIth century people did not understand culture.

Apart from the solid work on “paideia”, culture, by W. Jaeger, what Platon left us in this respect also applies here. The education of what he calls “the little man” in all of us, i.e. our spirit or sense of values, is central to him. We say “spirit or sense of values” because the good, the highest and all-encompassing idea (which includes all others), is what our spirit can grasp. So one does not confuse the Platonic concept of “spirit” with the Rationalist concept of “reason.

The big problem, according to Platon, is that people are absorbed in the “kataskeuè tou biou,” the livable apparatus. What he calls “the great monster” (night life, eating, drinking, living,--sexual life and labor (economy)) and “the lesser lion” (the sense of honor), swallow us up too much.



***Second sample: Still looking for a definition.*** (17/22)

Now that the ground has been cleared, we can more directly address the definition of “culture.”-- Distinguish, to begin with, two types of defining, the existential and the axiological.

***1. Existential definition.***

We are, as human beings, thrown into a situation of nature, which we can, however, also design to our ‘designs’. Passively, yes, but also actively we settle with what can be called ‘nature’.

**a.** *W. Nölle, Völkerkundliches Lexikon*, Munich, 1959, 85, defines ‘Kultur’ as follows.-- At its origin the Latin ‘colere’, care and even worship. From there ‘cultura’ and also ‘cultus’ (worship). Nölle’s description: ‘Nurturing, development and perfection of plants, animals and human life form’.

**Note.--** Why the inanimate nature given to us as a natural landscape is left out is a mystery to us: isn’t the transformation of the natural landscape into a “cultural landscape” also “culture”?

**Note.--** *Thassilo von Scheffer, Die Kultur der Griechen*, Köln, Phidon, 1955, 13, also nods to ‘culture’ to characterize what the Ancient Greeks meant by ‘culture’: ‘ennoblement’ of nature and man seems, practically speaking, to mean von Scheffer.

*A. Toynbee* (1889/1975; British cultural historian), known for his twelve-volume *Study of History* (1934/1961), sees it as follows.

**(1) Situational.--** A challenge -- e.g., a severe or untenable situation in a Primitive tribe -- provokes a response. That response has as its goal survival and life. When a natural disaster is over, the tribe is ready for gains in culture.

**(2) Elitist.--** The rise of culture in response to a challenging stimulus is practically always due to a finding: resourceful (‘creative’) minorities can be found everywhere. Think of what the culturists call “salvation bringers” or “salvagers” or “saviors. The great masses follow.

*H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture*, therefore defines culture as follows.-- At a given nature, culture responds as activity controlled by values (e.g., survival, life enhancement).

**a.** It is the totality of that independent, purposeful activity by which man, together with fellow men (synchronously) and in a tradition to be repeatedly re-established and actualized (diachronically), enriches nature with new structures that aim at the ever more successful realization of values.

**b.** Metonymically, “culture” is also the totality of the results achieved.

## **2. Axiological definition**

Defining “culture” as workfulness in response to situations offered to us by nature is one thing. Yet that industriousness is either purposeful or deliberate. This is where the values emerge (which already appear in Niebuhr’s determination of being, of course),

‘Axia’, in Ancient Greek, means ‘value’ or ‘price’ (a cargo, a slave have value and these in translatable into price); yet ‘axia’ is, in fact, more: it is the deserved continuation of an omen! A beautiful slave - omen - deserves as appreciation a high price; a sound work - omen,- deserves a suitable wage or reward. As, conversely, a wrongdoing - omen - deserves a punishment or blame - sequel.

‘Axia’ is ‘continuation’ (reaction) to something that is a ‘good’ (or its opposite): thus, ‘axiotheos’ means “that which corresponds to the ‘glory’ (dignity) of a deity.” --

**In summary:** **a.** there is a good or value; **b,** there is the appropriate valuation or value-estimation, estimation,- axia - So that ‘axiology’ actually ought to mean “theory of value-estimations”. Yet by metonymy ‘axiology’ usually means “theory of values”.

### ***Culture as a value system.***

**Bibl. sample.** : -- J. van Doorn/C. Lammers, *Modern sociology (A systematic introduction)*, Utr./Antw., 1976-2, 105/140 (*Cultural elements*).

**a.--** The authors distinguish “material” and “immaterial” culture. Material culture includes “the material products of human activity” (automobile, radio, television,-- assembly line labor, etc.). This is reminiscent of Niebuhr’s achieved results. Immaterial culture is apparently situated in the value system.

**b--** Culture is then definable in terms of values (o.c., 118), objects of feeling and of mind; these give rise to aims, ideas of what is desirable (‘ideals’); they raise expectations (o.c., 115), ideas of what is expected to happen; they are the basis of norms, i.e. reasons for counsels, commandments and prohibitions (duties and rights).- Central to the above quadrilateral is apparently values.

***Note: Axiology and happiness theory.***

Eudemonology or happiness theory in one aspect - and no small one - of value theory. After all, is there a value that surpasses being happy? More to the point, happiness summarizes, as it were, all possible goods.

One work among many : *G. van Leeuwen, In search of happiness (On happiness as motive and goal / Nature and possibility of happiness / Happiness and ethics)*, Antwerp, Patmos, 1984. Platon, Aristotle,-- Augustine, Thomas,-- Kant, Marx, the Utilit(ar)ists are discussed. Yet purely secular happiness is transcended by a Biblical conception of happiness (which then leads to soteriology or doctrine of salvation).-- Culture certainly has an affair with happiness.

***Opm. Sociology and Culturology.***

A. Hilckman, a.c., notes that since Auguste Comte (1798/1857; father of French Positivism) sociology has functioned as a science of culture.-- Against this he opposes, in my opinion, rightly: the formal object of sociology is group life! Admittedly, there is no society without a value system and, thus, indirectly, sociology is concerned with values and culture.-- It is the same with psychology, by the way: the formal object is behavior (and soul life),-- things that never exist without values and culture and thus have indirect culturological validity.

***Culture and Ethics.***

A. Hilckman, a.c., defines “culture” as “shaping human existence. Hilckman says this includes things like techniques and economics, forms of society of all kinds, law, science, art.

In Antique language, these are “technai,” skills. Whoever masters such a ‘skill’ is an expert, “a man of the trade”. But - says Hilckman again - what makes a culture distinguishable (and thus constitutes its being) from non-culture in the first place is conscience. Within a cultural circle, a culture labels things either as morally good (righteous, conscientious) or as morally evil (unrighteous, unscrupulous). “In the long run, the unity of a culture is grounded in the common acceptance of the same spiritual and ethical values” (a.c., 413).

***Note.--*** With this, Hilckman continues people like Socrates and Platon, in their struggle against Protosophism (-450/-350): a thief is an expert, but he lacks conscience (Socrates once said in a discussion of culture).

Let us summarize this in a typical Platonic differential:

incompetent	incompetent	expert	expert
unscrupulous	conscientious	unscrupulous	conscientious

This differential is a curious culturological differential: the cultural level rises as one moves from left to right!-- It is not surprising, then, that *The Economist* (1989: Sept. 30, 53), in a little article “*Case Study in Caring: Ethical Values*, emphasizes The Harvard School of Business. “How can businessmen be made more humane, sophisticated, and responsible? The Harvard Business School is trying to get it done”. So begins the article. Not teaching “Business Ethics,” but incorporating a set of ethical values into a two-year course of “management,” policy, is the intent. With: voluntary service in the community, summer jobs in the unpaid sector, renewed interest in something other than moneymaking.

Do we, with Paul Garcin (Geneva), emphasize truthful information (with the elimination of what he calls ‘intoxication’ (= false information)). Indeed: businessmen are experts in outsmarting fellow men (outsmarting involves withholding information).

***Culture and “glamour” (shine, glory).***

Where is this basic concept of human life situated? Platon says:

- a. there is “the good” (= all that is valuable without more);
- b. there is “the beautiful” (= everything that, thanks to its value-gloss or glory, compels admiration and wonder). Glamour - keep that Anglo-Saxon word - is situated in the aesthetic domain of values.

***Bibl. sample :*** *i-d magazine no 104* (May 1992) refers to itself as “*The Glamour Issue*.” Glamour situates the publishers (who are alternatives) in “i-dea, fashion, clubs, music, people”. In other words, all kinds of cultural domains. Already the cover girl, Helena Christensen, suggests the undertone of “the alternative glamour”. Clubs Glam, Pop Glamour, even “Pure Glamour”, Stage Glamour, Soul Glamour, Paris Glamour, Fashion Glamour, Computer Glamour. At “Pure Glamour” it reads, “Glamour is power, glamour is sensuality, glamour is self-expression. Glamour is politics on high heels and everyone from drag queens to performance artists is using it to get their message across”. (O. c., 14).-- Briefly translated : glamour thanks to its shine conveys a message, -- better than the shineless reality.

Of course - and this is shown in the examples of the monthly magazine i-D - this “glory - of - value” differs from cultural concept to cultural concept. The glory of God in the Bible, for example, is radically different from the “glory” of a gay man or a club fan or a performance artist! But the rhetoric, the efficient entry of a message, is the same.

In Platonic language viz; the good in itself appeals, finds entrance, comes across; the good in itself, reinforced by ‘luster’ and ‘glory’, is beautiful and appeals more strongly, finds entrance more deeply, comes across more strongly. A lustrous technician, a lustrous businessman, a lustrous form of society (‘life style’), a lustrous legal system, a lustrous scientific theory, a lustrous work of art,-- they appeal more strongly, are ‘more rhetorical’. A glossy culture is more culture than a lackluster one.

### ***Culture and normality.***

N, Elias says it: the introduction of the terms “normal” and “non-normal” belongs to Western “culture. Herewith a word.

***Bibl. sample :*** *R. Fouraste, Introduction à l’ethnopsychiatrie*, Toulouse, Privat, 1985.-- Ethnopsychiatry is the synthesis of ethnology (cultural anthropology) and psychiatry. The author quotes *M. Diop, Allocution d’ouverture du Symposium général sur Psychiatrie et Culture* (Dakar 6/9 avril 1981), in: *Revue de psychopathologie africaine* 1981, xvii, 1/2/3, 9/10, to. “Every society, every culture, puts forward its own modes of existence. It develops at the same time a set of notions concerning soul diseases and adapted therapies.

Already in 1950+ *G. Devereux* (known among other things for his *Essais d’ethnopsychiatrie générale*, (Essays on general ethnopsychiatry), Paris, Gallimard, 1977-3) was pioneering in this field. In his writings and in his teaching, culture, being normal and being non-normal only constitute one single whole. Thus literally Fourasté. In other words: every culture, as a culture, determines what is ‘normal’.

### ***The “abnormal man”***

This is the man or woman who does not belong (anymore) in the well-defined cultural system. One calls him/her “sick”, “pariah”, “crazy”, “deviant” (o.c., 28). Or he is called: “infidel, heretic, pagan, idolatrous” (o.c., 15); or even: “possessed, damned, insane, cursed” (o.c., 20).

Thus, the madman was conjured, burned, cast out, or rejected (o.c., 20).

*New Age (New Age, Nouvel Age).*

Fourasté says, o.c., 31: “The causes of ailments - he means in the context somatic (= physical) and psychic - are - understand: in non-Western cultures - essentially exogenous (*note* : coming from outside) - possession by a pathogenic spirit, attack because of a (black) magician, defilement (*note* : the acquiring of a ‘stain’ or ‘blemish’ of an occult nature) - ; rarely endogenous (*note* : coming from within), i.e. inherent to a constitution, a genetic factor, a psychological situation (understand : as this is interpreted in Western and industrialized culture)”.

Thus, the gap between our Modern (Enlightened-Rationalist and secularized) culture and the non-Modern (Premodern, Primitive, Archaic, traditional) cultures around the globe shows itself in the interpretation of what is considered non-normal. As a result, at least eighty percent of the current world population is not served by our Western psychiatry. At least that is the opinion of a number of etho-psychiatrists.

*Flair* 25.01.1991 contained sixteen pages by the hand of a Rosa Wouters,-- titled: “*New Age.-- Are we really entering new times?*” Writer sees things broadly: the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the momentum noted since then makes her say, “Everything is changing. The East is becoming free. The world seems smaller and smaller. We want to eat healthy again, live more consciously, romance. Even in your daily life you feel that “new times” are coming. Eco-friendly, worldly, peaceful times.... Exactly: New Age!” (A.c.,2),

On page 8, it reads, “*Is paranormal becoming ... more normal?*”

Death experiences, telepathic contacts, witches ... Does it send shivers down your spine? That may be about to change, as these “alternative” topics are now being discussed and thought about much more openly again. Parapsychology is an ancient world that we are now looking at with very different eyes”. Thus the text of the editors as an introduction to the text of Rosa Wouters.

This involves enriching the notions of “normal” and “abnormal” since Galileo and Descartes with “paranormal” that is neither.-- Rightly, the rationalists see in this a new culture.

**Third sample: Modern medicine and cultures.** (23/29)

**Bibl. sample :** E. Coreth, *Einführung in die Philosophie der Neuzeit ,I (Rationalismus / Empirismus: Aufklärung)*, (Introduction to Philosophy of the Modern Era ,I (Rationalism / Empiricism: Enlightenment)), Freiburg, 1972.

1. Steller says, among other things, that, before Modern Enlightened Rationalism, lies a long transitional period, whose “run-ups reach back deep into the Middle Ages” (o.c., 11). Indeed: the Scholastic (800/1450) exhibits a streak (among many others, for one) that contains a real run-up to Modernity.

2. Steller goes on to say: the new thing that, with Enlightened Rationalism, is getting off the ground, is situated in the endeavor to “ground” or ground philosophy as a rigorous science.-- This must be understood from the situation of the time, i.e. 1300+ (end of Scholasticism).

### 1.-- *The natural sciences*

Especially physics and astronomy - had at that time made an unprecedented progress.-- Think e.g. of Copernicus (1473/1543: heliocentrism), Johannes Kepler (1571/1630; Kepler’s so-called laws concerning the planets around the sun), Galileo Galilei (1564/1642; exact, i.e. mathematical-experimental, natural science).

These sciences had discovered, developed and applied the method appropriate to their form. Consequence: they grew into rigorous, methodically secure sciences.

### 2.-- *The philosophy of the day*

This one, on the other hand, showed a divergent (discordant) and confused outlook.-  
- Two main strands dominated the minds.

#### a. *Skepticism.*

b. It often took the form of **nominalism** (only the names or terms are generally valid; the content of thought differs from person to person, from culture to culture). Consequence: the skeptic adheres to what is immediately given (which he cannot doubt); what exceeds those immediately evident data is questionable and ambiguous.

#### c. *Science.*

d. The **expertly thinking sage** of those days, did not doubt the immediately given - as the skeptic -; moreover, he did not doubt what has been scientifically examined and rigorously proven, either.

René Descartes (Latin name: Cartesius; 1596/1650).-- “Four years after being convicted (1633), *Descartes* published his *Discours de la method* (1637).

One can only understand the success of this work which underlies the entire philosophy and science of modern times if one sees that it finally laid a reliable foundation for the new scientific rationality.” (*E. Vanden Berghe, Strongly suspected of heresy*, in: *Collationes* (Flemish Journal v. Theology and Pastoralism), 13 (1983) 13 (October), 328).

### **John Locke** (1632/1704)

Founder of the Anglo-Saxon Enlightenment. In the wake of William of Ockham (1290/1350; Nominalist) and *Francis Bacon of Verulam* (1561/1626: *Novum organum scientiarum* (1620); experimentally oriented science) John Locke is a Cartesian but with an emphasis on experience, perception, experimental method (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690)). Note that according to *Book iv* of *An Essay*, ‘knowledge’ (cognition) is perception, though not simply sense perception, but intellectual perception or intuition.

### **Summary**

Modern Rationalism decays into two strands: Cartesian pure Rationalism and Lockian Empiricist Rationalism (Empiricism for short).

Reason, then, is the human instrument of insight (scientifically speaking) which offers certainties beyond the immediately given (to which the Skeptic holds exclusively).-- What is not according to this rational method is written off as irrational.-  
- Behold, greatly abbreviated, the foundations or ‘presuppositions’ (Platonic: ‘hypotheses’) of twofold Modern Rationalism, nucleus of the Western Enlightenment (= Lumières (Fr.), Enlightenment (Eng./USA), Aufklärung (Dt.)).

### **Modern medicine.**

Our established medicine prides itself on being one of the “shiniest” (*KF 20*: glamour) realizations of dual Rationalism.

Do we now examine, very briefly, how rational that medicine, with its biomedical paradigm, is and how it is rational (*KF 04; 14*). That is philosophy (ontology).

We rely on one article (from many texts): *Lynn Payer, Frontier Cases (Cultures in Western Medicine)*, in: *Nature and Technology* 59 (1991) : 6, 424/437.-- We take from it the essentials. The article begins with a singular-concrete model.

Marie R., a young woman from Madagascar, had complaints of hyperventilation, anxiety, fatigue, muscle twitching.



A French doctor interpreted those symptoms as spasmophilia, ailment caused by lack of magnesium. He prescribed magnesium for her, as well as acupuncture. He recommended returning to her parents to be cared for. Marie R. moved to the USA. The American doctors interpreted her syndrome as caused by anxiety.

*As an aside*, American doctors did not even know the term “spasmophilia,” although French doctors had already identified that phenomenon between 1970 and 1980. She underwent psychotherapy and was given tranquilizers. Marie seems to have been cured since then -- her question afterwards is, “What am I actually cured of?”

This small sample shows how place-bound, how environment-bound biomedical scientists act.

**1967.**-- The World Health Organization commissioned an investigation.-- The same death certificate was submitted to physicians from different countries. the interpretations differed as to the cause of death.

Lynn Payer adds, “The diagnoses of psychiatric symptoms also vary widely. Until a few years ago, a patient called ‘schizophrenic’ in the United States would probably be called ‘manic-depressive’ or ‘neurotic’ in England and ‘delusional-psychotic’ in France. (A.c., 426).- So much for diagnoses.

***Now the treatments or therapies.***

In France and Germany, doctors recommend numerous homeopathic medicines. The majority of American doctors reject homeopathy or as “unscientific.

Regarding prescription drugs, “Germans, for example, take about six times as many cardiac glycosides or cardiac stimulants as French or English, but only half as many antibiotics.” (A.c., 426).

For heart defects, in the U.S., bypass surgery and angiography, in which the heart is examined by computer, are used about six times more often than in England, where doctors are two to three times more likely than their U.S. counterparts to consider the techniques inappropriate for certain patients.

Research has shown that, in addition to the financial side, the medical assumptions differ.-- As 1993 approaches, united Europe faces a painful problem regarding prescription drugs: England, France and Germany have very different prescriptions!

### ***German prepositions.***

One could summarize with the term “heart-oriented”. -- An electrocardiogram, for example, is much more likely to be interpreted by a German physician as revealing cardiac abnormality than in the U.S. -- German criteria (standards of distinction) lead to abnormal ECGs in four out of ten people in a patient group versus one out of twenty when American standards are applied.

Fatigue is often referred to by German doctors as ‘Herzinsuffizienz’ (heart weakness); in France, England or the USA, ‘fatigue’ is “in fact not even referred to as a disease in the real sense.” “Herzinsuffizienz is at present the most common ailment treated by German physicians.” (A.c. 427v).-- Consequence: widespread use of cardiac glycosides.

Antibiotics.-- Colds, serious illnesses do not usually lead to prescription of antibiotics in Germany. Bronchitis has a list of five most commonly used drugs: antibiotics do not occur,

### ***French prepositions.***

“Every French schoolchild is urged to think like Descartes” (a.c., 429; *KF* 23). Outside France, people are suspicious: Cartesianism sometimes leads too easily to a sophisticated theory with too little evidence. Not long ago, French medics announced that they were using cyclosporine to treat AIDS. This while they had not looked at more than a week at only six patients”. (A.c., 429).

As in Germany, disease is understood to be caused not so much by an external attack as by the failure of internal defense mechanisms. In Germany one thinks of the heart or the circulatory system in particular (emphasized by Rudolf Virchow, past century).

In France, people think of “le terrain” (the constitution as a defense system). Consequence: “le terrain” is strengthened by fortifying drinks, vitamins, medicines and spas. Even according to Pasteur, the founder of microbiology, “le terrain” was a key issue.

Further consequence: French doctors are less concerned about germs than American ones. Higher levels of bacteria in food are acceptable. If someone presents with a fairly innocuous infectious disease, they can be kissed (bringing them into contact with possible pathogens, of course, but making them immune at the same time).

Until fourteen years ago - a press conference of French hepatologists (liver disease experts) pointed out the minor role of the liver - French doctors pointed out - not the heart as the German but - the liver as the cause of such complaints as headaches, coughs, impotence, youth pimples, dandruff. "Weak liver" or "crise de foie" then served as par excellence.

### ***English prepositions.***

Not the circulatory system (Dt.) or "le terrain" (Fr.), but external causes of illness serve as a means of indication. The role of antibiotics is very important here. "The English list of the twenty most prescribed drugs contains no less than three groups of antibiotics. The German top twenty, on the other hand, has not one". (A.c., 430).

### ***Minimization.***

English doctors prescribe about half as many drugs as French and German doctors, - half as often x-rays and, when they do, half as much film. The daily amount of vitamin C they recommend is half that in other countries. -- You have to be in much worse shape in England, generally speaking, to count as "sick," let alone eligible for treatment. Even when it comes to elevated blood pressure or cholesterol, the standard for "being sick" is higher in England' (A.c., 430).

### ***Financial Structure.***

In large part, this minimization is due to the way the English physician is paid.

**a.** French, American, and German physicians receive honorariums according to performance: the more prescriptions, treatments, referrals to specialists, the more honorariums!

**b.** English doctors receive either fixed salary or fee per patient: the ideal patient(s), therefore, is the one the doctor rarely consults at the same fee.

### ***Empiricism.***

Biomedical behavior in England has another prefix: in the empiricist wake of Francis Bacon, John Locke (*KF 24*), David Hume (1711/1776; final figure of the English Enlightenment), people in England diligently collect data from statistically sound, comparative clinical studies.

*As an aside*, placebos (fop treatments) are used more in this regard than in other countries.

### ***American preconceived notions.***

“American medicine can be characterized with one word: ‘aggressive’ This approach goes back at least to the time of Benjamin Rush, a physician of the XVIII century and one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence.” (A.c., 431v.). According to Rush, the major brake on the progress of medicine was relying too much on the healing powers of nature. Hence his fierce criticism of Hippocrates of Kos (-460/-377; Greek physician).

### ***Adlibs.***

Rush believed that the body contained about thirteen liters of blood,--about twice as much as in reality. Consequentially, he urged his followers to eliminate four-fifths of this via venesection.--“In essence, not much has changed: in America, surgery is applied more frequently and extensively than elsewhere. For example, the number of women who have the uterus removed or who undergo a caesarean section is at least twice as high as in most European countries, For bypass operations of the heart the percentage is even higher.” (A.c., 432).

### ***Attack drive.***

“Sensible or not, one always feels compelled to ‘do something’ even when it is far from certain whether a particular treatment will be good for the patient.-- That is why Americans are always ‘in’ for ‘something new’ especially when it comes to ‘new’ diagnostic tests and surgical techniques (....). Of course, sometimes an aggressive approach can save lives, but often the cure is worse than the disease.” (A.c., 432).

### ***Analogical reasoning.***

Even if it turns out that the benefits of a treatment in one group outweigh the disadvantages, American doctors tend to extend the favorable results to other groups of patients for whom this relationship is by no means established. “In America, doctors prescribe AZT to seropositive people. Some doctors, however, go even further: they also give this drug to women who have been raped by someone of unknown HIV status, - a group, therefore, that has only a small chance of being infected.” (Ibid.) The premise is, “It is better to do something than nothing.”

Unlike Frenchmen and Germans, Americans have no particular organ to which they attribute bun ailments,--perhaps because they prefer to think of themselves as “naturally healthy.”

***Exogenous causes.***

Obituaries in the U.S. hardly ever mention the fact that one perished from an endogenous cause: there is always - says Lynn Payer, a.c., 434v. - some external cause.

Analogously, one explains disease: a French doctor once said that “Americans only fear bacilli and communists.” The bacilli bias partly explains the high frequency of antibiotics. “American doctors appear to prescribe about twice as many antibiotics as Scottish ones. Americans also routinely dispense antibiotics for ailments such as earaches in children,--a treatment that is considered inappropriate in Europe.” (A.c., 436).

***Puritanism.***

This exaggerated fear of bacilli - literally Lynn Payer says - is also responsible for the puritanical views on hygiene (...) : the daily cleaning rituals, the avoidance at all costs of someone with a harmless infectious disease and the attempts to quarantine people with diseases known to be transmissible only through intimate contact.

***Lynn Payer’s General Decision.***

It is twofold.

1.-- Rational medicine “is not nearly as internationally valid a science as is often thought” (a.c.,437). What she calls “a grid of cultural values” filters biomedical information.-- Expressed in our terms: there is a Medical multiculturalism,-- not a monoculture. The choice -- sample (*KF 08: inductivism concerning axiomata*) -- of presuppositions - - stoicheia, elements (*KF 05: factor decomposition*) -- whether or not consciously committed in the various cultures limits biomedical practices to particularisms. Without universal value.-- Well, the basic interpretation of Modern Rationalism is that, subjectively speaking, reason is identical in all doctors and that, objectively speaking, the information that such a universal reason acquires is universally valid. --

2.-- The multiculturalism on biomedical praxis, empirically and experimentally, amounts to a kind of natural experiment. Doctors work, differently to a great extent, but -- says L. Payer-- mostly they do not realize this and do not see its experimental value.

***Conclusion*** .-- Reread *KF 11v. (ABC theory)* : doctors confronted with symptoms (A) interpret them according to private preconceptions (B) and thus arrive at different systems (C).

**Fourth sample : the principle of sufficient reason or ground.** (30/34).

We have named this as: *KF 08* (below),-- Factor Analytic (stechiotic) boils down to this: “Something (anything,-- a concoction, science fiction, the absurd in proving from the incongruous, -- a materially verifiable fact) necessarily has a ‘reason’ (= ‘ground’) by which it is intelligible (to our human minds yes, to every mind transparent). Either that reason or ground is to be found in that something or that reason or ground is to be situated outside that something. What the concept of totality (and divisibility of it into elements and parts) entails.-- In the language of Jevons-Lukasiewicz: “If A (reason, ground), then B (intelligible, sensible, transparent).” This constitutes the preface to any responsible reasoning.

**Bibl. sample :**

-- E. Oger, *Literature review (Rationality, its foundation and its samples)*, in: *Journal of Philosophy* 54 (1992): 1 (March), 87/106 (an extremely thorough study);

-- M. Fleischer, *Wahrheit und Wahrheitsgrund (Zum Wahrheitsproblem und zu seiner Geschichte)*, (Truth and Truth Ground (On the Problem of Truth and its History)), Berlin / New York, de Gruyter, 1984 (the age-old correspondence theory: knowledge corresponds to reality (correspondence theory));

-- P. Faucon de Boylesve, *Etre et savoir (Etude du fondement de intelligibilité dans la pensée médiévale)*, (Being and knowing (Study of the foundation of intelligibility in medieval thought), Paris, 1985 (truth is the showing of being).

-- *Forum Philosophie Bad Homburg*, Hrsg., *Philosophie und Begründung*, (Philosophy and Justification), Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 1987 (ten proposers on “justification” (justification) or “foundation” (grounding) in philosophy, -- following the *Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg*, June 1986);

-- A. Burms / H. De Dijn, *De rationaliteit en haar grenzen (Kritiek en deconstructie)*, (Rationality and its limits (Critique and deconstruction)), Leuven, 1986 (acting rationally seems to be a magic word today: yet it is limited);

-- K. Hart, *The Trespass of the Sign (Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy)*, Cambridge, Univ. Press, 1989 (Derridian of approach);

-- H. Parret, ed., *In all reasonableness (Views on the thinking, speaking and acting of reasonable man)*, Meppel / Amsterdam, 1990 (on “the reason” of reason).

**As an aside**, there has been an Institute for *Ultimate Reality and Meaning* (T.Horvath) and an accompanying journal, *Ultimate Reality and Meaning (Interdisciplinary Studies in the Philosophy of Understanding)*, since 1978.

*J. Derrida et autres, La faculté de juger* (The ability to judge ), (Colloque de Cerisy-la Salle 1982), Paris, Minuit, 1985, is a work in which six theorists write about judging (of a subject, originally, a proverb is claimed as a model). Judgments on scientific, artistic and aesthetic, ethical and political matters are examined with the major comprehensive premise of the great crisis of cultural values in our twentieth century. In a time characterized by a desperate search for new values for which and from which everyone can live, it is striking how no one thinks he/she possesses “the truth” in this matter on which he/she could rely (as a premise to make a justifiable (“justifiable”, “fundable”) judgment.

**By the way:** even the ordinary judgement - e.g. “I see it raining outside” - presupposes, among other things, “If A, then (here: if it is raining outside, then (I have the right to say) “I see it raining outside”. In other words: among other things the principle of necessary and sufficient reason or ground (which gives me the right to say something) is invariably presupposed as an ‘element’ (*KF 05: stoicheiosis*). Just that one little preposition justifies, ‘justifies’, ‘grounds’.

***Fundation(al)ism, foundation(al)ism criticism,***

Already *G.E. Moore* (1873/: 1958; Anglo-Saxon Analytic thinker), e.g. in his *The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception* (1905), talked about “How do we know that p ?” (How do we know that p, namely a judgment, is true, justifiable?). Not the genetic question - “How does my mind create this one - but rather “What is the justifying reason or ground of the statement or judgment ‘p’? “ was already the issue at that time.

In the year 1925 already (so many years before K. Popper’s work in 1934) - what is now called - Foundationalism, the belief that all statements have a foundation, a foundation, a logically rigorous formulaic preposition, was becoming a main issue for Moore.

The doubt about the absolutely provable “ground” or “reason” of all judgments, including the so-called “strictly scientific” ones (since Galilei and Descartes and Locke), is called “Foundationalism Criticism. One examines whether one can prove absolutely everything in the Enlightenment-Rationalist sense (pure or empirical).-- This then is the core of a Foundationalism-critical theory of judgment.

### ***The mirror man.***

We introduce this term following e.g. *Richard Rorty* (the title of his work translated into French is “*L ‘homme speculaire’*”). According to Rorty, what characterizes “all Western culture”, “since Platon” (an increasingly popular expression), is the fact that man considers himself to be “the mirror” or accurate representation, thanks to his mind of course, of reality.

One thinks of what Platon, with his predecessors, called “the noble yoke” (the model in my mind reflects, depicts the original in reality). Following in the footsteps of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Rorty believes he can replace this (= justification language) with a kind of Pragmatism.

Whereby the question arises, of course, whether the mind, the Pragmatic presuppositions handling mind, of Rorty thereby “reflects” reality better than e.g. Platon, Cfr. *P. Pekelharing, Richard Rorty (The mirror as an obstacle)*, in: *Streven* 1989: 7 (April), 614/627 (esp. 622).

### ***One consideration:***

Platon and the whole of Western culture have always realized that our mind is not a pure mirror of reality. But whether this necessarily-straight logically justifiable-should lead to the dismantling-deconstructing-the “whole of Western culture” in its philosophical foundation is another matter.

***As an aside:*** one of those typically Western-traditional solutions to the mirror problem can be found with *Cardinal John Henry Newman* (1801/1890). In his *Grammar of Assent* (1870), among others, he tries to ‘justify’ the judgment - among others of the ordinary person of every day - based on the fact that both in science and outside science we have at our disposal over time a series of probabilities which all or at least in the majority point in the same direction. This concurrence or ‘convergence’ of uncertain but nevertheless probable judgements means that we may ascribe some solid value to the (mirror) model in our minds.

Again: that’s just one attempt to “justify” the mirror model. At least as strictly logical as the Pragmatism of a Rorty. Because the Newman model amounts to a set of samples in reality that reinforce each other (*KF 07*, where talk about the summative induction or summary of a set of samples). Such a type of induction counts as sufficient reason!



### ***Redeeming.***

This expresses the “harmony of opposites” which is one of the premises or “backgrounds” of the more recent discussion both about the validity of reason (especially in its Modern Rationalist form) and about the principle of sufficient reason.

Already Kant, top figure in the critique of Rationalism before him (Hume was referred to by Kant among others), writes in passing that the boundaries that demarcate reason from nonsense or “unreasonableness” are very difficult to describe.

### ***Francisco Goya y Lucientes (1746/1828).***

The artwork - paintings, among others - of Goya exhibits “reason-and-unreason”. Some of his works reflect - he too was a mirror man - the idyllic-feminine side or aspect of human reality at that time. Another part, however, reflects, rendered crudely disorderly, the horror side or slant of the same human reality. Not without reason or ground - one sees it: that principle works throughout - *E. Oger, Rationality, its ground and its monsters*, 105v., pauses at Goya.

### ***“El sueño de la razón produce monstruos”.***

“The dream of reason brings forth monsters” (thus Oger translates), is the title of one of Goya’s drawings: someone (perhaps Goya himself) is overcome by sleep and lying on a table; he is living through a nightmare. Above the dreamer, a pair of black-spotted birds are visible. Owls, it seems. Also bats, crows etc. (‘night birds’).

This drawing is situated in a series titled “Los Caprichos” (The Whims), probably drawn by Goya a few years after the French Revolution, the achievement, at the time, par excellence of French Enlightened Rationalism (1793+).

**a.** Goya was “convinced” (that also the French Revolution was only one sample among possible other samples (*KF 08: axiomatic inductivism*), only penetrated his “Modern rationality” afterwards) supporter of the Lumières and Revolution.

**b.** yet, in his drawing, reason itself is asleep-dreaming: it gorges itself on deliriousness about “absolute revolution” etc. and it generates monsters.

What does this reflect? The fact that Goya was the witness to the fact that Rationalism, in the context of its Revolution, led to reign of terror, “terror.

KF. 34.

Together with his total deafness, the failure of the Revolution led to a profound crisis of values (= cultural crisis): "He no longer shared the unconditional optimism of the Age of Enlightenment where, in the aspirations of reason itself, the guillotine looms. The reason of "Les Lumières" necessarily produces monsters". (A.c., 106).

*As an aside*, Platon had already realized, in the wake of predecessors, that night dreams disable reason and pave the way for the unrede. We saw this briefly in *E.PL.PSY. 83/89 (Soul and Night)*: the criminal and especially the 'turannos' the dictator expose what is at work in them in the nightly humming of reason.

Goya does nothing but actualize and re-establish Platon (Herodotos, Sophocles) in Enlightenment-Rationalist context. - Immediately, this is a pragmatic argument from what reason (and its revolutionaries) produces, its effects, its true nature appears! The tree is known by its 'fruits'. The autonomous - freed from the clergy and the monarchy - reason replaced what went before with what it 'dreamed': the difference with what went before did not, in Goya's eyes, appear so great. Only this: the Christian monarchies did it "in the name of God"; the French Revolutionaries did it "in the name of autonomous reason".

Each time "in the name of," i.e., on the basis of presuppositions or "sufficient reasons. The very principle of necessary and sufficient reason is thereby compromised in the eyes of Goya and many others. That rough and raw action "in the name of" presuppositions made the expression "in the name of" (as Fr. Lyotard rightly points out) seem suspicious.

Now culture is nothing but a number of 'names' (preconceived values) in the name of which one e.g. labels as normal and permissible and as abnormal and forbidden (*KF 21: Culture and normality*), yes, exterminable all that does not correspond to the preconceived values.

Thus the Christian (or rather, pseudo-Christian) monarchs oppressed and exterminated "in the name of" a Christian culture. Thus in turn oppress and eradicate from the autonomous, religion-free systems generated by Modern reason-and-unreason! It is to doubt any culture and all cultural representations "in the name of which" one oppresses and eradicates (the so-called group dynamics).

***Fifth sample: The sufficient reason in Kafka's works. (35/39)***

"If Z, then S. Well, S. So Z"-

Z' stands for 'sin, guilt'; 'S' for punishment. Thus we elucidate one of the fundamental structures of Kafka's work. What follows will be one long commentary on this reductive (Platonic- analytic; *KF 08* ('*Analisis*')) reasoning. Moreover, it is, in Platonic terms, lemmatical-analytical.

Reductive reasoning sometimes works with unknowns, but one can pretend to already know those unknowns. One then introduces a lemma or tangentially preliminary phrase or symbol. Here 'x', Why? Because in Kafka's eyes the sin debt that 'justifies' the punishment as its necessary and sufficient reason is an unknown debt.

Consequence According to the expert Schoeps, the reductive reasoning in Kafka's works reads as follows: "If X. then S. Well, S. So X". Modern reason is unable to specify our cultural crisis, interpreted as a punishment by Kafka. Also: that same Modern reason comes to an absurd experience: "If X, then A. Well, A. So X". Translated into words, "If the necessary and sufficient reason is an unknown, then there is absurdity (incomprehensibility, absurdity, incongruity). Well, there is absurdity. So there is an unknown sufficient reason or ground". Cfr. *KF 30*.-- We now explain this.

***Franz Kafka* (1883/1924).**

The terms "Kafkaesque" or even "Kafkaesque" have become commonplace since a few decades. *Kafka's* works - think, among others, of *The Trial* - are among the most widely read in the world. They are translated into many languages. They are filmed, adapted for the stage and yes, set to music. They are even presented as reading material in secondary schools, because, especially since the Second World War (1939/1945), Kafka is considered to be world literature.

Some say that as many commentaries have been devoted to Kafka as to Shakespeare. -- This is notwithstanding the fact that the atmosphere of Kafka's works is "harmony of opposites": they attract through a peculiar magic; they repel through an "Unheimlichkeit" (an atmosphere of unsafety, of incongruity). For younger, unformed people in particular, this is often a tough sell, - all the more so since the teachers leave them to their inability to process Kafka, at least in a balanced way.

**Bibl. sample** : it is impossible work, but one work we pick out *H.-J. Schoeps, On Man (Reflections of Modern Philosophers)*, Utr./Antw., 1966, 119/141 (*Franz Kafka: faith in tragic position*),-- because this work keeps necessary and sufficient reason central.

***Kafka's work: ambiguous.***

Kafka provoked conflicting interpretations. And indeed: he is multi-interpretable. So e.g. A. Camus (1913/1960; his *L'homme révolté* (The revolting man ), (1951) was contested by both right-wing and left-wing (Sartre a.o.) politicians) indicates Kafka is “existentially” oriented and so he says: “In any case, Kafka’s work reflects the problem of the incongruous (= absurd) in its entirety” (cited by *W.J. Simons, Timeless topicality of Kafka only belatedly recognized*, in: *Spectator* (Ghent) 30.08.1983, 36).

Thus, psychiatrists such as *Dr. Hesnard, L'univers morbide de la faute*, (The morbid universe of the fault,), Paris, 1949 (last chapter, psychologically (possibly-which is fashionable-psychoanalytically), yes; as a neurological and/or psychiatric case.

What Hesnard calls “the world of sin guilt,” in the most tragic degree, may then be central: “This dark and incongruous, incomprehensible and tyrannical guilt weighed leadenly on the whole existence of this artist.” (O.c., 441s.).

Hesnard adds, “More than that : Kafka behaved - throughout his life and in all the fields in which he was active - like a guilty person who cannot ascertain the exact nature of an unforgivable error. Well, precisely that ‘Kafkaesque’ world - he described it in all his works - is our pathological world of guilt.” (Ibid.).

As we said, “If x, i.e. unforgivable yet untraceable error, then absurdity impression. Well, absurdity impression. So somewhere an unforgivable but unidentifiable ground error”. With such an ‘x’ Kafka lived . Whether the relations with his parents (especially his authoritarian father) are the necessary and sufficient reason for this, as mainly psychoanalysts claim, seems to us radically unproven. The absurdity impression extends far beyond e.g. the father figure (unless one identifies that father figure with the absolute self,--which actually only makes the degree of tragedy in Kafka “understandable”).

**Note:** In passing: *Dr. med. Trygve Braat'y, Uit de praktijk van een psychiater (Een populaire inleiding tot de medische psychologie en de psychiatrie)*, (From the practice of a psychiatrist (A popular introduction to medical psychology and psychiatry), ), Utrecht, 1939, 180/190 (*Enige beschouwingen over de religie in de psychiatrie*), (Some reflections on religion in psychiatry) can point out to us the fallacy of those who interpret the necessary and sufficient reason of the typical Kafkaian existence purely psychoanalytically. "If one is involved in psychiatric work, one will be struck by how many patients fret over religion and morality. The problems in the field of morality almost always bear a more or less clear stamp of religious sinfulness.

Very striking -- and often as the predominant feature of the clinical picture -- are such debilitating states of anxiety in -- what is called -- "the melancholic depression." (O.c., 180).-- Braatoy, as an "understanding" physician, addresses the vital question, "Why / why does this disease manifest itself as an incessant, religious nightmare in which the patient(s) is not left alone for a moment by his burden of sin, his regret and repentance?" (ibid.).

Steller says: The way in which a melancholic/melancholic person poses the psychiatric problem, -- the language he/she uses, reminds one a great deal of "the religion lesson of our youth" (o.c., 189). For from such a god one cannot expect an understanding of his difficulties" (o.c.,189).

**Note:** In Kafka's case, we are talking about an "absolute" reason or ground, not just the transient father figure: what Braatoy says brings us much closer to that religious reason or ground.

What Schoeps says reinforces this impression. Which gives us the typical religious interpretation.

### ***H.-J. Schoeps.***

We dwell at length on someone who:

**a.** with Max Brod, Kafka's friend, *Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer* (When building the Great Wall of China ), (1931), excerpts from Kafka's estate, ed,

**b.** of Jewish descent and typical Jewish-Christian, was well placed to penetrate Kafka's living world.-- This then is an authority argument,--which is not without far-reaching value.

### ***The laws, the deviations and the feedback.***

The pre-Socratic thinkers usually assumed that the cosmos is purposeful, indeed, purposefully guided by high deities. Any deviation therefore provokes a “corrective” (“feedback” say today’s cyberneticians) through which the purposefulness and even the purposeful divine universe policy makes itself felt in the form of calamity, sensed as a kind of punishment.-- Something analogous exhibits the Biblical revelation.

1.-- Schoeps, o.c., 123vv, begins with a little work by *Kafka, Zur Frage der Gesetze*, (On the question of laws), which deals with the “laws” known in Jewish circles.

This is what the theologians - including the Chassidim, whom Kafka describes as a kind of ‘nobility’ - are talking about. Kafka, however, feels he is an “ignoramus” (am ha-arez). Yet he is an “ignoramus” who has gotten so far in the analysis of “the laws” that he wonders if those laws are not sometimes sham laws.

Schoeps: “Kafka lives in the constant impression that he is governed by laws he does not know” (o.c.,123), For, in fact, phenomenally (as far as experiential, directly perceptible) the only visible - and tangible law is the ‘nobility’ of theologians who, for the benefit of “the people” (am ha-arez), interpret them as interpreters of “the law”.

2.-- Schoeps, o.c., 124vv.-- The great mass of “the people” (am ha-arez) - in contrast to the lawgivers - “the nobility” - departed from “the laws”.

3.-- Schoeps, *ibid.*-- An aberration -- interpreted in a right-believing Orthodox Jewish sense amounts to a God judgment (gesera). - Kafka’s story, *In the trail of a Dog*, expresses this painful God-judgment through allusions.

A dog tells how “the people” of the “dogs” have gone astray many generations ago. This error or guilt of sin weighs heavily on the present canine genus which **a.** carries the burden of it, **b.** but cannot interpret it (‘x’).

### ***Note -- The Talmud***

Literally “study” or “teaching” -- The Talmud is a sacred Jewish book, in which theological insights of Old Testament Law scholars are stored. These include the *Talmud of Jerusalem* and the *Talmud of the Babylonians* (by *Rab Asji* (352/427) and his successors).

***If A and B, then C.***

Reread *KF 11 (ABC theory)*.-- If one knows A and the prepositions B, by which one signifies A, then one possesses the sufficient reason or ground to understand C - in this case: Kafka's reaction to lived calamity. The Talmud, in the wake of the Old Testament teachings, strongly determined Kafka's 'B'.

1. *The Talmud (Sanhedrin 97a)* contains a prophecy of doom: one day, at the end of earthly history, the end times (eschatological perspective) will come; it will be "a time of terrors of all kinds"; the return (Christian), the coming (Jewish) of the Messiah will then be near. Then "the faces of the end-time people will be like the faces of dogs."-- This reminds one of the apocalypse or end-time revelation of e.g. the prophet Daniel and others.

2. It is as if, for Kafka, that prediction of a harsh, 'bizarre' (incomprehensible - uncanny) end time is materializing in our XX- st century. This bizarre atmosphere is an element or sufficient reason to understand how, for Kafka, our present existence means 'end time existences', the end of history.

***Schoeps:*** What *The tracks of a Dog* says about our "dog culture" (from a Jewish point of view), that fact is "essentially found in all of Kafka's literary works." With the absurd: the forgetting of actually is the sufficient reason or ground of the present cultural crisis (o.c., 12). Thus literally Schoeps. Which again demonstrates the history of mentality as a factor of text comprehension,

***Just like the atheistic Nietzsche.***

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844/1900; the thinker on the fact of Western nihilism or devaluation of (higher) values) is, in this context, quoted by Schoeps:

"The most important events find it most difficult to access the senses."-- For example, the fact that the Christian God is dead. The fact that, in what we experience, there is no longer heavenly goodness and guidance, no longer a divine justice, and -- generally speaking -- not even an immanent morality (*note:* a directly perceptible morality) perceptible.-- That is the terrible news which still needs a few centuries to penetrate the feeling of Europeans. Then, for a time, it will seem as if all 'weight' had disappeared from things (*Morgenröte (Dawn), (1882)*)" (O.c., 119).

***Sixth sample: The 'model' of the unknown reason or ground (40/42)***

How does Kafka arrive at judgments about "the unknown ground"? A judgment - we saw (*KF 31*) - includes an original (here: the 'x') about which a model (the saying) provides information. We dwell, then, on the artist Kafka and his art of nevertheless characterizing the 'lemma' (the wanted that one enters as 'known').

Kafka was, as Schoeps claims, a Jew by birth. Beliefs that in the eyes of his contemporaries - and perhaps in his own - had become "mythical" (understand: "good for Primitives"), under the demythologizing pressure of Enlightened Rationalism, nevertheless made him look again and again for what in Jewish parlance is called "the law". According to Schoeps, what in Kafka's eyes is the disaster consists in the fact that present-day mankind, deprived as it is of the notion of being a creature of God, - one thinks of Skepticism (only the directly tangible exists for sure), Agnosticism (one knows nothing about what exceeds the phenomena), Atheism (God does not exist) - loses the traits that precisely characterize them as a person(s), and, therefore,

- a. individually becomes a "thing" or "inanimate thing" and
- b. grows socially into a nameless mass. Cfr. o.c., 131.

***An artistic model.***

In Kafka's artist's imagination, the becoming like a thing e.g. is elaborated into a ghostly creature - reread *KF 33: black-spotted birds* (by Goya) - He calls it "odradeck". In Slavic, that means something like "got out of line. Deviated.

Seen in this way, man of today is more and more "dog man," without an "I. Rather, he is an "it," just like the objects he increasingly avails himself of in technological society. Thus Odradeck "takes on the meaningless - absurd - form of a spool of thread" (Schoeps, o.c., 131). Thus, he has become "an automatic running mechanism."

***The process.***

Cast in a descriptive-narrative form, what Kafka senses, senses as the basic structure of our culture, is called "*Der Prozess*." (The trial) It has a twofold structure:

- a. she is "an enigma";
- b. she is "an unraveling" of it.-- Think of the working-class person or even the educated intellectual: "Where did I earn that?" Socio-cultural: "Where did we earn such a thing?"



*A narrative model.* - As an artistic model, one can take *Der Prozess*.

**(1). *The conundrum.***

Joseph K. is being sued by a mysterious and higher court. The file containing the charges is not accessible to either Joseph K. or his lawyers.

**(2) *The unravelling.***-- Joseph K. attempts to trace the guilt for which he is being prosecuted. He therefore appeals to lawyers, their main task being to guess the offence, "To deduce from the interrogations the contents of the file which forms the basis of it,--that is very difficult." (O.c., 130). Schoeps, o.c., 129: "So from the character and form of the punishment one must try to find the 'x' of the sin,--even though a real verification cannot succeed.

This is precisely what happens in Kafka's work. Both in the great novels and in the short stories this motif recurs again and again as a tendency: to want to determine from the nature of the punishment (*op.*: model) the essence of the guilt (*op.*: original, i.e. the reason)."

***Tragedy or redemption from tragedy?***

***Bibl. sample :*** *Karl Jaspers, Ueber des Tragische*, (About the tragic), Munich, Jaspers (1883/1969; physician-psychiatrist and also 'existential' thinker) says that 'tragedy' presupposes as a necessary condition impermanence, yes, actual downfall. But that is only the tragic situation: 'tragic' in the full sense of that word is only the awareness of it. *Cfr. KF 17 (situational)*. *Cfr Jaspers, o.c., 18.*

The response to such a challenge (*KF 17*) is, normally, to look forward to redemption.-- That hope for redemption from a hopeless situation is what makes, according to Jaspers, the tragic hero different from the merely impermanent or subsuming figure.

Is Kafka's work, now, "tragic" in that sense? O.i. yes! For him, the thoughtful Kafka, the 'dog's' life today is in a state of transience and ruin. But - and this was maintained by Max Brod in Brussels, September 1967, in a lecture on his friend - "Kafka only aspired to a pure world view and a brighter future."

Schoeps confirms this: in Kafka lived - o.c., 140 - the messianic hope. Admittedly in a tragic situation: "the myth of faith in a tragic situation". In other words: situatively there was powerlessness-tragedy; existentially there was will-tragedy.

***History of salvation / history of doom.***

“The apostasy (of men) from the law of revelation makes history the history of human calamity. This makes itself known as increasing removal of the world from its revealed destiny path. This by a single rushing series of destruction which, judged by human blindness, must be regarded precisely as “higher development and constructive progress.” (Schoeps, o.c., 125).

**Note:** -- The terms “higher development” and “constructive progress” overwhelmingly refer to two main conceptions of Modern Rationalism of enlightened minds. Kafka, Postmodern, identifies Modern reason as “human blindness.” Which in turn makes him comparable to Goya (*KF 33*), for whom “the dream of reason produces monsters.”

We say ‘Postmodern’, because anyone who distances himself from reason as well as from two of its hobbyhorses, higher development (as opposed to, for example, the dark, i.e. unenlightened Middle Ages) and constructive progress, is no longer ‘Modern’ but is situated after the end of Modernity. Such a person is Post.modern.

***The reason or ground, one last time.***

Schoeps, o.c., 125.--”It is debt, therefore,--in its essence admittedly no longer knowable debt, which has darkened the world to such an extent that its order can no longer grasp the true word. This is because the pressure of the centuries has already made that word too fixed and the ‘dogs’ too ‘dog-like’.”

In other words, expressed in biblical terms, the “heart and kidneys of present-day mankind have become petrified” and no longer even comprehend that God once addressed the entire human race through wise men, priests, prophets and apocalyptists. That “true word” has become repressed and suppressed.

So much so that the tragic situation is almost not realized anymore (among the Enlightenment optimists, for example, but also among so-called Bible believers,--which S. Kierkegaard has touched upon).

The will to salvation is there but it turns all too much to pacifiers (the dreams of reason). Apocalyptically, then, present-day humanity is up to absolute tragedy: it does not even realize that there is guilt,-- let alone that it would trace it as a “sufficient reason or ground” of its emergency like the awakened Kafka; it sleeps in the midst of ruin.

**Seventh sample: “The Other. Of Reason”. (43/48)**

**Bibl. sample :** E. Oger, *Rationality, Its Ground and Its Samples*, 97/ 106.-- “What is this ‘other’ in the name of which one sometimes thinks one can subject reason to a critique? (...) Or must such criticism -- when it wants to speak -- always and necessarily speak in the name of reason itself?”.

Behold how Oger articulates the theme. The problem is the same as the one we have broached in the preceding chapters - samples: rational people commit errors (Goya, Kafka), -- in Biblical language: ‘sins’ (‘sin debts’). Is it reason itself that is (let us express it meanly but eloquently) ‘perverted’ (‘depraved’) or does it act rationally yet under the pressure of “the other” which then is ‘perverted’ and communicates its ‘perversity’, imposes it on reason which - of itself - is ‘pure’? That is the question.

**What does one understand by “normal”?**

We saw it very briefly - *KF 21 (Culture and normality)*: - a set of values, even when it is presupposed by Enlightened reason as a “necessary and sufficient reason or ground” in the name of which that reason decides about normality and non-normality, is always “source” (reason) of “normalization” (normalization declaration).

But let us leave this general domain and take a singular-concrete example.-- X, *Psychology: Is perversion normal?*, in: *Petra* (Hamburg) 1991: September.-- The text reads, “*Sex fantasies involving overwhelm and perversion are much more frequent than hitherto assumed,-- also among women (...)*).

1. “Most people often live through sex fantasies, Ald. Dr. David Barlow, director of the Program for Sexual Research (State University of New York). “Some fantasies are so extravagant that they prefer to keep them quiet.”

2. An Australian study shows it: the depiction of sexual perversions eroticizes women. Women find it particularly titillating when they imagine themselves, in the game of love, being spied upon,--when they imagine themselves spying on others involved in sex,--when they are compelled in her imaginings to commit sex.

**Note:** Tacitly but correctly, the article assumes that said men and especially women are “normal” and thus possess “normal reason.

'Normal' has at least two distinguishable meanings:

- a. is normal all that does not deviate from a predefined norm;
- b. is normally all that is peculiar to (at least half of) a population.

Here: "much more frequently than hitherto assumed", "most people"! That is the meaning **b.** But the title of the article "Is perverse (non-normal in the meaning **a.** ) normal (in the meaning **b.**)?" includes the two distinct meanings simultaneously.

This implies that the more something-a form of behavior-is frequent among the population, the more normal it can become! Even when everyone admits that those high-frequency phenomena are non-normal, 'perverse'.

This is the result of one of the Modern achievements of a "rational" nature, namely, statistics.-- The fact that "rational" has two distinguishable "normalities" at work at the same time points to "the otherness of reason.

a. 'Reasonable' is a statistical observation (a statistical induction viz. works with percentages);

b. 'Unreasonable' because 'perverse' is the determination of things that are against the rational breast. The element 'unreasonable' which is declared 'reasonable' by being frequent notwithstanding its abnormality, proves that "other of reason" in reason itself.

Put less stylistically, reason is amenable to more than one use of reason. Among others, one normal and one non-normal. Statistical reason and ethical reason are two distinct 'functions' ('roles') of the same reason.

**Michel Foucault** (1926/1984)

First Structuralist, then Poststructuralist).-- The critique of reason by this French thinker is summarized by Oger as follows.

He draws on *Foucault's* well-known work *Histoire de la folie à l' âge classique* (History of madness in the classical age), (1961). Radical critique of Reason as understood by les Lumières! In which Foucault "seeks liberation from the 'dungeon' of Reason" (a.c., 96).

The question of whether he is now criticizing Reason from within Reason itself seems possible. The question of whether he is criticizing Reason from "the other of Reason" (a higher agency or position than the supreme Reason) also seems possible. In the latter case of course, Foucault is "a Romantic 'rationalist'" who situates the other of Reason in madness - la folie. Madness would then have as its reason or ground the madness itself (and not Reason).

***The language of Reason is also the language of establishment.***

Behind this Foucaultian Critique of Reason, his “subversive politics” emerges: “The language of Reason has always been the language of ‘order’,--of an order that pushes out, excludes, imprisons.”

This is the group dynamics inherent in a rigid value system, whether Christian or Enlightenment-Rationalist.-- That is precisely why Foucault no longer wants to speak about “the other of Reason” -- the madness of psychiatric cases -- in the language of Reason but in a language that is that of vice, madness. With such a language one does not barbarically imprison insane persons, e.g. -- The Reason against which Foucault responds is the Reason that sows terror, that makes blood flow,-- the Reason that Bertrand d’Astorg, at the time, called the sufficient reason of “I’ univers concentrationnaire”.-- Thus Foucault, still in 1977, says: ... “Die Folter, das ist die Vernunft” (Torture,-- that is the Reason) (in an interview with K. Boesers; a.c., 100).-- Conclusion: one feels Foucault’s Anarchism.

**Note.**-- At the end of his life, Foucault reads Kant, the top figure of the German Aufklärung, - indicating a turning point in his thinking.

***Hartmut und Gernot Böhme. Das Andere der Vernunft.***

The night side of Reason is also discussed in their work *Das Andere der Vernunft (Zur Entwicklung von Rationalitätsstrukturen am Beispiel Kants)*, (The Other of Reason (On the Development of Rationality Structures on the Example of Kant)), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1983.

The Böhme brothers also want to continue the radical critique of Reason, no longer from the point of view of Reason, but from the point of view of “the other of Reason”, namely, madness with, in addition, everything that can be “irrational” (logical: the alogical, ontological: the unreal, ethical: the morally improper). The Böhme’s situate this irrational in ‘nature’ (as pre- and irrational reality), the human body, fantasy, desire, feelings. I.e., “in all that could not be conquered by Reason.” -- As omnipresent Unreason -- in all the enumerated realities -- the Böhme’s find “the ever-active force” which manifests itself in every action, including that of Reason!

***The power of Reason is also the power that wants to control everything.***

That Reason therefore emits or silences all that resists it. She is after all ‘narcissistic’, self-absorbed. That contains her madness. After all, she denies “anything other than Reason!” -- One feels the critique of Reason by Fr. Nietzsche and ... of M. Foucault!

**Note** - The Böhme 's put "the ever-working force" at the center. They are not alone in this, even if it is within a partially different cultural system.

**a. Kurt Leese, *Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion***, (Right and limit of natural religion,), Zurich, Morgarten, 1954, represents, in a Biblical perspective, what he calls "a religion of nature" that bears strong resemblances to the Irrationalism of a moment ago. Johann G. von Herder (1744/1803; German theologically oriented thinker and poet), in his Bückeburger period (= 1771/1776), and Friedrich D, Schleiermacher (1768/1834; theologically oriented thinker), in his well-known *Reden über die Religion* (Talking about the religion), (1799) were of the opinion that 'living' religion not so much 'Reason', concepts 'general truths'; 'law' constitute the essence of religion but rather revelation emerging in the course of history, individuality, animated intuition, living feeling.

What the Rationalists call "natural religion" falls under rational religion; what Herder and Schleiermacher advocate is "romantic" religion. Romanticism, after all, does not put "Reason" at the center but "life." Nature around us (as a landscape), the body, eroticism, women, mysticism and magic etc., are signs of 'life'. And thus "religious".

Which does not prevent Leese, as a fundamentally Biblically oriented thinker, o.c. 295ff., from clearly seeing "the demonics" of that same life. I.e.: the duality of life or, with W.B. Kristensen expressed, its "harmony of opposites". Herein lies the difference with the Böhme 's who include "the demons" (the alogical, the unreal things, the morally improper conduct).

**b. David Herbert, *Lawrence*** (1885/1930)

This English writer is well known for his vitality novels which provoked such exasperation for their blatant display of "life." "My great religion is a belief in the blood, the flesh as being wiser than the intellect",-- such is his creed. Strong biological-erotic life linked, of course, to "nature" as cosmos understood: "I am a part of the sun as my eye is a part of me. That I am a part of the earth, my feet know perfectly, and my blood is a part of the sea". Thus Lawrence in his *Apocalypse*.

Lawrence knows himself to be “the proclaimer of the life of the whole man”. He knows himself to be a “living” man who, from the physical reality with which he sees himself situated on earth, steps into life from the unbroken, “primary” biological functions of “blood and instinct”, convinced of its (re)vitalizing power or energy.

Especially sexuality is at the core of his cosmic-vitalistic religion. But beware: he has never defended a pure ‘animalism’ (ideal of perdition) or a destruction of the spirit like the amoral Erskine Caldwell.

Cfr. *P. De Wispelaere, D.H. Lawrence: preacher of vitalism*, in: *De Vlaamse Gids* 37 (1953): 6 (June), 368/375.-- Again: Lawrence like the Böhme’s takes the ‘demons’ in there but he wants a religion of nature, because he, like Leese (Herder, Schleiermacher), is convinced that “reason” destroys ‘life’, by ‘devitalization’ (the all too strong rational and moralizing of ‘Reason’ kills every ‘vitality’).

It is fascinating to compare Foucault, the Böhme ‘s, Leese (Herder, Schleiermacher), D.H. Lawrence: all of them engage in reason criticism but with variants. Yet - what is striking - Foucault and the Böhme ‘s seek it in “the otherness of reason” while the others seek it in “the vital or rather the revitalized life”.

#### ***The critique of J. Derrida and J. Habermas.***

Oger, a.c., 102/104.-- Both Postmodernists put a question mark over Foucault and the Böhme’s. They consider it impracticable, i.e. unjustifiable, to articulate madness (the Reason) from within madness itself: Foucault and the Böhme’s ‘dream’, when they imagine they can ‘criticize’ that same Reason from something other than Reason.-- “Always it is Reason itself that subjects a specific form of this Reason, to criticism.” (A.c., 103),-- Compare with that what was said *KF 44* (statistical reason / ethical reason as two roles of the same reason). That is one.

Yet there is more: Foucault argues that “Reason” sweeps away differences through its universal pretensions: the singular, the particular are stifled. Habermas believes that “Reason itself is the source of a multiplicity of interpretations”.

*As an aside*, we made that clear *KF 23/29*, where the many cultures on medicine (rational medicine) were discussed.

### ***Reason and Madness.***

*P. Friedrich, Hrsg., Wilhelm Waiblinger, Der kranke Hölderlin (The sick Hölderlin), (1830-1), Leipzig, Xenien, s.d..*

Friedrich Hölderlin (1770/1843), the well-known great German poet, became insane in 1804. This does not prevent him from being provided with profound comments by Martin Heidegger, for example.-- Friedrich quotes a Dr. Lange who says the following. "Apart from everything that is useful and of real interest or represents real progress, the mass of people is always fascinated by everything that is new and truly original. Further, all that occurs with great self-confidence inspires its respect. Even everything that is difficult: difficult to do, difficult to understand,--all that cannot be explained on the basis of the psychology of the everyday, all that is psychically mysterious and enigmatic. All that arose 'unconsciously' is also situated here. The masses love strong contrast effects, have a preference for everything that is striking and extreme. Powerful passions drag it along or compel its mute admiration. And, if a movement of feeling does not shrink from sacrificing life, such a sacrificial death still exerts an attraction on the masses."

**a.** Much of what is listed comes from the supernormal (das Uebernormale), the healthy real genius. Such an influence on humanity is understandable.

**b.** But much of it belongs in a disease of the mind (Geisteskranke). From this emerges something truly new and unusual,-something original. Here we often find a compelling self-confidence. Here also all that is psychologically difficult, all that is mysterious and enigmatic,--all that cannot be understood. Many diseases of the mind really show something striking and extreme; often enough they display outbursts of 'wild' temper which do not even shrink from death.-- Thus part of Hölderlin's influence coincides with the influence exerted on the masses by all that is mentally ill." (O.c., 9/10).

We saw it (*KF 21, 34, 43*): a culture defines what is "normal" and "above normal" and "below normal. Curious to the modern Reason of the masses - and of more than one intellectual - is that the non-normal exercises such prestige. There is something in many people that commands admiration and wonder for "the other than reason" or perhaps for "the other of reason." In the latter case, "Reason" or "reason" itself would be in bad shape.



***Eighth sample: the turnaround to the contrary.*** (49/52)

Beginning with a book, viz.

-- Jon Elster, *Ulysses and the Sirens (Studies in Rationality and Irrationality)*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press / Paris, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1979-1, 1984-2;

-- id., *Sour Grapes (Studies in the Subversion of Rationality)*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press / Paris, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1983.

Elster, from the humanities ("Social Sciences"), defines "rationality" as the human ability to deliberately ("Intention") consider the future.

In the biological sciences one can speak of 'purposefulness' such that there is 'functional adaptation' to the changing conditions in which 'life forms' are situated. But with that 'functionalism' one does not get around once it concerns humans and typically human life: there - to follow Elster's language - 'intentionalism' (= purposefulness in adaptation) prevails.

Elster, in both works, also studies the unsupported forms of rational life and, of course, also the so-called irrational life phenomena. Behold the differential with which Elster works.

It is well known to all Platonists that Platon gives priority to the 'nous' (Lat.: Intellectus), spirit, both in the individual and in the polis and in the cosmos (*KF I; 16 (op. )*). Still - and here again the fact that Platonic sentences have to be interpreted restrictively shows itself - it strikes him how 'ananke', necessity (to include the non-spiritual element), the second, opposite aspect of individual, polis, cosmos 'reigns' beside the 'nous' or spirit (with a.o. its purposefulness). One may safely equate 'ananke' in part with what we now call "the irrational".

***Lot analysis.***

Fate is that which is 'ananke', that which happens to us incomprehensibly to our minds. Usually fate analysis comes up in what is called 'philosophy of history': actual history, after all, is more a series of events that are unpredictable, 'chaotic', 'irrational' than purposefully achieved - 'intentional' (Elster's lingo) - facts.

*Karl Löwith* (1897/1973). *Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen*, (World history and salvation events), in: *W. Otto u.a., Anteile (Martin Heidegger zum 60 Geburtstag)*, (Shares, Martin Heidegger on his 60th birthday), Frankfurt a. M. 1950, 150, writes: “However inconceivable it may seem to begin with, namely the fact that the radical secularization has its origin in a religious ‘Entweltlichung’ (*note*: to withdraw from this world), this would nevertheless only confirm a general rule of history : in the process of history something else always emerges than what was intended at the beginning of a movement (...).

The great innovators of history prepare for others the paths which they themselves do not tread”. In other words : our Reason or our Reason does decide but fate - the fates - dispose!

### ***Applicable models.***

Karl Löwith comments.

**1. J.-J. Rousseau** (1712/1778), prepared the French Revolution (1789/1799). But he would not have recognized himself in Maximilien de Robespierre (1758/1794; Robespierre played a decisive role in “la Terreur,” the Reign of Terror, from May 1793 to July 27, 1794. Such a brutal dictatorship was not deliberately envisioned in Rousseau’s mind, quite the contrary.

**2. Karl Marx** (1818/1883) prepared the Russian Revolution (February/October 1917). The Bolsheviks, the majority, took power (they had defeated the Mensheviks, the minority, in Brussels and in London, at the 1903 Congress. Vladimir Lenin (1870/1924; founder of Bolshevik Marxism) continued a brutal repression that plagued the Soviet Union for seventy years. But Marx, who was more likely to mean the constitutions of what was then Switzerland or the U.S., would not have recognized himself in Lenin.

**3. Friedrich Nietzsche** (1844/1900), through his aristocratic nihilism, prepared the Fascist-Nazi Revolution. In 1942, in the encounter of the Brenner Pass, Adolf Hitler (1889/1945) gifted the works of Friedrich Nietzsche to his ally Benito Mussolini (1883/1945; Italian dictator, founder in 1919 of the Fascist party, proponent, like the National Socialist, of a “totalitarian regime”). But Nietzsche would not have recognized himself in Hitler.

We can add other examples ourselves.

**A. Weber**, *Histoire de la philosophie européenne*, (History of European philosophy), Paris, 1914-8, 234, claims that William of Ockham (1295/1350; Nominalist), with his “revolutionary” action aimed at purging and renewing the Catholic Church, really meant well.

His renewal movement, however, ended in the shaking off by the laity - especially some princes - of “the yoke of Christian Rome, something Occam (a second writing) would not have wanted.

*As an aside*, that William of Occam gained unsuspected fame in the novel *Il nome della rosa* (*The Name of the Rose*, Milan, 1980; basis of the film of the same name), translated into many languages, by the Italian semiotician *Umberto Eco* (1932/ 2016).

**Other model.-Maarten Luther** (1483/1545 German Reformer).

According to *Joseph Lortz*, *Die Reformation in Deutschland*, (The Reformation in Germany, ), 1939 - Lortz is the nestor of Catholic Luther research - , Luther was:

a. a deeply religious nature,

b. who inadvertently distanced himself from the Catholic Church.-- Which *Dr. Günther Deschner*, *Luther (Eine Bilanz nach 500 Jahren)*, (Luther (A review after 500 years)), in: *Bunte* 10.11.1983, 126, agrees. “Nothing was further removed from Luther than the founding of a new ideology. Not even the splintering of the Roman Church was in his intention (...). His success was nourished by other forces: they lay both in him and in the structure of his epoch”.

**René Descartes** (1598/16504)

Founder of Modern Philosophy.

*C. Forest*, *D.P.*, *Le cartésianisme et l' orientation de la science moderne*, (Cartesianism and the orientation of modern science), Liege / Paris, 1938, 3, says: “Cartesianism as a system was abandoned rather quickly. Yet Descartes continued to influence both Modern philosophies and Modern sciences no less”. Well, one of the most striking inferences that thinkers after Descartes derived from his premises were the theses of Materialism.

Fr. Forest: “The point is not to impute to Descartes the Materialist interpretation of science (...). He remained a believer to the end of his life. His spiritualism is not questioned.

But the conceptions which men circulate go beyond what they have foreseen: with inexorable logic they pursue their course, through the thinking minds.” (O.c., 4). Thus - what he himself was not - Descartes became a Prematerialist. His Modern “Reason” or “reason” notwithstanding.

**Conclusion:** destiny disposes of what our deliberate reason “chooses”.

KF. 52.

**Georg Fr. Hegel** (1770/1831)

Top figure of German (= 'Absolute') Idealism, stood for a "Philosophie der Idee",-  
- where 'Idea' means something like "all that is". Yet he did not put away his sympathy  
for "les Philosophes" (the name of the XVIII - d' century Enlightened Rationalists).

Even for those among them who most vehemently contested the cause of  
Christianity and that of Spiritualism (the latter being a way of thinking that presupposes  
a personal God and an immortal human soul). After all, the "Idea," as Hegel imagined  
it, includes both Spiritualism and Materialism as "moments" (temporarily appearing  
elements).

What do we see? Hegel had, in addition to "right-wing" students, also "left-wing"  
ones. Among them was Karl Marx. Marx simply turned Hegel's idealism on its head  
and redirected it into Materialism. In this he is similar to the French Materialists who  
pushed through Descartes' Prematerialism into full Materialism: a Marx et al. merely  
thought through Hegel's Prematerialism unilaterally.-Cfr. *R. Serreau, Hegel et l'  
hégélianisme*, Paris, 1965-2, 26s. (Spiritualism and matérialism).

So much for a small series of applicative models of Löwith's thesis. They all show  
that when someone, especially a revolutionary figure, sends his "message" out into the  
world, he cannot be certain of its interpretation for a moment,--not only meaning but  
also and especially sense (*KF 11v.: ABC theory as meaning*).

Expressed in terms of the ABC theory: no one knows for sure ahead of time how  
the B in the crowd will react to that someone's A! -- The popular man says: "They distort  
the meaning of my words.

The rhetoric of the ancient Greeks has, however, formally warned everyone: the  
spreader of the message (information) is one; the message is two; the reception is three.  
The reception theory demonstrates the enormous exposure of all that we disseminate  
around us : in this well-defined and verifiable sense, a Derrida is right (*KF 13: in the  
grip of interpreters*).

This confirms for the umpteenth time Ch.S.Peirce: many people interpret **a.**  
stubborn self-willed, **b.** straightforward (= slavishly following others), **c.** preferential -  
without grasping the meaning of what is given, they establish meaning -; few interpret  
'objective scientific'. As a result, a message often turns into its opposite.

KF. 53.

***Ninth sample: still 'fate analysis' (53/55)***

We, *KF 49*, introduced the term "destiny analysis" following the definition of "rational action" as "deliberately taking the future into account" This is: taking into account something that is not yet there! "Not yet is" in the sense of "is not yet actual," for the future "is" (the term is now used in the transcendental-ontological sense) there "in a way that is due to us" (which is non-nothing).

***Now we broaden the concept of destiny analysis.***

***Bibl. sample :***

-- *Lili Foldes, Léopold Szondi et l' enigme du destin*, (Leopold Szondi and the enigma of fat), in: *Sélection de Reader' s Digest* (Zurich) 1986: juillet, 98/104;

-- *Daniel Rops, Eléments de notre destin* (Elements of our destiny), (Essai), Paris, 1934 (proposer connects with the cultural crisis just before WWII (1939/1945) and identifies life as destiny culturologically);

-- *P. Boutang, Ontologie du secret*, (Ontology of secrecy), Paris, 1973,-- vrl. 21/44 (*Destin*);

-- *R. Guardini, Freedom, grace, destiny*, Antwerp, 1950.

The fact that books and articles are being written about destiny -- the collection and dynamic system of destiny -- should give us all pause for thought, -- either scientifically or primarily philosophically.

***Temporality.***

Better ware: 'time-boundness' -- having as its element a set of merely temporary, passing moments.-- Life -- not only human or biological but even cosmic -- proceeds within the pressing straitjacket of the three moments of time:

**a.** from the past (with its sometimes very heavy weight that "weighs after") as thrown into situations,

**b.** we live in the very narrow present moment called "now" or "the now.

**c.** towards the future as a design. Part;-an extremely large part of the past we forget (sometimes through repression (conscious) or repression (unconscious)); most of the elements of the situation that make up the present escape us; what the future will bring we usually do not know unless guessing.

In other words: torn apart in the moments of time - 'time extensions' says M. Heidegger, among others - we live,-- forgetting, unknowing, ignorant.-- That is the time-bound or 'temporality': because of this we are immediately 'destiny-bound', because what happens to us 'weighs' on us as 'fate', 'destinies', to which, due to ignorance, we can only react afterwards, if at all.

KF. 54.

**Conclusion :**

Far from being able to “take into account” past, present and future! The number of elements - factors, parameters - that govern our lives is so great that only a transcendent divine mind can handle it. The only thing we can handle is sampling from the totality of the elements that control our life - immediately our destiny. Which again confronts us with inductivism, (KF 08).

**Controlling fate.**

Nevertheless, man, at least if he is still “a little bit alive” (and not “burnt out”), is inclined to “take his fate into his hands”. Fate control, therefore.--The myth is one of the means of knowing how to see somewhat clearly in the maze of fate.

**a. First of all, myth is a story.**

(which can represent the moments of time after one, in the form of “omen / sequel”). In this sense, life as a series of fates is a sequence.

**b. The life force is central.**

The myth is also a story in which the life force through which one can control fate is usually very central (especially when the myth is employed liturgically and/or magically):- Let us clarify this using one singular-concrete sample.

**The Narkissos myth.**

Narkissos - Lat.: Narcissus - is a descendant of the god of the Kefisos (a river) and the nymph Leiriopè. At his birth, his parents consult the blind seer Teiresias - Lat.: Tiresias who replies, “The child will reach a high old age, if it does not stare at itself.”

Once grown up, Narkissos became the object of adoration for countless girls and nymphs,-- for the reason of his beauty. He did not respond to this.-- The nymph Echo (Weather Realm) also fell in love with him, but she did not achieve anything either. Desperate, she withdrew into solitude. She grew thinner and thinner until all that remained of her was a plaintive voice as a reverberation.

The rejected girls and nymphs then turn to the goddess Nemesis, who is thoroughly punitive. She works out an “ate,” a deity’s judgment, on Narkissos: on a stiflingly hot day, he becomes violently thirsty after hunting. He bends over the water of a spring and “stares at himself.” Whereupon he falls deadly in love with his own face. He becomes indifferent to the world and dies on the spot.

KF. 55.

Where he died arose a flower bearing his name, the “narcissus” (*P. Grimal, Dictionnaire de la mythologie grecque et romaine*, Paris, PUF, 1988-9, 308).

**Notes.**

First, one sees the structure “normal course (behavior)/ deviation (aberrant behavior)/ rectification” (the steering or, as one also says now, ‘cybernetic’ structure).

*E.W. Beth, Naturphilosophie*, (natural philosophy), Gorinchem, 1948, 36, says in the line of *H. Kelsen, Die Entstehung des Kausalgesetzes aus dem Vergeltungsprinzip*, (The emergence of the law of causation from the principle of retribution), in: *Erkenntnis* 8 (1939): the Voorsocratic thinkers - Pythagoras and Empedokles among others (whom Cicero mentions) - put forward a legal order, which they interpret as divine law. It includes:

- a. a rule for the normal course of things,
- b. a rule for the deviation from the normal course viz. the restorative allowance.

This was once the core of Antique-Archaic hylozoism (the view that even seemingly dead nature is alive, animated, inspired).-- Thus *Cicero, De republica* 3:11, 19, says that, in the opinion of Pythagoras and Empedokles, whoever does violence to a living being may expect to be subjected to unspeakable punishment. Violence on a living being is deviation; the punishment is corrective. Thus, fate is determined by the perpetrator and co-determined by the rule of law.

**Second Explanation:**

The punishment in the Narkissos myth is situated in his life force - in ancient Greek: ‘dunamis’ (Lat.: ‘virtus’) - The goddess Nemesis who drastically ‘effaces’ deviations, gives Narkissos an action in - atè, judgment - which takes him by his weak spot and thus causes him to destroy his own life force (which results in death).

**Conclusion:** Where hubris, arrogance, boundary-breaking (taboo violation) takes place, there a mysterious law, “a God-given law” comes into effect that “normalizes” the abnormal. Myths understood in this sense are therefore culturally edifying. Cfr. *KF 21 (34; 43; 48)*.

Reason or Reason that adheres to such mythical wisdom can thus “take the future into account” if it “produces monsters” (*KF 33 (Goya)*).

The Bible in virtue of Yahweh faith says something analogous as *KF 38 (Kafka’s Law)* mentions. After all, even in Kafka’s view, reason or Reason knows what awaits it if it deviates from the law or laws. The entire end-time doctrine (eschatology) of the Bible illustrates this.

KF. 56.

***Tenth sample : The sufficient reason or ground of “reason” (56/59)***

Return for a moment to *KF 30* (The principle of sufficient reason or ground). “If A (reason), then B (intelligible). If B has a (necessary and sufficient reason or ground (premise, ‘hypothesis’, in Platonic language)), then B is explicable (sensible, understandable). Or: then B is ‘funderable’ (established on a logically rigorous foundation).

***The Fundamental Analysis of Reason or ‘Reason’.***

(for once “la deesse Raison” (the deity of reason), became a watchword) can - apart from the problem of madness (reason or “Reason” with its dream monsters (*KF 33* (42;55)) - also dwell on - what *Oger, Rationality, its ground and its monsters*, 89, calls - “the reason of reason” itself. We will do that for a moment now.

The questions that arise here are:

a. “Is a choice for or against rationality (especially in the Modern, Enlightened-Rationalist sense of that word) as ‘rationality’ even possible? If so, is this choice ‘rationally foundable,’ justifiable, ‘provable?’” Immediately, “Is irrationality radically provable? For that matter, what exactly is ‘irrationality’?”.

b. “Can a “reason or ground or foundation of reason” be shown? Is that reason or ground then to be found in or outside reason or both in reason and outside reason?” (Cfr. *KF 06: Collection/System*).

c. “Is there a final reason or ground for both of the themata just evoked?” (Cfr. *KF 30: Ultimate Reality*).-- Oger, a.c., 89: “These and many other similar questions still dominate an important part of contemporary philosophy.

The answers to these questions vary considerably from one viewpoint to another, but also - within a certain viewpoint - from one thinker to another. Behold the multiplicity.

Now the unity: “What is most striking, however, when looking at the jumble of philosophical discussions on rationality, is perhaps that, between philosophical schools of thought that develop almost without taking serious notice of each other, curious similarities sometimes emerge. This is what Oger, who examined the issues in depth together with the answers, believes he can summarize. In the light of his article, we will briefly go over the main points.



KF. 57.

***The stakes: the Enlightenment.***

***Bibl. sample :***

-- M. Milner/Al. Haider, *Heders kleine philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Basel/Freiburg/Wien, 1959-2, 141/143 (Rationalismus).

**a. Rationalism.**

What is called 'rationalism' (without a capital letter because it is a universal term), includes what follows: A, i.e. all that is, B, i.e. is approached from reason - sometimes this reason is hypostasized to such an extent, personified into a kind of 'deity', that one writes 'Reason' - C, i.e. what gives rise to rational behavior (*ABC theory : KF 11 (57)*). That reason expresses itself in singular, private and above all universal (general) notions processed in a logical-strange thinking. From Platon to Hegel e.g., such a rationalism prevails. Hegel e.g. says: "Everything that is human is only human because it is processed by thinking". That statement is characteristic of "rationalism" in the general sense.

**b. Enlightened Rationalism or "Rationalism.**

(with a capital letter to denote its singularity - its proper name). What is called "Enlightenment" (Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung) is a historically defined part of general rationalism. It is situated in the XVIIth / XVIIIth centuries. Enlightened Rationalism springs from R. Descartes (1596/1650) and even more from J. Locke (1632/1704).

That is Modern Rationalism, which took as its model of reality what the then emerging mathematical natural sciences perceived as "real" and "rationally attainable" (rationally knowable). In this, G. Galilei (1564/1642: exact foundation of natural science, viz. based on mathematics and experiment) played a leading role. Modern or enlightened rationalism therefore had a strong mathematical and experimental bias (mathematical and empirical reason).

Compared to what the Ancient Greeks had accomplished in mathematics and experimental sciences, this was considered a re-foundation and update of great magnitude.

Well, the stake in the discussion of "the reason (foundation) of reason" is precisely that general rationalism and very particularly Enlightened Rationalism, a part of the general.-- We specify this now.

K. Popper, J. Habermas, K.-O. Apel clearly put the Enlightenment first.- M. Foucault (the late Foucault), J. Derrida also but differently.

KF. 58.

As Oger, a.c., 88, says: even *P. Feyerabend* -- famous for his *Farewell to Reason* (a telling title) -- does say “farewell” to Reason (note the capital letter) but says “welcome” to reason (with lower case).-- The fact that such divergent thinkers nevertheless remain somewhere within Enlightened rationalism rightly points, as Oger maintains, to a common trait.

### ***The differences.***

We now briefly mention the trends.

#### **1.- Critical rationalism.**

This is the thrust of *Karl Popper* (1902/1994). Known for his epistemology (or philosophy of science),--among other things in his *Logik der Forschung* (Research logic), (1934).

In his wake people like W.W. Bartley, H. Albert, H. Lenk, G. Radnitzky, J. Watkins, who nuance Popper’s Critical Rationalism.-- Popper explicitly situates himself in the sphere of the Enlightenment (I. Kant).-- Popper and the Popperians see in our cultural life “a proliferation of irrationalism.”

Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Michel Foucault, and especially Jacques Derrida count as “irrationalists” in their eyes. Irrationalism is “a rebellion against reason” (K. Popper). This expression appears in a famous work by *Popper*, namely, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, 2 vols., London, 1945/1966, in which he claims that it is essentially the Ancient Greeks who taught us the concept of the open society. “From swords to words” (instead of swords to make or exclude other people, proceed to words, i.e. discuss on the basis of critical reason) is the watchword. Which is directed, among other things, against the dictatorships, in which reason is replaced by irrational behavior.

#### **2 -- The critical theory.**

Jürgen Habermas (1929/...), the second generation of the Frankfurter Schule (founded by *Theodor W. Adorno* (1902/1969 under the name Institut für Sozialforschung,-- in 1923), is, among other things, known for his *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (I (*Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung*), II (*Zur Kritik der Funktionalistischen Vernunft* (Theory of Communicative Action (I (Rationality of Action and Social Rationalization), II (On the Critique of Functionalist Reason)), (1981) - for his *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne* (Zwölf Vorlesungen), (The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Twelve Lectures), Frankf.a.M., Suhrkamp, 1985.

Second figure of Critical Theory: Karl - *Otto Apel* (1924/2017), known among other things for his *Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie*, (Language pragmatics and philosophy), Frankf., 1976 (strongly influenced by the Pragmaticism of Ch.S. Peirce).

KF. 59.

Let us not forget that members of the Frankfurter Schule had to take refuge under Nazism. This all the more so since, for quite a few German (and especially Jewish) intellectuals, philosophy and the professional sciences cannot be limited to mere “academic work” but involve social engagement.

Habermas and Apel criticize the Critical Rationalism of Popper and Albert in particular.-- But regarding the “reason” of reason, i.e. its foundation, they diverge: Habermas and his student A. Wellmer differ from Apel and his follower W. Kuhlmann,

### **3.-- Constructivism.**

Here situates the Erlanger Schule with *P. Lorenzen*, known for his *Normative Logic and Ethics*, Mannheim/Zürich, 1969, as the main figure. Here also situated, but at a distance *F. Kambartel*, *Philosophie der humanen Welt (Abhandlungen)*, (Philosophy of the Human World (Treatises)), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1989.

### **4 -- Deconstructionism.**

*Jacques Derrida* (1930/2004) is the man of “la deconstruction” (the deconstruction), a variant of M. Heidegger’s “Destruktion” of the Western tradition as “logocentrism” (the logos, rational thought, among other things, in its Enlightened-Rational form, is central). Among others, known for his *De la grammatologie*, Paris, Minuit, 1967.

Behold four striking currents on the account of reason or Reason as the basic premise of rationalism in general and the Modern Enlightenment in particular. We will now look at these in some detail.

But before that we dwell on Zenon of Elea (-500/...), the defender of his teacher Parmenides of Elea.-- According to *E.W. Beth*, *The Philosophy of Mathematics*, 19, Aristotle summarized the method of reasoning of the Eleate as follows: “You, the opponent of Parmenides, do not, like Parmenides, provide the convincing proof (meaning the necessary and sufficient reason) of what you claim.”

This we call “the thou-even-if-I argument”. *W.W. Bartley*, *Flucht ins Engagement (Versuch einer Theorie des offenen Geistes)*, (Attempt at a Theory of the Open Mind) Munich, Szesny, 1962 (// *The Retreat to Commitment*), says that Protestant theologians such as K. Barth, E. Brunner, R. Niebuhr, P. Tillich et al. employ the same method against (Modern) reason or Reason: “Neither thou, rationalist or Enlightened, proves thy presuppositions as we, Bible-believers, do.”

KF. 60.

***Eleventh sample: critical rationalism.*** (60/63)

Karl Popper, in his *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, II, 224ff., opposes two tendencies.

**1. *Irrationalism*** (see above):

**2. “*Uncritical Rationalism.*”**

(what he calls) “Uncritical Rationalism,” which is defined as follows. The more precise name for it is “Justificationism,” for the uncritical Rationalist posits as an axiom: “If and only if a judgment (proposition) is fully substantiated either by experience or by reasoning or both together, can it be called ‘rationally justified’ - vindicated, justified.”

Popper’s refutation is the following. Proposition is “all genuine rational assertions presuppose a sufficient reason or ground”. Well - says Popper - that premise has no sufficient reason or ground logically speaking. After all, how to provide the decisive proof of the principle itself? Because, if one wants to provide that, one must necessarily already put forward (and have proven) the principle to be proven itself. Which amounts to an endless series.

***Conclusion:*** not all assertions have a sufficient reason (because there is at least one exception).

***Note*** -- One sees something peculiar: sufficient reason and logically rigorous proof from propositions (which have already been proven) are identified. The Rationalist that Popper is -- in the Kantian sense -- reasons without more and stays within the range of reasoning.

***A solid foundation.***

Apart from the principle itself - Leibniz once gave the modern formulation of it: “Nothing is without (sufficient) reason” - there are still “firm principles” to be found in Modern philosophy.

So e.g. the “Cogito” (I think) of Descartes (which means: “I am consciously engaged with my reason”). So e.g. the “Ich denke” of Kant: all knowing - e.g. and esp. mathematical physics (Galilei, Newton) has “a-priori conditions” or “possibility conditions” (understand: necessary and sufficient reasons), among which in the first place the fact that “Ich denke” (the fact that I am conscious when I am reasoning). After all, the counter-model shows it: if I am unconscious and therefore no longer reason (= am rationally active), then there is no longer any reason and in particular proving-reason (these activities are “unthinkable”, “impossible”).

KF. 61.

Because Husserl recognized the weakness of the Cogito (Descartes) and, the Ich denke (Kant), he resorted to the phenomenological “reduction” (which here means “reduction to less”). Our consciousness is oriented towards the (outside) world (*KF 03: intentionality*). But in order to have an absolutely solid starting point, Husserl reduces that (outside) world to what in the individual consciousness of each of us as a direct given - ‘phenomenon’ - can be postulated of it (e.g. it is not certain (unproven, not directly given) that that (outside) world is indeed there “beyond what I experience of it”! Even the I that thinks - Husserl’s Cogito -, is reducible to what each of us perceives of it as a direct given (whether I am a deeper I or subject, a person, is not directly given!).

Behold two aspects of what is called “the phenomenological reduction” of things in consciousness to the merely ‘phenomenal’ (= immediately given). - Compare with *KF 04*, where the ‘opsis’ (the perception of what is immediately given) was discussed among the Milesians. The ‘historia’ goes beyond that ‘opsis’: it tries to prove things not directly given. Nor was Milesian philosophy a mere phenomenology like Husserl’s philosophy.

All this, with Husserl, to establish an irrefutable “foundation” (a rigorously proven premise).

**Note.--** The search for a solid ground or reason underfoot led e.g. Karl Marx to seek it in the economic substructure (or infrastructure) that had to serve as the reason or ground of the cultural super-politics (religion, politics, law; education, etc. have their necessary and sufficient reason in the economy). Marx’s Theory of Culture stands or falls with that axiom.

**Note --** One sees it: modern, ‘Enlightened’ Rationalism “wants to prove everything.” This is what it understands by “the principle of reason or ground” as the artery of thought. To “reason” from absolutely proven or at least provable premises or “hypothesis” (to speak with Platon (*KF 08: hypothetical method*)) is to apply the premise par excellence, namely the “Principle of sufficient reason” articulated by Leibniz.

Popper radically rejects such an uncritical justificationism, Not everything can be radically proven. Which leads us to Zenon of Elea (*KF 59*): “neither thou nor I prove all things”.

KF. 62.

**Two types of “sufficient reason”.**

**Bibl. sample :** A. Noiray, dir., *La philosophie (Dictionnaire Marabout)*, Paris, Gérard, 1972-2, 242s. (*Fondement (Foundation)*).-- The term ‘fondement’, (foundation, premise, ground or reason) has - according to the dictionary - two meanings.

**a. The logical-reasoning reason**

(as above) is one or more prepositional phrases from which one can make a derivation. In that strict logical reasoning sense, there is no sufficient reason or ground for the principle of sufficient reason, of course.

**b. The real ontological reason,**

of which the logical-reasoning is but a specimen, is all that in any case makes something (being) intelligible, sensible - in the Antique Greek language ‘true’ -. *Cfr. KF 10*: holistic-logic. The word-for-word principle “Everything has a necessary and sufficient reason (logical aspect) either in or outside of itself (holistic aspect)” does have a sufficient reason or ground, namely in itself.

The counter model shows this clearly: supposing that this principle or premise does not hold in at least one case, what follows for that at least one case? That it is absurd - nonsensical, incomprehensible, unexplained and even inexplicable ... in the absolute sense - is. Even of all the Enlightened minds who claim it is unprovable, there is not one who does not apply it in the ontological sense.

**Note --** In Platonic terms, the understanding of the principle in this last (and also in the previous) sentence is a matter of *theoria* (*KF 03*).

**Popper on the subject.**

Popper reduces the Platonic *theoria* to an ... “irrational choice”. It is an irrational belief in reason. Those who believe in the principle of reason or ground have “already adopted a rationalist fundamental attitude.” Only after that unaccountable choice can there be “rational evidence.” To an opponent, such a proceeding does not make the slightest impression.

**Conclusion:** A Rationalist life depends on a prior irrational decision. This is critical rationality, i.e. aware of its limits.-- This makes it understandable that Neo-Protestant theologians (*KF 59*) take issue with this and say : “You, Enlightened Mind, do not prove anything either as we, Bible-believers, do” (emphasis added: “Our Bible-belief is just as irrational”). - Fideistic decisionism is Popperian.

KF. 63.

***Irrational-ethical choice***

To be enlightened mind is a decision (decisionism) supported by a belief (fideism). It is also a moral or ethical choice.-- “Unlike questions concerning facts, questions concerning values (*note*: culture) do not allow for a ‘reasonable’ (= rationally justifiable) discussion. Popper therefore writes: “Arguments by themselves (cannot) determine a fundamentally moral decision.” (Oger, a.c., 91).

***Note.--*** Thus, no compelling logical proof is possible for matters of conscience.

This is the well-known distinction between - what the Germans call - ‘*Sein*’, (understand; rationally provable facts) and ‘*Sollen*’ (understand: data that concern us in our conscience). This distinction is particularly peculiar to Empiricist Rationalism (Hume) and Positivist Rationalism (Comte): values, including moral or conscientious values, are only triggers for irrational decisions. Immediately ... all that cultural stuff matters!

Platonism has a thoroughly different theory of value: our mind, o.g. the noble yoke (*KF 02*), has an also cognitive contact with all that is ‘good’ (the idea of the good or without more valuable spread over all that participates in it). The *theoria* is such that ‘being’ in itself is always ‘value’ (‘good’) and conversely that ‘good’ without any ‘being’ is immediately worthless. This is the ontological axiology.

***Conclusion*** -- Popper’s theory of rationality can be summarized as follows:

- a. In principle, “rational” reasoning is decisive (“apodictic” in Aristotle’s language),
- b. But in fact, both the Enlightened-Rationalist basic attitude (choice, decision, belief, behavioral habit) and any ethical basic attitude (choice) remain irrational decisions, -- which can be helped by “rational” arguments but never rationally enforced.

***Note*** Oger, a.c., 91; 105,-- Constructivism (Erlanger Schule) of e.g. P. Lorenzen also speaks of “an act of faith” when it comes to the foundation of the presuppositions of true judgments, “Faith” in the sense of “presupposing something for which no ‘justification’ is available”! Faith, then, here, in the rational-negative sense of that word.

KF. 64.

***Twelfth sample: revived critical rationalism.*** (64/65)

Do we now dwell for a moment, with Oger, a.c., 91/93, on a couple of Popperians who think they detect errors of thought in their master.

**1 -- W.W. Bartley.**

Among other things, in his *Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality*.

**a.** Bartley claims that Popper's irrational foundation presupposes a kind of "fideism" that is irresponsible. For Zenonic fideists (think Neo-Protestants), Popper's position is too vulnerable.

**b.** Bartley therefore radicalizes Popper's critical Rationalism. And this to a 'comprehensivist', (encompassing, generalizing) Rationalism or, as he later says, to 'Pankritic' ('All-critical') Rationalism.-- This overall 'Critical' Rationalism has an axiom: "If and only if a judgment is 'open to criticism' (understand: refutable), is it 'rational' ":

***The refutation of a J. Watkins or a J. Post.***

To formulate the axiom in such a way is tantamount to at the same time doing under understanding that it is "not open to criticism"! So there is at least one exception namely the basic judgment or axiom itself! That is fundamentally irrefutable. Such a thing amounts to a kind of 'dogma' (in the Rationalist sense of "a position that is above all possible criticism"). One sees the contradiction in terms" (inconsistency, logical contradiction).

**2.-- H. Albert.**

Among others, in his *Traktat über kritische Vernunft* (Treatise on Critical Reason), (1969), in his *Die Wissenschaft und die Fehlbarkeit der Vernunft* (Science and the fallibility of reason), (1982).

**2.a.-- Rebuttal.**

If the principle of sufficient reason is rational, provable, then this sets up a tri.lemma.

**(a)** either every preposition that founds must in turn be founded. This is what the medieval Scholastics call "regressus in infinitum" (a never-ending series of foundations). This is an impracticable foundation.

**(b)** either every foundational preposition must either have itself as a preposition or presuppose a preposition yet to be founded.-- In middle Latin "circulus vitiosus" ("vicious," i.e., containing a logical fallacy, or circular reasoning). This is a zero foundation.

**(c)** either one encounters in (a) and/or (b) an undoubted intuition ('evidentiality') which precedes as an evidential preposition. This is an arbitrary or even dogmatic -ring.-  
- Three times 'irrational'!



KF. 65.

### **2.b. -- Foundation**

To get out of that 'aporia' (situation without a way out) Albert puts forward an axiom of his own: **a.** a 'justification' is unnecessary; **b.** a 'criticisability' (refutability) is sufficient.

In other words, "If and only if a judgment is 'criticizable' (refutable) is it a 'rational' judgment." In other words : in principle, an assertion should be able to be refuted. Again: the 'falsificationism' already advocated by Popper returns here in another guise.

*Note.--* Only if Albert allows that his axiom itself is also criticizable is he "consistent" (not contradicting himself). If not, we fall into the criticism of W.W. Bartley's comprehensive Critical Rationalism.

*By the way:* the bibliography threatens to become endless! We also mention in passing: *J. Agassie / I.C. Jarvin, Rationality (The Critical View)*, Dordrecht, 1986. The work poses the question: "is rationality definable?" Whereby 'rationality' is conceived both in terms of the natural and human sciences. Popper and his students including W.W. Bartley III (with his comprehension-critical view) come through strongly. Questions such as the relationship between Rationalism and magic, Rationalism and dogmatism, Rationalism and irrationalism are also discussed.

### **Excerpt: Rationalism and eristics.**

*Bibl. sample :* *E.W. Beth, De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde*, (The Philosophy of Mathematics,), Antwerp / Nijmegen, 1944, 78/92 (*Eristics and sepsis*).

The 'eristics' or method of argumentation apparently starts with Zenon of Elea (*KF* 59) to come to full bloom e.g. with the School of Megara (with Eukleides of Megara (around -400) and Euboulides of Miletos as top figures). Also in Platon's dialogues one finds reasoning and - endless - counter reasoning which usually end in "aporia", futility. This is then called "Platonic aporetics."

Many - with Aristotle, some Church Fathers (Klemens of Alexandria, Hieronymus), Schopenhauer) - do not hide their distaste for eristics.

Beth, on the other hand, says: "The eristic method of refutation - one might almost say 'falsificationism' - is the method of the counter model. It has been applied with results e.g. in more recent mathematics and logistics". It has also proved fruitful in terms of reason or ground.

KF. 66.

***Thirteenth sample: The critical theory.*** (66/69)

Whereas with Popper and the Popperians and related forms of thought, (professional) science was the main thing concerning rationality, in Critical Theory rationality shifts to the Significa (Lady Welby) and especially to Semiotics (Ch.S. Peirce) or Semiology (de Saussure).

Central to this is the act of language (language act) with its three aspects, which we briefly outline.

a. "It's sunny today" is a well syntactically constructed sentence.

b. If, moreover, that statement is the reflection (*KF 02: noble yoke; 32*) and as correctly as possible of the corresponding reality (the fact that it is really sunny today (ontology)), then that sentence is semantically in order (it expresses truth).

c. If we pay attention to the intentions and aims (tenets) of that utterance, we grasp the pragmatic aspect. Thus e.g. one captures pragmatics, if one captures how the speaker wants to edify a fellow human being.

An important pragmatic element is the Significa: it aims at the relation of understanding between communicators and interactants.-- It is good to keep this in mind when one wants to situate the rationality theory of Habermas and Apel e.g. precisely in relation to Popperianism.

***Axiom.***

Our communicative action (knowledge, language, action) necessarily involves rationality in its praxis.-- In doing so, what follows should be noted.

**a. *The theory of signs***

(semiotics,-- signfica, semiology) is a meta-language about language and acts of language: indeed, one speaks of language in a meta-language. Now it is the case that this meta-language already presupposes the principle of sufficient reason if it is to be rational or at least meaningful.

**b. *The acts of language,***

about which semiotics speaks, itself presuppose the aforementioned principle in turn.

**1.-- *Jürgen Habermas.***

Beginning with a singular-concrete statement so as not to linger in the abstract. Cfr Oger, a.c.,95.

-- a. "I claim, here and now, that today - 17.11.1990 - is a rainy day" (or : "Today is a rainy day").

-- b. If, rationally, especially pragmatically-significantly, I assert something, therein lies a presupposition: "I claim (semantically) truth,

KF. 67.

Consequently: if you make that claim, then I am ready to argue. Here the significant claim: I seek understanding. To this end I am prepared to bring out the reason, the necessary and preferably sufficient reason, in my argument. One sees it: in the very praxis of constructing rapport lies the famous principle of rationality.-- In this case the reason for my assertion lies, e.g., in the fact that I go out for a moment with my eristic-skeptical fellow man and observe (*KF 24: Locke's Empiricism on Rationality*) whether it is in fact becoming a rainy day.

**Conclusion:** pragmatics presupposes principle.

**c1. Now I claim:**

“If the established fact is for me only-here-and-now, the reason for a true assertion, then the same establishable fact is at once also reason for true assertions for all possible rational beings whenever and wherever. In other words: the fact is universally valid, i.e. binds perceptive reason to all possible rational beings!

**Conclusion:** pragmatics broadens.

**c2. Now I am claiming something more:**

“If I am honest and conscientious and perceive “It is a rainy day,” then potentially all possible honest-conscientious beings; In other words : necessary and sufficient reason does not only affect perceptive reason; it additionally claims ethical or moral reason.

**Conclusion:** the appreciation, in, conscience, -- “in honor” one says -- of truth is more than mere empirical-positive perception; it is expression of conscientious, honorable empirical-positive perception. Cfr. *KF 19*: the thief is an expert but he lacks conscience (as a definition, ethical definition then, of culture).

Whether Habermas would fully agree with our comments has no importance here: the reasoning we carried out assuming his pragmatics leads unerringly to what we said.

In any case, the thesis - according to Oger - of Habermas reads:

**a. negative:** by mere logical reasoning, the proposition concerning sufficient reason is unprovable (as a Popper et al. demonstrate, especially H. Albert);

**b. positive:** rationality (the presupposition and honest-to-goodness application of the principle of sufficient reason) is presupposed in the very praxis of knowing, language and action. It is thus not a “free choice” (as Popper et al. want to make true).

KF. 68.

Says Oger, a.c., 95: “From the first words we stammer out as children, reason begins to exert an unobtrusive, tough, unrelenting “compulsionless compulsion.” (...). Reason exerts a compulsion by ceaselessly orienting our speech and actions. At the same time, reason is free of constraint because it is not an external body which is foreign and alien to us (...): it is implied in the pragmatics of every act of language”. This is how Oger describes Habermas’s position.

Says Oger, *ibid.*: “Often man tries to evade a ‘reasonable’ (understand: rational),-- fair and open argumentation.” That, then, is the unreasonable, indeed, immoral possibility.

Says Oger, *ibid.*: “We have always made the choice (namely, for or against reason). The pragmatics of language has - in a manner of speaking - already ‘decided’ on our behalf in an immemorial (*i.e.*: escaping our conscious memory) time, but this also means that there cannot be a decision “in the proper sense”:

Here are three texts by Oger that describe Habermas’s position. They become crystal clear if one rereads our exposition just before. In other words: we interpret Habermas correctly.

***Habermas’s critique of Popper.***

Oger, a.c., 94/96

**a. *Habermas criticizes Popper’s “political” presuppositions,*** After all, he is “liberal” in the Anglo-Saxon sense. With regard to epistemology and criticism of reason, an Anglo-Saxon liberal like Popper sees it as follows: from the outset, the free liberal citizen faces free choices in a “free country” (think of his critiques of dictatorial systems (Nazism, Communism)). Likewise: for the free choice between rationality or irrationality.

**b. *Habermas states what follows:***

That so-called ‘choice’ for rationality or against it has always been made. How so? Language as outcome-oriented action ‘chooses’ in our place - for us (as conscious beings) and for us (in our place). That is the human thing about humans as rational beings.

In other words: precisely because he applies the necessity of sufficient reason as a premise from the outset, he is in the rational “choice” without consciously wanting it himself. It is true that, as a free being, he can choose against the “pre-reflective choice” worked into his knowing, speaking and acting. But then he acts against his humanity.

KF. 69.

## 2 -- *Karl-Otto Apel*.

Oger, 93/94 (Apel's "ultimate foundation").--

"Fully parallel to Watkins's critique of Bartley (*KF 64*), Apel will also dispute that Albert -- with his model of critical inquiry -- has transcended any 'justificationism'." Thus Oger. Cfr. *KF 64v.*—In other words.: the 'eristics' go on and on!

What's more: Apel tries to show that the axiom of "indefinite criticism" (Albert) contains a "paradox. "Strongly resembling the paradox of the liar" says Oger. Which is directly eristic.

*Note.*-- When a liar says "I lie," what exactly is he saying? When he says "I am not lying", does that differ from the previous sentence? That is the paradox or prima facie unrhyming statement.-- So here when an adherent of indefinable criticisability says "I am for indefinable criticisability", what is he saying about his own statement? For about his own axiom he cannot say "I am for unconstrained criticisability"! Because, in that case, he is questioning his own main axiom. Which he rationally may not.

### *Ontology--language/meta-language.*

Albert talks about the principle of reason or ground (= ontology). Then he talks about its formulation (language). Then he talks about the scope of that formulation, rationally speaking (meta-language, i.e. language over language).

Well, if all judgments are fundamentally criticizable, then so is the axiom that all judgments are criticizable itself. The axiom as a meta-language does not contain the criticisability (if not it was subject to doubt); the language that axiom is talking about does contain the criticisability. Only if one distinguishes meta-language from language can one somewhat agree with Albert. But ... how rational is his meta-language (= axiom) and how is it rational? (*KF 14: existence / essence*).

Apel remains Leibnizian: he tries to keep the principle of sufficient reason as a foundation, namely as an evidentiality to which real doubt is not possible.-- But, unlike Popper, he situates this thesis in a language pragmatics, which he calls "transcendental.

A sufficient reason has always been presupposed in our language acts (and as undeniable), but that presupposition itself is not 'founded' or grounded in anything else (another presupposition). Which Apel attempts to demonstrate with a number of reasonings (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant).

KF. 70.

**Fourteenth sample: deconstructionism (70/71)**

Oger, 96/97.-- “With Jacques Derrida is found an analogous reasoning to that which leads Popper (*KF 60vv.* to reject ‘justificationist’ rationalism.”

‘Justificationism’ means that every - utterly every - ‘rational’ assertion (thesis, judgment, statement) presupposes an utter ‘justification’ (justification, reason or ground) in order to be (radically and definitively) valid. This in the name of one interpretation of the principle of (necessary and sufficient) reason or ground, namely, the strict logical-scientific (preferably in the sense of ‘exact’ (experimental-mathematical) science). Cfr. *KF 23*: “strict science” (as an ideal put forward).

Oger, *ibid.*-- “Unlike Popper, Derrida refuses to call such a questioning of the principle of (necessary and sufficient) reason ‘irrational’” Cfr. *KF 62*: “an irrational belief.” -- It is clear from this that the approach of Popper and Derrida is quite different.

**a. Popper, as an Anglo-Saxon “liberal”,**

Popper thinks from “a transition from an anti-social to a social attitude to life” (think Thomas Hobbes (1588/1679; Cartesian who deployed the materialist interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy (*KF 51*)) and *J.-J. Rousseau* (1712/1778: the end of French Rationalism), with his *Contrat social* (1762: Rousseau’s political views)). This carries over to Popper’s (professional) scientific field: he wants a transition from an irrational lifestyle to a rational one.

**b. Derrida wants something different:**

The West, among other things in its philosophies, is to him too “logocentric,” too much prioritizing reasoning thought. In its place he wants a deconstruction of that type of thinking. That is ‘deconstruction’ (which he claims has Heidegger’s - *Der Satz vom Grund* (The theorem of the reason), (1957) and *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (Of the essence of the reason), (1949-3) - and his notion of ‘Destruktion’ as its roots).-- But note: for Derrida, this ‘transition’ does not succeed if we simply think away reason itself.

In other words: the principle of reason or ground remains. More than that: it is the very essence of our entire culture, especially at the university level. As his *Les pupilles de l’ université* (*Le principe de raison et l’ idee de l’ université*), (The wards of the university (The principle of reason and the idea of the university) tries to clarify.

KF. 71.

***Similarity and difference with H. Albert.***

Cfr. KF 64.

**1. *Albert distinguishes a trilemma:***

Either impracticable proof (regressus in infinitum) or zero proof (circulus vitiosus) or dogmatic ‘proof’ (undoubted intuition). The impracticable argument can be referred to by a metaphor that has poetic value: ‘abyss’.

**2. *Derrida holds it to be a dilemma.***

Either circular reasoning (= zero proof), where one - in order to prove the proposition - proposes the proposition as already proven. Either an ‘abyss’, where one endlessly tries to prove what is postulated (impracticable regressus in infinitum). “The principle of reason or ground:

a. demands a ground for everything (all rational claims),

b. but is itself not groundable (understand: in a rational way)”. Thus, the Oger says, “It is groundless and therefore abyssal” (a.c., 96).

***Obedience or disobedience.***

“Derrida asks the question, ‘Do we obey the principle of sufficient ground when we ask about that which grounds this principle - which is itself a principle of grounding?’” (Oger, a.c., 97). Derrida’s answer:

**a. *We are not disobedient!***

We don’t want to undermine it, - that principle! We are not taking it off its pedestal! -- Derrida is not concerned with opposing that principle. “For then one would end up in and irrationalism” (Oger).

**b. *We are not slavishly obedient either!***

“For then one would fall back into a traditional rationalism” (Oger), In other words: then one would think, speak, act ‘logocentrically’,-- in a word “founding culture”.

***The impotence of (rational) reason.***

Stated, then, by Derrida, in the eristic wake of many others, is the question of “the origin” (another word, in substance, for “reason”) of the principle of sufficient ground. He considers it “self-evident” which points to an obviousness - that the answer to such a question is “not regulable by reason itself. One must step outside the field of validity of the rational! “This stepping out, however, does not stand in opposition to the principle of reason but only opens up the possibility of addressing reason” (Oger).

The ‘archè’, presupposition (KF 10: *stoicheion as a hypothetical*), of reason somewhere exceeds that reason.

KF. 72.

***Fifteenth sample: The lemmatic-analytic approach (72/75).***

Let us return for a moment to the “good old” Platonism. Let’s reread *KF 08*: the analytic method! The formula reads: “If A, then B. So A”.

In the analytic hypothesis, Platonically understood, we seek “the reason” or “the ground”. Only then do we understand B, the fact subjected to examination ‘historia’ (to use a Milesian word),. To ‘analysis’ (always in the strictly Platonic sense).

Rereading *KF 35vv*: “If x, then B. Well, B. So x”. Kafka’s rational -- at the same time Biblical -- thinking structure worked with an unknown. So he could write books and smaller works!-- That is introducing what in the Platonic tradition is called a lemma.

***In passing***: O. Willmann *Geschichte des Idealismus, III (Der Idealismus der Neuzeit)*, Braunschweig, 1907-2, 48ff., explains this in more detail for a moment.

Diogenes Laërtios 3:24 reports, “As the first, Platon gave the research by analysis to the Thasian Leodamas. It consisted in introducing the sought (provisionally unknown or requested) as ‘given’ (already known). So one pretended that the unknown was already known. Then one worked with it: a stoicheiosis (*KF 05*;-- 29; 31) or factor analysis (which examines relations).

The distinctive feature - says Willmann - is “die vorgreifende Ansetzung des Gesuchten” (the anticipatory appointment of the want),: it would be more appropriate - always Willmann says - to introduce the name “prolepsis or lemmatic method”, since the actual analysis only gets off the ground afterwards. This analysis works with unknowns with which one pretends to already know them,

O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, 1959-5, 137, says that one of the applications of that lemmatic-analytic method is to introduce and work with unknowns (x, y, z) instead of numbers in mathematics (the algebra since François Viète (1540/1603; French mathematician) became letter calculus instead of number calculus).

Instead of “3 + 5” one works with “x + y” (which includes generalization).-- Another application is the “black-box method”. In electricity, one cannot open a box. But one can test (work with) the wires that come in and out. In itself, the box is “black” (black, unknown). In its relations (stoicheiosis) examined it reveals its secret at least in part.



KF. 73.

**Note -- Acting as if, can be a delusion.**

Thus the methodical doubt. The later Academicians (Second Academy (Arkesilaos (-314/-240); Third Academy (Karneades (-214/-129)), some Church Fathers (H. Gregorios of Nussa (335/394), in the East; H. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430)), R. Descartes (1596/1650: “le doute methodique”) (the methodical doubt), proceeded in this way.

Charles Sanders Peirce severely criticizes that method as genuine experience: if it is to be more than a rhetorical artifice, it should put real reasons or grounds first. When one, in oneself, does not doubt (in good conscience), then one can pretend to doubt but then one is not sincere. - Like the proof from the absurd, the methodical doubt, if rational, starts from a counter model: “If I claim that, then what follows refutes me”.

The doubt is the reason for the non-doubt, e.g.. The lemmatic-analytic method is to introduce a ‘sign’ that stands for what is not (yet) known but sought (analysis): the act of pretending manifests itself in the introduction of ‘something’ that provisionally replaces what is sought.

**As an aside:** the false doubt is equivalent to the paradox of the liar (KF 69)

**“I (pretend to) doubt”**

contains something that is semantic nonsense: I am saying in the very sentence I am uttering, at the same time, something about that sentence itself (and confuse meta-language with language and language with that about which she is speaking). Cfr. I. M. Bochenski, *Philosophical methods in modern science*, Utr./ Antw., 1961, 72v. (*Semantic Stages*).

Reread all that the three great ideologies say concerning the justification of the axiom of sufficient reason or ground. No one really doubts the validity because everyone applies the principle, -- at least insofar as he acts rationally. Note the restrictive!

When one says, e.g., that “the principle of reason is grounded, but itself hangs over an ‘abyss’ and is groundless then one is not so far from a paradox. For one speaks of judgments and presuppositions of judgments, but insinuates that it is about more than judgments and presuppositions of judgments. It is precisely this insinuation that allows one to speak of ‘irrational’ grounding of rational thought. Or of ‘abyss’, Or of ‘faith’. Or of ‘decision’ -- Thus seen, Habermas, who emphasizes the necessity, praxeological-pragmatic (present in the very essence of all acts of language), is right (KF 67).

KF. 74.

As Habermas says, putting the axiom of reason or ground first is a natural necessity. Yet at some point in their lives, a number of people come to rational reasoning and to “ground” that principle.

Platonic it is as follows: from prepositions it is irreducible because those prepositions presuppose it; yet it is an evidentiary thing (which is evident by itself); consequently: one introduces it as a lemma! It is unfounded in the chain of evidential judgments but it is introduced, although unfounded, because of its evidentness. This evidentness as the absolute pre-eminence of all rational proof is a “sufficient reason to employ it as a lemma, continually. Until when ... the contrary would appear. For that is the fate of a hypothetical reality.

**Conclusion:** the acts of language, as rational deeds, put the natural imperative first; the lucidity allows it to be introduced and employed (“worked with”) as a lemma in reasoning, as the algebra works with  $x, y, z$ ). So far, there is no “sufficient reason” (!) to banish the lemma as irrational (as one banishes, e.g., a hypothesis, after falsification (after refutation)).

***Pragmatic reasoning in this regard.***

*Ch.S. Peirce* (1839/1914), in his *How to Make Our Ideas Clear*, in: *Popular Science Monthly* Bd. 12 (1878: 286/302, formulates his “pragmatic maxim”:

“Consider what effects that might - conceivably - have practical bearings we conceive (we imagine), the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of these effects is the whole of our understanding of the object.” The idea is clear: “One has called this maxim - Peirce himself later said - a skeptical and materialistic principle.

In fact, he is merely the application of the one principle of logic that Jesus recommended, “By their fruits ye shall know them.” Immediately he is closely related to the ideas of the Gospel. (...).

KF. 75.

Nor should we conceive of the term ‘practical bearing-width’ in a low and sordid sense.” (R. Berlinger, Hrsg. / Kl. Oehler, Uebers., Ch.S.S. Peirce, Ueber die Klarheit unserer Gedanken, (About the clarity of our thoughts), Frankf.a.M., 1968, 62/63).

**Note.--** We put “Pragmaticist maxim” in the title of this section because Peirce himself, as a “Scholastic realist,” opposed, among others, William James (who claimed the term “Pragmatism” for himself), who was too nominalistic for him.

“If - Peirce wrote in 1905 - a certain prescription for an experiment is possible, then a well-defined experience will follow.

Indeed: as Dewey will later write, “the world in the making” is central to Peirce’s thinking. If one will: reason or ground is scanned in its/their future applications brought about by human experimental intervention.

Resume, in French translation, the Pragmatic Maxim: “Considérez quels sont les effets pratiques que nous pensons être produits par l’objet de notre conception. La conception de tous ces effets est la conception complète de l’objet”. Thus Peirce writes in 1903.

#### **‘Effectivism’**

This term would reflect the matter well. What do we know, strictly speaking, i.e., by observation of what it gives as an effect, of e.g., the principle of sufficient reason, if we do not introduce it as a lemma (provisionally unfounded) and work with it, continuously? All we know of it - in that hypothesis - is “what we imagine of it”! Nothing more. From the “black box” or lemma, however, emerge the effects: all our rationally justifiable acts (acts of knowledge, language, practice) are structured by it. The results achieved are one long and uninterrupted plea in favor of the introduced and always used lemma of reason or ground.

In other words, Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim exhibits precisely the same structure as Platon’s lemmatic-analytic method.-- For background information, see *John Dewey, Le développement du pragmatisme américain* (The Development of American Pragmatism), in: *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 29 (1922): 4 (oct./dec.), 411/ 430 (a very solid article by someone whose instrumentalist way is in the same Pragmaticist tradition as James and Peirce).

**Conclusion .--** “Work with the principle of reason or ground, and see what it gives”! Only then will it become apparent what it is worth.

KF. 76.

**Sixteenth sample: did Platon lie? (76/84)**

**Bibl. sample :** *Georges Nivat, Bulgarie / Pologne: Visite au monde de pierre*, (Poland: Visit to the world of stone), in: *Journal de Genève / Gazette de Lausanne* 12/13.09.1992, 24.

Steller talks about two works: *Tzvetan Todorov, Au nom du peuple (Témoignages sur les camps communistes)*, (In the name of the people (Testimonies on the communist camps), L'Aube, and *Tadeusz Borowski, Le monde de pierre (Trad. de Laurence Dyèvre et Eric Veaux)*, *Lettre internationale / Bourgeois*.

Let us take a moment to consider what Nivat says of the second work that gives his article its title.

“When, as a young fellow, he left the concentration camp in which, as an Aryan, he had been employed - in carrying away the corpses and the dying in the convoys on the way to Auschwitz - , Tadeusz Borowski became a Communist: like many others, he was then convinced that “Communism” was “the means par excellence” to make concentration camps never happen again.” Behold phase one.

This contrasts, of course, with the book by the Bulgarian-French thinker (former Structuralist) Todorov ... who speaks to the people who lived through the Communist-Bulgarian camps. Where the emphasis is placed on the fact that “they still encounter their executioners in the streets, who proudly pin the marks of honor on their chests”! “Thou art trash” sounded to them and the sticks, -- the sticks, were applied! Not far from there the prisoners could see the Western tourists on the beaches”. Todorov questioned the people, the executioners included, and filed their testimonies.

*As an aside*, Nivat notes that the Communist executioners “speak completely the same language as the SS general in the film Shoah.”

### **Conclusion :**

The Hitler model found a perfect imitation among its opponents. As if one and the same ground or reason were at work - at least in appearance - in opposing camps. That reason or ground is called ‘name’; “in the name of the people” both in Hitler Germany and in the Soviet world, people were deprived of their freedoms and even stripped of any human outlook. The ‘reason’ by which one ‘justified’ - *KF 60;-- 70* - justified, justified that barbaric behavior sounded “in the name of the (sovereign) people.”

Without questioning whether that reason was a true, “real” (being) reason and not a sham reason.

KF. 77.

Re-reading now *KF 21v. (Culture and normality)*: the prisoners had been renamed, in the name of the sovereign people, 'deviants' (= not (anymore) normals). The cultural values were behind and in that 'name' called "the people".

Re-read *KF 08;-- 29; 33; 54*, where it is emphasized that a set of values does not yet represent all possible values and even less the actual values. The inductivism that in Socrates' wake Platon honed in on us!

### ***"Un second livre"***

Nivat: "A second work invites us to a hard journey,--a truly ruthless book, an unforgettable book. A book whose reading should be made compulsory for all those who have forgotten (the atrocities of the concentration camps); - for the Revisionists (*note*: those Nazi-Followers who go so far as to claim that the concentration camps did not exist and therefore want to 'revise' the history books).

That book is *Le monde de pierre (The Stone World)*, by *Tadeusz Borowski*". Thus Nivat.-- "Rock-hard is this book -- Nivat continues -- in that it lacks any compassion, or almost, in that it refuses references to the "other world," i.e., the "other world before or after."

The main character - Tadeusz - in the book is someone who manages to pull himself out of the battle while everyone else is cremating, he plays his bacon inside; the dying babies who were still in the railroad carriages for transport on arrival at Auschwitz station, he simply throws out.-- In a conversation with his French brigade chief, Tadeusz says: "Mon vieux, inside me lives a hatred, radically incomprehensible to me, for those by whose doing I am working here. When I think that they are on their way to the incinerator, I feel nothing, absolutely nothing, resembling pity. If only the earth beneath their feet could open up: I would strike it with my fists! Something like that must be pathological. I don't understand a thing". Thus Nivat.

Rereading we *KF 44 (Foucault, the Böhme' s); (33Goya),-- 42; 55v.)*: the monsters of reason or Reason. Let us not forget that Marxism (also in its Leninist version) wants to be a Rationalism and that National Socialism, although Primitivist (the Old Germanic mythical world), nevertheless mobilized typically XX- st' century people, among whom quite a few German ... physicians (*KF 23/29, Biomedical speech*).

KF. 78.

Nivat: “So instilling hatred in such creatures has succeeded.-- They lay the foundation of -- I don’t know what -- monstrous culture.-- Tadeusz loved Platon,-- he had a girlfriend, a street in which he lived,-- a mother. All those things have been swallowed up into nothingness. “Now I know that Platon was lying, for this earthly world is not the picture of an ideal world, but the painfully-heavy, bloody work of man. This is how Tadeusz reasons”. This raises the question of the proper interpretation of Platon’s claim that that world is a picture of an ideal world. In particular: in what sense is our actual phenomenal world a “picture” of an ideal world? Let us let Platon himself have his say.

***The proper sense of Platon’s doctrine of ideas.***

*KF 11* taught us the two modes of meaning, sense and sense foundation.-- What is an idea (‘idea’, ‘eidos’)? Answers first abbreviated.

**a. *She is a type of sufficient reason,***

For it determines what something is (essence) and that / to what extent something is (existence) (*KF 04;--14;24;72*). Seen in this way, it is the result of *theoria* (*KF 03*), i.e. ‘opsis’ (direct knowledge), possibly extended to ‘historia’ (research, indirect knowledge).- Or: Platon’s theory of ideas is the result of his hypothetical method (*KF 08*).

**b. *Of what is the idea the reason or ground?***

It is the true reason or ground of factor analysis (*stoicheiosis*, *KF 05;--29;31; 72*) or, in Kantian language, of tracing the possibility conditions of something. As we saw - *KF 06* - parameter analysis employs induction (*KF 06; 08*) and proceeds within the framework of dialogue (*KF 02*).

Both methods, induction (‘epagogè’) and dialogue (‘dialogos’), are modes of sampling. taking,-- the induction because it addresses an aspect (element, part) out of a totality of data,-- the dialogue because it complements in their one-sidedness the samples that each interlocutor performs. After all, each of us, each limited group sees only a portion -- a sample -- of total reality.

The rule that governs Platonism may read “Bonum ex integre causa, malum e quocumque defectu” (The good puts totality first in its flawlessness, evil is there when whatever is lacking in that total flawlessness).

KF. 79.

**Bibl. sample.** : concerning the great role of stoicheiosis (analysis of parameters or factors), see especially *E.W. Beth, De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde (Van Parmenides tot Bolzano)*, (The Philosophy of Mathematics (From Parmenides to Bolzano)), Antw./Nijmegen, 1944, 34/42 (The two the period in Platon's thought); 42/51 (*The theory of so-called 'idea numbers'*)

*G.J. de Vries, Plato's image of man*, in: *Tijdschr.v.Filos.* 15 (1953): 3, 426/439 (one of the best articles) - So much for the methodological background of the theory of ideas.

### **Applicable model.**

Spring is coming in abundance. I go out into nature: what do I see? Here and there wild daffodils. - If you have a little Greek mythology in your body, you think of the myth of Narkissos (*KF 54vv.*): once he died - literally - due to a lack of life force, he was turned into a daffodil by the rock-hard goddess of the effusion of fate, Nemesis. This would then be "the mythical view" of the phenomenon of the narcissus.

Platon knows the myths, values them, but restrictively (insofar as they are immoral, he rejects them as "more nothing than something" ("me on") literally: non-thing)). If need be, he engages a myth in his texts when he has no rational thought available to him, for, even for the so-called "world-fleeing" Platon, "reason" or reason is a typically human aspect of man's soul, even to a high degree that which makes him truly human.

But I pass over this mythical wisdom and look attentively ('theoria') at the structure of the one specimen I am holding in my hand: I observe accurately - akribos - e.g. the trumpet-shaped flower. I compare with a second specimen. And so on.

In my 'nous' (mind) the human concept 'narcissus' is formed which gradually grows into a universal, all (possible) narcissus summarizing concept. That is stoicheiosis as a collection of 'elements' (= specimens, 'images') which all show the common characteristics of 'the' daffodil (the abstract concept).

At the same time I note that daffodils prefer to occur in groups (via tuber expansion e.g.). To recognize this is stoicheiosis as a system of cohesive elements.

**Conclusion:** stoicheiosis leads to generalization and to generalization. Two complementary forms of totalization or formation of a concept of 'totality'. That totality in its two forms is the idea (here: 'the' narcissus), insofar as it comes through in our concepts.

KF. 80.

Note the restrictiveness of the last sentence “insofar as the idea comes through in our concepts”. For the idea is not our understanding! It is what makes our understanding possible (possibility condition, ‘hupothesis’).

I go on, with others, who are pursuing the same thing - exploring the wonders of the ‘fusus’, natura, nature - and what do we see? A deformed daffodil! How do we know that she is deformed? Because with the universal and systemic concept (generalization / ‘whole-ization’), the lucky narcissus (in Platonic terms: “the good narcissus”) has appeared in our mind. If one wishes: the ideal, perfect narcissus. That too our stoicheiosis or factor analysis discovers. That ideal (in this case of the narcissus) is also “the idea” (of the narcissus e.g.).

Note: not our understanding of that ideal is the idea. The idea only makes that ideal understanding or design possible. Only then do value judgments become possible.

**To summarize:** general concept (all (possible) narcissi); system concept (the interrelationship of all (possible) narcissi); ideal concept (the perfect narcissi)!

Behold what the stoicheiosis of the natural phenomenon ‘narcissus’ gives us. We summarize this in the name (onoma, Lat.: ‘nomen’) ‘narcissus’. We summarize this in the abstract concept of ‘the daffodil’. But the idea is neither. Why not? Because the idea is something that, before any human intervention, is already always at work in the phenomena of nature, and that is... as a “model” in the sense of paragon or “exemplary cause” (as they also said in antiquity). Just as a girl is said to “model” when painting a goddess or making a goddess statue. Therefore, Platon says that the idea is pre-existing (pre-existent).

**Note** -- It is therefore radically misleading to treat the theory of ideas in the theory of concepts (a subdivision of traditional logic). As *E. De Strycker, Concise History of Antique Philosophy*, Antw., 1967, 95/ 100 (Doctrine of Being), puts it: the doctrine of ideas belongs in ontology. Namely, in that part of ontology which deals with the objective reason or ground of the ascertainable fact that there is universality, systemic coherence and ideality in nature. That reason or ground is something objective, in and yet behind, above, before the given.



KF. 81.

***The one original / the many models.***

This time we use the term ‘model’ not in the Antique sense, but in the sense of the more recent model theory, namely in the sense of “what provides information (insight) about an original (about which information is sought).”

When *E.W. Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics*, 46vv., broaches the subject of “idea numbers” (a very poor translation better true “structuring ideas”), he says, o.c., 47v.: “So e.g. the ideas. These are disembodied and precede the bodies. Yet each idea taken by itself is one, but considered in connection with others many”. Something analogous we wish to expound with this.

**a.** Our inductive journey through the ‘fusus’ (nature) yields us only samples, and our dialogue with the other co-investigators yields us the insight that each of us yields only, one perspective - another word for ‘sample’ (but beloved by Fr. Nietzsche).

**b.** How could one claim, in those very restrictive conditions, that our notions, of an inductive-dialogical nature, really grasp both the (universal and overall) totality and ideality creatively and completely? Certainly Socrates and Platon did not. The being-faithful and complete representation of the full reality and full value of something is present only in its idea. For every human approach and beyond that approach.

**Conclusion:** what nature offers in terms of visible and tangible phenomena, -- what our concepts offer us (not to mention our terms) -- in this case a very limited number of daffodils -- these are only models of the original, the idea. That original may easily be subject (original) in our utterances (for it is the unknown), but it becomes difficult when it is used as a saying. Why? Because we have no direct control over the idea. We do have that ‘grip’ on its models. Platon rightly calls these ‘pictures’. Images of the idea.

***The imperfect images.***

We saw it a moment ago: “Look over there, a deformed daffodil!”. That can be tragic (a deformed person, for example). But it can also be comic: think of the clown who ‘imitates’ the (ideal) human being in a ‘deformed’ way (what is an imitation or image that makes one laugh, other than a ‘caricature’? The actual models of ideas are more often than not ‘caricatures’ (N. Gogol’).

KF. 82.

**Note.--** Reread *KF 04v. (The Transcendental)*.-- The idea is a living illustration of the quadrilateral “being, true, one good”. ‘Being’ is all that is, in any case, reality (non-nothingness). ‘True’ is all that, in itself or outside itself, has a necessary and preferably sufficient reason or ground (makes sense, can be understood, can be explained). ‘One’ is all that by reason of similarity belongs to one and the same collection and by reason of coherence belongs to one and the same system (collection and system bring a multitude into unity). ‘Good’ is everything that represents value in any way.

Seest thou not that the idea makes ‘being’ (here the narcissus sample) intelligible (‘true’) by ‘fathoming’ that being to the reason or ground of the similarities and coherences it exhibits (‘one’) and to the reason or ground of its assessability in the form of value judgments (successful / deformed e.g.) (‘good’).

As *O. Willmann, Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, Herder, 1959-5, 372, puts it “Eukleides of Megara, of the Megarian-Socratic school, connected Socratic thought with Eleatic ‘speculation’ (*note*: in the Antique sense of ‘fathoming’) and inaugurated the connection of the concepts of ‘being, truth, unity, goodness’,--connection which Platon carried through to ‘fusion’.”

In the light that illuminates, of the four basic ontological concepts, one understands the theory of ideas still very law better.

**As an aside**, most of the time Willmann emphasizes not so much the Eleates (who particularly emphasized the “one”) but the Paleopythagoreans (who brought unity to multiplicity via the concept of “structure” (“arithmos”) or “configuration”).

***From the “ontos on” to the “mè on”.***

From that which is really real (and not apparent), to that which is rather nothing than something (non-thing)! Behold what Platonism has always claimed, when it considers the actual cosmos and, in particular, actual or ‘phenomenal’ humanity (theoria). What a number of deformed pictures, to weep at (tragic) or to laugh at (comical).

Now how can a Tadeusz (Borowski) maintain, with necessary or sufficient reason or ground, that Platon ‘lied’? He can only do so either by not having even read Platon (except for a cursory easy ‘resume’), or by not having read him ‘properly’.

KF. 83.

***The caricatures.***

“The earthly world does not reflect an ideal” said Tadeusz (Borowski). This is precisely a Platonic statement! After all, as *de Vries, Plato’s Image of Man*, 430, puts it, “all of Platon’s propositions have no more than limited validity.” I.e.: they are restrictive, reservation judgments. In this case, “The earthly world does reflect an ideal”! The two - one of many examples of “harmony of opposites” - are true to some extent at the same time. They are corrective to each other.-- This explains what follows.

***Man as soul situated in body, polis and cosmos.***

Cfr. *KF 01*.

**a. Cosmic**

“Platon describes the two forces he sees in the universe: the nous, reasonable understanding accompanied by objective, and ‘anankè’, inevitable co-cause which has only negative meaning in that its reasonless existence hinders a perfect shaping of the whole - the cosmos - according to divine example.” Cfr. *KF 49*, where we already mentioned this twofold ‘formative’ (universe-founding) element.

For more and historically accurate insight see *A. Rivier, études de littérature grecque (Théâtre / Poésie lyrique / Philosophia / Médecine)*, (studies of Greek literature (Theater / Lyric poetry / Philosophy / Medicine),), Geneva, Droz, 1975, -- o.c. 3/42 (*Eschyle et le tragique*) - so e.g. 23: “*Nécessité, Destin, Fatalité*” (“Necessity, Fate, Fatality”), ; so also o.c., 139/161 (*Un débat sur la tragédie grecque (Le héros, le ‘nécessaire’ et les dieux)*); (A debate on Greek tragedy (The hero, the ‘necessary’ and the gods), also o.c., 163/194 (*Remarques sur le ‘nécessaire’ et la ‘nécessite’ chez Eschyle*). (Remarks on the ‘necessary’ and the ‘need’ in Aeschylus). Anyone who goes through these texts from a connoisseur will understand why Platon does not hesitate to include the term ‘anankè’ (necessity, ‘nécessite’) with they whole Aischulian tragedy, in his thinking.

**b. Political.**

Does it still need to be explained how Socrates and in his wake Platon tackled the degeneration of society, among other things and especially in the typically ‘rational’ form of that degeneration, namely unscrupulous expertise (strongly advocated by a number of sophists)? Cfr. *KF 19* (where we touched upon this political aspect). And what about the contents of his Seventh Letter (where the degeneration of Sicilian society is discussed in no uncertain terms)? What can be said about the death sentence passed on a noble man like Socrates? The polis where Platon lived was “the painful-heavy, bloody work of man.”

KF. 84.

***c. Individual.***

Needless to say, the whole Platonic psychology revolves around a triad, namely “the great monster of lower urges (nightlife, ‘diaita’ (living, eating, drinking), sex, economy), the lesser lion (the nobler part of the soul which stands or falls with honor and sense of honor,--not without its frustrations such as grief, resentment, anger, etc.) and last but not least the little man (i.e. all that is spirit in the soul).

Behold the differential “great, lesser, lesser”. That which constitutes precisely the human in man is, in Platonic human experience - human beings as they are in fact, phenomenally, and not as they are designed in vague ideals - , the smallest of the three soul aspects. Whether such a thing does not speak volumes. But then again, one must have read Platon ... have read and meditated on Platon himself so that, instead of inspirational fallacies, one achieves a meaningful conception.

***Anagogy.--not catagogy.***

‘Anagein’ is ‘upward education’; ‘katagein’ is ‘downward education’. In topical terms: ‘anagogè’ is construction, if necessary by re-foundation and/or actualization; ‘katagogè’ then is ‘Destruktion’ (Heidegger), ‘deconstruction’ (Derrida), dismantling.

In other words, notwithstanding the raw evidence to the contrary, Socrates and Platon continued to strive for development in the souls (of the young especially) of all that is higher,--particularly of higher ideas like ‘isonomia’ (democratic equal rights), ‘dialogos’ to enter into conversation with each other in order to bring the problems, through inductive sampling, one step closer to a solution,--if not the ideal then at least some feasible one.

That is what is different from the constant hammering in of “mondo cane” (dog’s world), -- of nihilistic slogans. What can one get for solution of life problems of every day from the profundities of a “destroying” Heidegger? What can one build with “la déconstruction” which consists in criticizing and criticizing the critic and criticizing the critic and criticizing the first critic ... exercise?

Isn’t that “regressus in infinitum” (KF 64), an endless relapse into “negative” (understand: catagogic) thinking? Positive’ (understand: ‘anagogic’) thinking is, among other things, a New Age watchword. Perhaps the Platonism that we have been advocating here tooth and nail can contribute to this. For the good of the coming ‘culture’.

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